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Pan Africanism and the Emancipatory Project for Global Africa

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Le panafricanisme et le projet émancipateur de l'Afrique dans le monde

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Editorial

The history and legacy of Pan-Africanism, as a movement for the emancipation of Africans, is alive and strong, having overcome numerous challenges. Rooted in the foundation laid by seminal actors, such as Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah, the ideals of Pan-Africanism have remained open to embrace by successive generations. Evidence of the movement's strength and regeneration emerges periodically across global Africa, when widely publicised grave abuse, violence or oppression of black people catalyses sustained protest. Often, the power of the response is evident in the fact that a plurality of people, in diverse and distant parts of the world, are galvanised into action to forge united rebuttals against such oppressive conditions through various means (including, in the present moment, virtual platforms). Often, the result has been a tactical retreat of the oppressive forces, via miniscule reforms—a grudging acknowledgement of the wrongs against black peoples that is, however, generally followed by a return to life that is more or less the same. In other words, the status quo is maintained, and the cycle repeats over and over again.

Even with a robust attempt to sustain the Pan-African ideal, at every turn the idea of Pan-Africanism is confronted by doubt, cynicism and even resistance from within the African world. These doubts tend to be stronger the farther away from the historical foundations of Pan-Africanism we have moved, and among younger Africans for whom the dividends of historical Pan-Africanism are few and far between and rarely as tangible as they were for older Africans. The African youth perceive Pan-Africanism as a collection of dated ideas, useful only in relation to the historical struggle for independence, a struggle they now take for granted mainly because most of them have lived only the reality of 'flag' independence. For the majority, the inherited histories of colonialism and slavery seem too far removed from the realities of the oppressive character of those systems, which were, to those who experienced them, immediate, brutal and dehumanising. The present lived experiences of Africans and people of African descent, wherever they are located, seem very different and of much more pressing concern. Yet, the realities of neocolonialism, the persistence of overt and covert systems of oppression at economic and political levels, the undermining and even attempted erasure of systems of thought and culture of black peoples across the world, the persistence of male and white supremacist power struggles and their control over levers of global interaction, all point to the unending relevance of Pan-Africanism as the basis for organising peoples of black descent across the world.

In the last century, among the many goals that Pan-Africanism had historically advanced, two were prioritised: national independence for a colonised Africa, and continental unity. As Adom Getachew argues in this Bulletin, these goals of national independence and continental unity seemed to be in tension, given that the nation-state is a problematic framework for constituting Pan-African unity. Her analysis of the thinking of Kwame Nkrumah suggests that while he was aware of this tension, he planned to resolve it by dealing with the question of economic dependence. However, of the frameworks for building continental unity envisioned during the putative years of independence in Africa—frameworks that led to the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)—the one that won the day was the least capable of transcending the narrow nationalism of postcolonial nation-state formations; it lacked the internationalism that Nkrumah had associated with complete independence.

Since the 1960s, the postcolonial framework has been inadequately Pan-African in consciousness and orientation and has occasionally been antithetical to the dreams of realising complete independence based on Pan-African ideals. The framework has also been inadequate in dealing with some of the most corrosive vestiges of colonialism. Nothing confirms this better than the hold the French state has retained on, and the rents it extracts from, its former colonies in Africa. This is clearly demonstrated by the piece in this Bulletin jointly authored by Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla, which articulates the influence the French have in 'Francophone' Africa and, increasingly, the rest of the continent. Not only have the French engaged in

neutralising attempts to enact the ECO as an alternative West African currency to the CFA, but they have also done this by perniciously co-opting some African leaders into strategies that undermine the possibility of continental unity and short-circuit other recent initiatives towards a continental free trade area.

Young Africans who see Pan-Africanism as outdated might therefore be excused for the understanding and perceptions they have of the movement's historical mission. The gains of independence have been reduced over the years in ways none dreamt of during the struggle for freedom. The capture of historical Pan-Africanism and its re-framing into a state project has done more damage to building a Pan-African consciousness than had been anticipated. Regretting the failure to realise Nkrumah's idea of 'unity government' at the Accra Summit in 1965, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere confessed that, 'We of the first-generation leaders of independent Africa have not pursued the objective of African unity with vigour, commitment and [the] sincerity that it deserved.' He further elaborated that what they failed to realise at the time was that:

> Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats of the United Nations, and individuals entitled to a 21-gun salute, not to speak of a host of ministers, prime ministers and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanised.[1]

The cost to Africa of the failure to unite has been immense indeed and many of the challenges the continent confronts today can be traced partly to this failure.

As Horace Campbell shows in the introduction, the articles in this issue of the Bulletin, while drawing from the historical context of Pan-Africanism, seek to engage with more contemporary issues, of interest largely to the younger generation. This is especially so regarding the possibilities offered by digital technologies to forge Pan-African solidarities, spread Pan-African values and find new ways of re-imagining a Pan-African world. The vast potential opened by the explosion of information across media and digital platforms, the extensive mobility enabled by expanding infrastructure, and the ease with which ideas, people and goods move, all suggest that a contemporary Pan-African vision can be activated to energise and correct the failures of the past. If we think about the digital age as an enabler of new forms of struggle, then this opens doors wide for building a new Pan-African consciousness. This would be a consciousness that still held the promise of the unity of African peoples, as a basis for building resistance against extant forms of violence, oppression and abuse. It would be a form of consciousness that would be critical of class-based forms of exploitation and sought to diminish racism, sexism and marginalisation. In short, it would be an emancipatory consciousness.

Indeed, the success of African arts, poetry, music, literatures and fashion in crossing borders and transcending boundaries points to a new consciousness that is continental and diasporic in reach, and emancipatory in orientation. Part of its emancipatory thrust rests on its refusal to be hemmed into narrow nation-state frameworks. Indeed, not only has this reality led to new criticisms of the biography of the nation-state, but it has also revealed the very oppressive and violent history upon which this biography of the nation-state is based. A fresh thrust of Pan-African consciousness is beckoning, and intellectuals in Africa, perhaps even more than those located elsewhere, need to seize the opportunity and respond to Julius Nyerere's challenge at Ghana's 40th independence anniversary celebrations: 'My generation led Africa to political freedom. The current generation of leaders and peoples of Africa must pick up the flickering torch of African freedom, refuel it with their enthusiasm and determination, and carry it forward.'

Note

1. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, speech at Ghana's 40th independence anniversary celebrations on 6 March 1997, published in *New African*, 3 May 2013. Accessible online at https://newafricanmagazine.com/3723//

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Éditorial

Fort de son histoire et de son héritage, le panafricanisme, en tant que mouvement pour l'émancipation des Africains, se distingue par sa vivacité, sa constance et sa capacité à surmonter de nombreux défis. Ses idéaux sont ancrés dans les valeurs fondamentales portées par des personnalités pionnières telles que Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, Julius Nyerere et Kwame Nkrumah, et sont toujours aussi accessibles aux générations africaines successives. Des preuves de la vigueur du mouvement et de sa régénération se manifestent périodiquement dans toute l'Afrique lors des protestations prolongées contre l'abus, les violences ou les graves oppressions, au demeurant largement médiatisés, à l'égard des peuples noirs. Bien souvent, la puissance de la riposte s'incarne dans l'action d'une pluralité de personnes, aussi diverses qu'éloignées géographiquement. Ces actions forgent un front uni de contestations contre toute velléité d'oppression par divers moyens y compris les plateformes virtuelles actuelles. Dans la plupart du temps, le résultat a été un retrait tactique des forces d'oppression moyennant d'infimes réformes, ce qui peut s'interpréter comme une sorte de reconnaissance à contrecœur des exactions commises contre les peuples noirs, mais cette reconnaissance ne tarde malheureusement pas à s'effriter avec le retour à une situation plus ou moins identique. En d'autres termes, le statu quo est maintenu, et le cycle se répète de nouveau.

En dépit des efforts déployés pour soutenir l'idéal panafricain, l'idée du panafricanisme demeure confrontée, à chaque tournant, au doute, au cynisme voire même à la résistance du monde africain. Ces doutes ont tendance à se renforcer à mesure que nous nous éloignons des fondements historiques du panafricanisme. Ainsi, parmi les jeunes Africains, il y a ceux pour qui les dividendes du panafricanisme historique sont maigres et ne sont pas aussi tangibles qu'ils l'étaient pour leurs ainés. La jeunesse africaine perçoit le panafricanisme comme un recueil d'idées dépassées et utiles uniquement dans le cadre de la lutte historique pour l'indépendance. Désormais, la jeunesse considère cette lutte comme acquise, principalement parce que la plupart des jeunes n'a vécu que la réalité d'une indépendance de « drapeau ». Pour la majorité d'entre eux, les aspects oppressifs, instantanés, cruels et déshumanisants des réalités héritées du colonialisme et de l'esclavage, pour ceux qui les ont vécus, leur semblent comme un lointain souvenir. Certes, les expériences vécues aujourd'hui par les Africains et les personnes d'ascendance africaine, où qu'ils se trouvent, semblent très différentes et présentent un intérêt beaucoup plus pressant, mais les réalités du néocolonialisme restent elles toujours d'actualité. La persistance des systèmes d'oppression économique et politique, visibles ou cachées, la fragilisation et parfois même la tentative d'anéantissement des systèmes de pensée et de culture des peuples noirs à travers le monde sont là pour le rappeler. Ajoutons à cela la persistance des luttes de pouvoir entre hommes et suprématistes blancs, ainsi que leur contrôle des leviers de l'interaction mondiale. Ce sont là autant de preuves de la pertinence continue du panafricanisme comme base d'organisation des peuples d'ascendance noire à travers le monde.

Au cours du siècle dernier, parmi les nombreux objectifs que le panafricanisme avait historiquement mis en avant, deux étaient prioritaires : l'indépendance nationale pour une Afrique colonisée et l'unité continentale. Comme le souligne Adom Getachew dans le présent Bulletin, ces deux objectifs semblaient être en contradiction dans la mesure où l'État-nation constitue un cadre problématique pour la constitution de l'unité panafricaine. Son analyse de la pensée de Kwame Nkrumah suggère que, tout en étant conscient de cette contradiction, il prévoyait de la résoudre en abordant la question de la dépendance économique. Cependant, parmi les dispositifs d'édification de l'unité continentale envisagés pendant les années d'indépendance putative de l'Afrique – dispositifs qui ont conduit à la naissance de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA) – celui qui l'a emporté était le moins capable de transcender le nationalisme étroit de la formation des Etats-nations postcoloniaux ; il manquait juste l'internationalisme que Nkrumah avait associé à une indépendance complète.

Depuis les années soixante, l'ordre postcolonial n'a pas été suffisamment panafricain dans sa conscience et dans son orientation, et se situait même parfois aux antipodes des rêves d'une indépendance totale fondée sur des idéaux panafricains. Cet ordre n'a pas également réussi à traiter certains des vestiges les plus corrosifs du colonialisme. Rien ne le confirme mieux que l'emprise de l'État français sur ses anciennes colonies

en Afrique et les rentes qu'il en tire. Cet état de fait ressort clairement de l'article de Fanny Pigeaud et Ndongo Samba Sylla, qui décrit l'influence que maintient la France sur l'Afrique « francophone » et, de plus en plus, sur le reste du continent. Les Français ont, non seulement, tenté de faire échec à l'adoption de l'ECO comme monnaie alternative ouest-africaine au CFA, mais ils ont également tenté de coopter sournoisement certains dirigeants africains dans des stratégies qui compromettent la possibilité d'une unité Africaine et court-circuitent d'autres initiatives récentes pour une zone de libre-échange continentale.

Les jeunes Africains, qui considèrent le panafricanisme comme dépassé, peuvent donc être excusés pour la compréhension et les perceptions qu'ils ont de la mission historique du mouvement. Au fil des années, les acquis de l'indépendance ont été atténués d'une manière que personne n'aurait imaginé pendant la lutte pour la libération. La capture du panafricanisme historique et sa reformulation en un projet d'État ont causé plus de préjudices que prévu à la construction d'une conscience panafricaine. Regrettant l'échec de la concrétisation de l'idée de Nkrumah d'un « gouvernement d'unité » au sommet d'Accra en 1965, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere a reconnu que « Nous, dirigeants de la première génération de l'Afrique indépendante, n'avons pas poursuivi l'objectif de l'unité africaine avec la vigueur, l'engagement et la sincérité qu'il méritait. ». Il a en outre ajouté qu'ils n'avaient pas réalisé, à l'époque, que :

> Lorsque vous multipliez les hymnes nationaux, les drapeaux nationaux et les passeports nationaux, les sièges aux Nations Unies et les personnes ayant droit à une salve de 21 coups de canon, sans parler d'une foule de ministres, de premiers ministres et d'émissaires, vous vous retrouvez avec une armée de personnes puissantes ayant des intérêts directs dans le maintien d'une Afrique balkanisée[1].

L'incapacité de l'Afrique à s'unir lui a coûté très cher, et bon nombre de défis auxquels le continent est confronté aujourd'hui peuvent, en partie, être attribués à cet échec.

Comme le montre Horace Campbell dans l'introduction, les articles de ce numéro du Bulletin, tout en s'inspirant du contexte historique du panafricanisme, abordent des questions plus contemporaines qui intéressent plus largement la jeune génération. Ceci est particulièrement vrai au vu des possibilités qu'offrent les technologies numériques en matière de construction des solidarités panafricaines, de dissémination des valeurs panafricaines et du développement des nouvelles manières de réinventer un monde panafricain. Le vaste potentiel ouvert par la prolifération de l'information à travers les médias et les plateformes numériques, la grande mobilité rendue possible par le développement des infrastructures, et la facilité avec laquelle les idées, les personnes et les biens peuvent traverser les frontières, sont autant de facteurs qui suggèrent l'activation d'une vision panafricaine contemporaine dans le but de corriger les échecs du passé et insuffler une nouvelle dynamique au panafricanisme.

Si nous considérons l'ère numérique comme un catalyseur des nouvelles formes de lutte, elle ouvre la voie à la construction d'une nouvelle conscience panafricaine. Il s'agirait d'une conscience qui tiendrait toujours la promesse de l'unité des peuples africains comme base pour construire la résistance contre les formes existantes de violence, d'oppression et d'abus. Ce serait une forme de conscience qui critiquerait les formes d'exploitation basées sur les classes sociales et qui chercherait à endiguer le racisme, le sexisme et la marginalisation. Bref, ce serait une conscience émancipatrice.

En définitive, le succès de la poésie, de la musique, de la mode, de la littérature et des arts africains à franchir et à transcender les frontières témoigne d'une nouvelle conscience de portée continentale et diasporique, et d'orientation émancipatrice. Son élan émancipateur repose en partie sur son refus de s'enfermer dans le cadre étroit des États-nations. En effet, non seulement cette réalité a conduit à de nouvelles critiques de la biographie de l'État-nation, mais elle a également révélé l'histoire très oppressive et très violente sur laquelle se fonde cette biographie de l'État-nation. Un nouvel élan de la conscience panafricaine s'annonce. Les intellectuels en Afrique, peut-être encore plus que ceux d'ailleurs, doivent saisir cette opportunité et répondre au défi exprimé par Julius Nyerere lors des célébrations du 40e anniversaire de l'indépendance du Ghana : « ma génération a mené l'Afrique à la liberté politique. La génération actuelle des dirigeants et des peuples africains doit reprendre le flambeau vacillant de la liberté africaine, le raviver avec son enthousiasme et sa détermination, et le mener de l'avant. »

Note

1. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, discours prononcé lors des célébrations du 40e anniversaire de l'indépendance du Ghana, le 6 mars 1997, publié dans *New African*, 3 mai 2013. Disponible en ligne à l'adresse https://newafricanmagazine.com/3723//

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Introduction: Pan Africanism and the Reparative Framework for Global Africa

A revolutionary future is taking place that is transforming almost every aspect of society on a global level. Africa has been engulfed by this revolutionary transformation as well as the entire African Diaspora. Of course, this means that Pan-Africanism, the discourse and action that links together Africa and the African Diaspora, is being transformed in the digital age. (Alkalimat and Williams) (this Bulletin page 49)

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Introduction

The new digital technologies have offered great possibilities for humans and at the same time great dangers for dehumanisation. In her book, *Algorithms of Oppression* (2018), Safiya Umoja Noble warns of the bigoted assumptions and ideas that inform the mindset of the mainstream technicians who are programming the systems for machine learning and artificial intelligence. The pandemics of racism, militaristic police killings and unequal health care internationally have also brought attention to the ways in which high-performance computing (HPC) has given an advantage to those countries with supercomputers to be able to understand new strains of viruses and the complex interactions of the human body. Vaccine apartheid has been the immediate outcome of this world of high-performance computing, artificial intelligence and the genetic technology that allows researchers to fast-track many stages of vaccine research and development. It is now in the era of SARS 1 and II that it is clearer that there exist solutions for particularly recalcitrant diseases, such as tuberculosis, HIV and malaria. Calls for democratising access to the research and therapies are now being echoed from all parts of the planet. This is the context for the new Pan-African struggles around questions of life, health, peace and environmental repair (Campbell 2016, 2017).

If the end of the Second World War had provided the conjuncture for clarity on the dead-end of the European colonial project, so the coronavirus pandemic is exposing the end of the militarised management of US imperialism. One component of this military management has been the weaponisation of rules relating to intellectual property to ensure the dominance of US corporations. It is from Africa and other parts of the global South that calls have come for a temporary waiver of certain TRIPS obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in response to COVID-19. That an African woman from Nigeria, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has become the Director-General of the WTO reinforces to humans everywhere the idea that transforming global power relations requires far more than representation. This has been the lesson in the Pan-African movement from the independence period to the end of apartheid. It is clear that radical Pan-African transformations involve far more than the Africanisation of imperial institutions.

Global political shifts in relation to the deployment of economic power, investment capital and the projection of telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, smart cities and other high-tech areas have demonstrated the limits of military power without harnessing human capital. Humans have reached a new conjuncture and the citizens of Global Africa represent a rich prize to be courted in the new international alliances. The Pan-African movement is catching up with this new world and African youths are voting with their feet to escape the strictures of political leaders who imprison them in neocolonial structures.

The continuing devastation unleashed by the pandemics of capital impose a certain urgency for African peoples globally to intervene to harness those aspects of the current converging technologies to serve the needs of humans rather than global capital. Abdul Alkalimat and Kate Williams sum up the future of Pan Africanism in the

digital era in their contribution to this Bulletin of CODESRIA. It is in the context of the emerging digital infrastructures for the post-COVID world that their intervention on Pan Africanism serves as a warning. Globally, African peoples must plan for the sweeping transformations that are being unleashed in the context of Third Technological Revolution. Instead of lamenting the current digital divide, these authors call on the youth to embrace the new technologies while promoting three fundamental values that are both desirable and possible. These relate to:

1. Cyberdemocracy: Everyone has to be included in the digital age;
2. Collective intelligence, digitalising knowledge in Africa and making it available to all; and
3. Information Freedom: The new information technologies produce and distribute information in such a way that drives its exchange value down towards zero.

This special issue of CODESRIA is already part of the digital future, in seeking to reach a wider constituency, and promises to take CODESRIA surging to the forefront of the innovative transformations that are to be unleashed by joint action and collaboration in Global Africa. This is one component of the reparative aspects of Pan Africanism in the twenty-first century.

The articles

The articles of this special bulletin come from leading Pan-African scholars in all parts of Global Africa. One of these contributors, Michael West, had previously defined the notion of 'Global Africa' as:

> an idea and belief that Africans and those of African descent have shared similar experiences of oppression, exploitation, force and coercion, which serve as the need for collective and united struggle for the emancipation and liberation of all blacks. One can argue the principal tenets of this idea are a shared experience, a collective struggle, and a black global consciousness. Blacks not only share common ancestry, but a common history in the context of the slave trade, slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism which have created a shared experience for all blacks. (West 2005)

The concept of 'Global Africa' has become more acceptable than the term 'African diaspora', in contradistinction to the diaspora of peoples who later expropriated lands from other peoples. Progressive Pan Africanists have registered their solidarity with the peoples of Palestine and now support the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement in order to bring attention to the occupation of Palestinian lands. Deploying the formulation 'Global Africa' in the dictionary of radical Pan Africanism is now an expression of self-identification with the base of African freedom, the unification and reconstruction of Africa.

The delicacy of the refinement of this 'diaspora' concept has become apparent in the context of the struggles for reparations in the United States. Since the era of the transatlantic slave trade, calls for reparations have been a continuous Pan-African demand. At every turn, imperial planners have worked to derail the global push for reparative justice. The contribution of Jessica Ann Mitchell Aiwuyor highlights the divisive disinformation campaigns through social media that threaten to disorient and create chaos among dispersed Africans in the US. Her description of the activities of the organ called African Descendants of Slavery (ADOS) should remind us of the role of firms such as Bell Pottinger and Cambridge Analytica in psychographic targeting, to demobilise and confuse. It was the heritage of the culture of Pan-African intellectuals that was the first line of defence against this cognitive hacking on an international scale.

The article by Carol Boyce Davies in this collection brings together the issue of reparative knowledge and the unfinished business of decolonising knowledge. Her contribution on reparations and the future of African institutions of higher learning (the decolonial university) complements the contribution of Adom Getachew, whose focus on the work of Kwame Nkrumah is a welcome return to the ideas of revolutionary Pan Africanism. Both Davies and Getachew critique the hierarchy of knowledge in which African peoples' experiences still remain at the bottom. In my own work on Ubuntu and fractal thinking, I have highlighted the centrality of African knowledge systems to anchor the project of African liberation. Pan-African organs, such as the African Mathematical Union, have been striving to bring to the curriculum the richness of mathematics in Africa as it is expressed in everyday life.

African scientists, such as the late Professor Calestous Juma, have remarked that the extant knowledge of the village community could be a force in bypassing the destructiveness of Western industrialisation. Carol Boyce Davies. in her contribution. hammers home the point that, 'In every discipline, one is confronted with a production of knowledge that assumes European epistemologies,

ideas, timelines as the defining frameworks for intellectual work.' Progressive African scientists and biologists are holding the line against complete surrender to European frameworks and have been digging deep in the village community to harness indigenous research methodologies. Bagele Chilisa and Malidoma Somé are two scholars whose work on African knowledge systems deepens the arguments that Boyce Davies makes in a wider terrain.

Thus far, African decision-makers have been seduced by the Stages of Growth theories of Western capitalism and have eschewed planning for an era beyond the climate catastrophes unleashed by Western concepts of domination, especially domination over nature. The African Union's Specialised Technical Committee on Education, Science and Technology has not taken on board the contributions of scientists and researchers. At the African Academy of Sciences (AAS) of the African Union (located in in Kenya), the incentives for supporting African scientists in the context of the Kwame Nkrumah Award for scientific innovation remain polluted by the activism of Western foundations linked to British and US companies.

The decision of CODESRIA to mount this special bulletin on Pan-African renewal opens avenues for this organisation to mobilise the networks of African scientists beyond the geographical space of the continent of Africa. In a context where the brain-drain bleeds Africa of many of its scientific and intellectual cadres, a major step forward in the Pan-African project would be for scientific and educational networks of the AU to become truly Pan African, to include the dispersed children of Africa.

Alkalimat and Williams's contribution stresses that the most powerful manifestation of Pan-Africanism is collaboration and joint action between countries in the African continent, involving governments, institutions, movements and people in general. Cyberpower involves all of this. Zoom conferences and discussions hosted by CODESRIA in the era of COVID have opened one avenue towards future collaboration with conscious, digital, Pan-African experts.

It is now known that the transformation away from the centralised digital platforms of the Western tech giants' platforms is the wave of the future (Vergne 2020). Youths of the sunrise movement internationally, and African youths struggling against environmental racism, are clued in to the need for global networking. Activists from the Niger Delta in Nigeria who teamed up with lawyers and environmental activists in Europe have opened a new space for Pan-African organising. One of the limits of this bulletin is the absence of a robust contribution on Pan Africanism and environmental justice. Many of today's youths are not aware of the arguments made more than thirty years ago, that it was more economical to dump toxic waste in Africa because African lives were less valuable than other lives (Bassey 2012).

An emerging front for Pan-African mobilisation is the opposition to destructive mining practices, especially in the fossil fuel industry. In the new struggles to combat global warming, Africa has a huge advantage in an era when industrial production moves from the use of fossil and mineral resources (coal, petroleum and natural gas) towards living biological raw materials, primarily 'biomass' plant matter such as woodchips, agricultural plants and algae. The bioeconomy is associated with wider application of modern biotechnologies in areas such as agriculture, medicine and industry.

It was Calestous Juma who argued that African progressive scientists hold the key to ensuring that Africa leapfrogs the old forms of industrialisation into the digital revolution. He noted that it is not necessary to build new paths of industrialisation in the bioeconomy based on the past production of primary products. In the maturation of the bioeconomy the convergence of nanotechnology, information technology, biotechnology, robotics and cognitive sciences will provide a new basis for African reconstruction and transformation.

All the contributions echo that transformative education is urgently needed in Africa. According to Joyce King:

> Transformative education ... is the production of knowledge and understanding people need to rehumanise the world by dismantling hegemonic structures that impede such knowledge. Alternately, education for submission, recapitulates knowledge which has been used as a tool of white imperialist hegemonic rule. It is a deliberate and aggressive means of perpetuating the disenfranchisement of the masses. (King 2005)

African languages hold some of the key signposts of cognitive technologies that can be a buffer against mind control and the psychological warfare against Africans. Those who are studying the transformation of human cognitive skills over the millennia of transformations have been

toying with initiatives such as the Human Cognome Project and The Genographic Project to tap into the African knowledge of the oldest people alive in East Africa. There is now an effort to reverse engineer the human brain by studying both its structure and function, in order to fully understand mental processes, also known as cognition (Kaku 2012). That Facebook, Google and Microsoft and other big tech companies are looking into the cognitive skills of the African youth in order to harness their creativity is now being demonstrated with investment plans and the location of hubs in strategic African cities. Innovative software applications such as Ushahidi and M-PESA in Kenya have awoken global capital to the digital creativity of African youths.

It has been more than twenty years since biological anthropologists traversed the African towns and the countryside on behalf of global capital to study the potentialities of Africa and Africans for this digital era. Pan-African intellectuals have been labouring to reverse the hierarchies of knowledge that inspire the investments of the big tech companies. Drawing from the ideas and teachings of African scholars, such as Walter Rodney, Kwame Nkrumah, Wangari Mathaai and Claudia Jones, the global Pan-African movement is moving from the posture of defensiveness to a clear articulation of what reparative education must look like in the twenty-first century in all disciplines. Boyce Davies uses the definitions of the Caribbean Reparations Commission and its ten-point programme to anchor her analysis within a clear political project from one corner of Global Africa.

Pan Africanism and the unification of African peoples

From the rebellions against enslavement to the current rebellions of the Black Lives Matter movement, the Pan-African currents have informed concepts of dignity and humanity that have not been present in the European conception of humans. Within the United States, the concept of the citizen was not accorded to African descendants. In that democratic state, Africans were considered three-fifths of a person. Not even the so-called democracies that rolled out the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 considered that Africans had the right to live freely on planet Earth. The apartheid government of South Africa was one of the signatories of the UDHR but it was the global anti-apartheid struggles that forced the South African state to implement the constitutional changes that gave Africans in that society full democratic rights. After the global struggles to defeat entrenched racism, international foundations and think tanks deployed more than USD 1 billion to divert the youths of that society from the emancipatory ideas of Pan Africanism. Political leaders in South Africa who once embraced the concept of an African renaissance deployed apartheid concepts of xenophobia against other Africans without grasping the important intellectual future that would be gained from moving Ubuntu from the philosophical level to the level of practical investments for human fulfillment and wellbeing.

Patricia Daley, in her contribution on Pan Africanism and migration, quotes Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, who wrote that 'For Africa as a whole we want our peoples to have the right to move, settle, work, and live without visas or passports from Cape Town to Cairo.' This dictum of Pan-African citizenship was the call of Marcus Garvey one hundred years ago in the demand of Africa for the Africans at home and abroad. Such an understanding of the Global African would elevate the African person from being a member of a 'minority' to being part of a global community of humans. Daley is drawing from the Garvey, Tajudeen and Nkrumah position on citizenship, mobility and migration to reassert the Pan-Africanist approach to freedom of movement across borders. She begins by contextualising migration practices historically, tracing the evolution of depictions of African migration as a problem, especially the origins of this view in European modernity, and its links to African enslavement, the pseudo-science of racial hierarchies, and colonialism. She notes:

> Europe's offshoring and outsourcing of its border work make African states complicit in its racialised restrictive policies that involve criminalisation, containment and detention, perpetuating the dehumanisation of Africans. The adoption of detention in transit countries as a preventative strategy violates the human rights of Africans seeking a better life.

Daley then proposes how a Pan-Africanist understanding of migration can humanise and dignify those whose mobility is forced or voluntary, drawing inspiration from historical moments of African independent actions on emancipatory migration. Subsequently, Pan Africanists can assess critically the continuing relevance of the global North's

understandings of human mobility to explain migration in Africa and the diaspora.

Daley's work is seeking to catch up with the reality on the ground where African peoples choose freedom of movement. Since the launch of the African Union, presidents have declared their intent to create the legislative environment for free movement, but imperial hangover ensures that many African governments enforce Europe's offshoring and outsourcing of its border work. The images of the deaths of Africans in the Mediterranean Sea have been some of the most dehumanising for Africans globally.

Pan-African scholarship has reiterated the demand for Pan-African mobility and freedom of movement in a free and united Africa. This mobility and freedom should not only be continental but applied equally to the children of Africa scattered by the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism and the continued disruptions and dispersals inspired by racial capitalism and imperialism. Temporarily, the African Union has gestured towards the recognition of these dispersed children by including a sixth region of the AU, but the intellectual investment and planning for real engagement with this region has been lacking, beyond the dream of tapping into remittances.

Whether it was the Pan Africanism of the villages and streets or the Pan Africanism of major conferences, it was always clear that only the unification of the African peoples beyond the Berlinist enclaves could usher in a period of dignity and renewal. Such dignity would be unleashed in the process of transcending the injustices of enslavement, bondage, colonial plunder and neocolonial theft. Just as it is understood that enslavement did not end with formal emancipation, so it is also understood that racial capitalism can be transcended with the atonement of reparations and reparative justice.

Racism and police terror in Global Africa

This issue of the Bulletin was being prepared as the world watched the pandemic of police killings in the United States intensify with the graphic lynching of George Floyd in Minnesota. These public killings and the general dehumanisation of black bodies are painful reminders of the devaluation of black lives internationally. This writer, as a Pan Africanist, agrees with the findings of the International Commission of Inquiry that, 'the systematic killing and maiming of unarmed African Americans by police amount to crimes against humanity that should be investigated and prosecuted under international law' (International Commission of Inquiry 2021).

Pan-African co-operation and mobilisation across all continents as a result of the police killings in the US ushered in a new era of political consciousness and new tactics in an intergenerational and multinational movement against systemic racism. The re-imagination of freedom in this new mobilisation has pushed new ideas and new leaders to the forefront of the Global Pan-African struggles (Ransby 2018). But despite the massive publicity about the opposition to racism, many African academics and institutions have not taken on board the struggles against racism, xenophobia and related intolerances. The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Systemic Racist Police Violence Killings of Blacks in the United States has reminded us of the ideas of reparative justice that were spelt out in the third World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban in 2001.

The anti-racist agenda of reparative justice is one common thread through the contributions. In addition, they discuss the unification of the peoples of Africa, the self-emancipation of the working peoples of Africa, how Africa will respond to the new Biden-Harris Administration in the United States and two perspective of the struggles for reparative justice in the era of global warming, economic crisis, health pandemics and the pandemic of white supremacy.

Cheryl Hendricks of the Africa Institute (AI) of South Africa discusses Pan Africanism within the context of the new administration in Washington. She poses a question that is being raised in all parts of Global Africa. Does the new Biden Administration hold out the possibility that a renewed Pan Africanism could underpin the Africa–US relationship, and if so in what form?

She answers her own query by focusing on the key question for Global Africa, that of peace and reconstruction. By reminding the reader of the excessive racist direction of the Donald Trump Administration, Hendricks draws attention to the pledge of the African Union to silence guns by 2020. She argues that the search for a better life in Africa cannot be found through more militarism on the continent as manifest in the promotion of the US–Africa Command: '… extremism also results from the search for a better life—real or imagined. These conditions cannot be addressed through increased militarisation.'

From this assessment she delves into the efforts to establish the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as one of the Pan-African goals of greater economic co-operation in Africa. There is a clear contradiction between the goals of Pan-African trading linkages across the length and breadth of Africa and the push by the US government to sign bilateral trade agreements with specific African countries to undermine Pan-African trade and economic relations. In the specific case of the secret negotiations between the US and Kenya, concerned African scholars are calling on Kenya and the wider African community to closely study and 'learn from the experience of other countries that have signed an FTA with the U.S. in order to avoid mistakes that could prove to be costly including in the arena of public health and specifically in relation to access to medicines' (Ogendi 2021).

That the political leadership in Kenya is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the US without regard to the implications for the future health of Africans runs counter to the goals of African economic independence. The countries of the ASEAN bloc have demonstrated that only collective and multilateral trade relations with the US can overcome the bilateral muscle that it deploys by weaponising trade and finance. It is the COVID-19 pandemic that has crushed the neoliberal ideas about individualised access to health care and hastened the new global alliances to break from the Bretton Woods institutions. For the past thirty years, CODESRIA has been at the forefront of delegitimising the ideas of structural adjustment. Following the lead of the spirit of Bandung and the calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), the economic imperatives of the emancipation of Africa run throughout the articles. In this sense the articles carry forth the rich intellectual traditions of scholars such as Adebayo Adedeji, Thandika Mkandawire, Eskor Toyo and Samir Amin.

In his work, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (1990), Amin argued forcefully that developing countries dealing individually with the US on questions of health, currencies or financial technologies would be in a no-win situation unless they acted collectively. More than forty years ago, in the era of Thatcher and Reagan, economists promoted the idea that 'government is the problem'. This was and continues to be the outdated mantra of neoliberal thinking and action.

> Neoliberalism promotes the market and individual responsibility as the solutions to racial inequality. Neoliberal ideology and the neoliberal state justify and guarantee capital accumulation through privatization, racialized state violence, and dismantling social protections by making public goods and public institutions synonymous with continuously racialized and demonized people of color. (Edwards 2021)

Whereas the orthodoxy of liberal capitalism frowned upon massive government expenditure, Western capitalist states are now unleashing money in unprecedented amounts. Within a period of less than five months the Biden Administration has rolled out initiatives worth more than USD 6 trillion. The same deficit spending that the US gives itself is denied to humans who are suffering under the heel of imperial domination.

The world's primary multilateral financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—are taking the lead to entrench the medical apartheid that is now manifest in unequal access to medicines, protective health equipment and vaccines (Washington 2008). The societies of Cuba and Vietnam have exposed the superiority of public, well-managed, health-care systems.

Towards the united peoples and societies of Africa

Just as the realities of COVID sharpened the awareness of Asian countries that, despite their differences, there is an urgent need to collectively work for the health and security of their citizens, so in all parts of Global Africa the pandemic has reawakened the awareness of the dead-end in the ideas of possessive individualism, petty nationalism and neoliberalism. Long before the outbreak of this current pandemic, Samir Amin had warned of the destructiveness of viruses, whether intellectual ones (such as liberalism) or biological ones (such as Ebola and COVID). His study on liberalism and militarism in *The Liberal Virus* is even more salient in seeking to understand the thrust for radical Pan-African responses to imperialism and racism (Amin 2004).

Among peoples globally working for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), COVID has sharpened the understanding of the forces that drive the global political economy. The individual approaches of the mini states in Africa, in seeking to negotiate better terms with global capital, contrast sadly with the reality demonstrated by a country such as Indonesia, with over 270 million persons, which understands that it is in its best interest to be part of a larger economic arrangement, such as the ASEAN system. Similarly, an economic powerhouse such as the Federal Republic of Germany understands that its political and economic future lies in a larger union of capitalist states in Europe. These realities inform the contribution

of Adom Getachew on 'Kwame Nkrumah and the Quest for Independence'. Her intervention interrogates the question of Pan Africanism and the total independence of the African peoples at home and abroad. She underscores a key fact of the contemporary world—that no one African state can compete in the current international order. Hence, she concludes that for African independence to be consolidated it will be necessary to work towards political and economic links that would create a United States of Africa.

Refreshingly, Getachew brings her incisive analysis to bear in critiquing the recent work of scholars who are imprisoned by the Eurocentric concept of a 'nation-state for Africa'. Kwame Nkrumah was clear that the borders of Ghana had been artificially created and that the peoples and ethnic groups of Ghana had long historic linkages with all peoples of Africa. This awareness inspired his advanced Pan-African ideas, which he signalled all across Africa on the night of independence in 1957, when he insisted that Ghanaian independence 'is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent'.

Federation of states or the unification of peoples

The book by Kwame Nkrumah that came out of his plea for the Unification of Africa in 1963 is entitled *Africa Must Unite* (1970). At that historical conjuncture, Nkrumah put forth a minimalist position calling for the unification of independent states. Getachew draws from this text to remind the current generation of scholars, that:

> Organised on the continental scale, African states could forego their dependence on international markets and reorient their economic relationships towards other African states. Having broken the political and economic boundaries that separated them, African states could … collectively achieve a purchasing and bargaining power to rival other regions and international powers.

As such, 'Independence means much more than merely being free to fly our own flag and to play our own national anthem', Nkrumah argued. Independence required a 'revolutionary framework', enacted both nationally and internationally.

It is this demand for a revolutionary framework for the unification of Africa that informed the later writings of Nkrumah after the imperialist-inspired coup d'état in 1966. Notwithstanding the clarity that is embedded in his work, *Revolutionary Path* (1973), there are Pan Africanists who have sought to generate a tendency calling for a federation of the current states. This tendency has now reappeared within the discussions by Ethiopians on the need for a Confederation of the States of Eastern Africa (viz Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea) (Milkias 2021).

These 'federalists' have mobilised the text of Cheikh Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Basis For A Federated State* (1987), to promote a Pan Africanism that is based on the current Berlinist states, such as Senegal, Rwanda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Egypt, etc. Without a close reading of Diop's *Cultural Unity of Africa* (2000), there are those Pan Africanists who have taken this text along with the very long interview with Carlos Moore to promote concepts of Black Africa and sub-Saharan Africa that readily promote disunity. The major theme of Diop's writings is that precolonial Africa had a cultural, economic, political, psychological and linguistic unity. His call for linguistic unification on a territorial and continental scale, with a single African cultural and governmental language, was a central aspect of his view on regaining the independence of Africa.

Getachew steers clear of the confusion that is circulating about federalism or a unitary government in so far as her objective is to draw attention to the revolutionary possibilities that await those who follow the Nkrumist path. The day-to-day experience of the youth informs them that only the progressive dismantling of the legal and coercive structures of empire can unleash the unification project. What is lacking in higher education in Africa is a research agenda guided by the ideas and practices of decolonising, patriotic, progressive, indigenous and transformative jurisprudence. Progressive African students have been in the vanguard of social change, from Soweto in the 1970s to the students of the Sudanese uprisings of 2019. It is clear now to the youth that the unification project must be part of the process of the African Revolution.

Michael West's article on the Pan-African contributions of Walter Rodney brings the question of African revolution to the centre of the Pan-African debate. Entitled 'The Prophecy of Self-Emancipation: Walter Rodney and the Scholarship and Praxis of Defiance in the African World', it describes the life and revolutionary work of Walter Rodney to highlight the reality that the Pan-African revolutionary must fight for all peoples of planet Earth. Thus, West remarks that Rodney was not only a Pan-African revolutionary, but a world revolutionary.

> There is a difference, and a crucial one, between the prophet and the preacher. The preacher's task is largely one of reconciliation—reconciling congregants to current reality, to the powers that be. Soothing, encouraging, bearing good news—such is the mission of the preacher. The prophet, on the contrary, is the bearer of bad news—but with this important caveat: the news may be bad, but it needn't remain that way. A better world is possible. The prophet's is a call to repentance, reparation, reconstruction—in other language, revolution.

Revolution in the digital age

I started this introduction with the call from Alkalimat and Williams for revolutionary transformations to unleash cyberdemocracy, collective intelligence and information freedom. Imperial planners who conceive of projects such as Cambridge Analytica's cognitive hacking have inspired organs such as the African Descendants of Slavery (ADOS) in the US. Scholars whose training falls outside of liberation ideas fall prey to the machinations of imperial planners to foment division. Imperialist planners are very aware of the potentialities of global alliances that emerged within the context of the anti-apartheid struggle. The lessons of ADOS in the US are that Pan Africanists cannot rely on imperial digital platforms that emanate from the United States to promote the Pan-African agenda. In a few African states, governments are investing in smart cities, such as Konza Technopolis in Kenya, without harnessing the cognitive skills of the village community. Creative artists are already inspiring African youths with the potentialities of African freedom. The film *Black Panther*, set in the mythical village of Wakanda, opened up the imagination of what a transformed Africa could be, with its massive resources. I conclude this introduction with extracts from my essay, Lessons From Wakanda: Pan Africanism as the antidote to robotisation (Campbell 2018).

> The lessons since the end of apartheid point to the need to lay out a theoretical terrain relating to social transformations and the collateral ideas of peoples' consciousness and political actions. In this sense the transformations towards unity are linked to the conscious activities of the producers who believe that it will be possible to transform the economic relations in the process of elaborating democratic political relations in Africa.
>
> … This author has identified key areas of transformation with the focus on the democratisation of access to water resources and the re-engineering of the African landscape to unify the African people. It is a transformation where the working people 'who have eyes and ears' will choose to look back in order to look forward. Looking back draws on the memories of transformative moments of African liberation and draws inspiration from these moments. The moment of Haiti's independence as well as the rapid decolonisation period between 1956 and 1965 were two such moments when the explosive spread of the culture of independence temporarily silenced those who wanted to colonise Africa for another one hundred years. Kwame Nkrumah was the leader of Ghana at that transformative moment. We need to clarify the differences between the project of unity as inscribed within the present political leadership and the thoroughgoing push for freedom from those who crave a new concept of citizenship. We will agree with Nkrumah that Africa needs a new kind of citizen. Our task is to draw from the positive memories while outlining the challenges in the present period.

Notes

1. Both COVID-19 and SARS are caused by coronaviruses. The virus that causes SARS is known as SARS-CoV, while the virus that causes COVID-19 is known as SARS-CoV-2. There are also other types of human coronaviruses.
2. https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds.
3. ASEAN countries comprise Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

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FORTHCOMING / À PARAÎTRE



Reclaiming Mobility: A Pan-Africanist Approach to Migration

For Africa as a whole we want our peoples to have the right to move, settle, work and live without visas or passports from Cape Town to Cairo. As steady progress is being made at regional level it makes this Pan African dimension inevitable … It just means that they are free to do so if they wish without any security or police always harassing them as 'foreigners'. (Raheem 2006)

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When did human mobility emerge as a global problem to be prevented or contained? If mobility is intrinsic to the survival of human beings, then constraints on mobility can be equated to the denial of the right to life. Mobility is intricately linked to freedom that is expressed in questions of who decides who moves, who is expected not to move. and under what conditions these decisions are made and movement occurs. From a Pan-Africanist perspective, how can scholars account for the disposability of African bodies as Europe-bound migrants die, amid indifference, in the Mediterranean Sea, in the long afterlife of the transatlantic middle passage? (Sharpe 2016). Pan-Africanists are drawn to Aimé Césaire's *Discourses on Colonialism* (2000), in which he refers to the 'boomerang effects' of imperialism, specifically how ideas, policies, practices and techniques of governing imperial interests flow back and forth from the colonial 'core' to the peripheries. A Pan-Africanist approach to migration begins by contextualising migration practices historically, by tracing the evolution of depictions of African migration as a problem, their origins in European modernity, the links of this migration to African enslavement, and the pseudo-science of racial hierarchies, and the era of European colonialism (Mayblin and Turner 2021). This approach then proposes how a Pan-Africanist understanding of migration can humanise and dignify those whose mobilities are forced or voluntary, drawing inspiration from historical moments of African independent acts of emancipatory migration. Subsequently, Pan-Africanists can assess critically the continuing relevance of the global North's understandings and governance of human mobility to explain migration in Africa and the diaspora.

Understandings of migration are Eurocentric

The dominant language, discourse, policies, and practices with respect to African migration are Eurocentric in origin, being derived from the hegemonic philosophies of European modernity relating to the politicisation of mobility. They include the association of people with distinct spaces, and the universalisation and adoption of the European idea of the 'nation-state' as the normative political community, with its bounded territory and exclusionary concept of sovereignty, nationhood and citizenship (Mbembe 2000). It is European modern society, dating from the period of European exploration and enlightenment, that has placed political limits on human mobility, with the state or the elite determining who has the right to move and under what conditions (Mayblin and Turner 2021). Historical records demonstrate that precolonial African societies had a different conceptualisation of space, with varying degrees of attachment to land, a fluidity of territorial boundaries (Asiwaju 1983; Kopytoff 1987; Mbembe 2000) and a flexibility of identity and belonging (Nyamnjoh 2017: 259). Widespread evidence exists of local and regional histories of migration and settlement across the continent prior to colonial rule.

European global capitalist expansionism between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries has been linked to unprecedented movements of people (Mbembe 2019). European 'repeopling of the world … inaugurat[ed] a new epoch of global resettlement' (Mbembe 2019: 45). The spread of capitalism generated new forms of labour mobility, involving the enslavement, subjection, and exploitation of indigenous peoples. The dehumanisation of labour was possible through Europe's construction of hierarchies of human beings using

the Social Darwinian ideology of race. Capitalism and racialisation intersected to enable the forced migration of an estimated ten million enslaved Africans, who were transported to the Americas, and an unspecified number who went elsewhere in the world. Enslaved Africans were stripped of their humanity and commoditised to fulfill the demands of European capitalism.

The racialisation of human mobility

European colonialism led to the racialisation of human mobility. Some seventeen million people emigrated from Europe to the colonies between 1814 and 1914, mainly to the USA, New Zealand, Australia and Africa (Bastos 2008; Mayblin 2021). They were fleeing poverty and famine and were encouraged to move as a strategy to establish new state territories with people of European ancestry. European migration was always accompanied by the elimination, dispossession and displacement of the indigenous people and the settlement of their lands (Bastos 2008; Mayblin and Turner 2021).

From the nineteenth century onwards the USA, Canada and Australia initiated immigration legislation to prevent the in-migration of Chinese and other Asian peoples to shore up white supremacy at its peripheries (Atkinson 2016). Whites-only migration policies remained in place in countries such as Australia until the 1970s. As with the slave trade, Europeans sought to control the mobility of non-white people in their colonies for their labour and as soldiers in colonial wars. Chinese and South Asian indentured workers were recruited through debt bondage and dispersed across the British empire.

The history of African migration within the colonial sphere, too, has been a racialised one, suffused with dehumanisation, domination and subjection. In Africa, capitalist enterprises, namely in mines and on plantations, were reliant on state-directed forced labour and the recruitment of labour migrants on long contracts. Labour migration was not a popular option for Africans but became essential to survive punitive taxation and an increasingly commoditised economy. Recruitment focused on bodies stereotyped as being suitable for hard labour and were ethnicised and gendered. Those women who challenged restrictions on their mobility and moved to urban areas found their bodies heavily policed in public spaces. These colonial patterns of migration have enduring legacies in almost all African countries.

Security considerations also led to the forced migration of Africans, many of whom were moved across colonial territories as a strategy to quell uprisings against colonial rule and significantly, as part of labour migration regimes. Over 400 people from varying British colonial territories were exiled to the Seychelles (Kothari and Wilkinson 2010), and in the late 1950s some Kenyan Mau Mau freedom fighters were forcibly moved to the south-western part of Tanganyika (Daley 1989). The legacy of such state-enforced securitised migration is that it has reinforced the view that migration management is intrinsic to political stability. Control over the mobility of colonised people became increasingly a security matter and was more extreme in white-dominated colonies.

European migration legislation prevails

Even though migration management in African states has its origins in draconian colonial laws, African states have yet to pay sufficient attention to how migration legislation might be addressed in a decolonial and Pan-African way. Mamdani (1996) has shown how the colonial definition and delineation of tribes and tribal territory fixed identity to place and created new forms of belonging. Nationalist and postcolonial leaders' acceptance of the 'nation-state' as the ideal political community and of the territorial boundaries set by European colonial administrations, within which liberated postcolonial nations could be forged, ended up limiting their imaginations of alternative ways of belonging that recognised mobility as an inherent characteristic of human sociality and survival.

While independence offered the freedom to move, the barriers imposed by the new 'nation-states' prevented it. When the bounded spaces of tribal homelands were upscaled to those of the nation, a mythic European notion of national identity was promoted as a unifying factor in the struggle for self-determination. Independent states were encouraged to domesticate international laws that reified citizenship and the boundaries of the 'nation-state'. Laws governing migration between states, and the categorisation of those who moved according to the cause or purpose of their migration—as labour/economic migrants, refugees, visitors, irregulars, etc.—originated in Eurocentric understandings of the 'nation-state, belonging, citizenship and the right to move and in the European colonialism and European migration regimes that

emerged after the Second World War in the context of the Cold War (Chimni 1998). These observations of Africa's subordination and acceptance of international law are of central concern to those global South scholars who advocate Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) (Chimni 1998).

From the 1960s onwards, European visa restrictions were aimed primarily at preventing the in-migration of people from former colonies to the metropoles. Citizens from white-dominated countries have greater access to Europe and to African countries than Africans who seek to enter Europe, who have to submit to the most draconian visa processes and restrictions and be racially profiled through the use of Smart border technologies (Pailey 2016; Vukov 2016; Achiume et al 2020. Achiume's (2019) call for the recognition that African economic migration to Europe represents decolonisation in practice, or reverse colonialism, which could reform the political communities in Europe by reflecting their colonial links, is unlikely to be realised due to the prevalence of xenophobia and racism in Europe (De Genova 2016). Indeed, as Pailey (2016: npn) notes, 'we can't dismiss mobility restrictions that deliberately humiliate one group while honouring another'.

Colonial racist immigration policies were initially adopted by African states who replicated visa restrictions against Africans from neighbouring territories. The 2020 Africa Visa Openness Index report published by the Africa Development Bank (ABD) was aimed at promoting freedom of movement for 'accelerated development'. It noted that Africans could travel visa-free to only 26 per cent of African countries. Visas were required to travel to 46 per cent, although the trend over time was downward. The quest for freedom of movement within the continent cannot be achieved as long as leaders conform to European logics of territory and of racialised mobilities.

African attempts to reclaim agency over migration

Pan-African leaders in Africa have espoused the necessity of regional and continental freedom of movement. Periodically, they have articulated ambitious visions, some of which have been put into practice partially, as in the Economic Community of West African States, which has progressively removed visa requirements for citizens travelling within that region since 1979. While other regional economic unions have referenced the need for freedom of movement, such as the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), moves towards enacting this ambition have been weak and, in some countries, non-existent. SADC's Labour Migration Action Plan 2020–2025 (LMAP), which aims at 'strengthening labour migration policies and regulatory systems for better labour migration governance', could reproduce colonial regional labour migration policies that were based on the 'thingification' of the African as 'an instrument of production' (Césaire 2000: 42).

A Pan-Africanist approach to migration questions and contextualises migration policies that emanate from the global North and articulates alternative policies that dignify Africans. At the continental level, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, established in 2018, aims to enable the free movement of people. For this to be realised, Pan-Africans will have to think independently of the migration governance structures being promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations International Organisation for Migration (UN IOM), whose policies are informed primarily by the needs of Europe, as in the Action Plan of the Valletta 2015 Summit on Migration with North African states. The African Union 2015 Declaration on Migration contained the elements of a progressive stance on intracontinental migration. However, its revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2018) and Plan of Action (2018–2027) are more aligned with the UN's Global Compact on Migration, in which external priorities predominate.

Characteristically, the international community's response to African initiatives is to provide donor funding and to shape policies in the process of collaborating in the implementation of these initiatives. Through IOM and Western government sponsorship, some African states have been able to enhance the digital technology used in migration monitoring, which includes data sharing. While this is portrayed as a win-win security strategy, it also serves to ensure that the West, in particular the European Union, can access biometric databases to track and return 'irregular' Africans entering EU territory, which is legitimated by the war on terror (IOM 2020; Brachet 2016). Pan-Africanists should question whether an EU that practises racialised mobility and has allowed thousands of Africans to die in the Mediterranean can be a force of good with respect to intracontinental migration.

Geopolitical considerations linked to humanitarian discourse and interventions govern the mobility of refugees in Africa. Here, too, policies and practices have been ra-

cialised. International refugee law was not designed with Africans or global South people in mind (Mayblin 2017). The United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention was established to address the fact of post-Second World War European refugees. With colonialism still present on the continent and racial segregation in the USA, the West did not perceive Africans as having human rights that needed to be protected (Chimni 1998).

In the 1960s, anticolonialism and Pan-Africanism led to one of the most progressive approaches to mobility on the continent, as newly independent African states were able to take a principled stance against colonial domination, allowing the in-migration of those fleeing colonial rule and providing sanctuary to liberation movements from white-dominated states. In 1963, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) set up a special committee—the OAU Liberation Committee, with a regional office in Dar es Salaam. The aim of the Committee was to harmonise the assistance provided in aid of African liberation struggles and to encourage cooperation (Biney 2018; Brankamp and Daley 2020).

Because the anticolonial struggles, as in Rwanda and Burundi in the late 1950s, and the fleeing of people to neighbouring colonial territories occurred simultaneously with the beginning of the Cold War, at that time Western states saw African refugee populations as a security threat. In 1967, a protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention was added, which allowed for 'humanitarian' intervention in the newly independent states. African states were encouraged to align their laws with international ones. However, African recognition of the inapplicability of UN legislation to local contexts resulted in the drawing up of regional legislation, the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. But despite being Africa-owned and addressing the anticolonial struggles on the continent, the content of the OAU Convention relied heavily on the UN's 1967 protocol (Brankamp and Daley 2020).

In the absence of local financial support for refugees, Western governments and African political elites, through the UN, have sought to control the mobility of refugee communities, depoliticising them where the political interests of the refugees and host/international community do not coincide. In 2020, Africa hosted 25 per cent of the global refugee population. As Western countries become more draconian in their approach to refugees, so have African countries. The West's increasing anti-refugee discourse and policies have set the agenda and dictate migration policy in contemporary Africa. Since the war on terror and the 2014 Arab Spring, Europe has increased the securitisation of migration from Africa to Europe and reinforced its anti-migrant stance (Tinti 2018; Fakhoury 2016). Europe's offshoring and outsourcing of its border work make African states complicit in its racialised restrictive policies that involve criminalisation, containment and detention - perpetuating the dehumanisation of Africans. The adoption of detention in transit countries as a preventative strategy violates the human rights of Africans seeking a better life. As Césaire (2000) notes, the 'collective hypocrisy' of Europe is 'indefensible'.

Outright hostility to migrants and refugees in the global North and growing criticisms of trends in international migration and asylum policies have led to slight changes in the discourse on refugees in Africa. A more neoliberal agenda is emerging, viewing refugees as an economic resource (Crush et al 2017)), which claims to 'challenge the narrative on African migration' (IOM 2021). But although the UN's Comprehensive Refugee Framework and the Global Compact on Migration emphasise multi-stakeholder solutions, refugees themselves are still positioned at the bottom of the list of powerful international and national actors. Changing the narrative on migration in Africa requires emancipatory thought at the regional level, not international interventions.

Humanizing Mobility

Living transnationally is part of the everyday practices of Africans whose communities have been divided by colonial boundaries, even if a national consciousness has emerged in some states since independence. Nyamnjoh (2017: 258), referring to the incompleteness of this state of being where identities are not fixed but always in the making, considers Africans 'frontier beings', who 'contest taken for-granted and often institutionalised and bounded ideas and practices of being, becoming, belonging, places and space, and 'seeking conversations with and between divides'. At the South Africa/Zimbabwe frontier, Moyo (2016) notes, the realities of the complex identities of the 'border citizens' who have a long history of 'defying strict regulatory regimes'. Across the continent, border flexibility is negotiated everyday by traders; religious practitioners visiting shrines, churches, and mosques; and people attending ceremonial and family events. These everyday mobilities tend to be criminalized unless enacted via state-sanctioned avenues for mobility that formal laws uphold, and explain the need for nuanced understandings, if Africans are to live fulfilling lives as hu-

man beings. Exclusionary border practices and racialization mean that Africans residing in Europe are routinely denied visas for their Africa-based relatives to attend family functions, such as weddings and funerals. African states should not be influenced by the West to deny the right to liveable lives for the continents' citizens.

Conclusion

To conclude, I argue that contemporary approaches to migration have to take into consideration racialised histories of migration, the universalisation of the 'nation-state' as an ideal political community and the imposition of borders and political boundaries to govern flows of people and goods. In the post-independence period, the reliance on external donor funds for managing migration has meant that the modern African state has continued to operate using these colonial logics. Pan-Africanist approaches to migration reveal how policies that have disrupted the colonial narrative have come from within Africa, notably the OAU Liberation Committee, the African Union's progressive stance on making the African diaspora the sixth region of the continent and Ghana opening citizenship to the old African diasporas. These actions signal a shift away from the national territorial focus of European concepts of belonging to one that is transnational and inclusive. A Pan-Africanist approach requires a decentring of the economic arguments for and against migration that reproduce colonial logics of subjugation and exploitation. Such thinking would involve reducing the emphasis on remittances, labour market demand, donor funding and Western humanitarian intervention. Instead, it would humanise migration by engaging with the multiplicity of mobilities that people participate in, ,and should be free to undertake, within and between continents, and exploring the flexibility, sociality and conviviality that exist between communities. Such an approach would break with the continued coloniality of being to which African migrants have been subjected.

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Franc CFA : la farce de mauvais goût de Macron et Ouattara

Les deux principaux textes de la «réforme» du franc CFA d'Afrique de l'Ouest – dont un n'a jamais été soumis aux parlementaires – ont été rendus publics par le gouvernement français. Ces documents confirment que rien ne change : le contrôle de l'État français sur cette monnaie reste identique. Emmanuel Macron et Alassane Ouattara n'ont rien fait d'autre qu'une belle opération de communication.

Fanny Pigeaud
Collabore chez Mediapart
Paris, France

Ndongo Samba Sylla
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation,
Dakar, Sénégal

Il n'aura échappé à aucun observateur attentif que la France est en difficulté sur le continent africain. Son emprise sur les pays de la zone franc, ce que certains appellent son «pré carré», est de plus en plus contestée par les populations des pays concernés.

Paris a déjà été confronté à plusieurs reprises à une telle situation dans le passé. Pour s'en sortir, le gouvernement français a toujours utilisé la même recette : apporter en surface quelques modifications à son édifice néocolonial afin de faire croire qu'il prend en compte les critiques, tout en ne changeant rien au fond. L'idée est à la fois de gagner du temps et de reprendre la main, voire de resserrer son contrôle.

C'est ce procédé que les autorités françaises, sous pression, ont décidé d'appliquer à nouveau avec la réforme du franc CFA d'Afrique de l'Ouest, annoncée à Abidjan le 21 décembre 2019 par Emmanuel Macron et Alassane Ouattara.

Cette réforme, adoptée par les députés français en décembre 2020 et par les sénateurs en janvier 2021, vise ainsi à débarrasser le «système CFA» de ses aspects les plus embarrassants, ceux qui ont nourri les critiques répétées des mouvements pour l'émancipation monétaire en Afrique francophone : l'acronyme franc CFA, la représentation française au sein des instances de la Banque centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), l'obligation pour celle-ci de déposer la moitié de ses réserves de change auprès du Trésor français.

Mais dans le même temps, et c'est l'objectif principal, elle maintient les fondamentaux du «système CFA» : la parité fixe avec l'euro, la liberté de transfert des capitaux et revenus, et la tutelle du Trésor français sur le franc CFA et la BCEAO à travers sa prétendue «garantie» de convertibilité.

Cette stratégie apparaît de manière évidente lorsque l'on examine attentivement les nouveaux textes qui ont été adoptés et qui viennent d'être rendus publics par le gouvernement français, mais aussi quand on s'intéresse à la manière dont les parlementaires ont été utilisés, pour ne pas dire dupés.

La fausse procédure démocratique

Contrairement à ce que le gouvernement leur a fait croire, les parlementaires français n'ont pas été consultés. Le processus d'approbation auquel ils se sont soumis et auquel certains ont sincèrement cru était dans les faits sans objet et sans effet : tout avait été déjà décidé et même déjà mis en œuvre.

Regardons cela dans le détail. Il faut d'abord noter que la réforme repose sur deux nouveaux textes. Le premier est un accord de coopération monétaire, signé le 21 décembre 2019 par les ministres des Finances des huit pays de l'UMOA (Union monétaire ouest-africaine) et par le ministre français de l'Économie, des Finances et de la Relance, Bruno Lemaire. Il remplace un précédent texte datant du 4 décembre 1973. Le second document est une convention de garantie, signée le 10 décembre 2020 par Bruno Lemaire et Tiémoko Meyliet Koné, gouverneur de la BCEAO.

Cette convention de garantie prévoit, comme le faisait la convention de compte d'opérations de 1973 qu'elle remplace, que la France prête sa monnaie (des euros)

à la BCEAO lorsque cette dernière manque de réserves de change pour couvrir ses engagements extérieurs. Il a fallu que le sénateur communiste Pierre Laurent insiste pour que ce texte soit rendu public.

Cet accord de coopération monétaire (AC) et cette convention de garantie (CG) sont entrés officiellement en vigueur le 1er janvier 2021 (AC, art. 10 et CG, art. 10).

Premier problème : bien que constituant le cœur de cette pseudo-réforme, le texte de la convention de garantie n'a jamais été porté à la connaissance des parlementaires – ce qu'ils n'ont pas relevé. S'il a été depuis mis en ligne par le ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de la Relance, une annexe n'en a, quant à elle, pas encore été rendue publique.

Deuxième problème : bien avant que le texte de l'accord de coopération monétaire soit soumis aux parlementaires, certaines de ses dispositions étaient déjà appliquées «sur la base d'un avenant à la convention de compte d'opérations antérieure», signé en octobre 2020 sous l'empire de l'accord de coopération monétaire de 1973, nous indique le ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de la Relance.

Troisième problème : la réforme dans son entièreté était déjà appliquée bien avant que les parlementaires ne l'adoptent puisqu'elle est entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier, alors que les sénateurs ne l'ont approuvée que le 28 janvier et que le président Macron a promu la loi y correspondant le 3 février. Est-ce bien constitutionnel étant donné que l'article 53 de la Constitution française stipule qu'un traité international ne peut prendre effet qu'après avoir été ratifié ou approuvé ? Le ministère nous répond que « la convention de garantie a été conclue et mise en œuvre sous l'empire de l'accord de coopération monétaire de 1973 ».

En somme, les parlementaires ont participé sans le savoir à une opération de communication, voire à une farce : qu'ils approuvent ou pas les changements, cela n'avait aucune incidence sur le déroulement des opérations décidées et menées par le Trésor français.

Il faut dire que dans le fond, les changements apportés par cette «réforme» ne sont qu'apparents, comme nous allons le voir.

Sur le « départ » des représentants français

Première modification induite par les deux textes : il n'y a plus de représentants français au sein du Conseil d'administration de la BCEAO, de son Comité de politique monétaire et de sa Commission bancaire (AC, art. 10). C'est censé être un progrès et montrer à l'opinion publique que la France renonce à son influence. En réalité, ce «départ» des représentants français des instances de la BCEAO est nominal. Car d'autres formes de contrôle sont mises en place pour le pallier, comme le laisse voir le texte de l'accord, qui précise :

- «Le Comité de politique monétaire de la BCEAO comprend une personnalité indépendante et qualifiée, nommée *intuitu personæ* par le Conseil des ministres de l'UMOA en concertation avec le Garant [le gouvernement français].» (AC, art. 4)
- «Afin de permettre au Garant de suivre l'évolution du risque qu'il couvre, la BCEAO lui transmettra régulièrement les informations dont le contenu et les modalités de transmission seront précisés par échange de lettres entre eux. La coopération est également assise sur la tenue de rencontres techniques organisées en tant que de besoin entre les différentes parties, selon des modalités à convenir entre elles.» (AC, art. 5)
- «Les Parties à l'accord se réunissent à la demande de l'une d'entre elles lorsque les conditions le justifient, notamment en vue de prévenir ou de gérer une crise.» (AC, art. 6)

On constate que, en plus de ces dispositions, la France continue à exercer un contrôle politique de manière informelle et hors des textes puisque les détails de la mise en œuvre de la convention de garantie sont déterminés «par échange de lettres» entre la BCEAO et le ministère des Finances français.

Sur la fin du compte d'opérations et la « garantie » française

Autre évolution apparente apportée par la réforme : la BCEAO n'est plus obligée de laisser la moitié de ses devises au Trésor français sur ce qu'on appelait le « compte d'opérations ». Les montants placés au niveau du Trésor français sont désormais « transférés sur un ou plusieurs comptes que la BCEAO désigne » (AC, art. 10). Fin 2019, la BCEAO avait accumulé 6 252 milliards de francs CFA (9,5 milliards d'euros), soit 76 pour cent du total de ses réserves de change, dans son compte d'opérations auprès du Trésor français. La BCEAO a donc maintenant la possibilité théorique de placer librement ses réserves de change dans les actifs de son choix.

Mais le compte d'opérations disparaît-il vraiment ? En réalité, le Trésor français continue à maintenir son rôle putatif de « garant » de la convertibilité du franc CFA à taux fixe, ce qui signifie qu'il autorise la possibilité d'un découvert « non plafonné » en euros à la BCEAO en cas d'épuisement de ses réserves officielles (CG, art. 2). Or une telle disposition requiert l'ouverture préalable d'une ligne de trésorerie dans les écritures comptables du gouvernement français (CG, art. 2).

Autrement dit, le compte d'opérations disparaît pour ré-apparaître sous une nouvelle forme, moins onéreuse pour le gouvernement français (il n'est plus tenu de verser à la BCEAO des intérêts sur ses réserves au taux nominal de 0,75 %), et qui lui assure un contrôle politique similaire. C'est la magie de la « réforme » à la française…

Conditions préalables à l'activation de la garantie française

Ce n'est pas tout. L'activation de cette « garantie », de cette possibilité de découvert, reste assortie des mêmes conditions drastiques qui l'ont toujours rendue superflue. La BCEAO va continuer à faire ce qu'elle a toujours fait, à savoir s'astreindre à maintenir un taux élevé de couverture de l'émission monétaire – le rapport entre les réserves de change de la BCEAO et ses engagements à vue –, ce qui rend la garantie française inutile.

Entre 1960 et 2020, la BCEAO n'a ainsi bénéficié de découverts auprès du Trésor français que durant la période 1980-1990 – découverts qui avaient généralement servi à faciliter le rapatriement des capitaux et revenus des entreprises françaises craignant une dévaluation du franc CFA (voir Pigeaud & Sylla 2018:114-115).

Le système CFA comporte par ailleurs un dispositif d'alerte que la réforme ne change pas : le signal que le niveau de réserves a atteint un niveau critique est donné lorsque le taux de couverture de l'émission monétaire est inférieur ou égal à 20 pour cent. Dans un tel cas, avant de solliciter la garantie française, la BCEAO doit utiliser les Droits de tirage spéciaux (DTS) de ses États membres auprès du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) ou les convertir en devises. Elle doit aussi procéder au « ratissage », c'est-à-dire récupérer les devises détenues par les organismes publics et les banques de la zone UMOA.

À supposer que ses réserves de change baissent jusqu'au seuil d'alerte (les 20 %), elle doit, en plus des dispositions de « ratissage », durcir sa politique monétaire afin de reconstituer rapidement ses réserves de change.

Si, malgré toutes ces mesures, la BCEAO fait face à une insuffisance de réserves de change, il est prévu qu'elle « informe dans les meilleurs délais le Garant de l'activation possible de sa garantie et des montants susceptibles d'être appelés [utilisés] » (CG, art. 5). Le souhait de voir activer la garantie française pour un premier tirage doit être notifié « cinq jours ouvrés Target [le système de paiement de la zone euro] » à l'avance (CG, art. 6).

Mais un tel scénario reste toujours très peu probable, car même s'il n'y a plus de représentants français dans les instances de la BCEAO pour faire en sorte que le système fonctionne sans avoir besoin de la « garantie » française, le dispositif de contrôle qui avait cours avant la réforme reste, lui aussi, bien là. La France, en tant que « garant », a toujours son mot à dire pour « prévenir » une crise ou aider à la résoudre. En effet, la « fin » du compte d'opérations et le « départ » des représentants français des instances de la BCEAO ont été compensés par des garde-fous institutionnels, dont :

Un système de reporting : « Le Garant est préalablement informé des changements substantiels dans la gestion des réserves de change [de la BCEAO]. » (CG, art. 3)

Un retour possible avec voix délibérative du représentant français au Comité de politique monétaire de la BCEAO : lorsque le taux de couverture de l'émission monétaire est inférieur ou égal à 20 pour cent, « le Garant peut, en complément des dispositions prévues dans les statuts de la BCEAO, désigner, à titre exceptionnel et pour la durée nécessaire à la gestion de la crise, un représentant au Comité de politique monétaire de la BCEAO, avec voix délibérative » (AC, art 8).

Un retour possible avec voix consultative des représentants français au Conseil d'administration et à la Commission bancaire de la BCEAO : « Pour prévenir ou gérer une crise, le Garant peut demander, à titre exceptionnel et pour la durée nécessaire à la gestion ou à la prévention de la crise, à participer sans voix délibérative aux réunions du Conseil d'administration de la BCEAO et à la Commission bancaire de l'Union, pour y porter sa position. » (CG, art. 4)

Conditions financières associées à l'activation de la garantie

Dernier point qui confirme que rien ne change : en cas d'activation de la garantie, hypothèse décidément hautement improbable, « la BCEAO, ou les institutions habilitées qui lui succèdent, a l'obligation de placer au moins 80 pour cent de tout flux entrant de devises sur cette ligne de trésorerie » (CG, art. 7). Cette disposition, qui paraît difficile à mettre en œuvre (au regard notamment du délai de recouvrement des recettes d'exportation), confirme que le système du compte d'opérations est redéployé sous une nouvelle forme et, surtout, que la garantie, l'autorisation de découvert, doit avoir un caractère exceptionnel et temporaire. Dans un tel cas, la BCEAO devra aussi payer un taux d'intérêt débiteur basé sur le taux de prêt marginal au jour le jour de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE).

Dans le passé, la France a eu, rappelons-le, deux attitudes quand les banques centrales de la zone franc ont souhaité faire activer la garantie française afin de maintenir la parité du franc CFA vis-à-vis de la monnaie française. Soit elle a procédé à une dévaluation du franc CFA, comme en 1994, soit elle a fait appel au FMI, qui a octroyé les liquidités nécessaires en contrepartie de politiques d'austérité et de libéralisation économique, comme cela a été le cas pour la Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale (Cémac) au milieu des années 2010. D'ailleurs, dans un document intitulé « Gestion des réserves internationales de la Cémac » et publié en 2018, le FMI soulignait qu'il « existe des incertitudes quant à la capacité du Trésor français, qui lui-même doit respecter les règles plus larges de la zone euro, à offrir ce type de garantie à grande échelle pour une période indéfinie ».

Pendant tout le reste du temps, ce sont les États africains qui ont, dans les faits, avec leurs réserves de change, garanti eux-mêmes la valeur du franc CFA et donc sa parité fixe avec l'euro. Comme l'a écrit, en 1980, Bernard Vinay, ex-directeur de la Banque centrale des États d'Afrique centrale et du Cameroun (l'actuelle BEAC) : « La garantie est virtuelle aussi longtemps que les instituts d'émission (africains) disposent de réserves. […] Lorsque les pays de la zone franc disposent de réserves de change, cette garantie est purement nominale puisqu'elle n'est pas mise à contribution. » (Vinay 1980:116-117) Les autorités françaises savent tout cela parfaitement. Le député qui a été le rapporteur sur le projet de réforme a lui-même dit à ses collègues : *« Le pari est fait qu'il en ira de même à l'avenir. »*

La prétendue garantie française a toujours été un prétexte permettant à la France d'avoir un contrôle politique sur les affaires économiques et monétaires des pays de la zone franc.

D'une pierre plusieurs coups

Avec ce tour de passe-passe, Paris réussit donc provisoirement à sauver son empire monétaire pour quelque temps encore.

Le gouvernement français fait en plus d'une pierre deux coups puisque l'un des objectifs cachés de la réforme était de doubler la Communauté économique des États d'Afrique de l'Ouest (Cédéao), qui a l'ambition de créer une monnaie unique pour les quinze pays qui la composent, dont les huit pays de l'UMOA qui utilisent le franc CFA.

Les chefs d'État de la Cédéao ont en effet élaboré une feuille de route pour l'avènement de leur monnaie unique régionale, qu'ils ont choisi d'appeler eco (diminutif d'Ecowas, acronyme anglais de la Cédéao). Le jour même où la Cédéao devait se prononcer sur le futur de cette monnaie, MM. Macron et Ouattara ont annoncé, sans avoir consulté quiconque, que le franc CFA serait rebaptisé eco. Le couple franco-ivoirien a ainsi opéré un vol pur et simple n'ayant d'autres buts que de créer de la confusion et de substituer au projet d'intégration monétaire de la Cédéao celui de la France, laquelle cherche à étendre l'usage du franc CFA à d'autres pays de la région.

Derniers éléments à souligner

- Le nouvel accord de coopération monétaire et la convention de garantie ne font nulle part état d'un changement du nom franc CFA en eco. Soit un autre élément de la blague franco-ivoirienne.
- Bien que l'accord de coopération et la convention de garantie soient entrés en vigueur, ils n'ont toujours pas été publiés

sur le site web de la BCEAO, dont les statuts n'ont pas non plus été modifiés, ne serait-ce que pour prendre en compte les évolutions relatives à la présence française dans ses instances.

- L'accord et la convention de garantie n'ont pas été soumis aux parlements des pays de l'UMOA. Il semblerait que ce passage devant les instances démocratiques ne soit pas nécessaire, car il s'agirait d'un « accord en forme simplifiée ». Pourtant, le régime d'émission de la monnaie est une prérogative parlementaire dans la plupart des constitutions des pays francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest.

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Africa-United States Relations under the Biden Administraton: Room for a Pan-African Agenda?

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The inauguration of Joe Biden as the new president of the United States (US) on 20 January 2021, the broad contours of his vision and the strategic construction of his administration sent a wave of optimism globally that America will return to a trajectory of promoting diplomacy, inclusivity, multilateralism and democracy. Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris (the first woman and African American and Asian American to occupy this position), ensured that they put forward a diverse cabinet broadly representative of their society. They recognised the strong African-American support received during the election and in return made key senior appointments of black people. Gen. Lloyd Austin has been appointed to lead the Department of Defense, Linda Thomas-Greenfield is the new Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), and many other black men and women have been appointed into key positions.

Similar to the election of former president Barack Obama, Biden's victory was seen as providing new opportunities for Africa–US relations and for strengthening ties between African Americans and Africans. The ties that bind the diaspora and Africa are deep. They are rooted in descent and in the shameful past of slavery, and these factors, to a greater or lesser extent, permeate relations between Africa and the US. Pan Africanism emerged in the diaspora before embedding itself within the ideology and practice of Africans on the continent. In 2003, the diaspora was constituted by the African Union (AU) as its sixth region. Does the inauguration of the new Biden Administration hold out the possibility that Pan Africanism could underpin Africa–US relationships, and if so in what form? This article reflects on the possible contours of future Africa–US relations, by focusing on:

1. The idea that 'America is back', and that the new government can restore more harmonious diplomatic relations as well as resume global leadership;
2. The African continental context and its current needs;
3. Areas in which the US can strengthen relations with Africa;
4. Reviving Pan Africanism through Africa–US relations.

It is a truism that domestic and foreign policy are intertwined. America, in the era of Trump, demonstrated this yet again. During the four years of Trump's rule the cleavages within American society were heightened. The racial, class and ideological divides resurfaced because of a narrow ethnonationalist politics that was being pursued. This form of politics also found expression in

US foreign relations in which there was a discernible tendency towards isolationism, hierarchisation and racism. Multilateral bodies were being shunned and non-democratic militarily strong states were being wooed. Simultaneously, the US was trying to keep the 'foreigner' out, and an 'othering' and marginalization of peoples and countries was taking place, noticeably with the infamous dismissal of Africa as a continent with 'shithole countries'. It has also been touted that there was 'minimal senior level engagement with Africa' (Schneidman 2019) during Trump's reign. Trade, though, increased and we saw a continuity of emphasis on issues of security and health.

Africa has never been central to US foreign policy. Africa has and continues to be engaged with in as far as it presents a source of threat for the import of violent extremism (hence the emphasis on peace and security) and because of its natural resources and potential markets (hence the African Growth and Opportunity Act). The US focus over the last few years has been on limiting China's trade, investment and influence, and Africa, too, has been affected by its growing competition with China. Trump's 'Prosper Africa' initiative was aimed at 'countering China's commercial, security and political influence' (Schneidman and Signé 2018). Trump also sought to use some African countries in his attempts to assist Israel to normalise its foreign relations, Sudan being a recent example.

The Trump regime exposed the underbelly of American society: the continued racism, lack of respect for democratic principles (as highlighted by the storming of the Capitol), the fragmentation of American society, and a bullying practice internationally. This genie one cannot easily put back into the bottle and/or erase from the international community's memory. These flaws will for a long time to come alter the way in which America is perceived and how others relate to it, as opposed to merely how the US relates to them.

America's influence was waning before Trump ascended to the presidency, and it has continued to decline, primarily because there are a number of new international actors to contend with. Trump's administration sought to work with countries bilaterally (hence his popularity in Kenya and Nigeria), undermining African multilateral institutions and their consensus agreements. He was beginning to employ the classic tactic of divide and rule to gain an advantage.

America's interaction with Africa also veered towards being biased and punitive rather than constructive: for example, siding with Egypt during negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and threatening to reduce aid to Ethiopia because it dared to build a dam on its own; forcing Sudan to pay the US compensation because of Al-Qaida's attacks before it would take Sudan off the terrorist list, and 'persuading' it to acknowledge friendly relations with Israel.

There was therefore a sigh of relief when Joe Biden was announced as the winner of the presidential race, and, momentarily, a sense of shock when somewhat familiar tactics to those used by some African leaders were on display in a bid to prevent him from assuming the helm of the Oval Office. President Biden seeks to put an end to this rather bleak chapter of America's history, to reunite the nation, reinstill America's core values and rebuild its alliances. The rallying phrase of his campaign was 'America is Back'. But, which America is back, where? This will be no mere "pressing of a reset button" (Naidoo, 2021). His administration has a big task ahead of it. The world has not been sitting and waiting for a new president in America. It has moved on despite it.

This will not be the same America we knew in the 1990s or when President Barack Obama assumed power in 2009. It is fractured in many dimensions and, therefore, in terms of soft power, it is weaker. Biden's administration will also find that the world, and/or Africa, has changed. So it will have to think through a new approach to that which it adopted in the 1990s when it basked in its triumphalism as it became the uncontested global leader. Biden's America will soon discern that there has been a global rise in conservatism; a decline in the quality of our democracies; a rise in hybrid democracies; a rise in violent extremism in Africa; a world in which the COVID-19 pandemic has taken us back into laager mentalities and increased economic hardship; a world where climate change is accelerating; and a world where military might cannot fight against the current key threats of cybersecurity, energy insecurity, water and food shortages, health insecurity, poverty and unemployment. In short, America will re-emerge from its isolationist politics into the global arena to find that countries are more inward-looking, ethnocentric and autocratic, this at precisely the time when stronger global governance, a common sense of purpose and more solidarity are needed.

President Biden's administration is not oblivious to these global trends and hence his wanting to return to a focus on democratisation, inclusivity and multilateralism.

However, can America reassert leadership in this context when it is itself wracked by internal challenges and where its leadership is no longer uncontested? The new Scramble for Africa, for example, has long been underway and so there are many more actors in Africa that play agenda setting roles. America will therefore need to work hard to restore trust and credibility it will have to engage more collaboratively even with those that it is framing as its enemies, i.e. China. This is the more so since these countries are not necessarily Africa's enemies and Africa has the choice of collaborating with a number of different actors, and it will, and should, use this choice to its own advantage. Africa, hopefully, will not be caught up again in hegemonic power rivalries.

In trying to restore diplomatic relations, Biden's message of 'America is Back' is primarily directed at Europe, for these relations became strained under the Trump regime. Africa has not been, and will not be, a priority for the US no matter the ideological disposition or hue of the US president. But then Africa may not want to celebrate America being back too quickly either, especially if it's the same one that in its quest to bring democracy to everybody caused destabilisation that continues to persist in, for example, Libya. So when America says it's back, Africa would want to be clear on the what, where and how thereof!

It was encouraging to see that Biden took the time to address the AU virtually on 4 February 2021. This sent a strong signal of a willingness to reach out to strengthen relations with continental institutions and demonstrated a level of respect. In his address to the AU, Biden noted that his administration was opting for 'a future committed to investing in [American and African] democratic institutions and promoting the human rights of all people, women and girls, LGBTQ individuals, people with disabilities, and people of every ethnic background, religion and heritage', and emphasised health security, climate change, entrepreneurship and peace and security. He stressed the mutuality of the relationship, wanting America to 'be your partner in solidarity, support and mutual respect'.

The US has had a diplomatic mission at the AU since 2006. It has since the Clinton Administration defined its partnerships in Africa as based primarily on peace and security, democracy and governance, and trade and development. This will continue to be its focus even if the rhetoric and emphasis within these categories may differ. President Biden has, for example, already provided a clear indication that his focus is on democratisation and inclusivity. Alas, here Biden would have to begin his work in the US first, then in the global governance institutions (all of whom remain in need of reform), and perhaps also deal with the racism and narrow nationalism that have re-emerged in Europe, before he embarks on this quest in Africa. Thus Biden will have his challenges cut out for him in his quest to reclaim America's seat at the head of the table of global leaders.

The Current African context

Africa's conflict context is changing. There are also shifts in the geopolitical power of particular countries and a weakening of African intergovernmental institutions. There is, for example, a broadening of the scope of, deepening of the intensity of, violent extremism on the continent. The increase in violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, since 2017, means that it has become a threat in all five regions of Africa. Obviously, if it is spreading then we need to question the methods employed to counter terrorism. These have been adaptations of counter-terrorism templates developed in different contexts as if there were a one-size-fits-all approach to countering violent extremism.

African countries are receiving and spending billions on military reinforcements, high-tech equipment and training at the expense of development. The conditions that enable the spread of violent extremism are well known. They relate to the nature of the state, particularly extractive states with weak regulatory mechanism of natural resources and a proliferation of transnational crime and power networks. These states usually have por ous borders, a weak presence of security forces which often, too, are engaged in predatory behavior and exert undue force on citizens. Violent extremism emerges in states where some citizens are marginalised and excluded and where there is large scale poverty and underdevelopment. In communities living under these conditions there is a loss of hope in the prevailing governance systems and armed groups emerge and begin to assert alternative governance. Youth are attracted to these extremist armed formations in search of belonging and meaning (see Vlassenroot et al 2020) and a better life—real or imagined. These conditions cannot be addressed through increased militarisation. If the AU and its member states are serious about 'Silencing the Guns' they need to transform the state structures and/or state society relations that

provide the opportunity structure for violent extremism to flourish.

More local-level conflicts induced by climate change as well as interstate tensions can also be seen in Africa, for example the herder–farmer conflicts in West Africa and the conflict over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Fights over access to water will become more frequent and point to the need for us to revisit old treaties and agreements and to revive and/or repurpose the mechanisms that were set up to deal with this issue but then shifted to tackle violent extremism, as happened in the Lake Chad Basin. The recent conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, as well as secessionist struggles in Cameroon, point to the unresolved issues of nation-building, the continued use of force to settle disputes, and to broader governance challenges. The Horn of Africa remains fragile and a return to conflict in Ethiopia will be a major source of continued regional instability.

Band-Aid strategies continue to be used to resolve conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and many other countries, and hence the lack of sustainable peace. To build sustainable peace there is a need to rethink forms of state-building, representation, social contracts and/or the provision of human security. Governments of National Unity can no longer be the solution for deep cracks in the foundation of these societies. Through them we merely keep adding layers and layers of diverse actors in government (many of them non-democratic, who we expect to convert to being democratic once in power). Many of these actors are simply intent on eating from an already empty state trough rather than providing inclusive democratic governance and sustainable development in which all prosper. They present a no-brainer for why the states remain dysfunctional and why peace agreements do not hold.

Other countries in Africa continue to be bedevilled by a lack of service delivery, corruption, one-party and/or one-leader dominant states, and the like. The COVID-19 pandemic once again lay bare the extreme vulnerabilities of many countries in Africa: not just inadequate healthcare, which has been apparent for decades, but inadequate education, reform of the security sector, parliamentary oversight, social protection, and so on. More importantly, though, the response to the pandemic could also showcase the resilience and innovation of Africa's people (as opposed to states), for they have actually been surviving without state support for decades. How do we build on their resilience strategies?

A more positive note for state intervention was the stepping up of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention during the pandemic, highlighting what can be achieved when states work together to address a mutual challenge. The AU suddenly became an important source of information and co-ordination on the pandemic and for access to vaccines. More of these kinds of co-ordinated responses to address common challenges are needed going forward.

Areas in which the US can strengthen relations with Africa

The AU adopted Agenda 2063 in 2015. Central to the Agenda is the quest for 'Silencing the Guns' and the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Africa–US relations must be informed by the context and needs of Africa as well as by its development frameworks. The guns have not been silenced and appear to be echoing louder in some parts, and the AfCFTA is still at the beginning stages of implementation, with many foreseeable challenges. The AU has extended the roadmap for silencing the guns to 2030, with no serious reflection and evaluation on its execution. This evaluation should be supported by the US as part of its engagement in peace and security on the continent. Much needs to be done to ensure the success of the AfCFTA if it is not to suffer the same fate as previous regional integration roadmaps, such as the Lagos Plan of Action. The AfCFTA needs enabling environments: supportive regulatory frameworks, infrastructure, investment, etc. Here, too, America can play a key role.

The US has engaged Africa on issues of peace and security largely through its Africa Command (AFRICOM). It has between 6,000 and 7,000 troops on the continent in about twenty-nine bases, mostly scattered in North Africa, Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (Turse 2020). There are around 1,200 special forces involved in countering violent extremism in Somalia and Niger. The US has provided support to the African Union Commission's Peace Support Operations Division (in the form of equipment, logistics support, training, etc). It has assisted peace missions in CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, Sudan-Darfur and South Sudan, and it has supported capacity-building for peacekeeping in many African countries (White House 2014; CRS 2019). The US has also been engaged in supporting peace processes in, for example,

Cameroon, CAR and South Sudan. It therefore has a formidable presence in the resourcing of peace and security efforts in Africa.

This will most probably be continued, especially because of the growing threat of purported ISIS-affiliated extremist groups. However, the form of the support should be revisited so that it deals more directly with the hard security and human security needs of African citizens, i.e., responds more appropriately to the context sketched earlier. The US needs to provide support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in addition to that of peacekeeping. It should provide support so that the AU can undertake the necessary evaluations of its roadmaps and so that it, and member states, can redesign more context-appropriate, citizen- oriented strategies. Providing Africa with high-tech military weapons and setting up military bases may leave Africa with bigger problems in future, if not fuel further violent extremism. Already we see the remilitarisation of African societies and the concomitant decline in democratic forms of governance.

The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) needs to be renegotiated by 2025. The implementation of AGOA must be evaluated to see in which ways it has benefited Africa and the US. Francis Kornegay has noted the need for a renegotiated AGOA that is in harmony with that of the AfCFTA, and therefore the need for senior US management to effectively interact with the secretariat of the AfCFTA, UNECA and other stakeholders (Kornegay 2021).

Health and education remain the key levers for prosperity in Africa, and the US should therefore continue to invest resources in these sectors, the more so in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Access to the technology for remote learning and to vaccines has become paramount in addition to the continued call for support of infrastructure, resource and pharmaceutical needs.

Gender-based violence remains a scourge across the continent and more holistic interventions are needed to change behaviour. African countries are now only starting with data collection (beyond that collated by administrative statistics), so that there is a more evidence-based assessment of the extent of the problem. Acquiring these datasets costs huge amounts of money and effectively dealing with the challenge needs an investment in appropriate structures, programmes and processes to assist the legal frameworks already in place. Perhaps here the US can also help by supporting the security sector in countries to establish sexual misconduct centres, since many members of the security sector are part of the problem they are charged with responding to.

Reviving Pan Africanism though Africa–US relations

Pan Africanism is the underlying tie that binds Africa and the US and it should underpin their relations. In particular, African Americans should be at the forefront of ensuring that American foreign policy does not sow further division in Africa, through promoting bilateralism or through supporting one country against another, as was the case with Western Sahara and Ethiopia. It is imperative that African Americans ensure that multilateral institutions, such as the AU and its Regional Economic Communities, which have been established to promote Pan Africanism, are not only supported, but respected and engaged with through principles of mutuality. The US should ensure that their representatives to the AU and to key African countries are ambassadors who also believe in Pan Africanism and the African Agenda so that there is a common goal to be pursued, in the interests of both Africa and the US.

This year's AU theme is dedicated to Arts, Culture and Heritage. Here, too, African Americans can play an important role in promoting the arts and heritage as another important aspect for development, the building of a cultural economy. There is much to learn from each other and much innovative growth that can be attained in this sector, including the revival of Pan-African cultural festivals. Culture may be rooted in the past but it is dynamic and oriented towards the future and it is therefore the vitality that we have seen in the art forms of African and African-American youth that should be the focus of building these cultural interactions.

The US should also be cognisant of the new ways in which countries are seeking to engage Africa, such as through co-operation forums. However, the US should not compete with other countries by replicating this model. Africa does not need another forum for all its leaders to attend. The state-to-state co-operation model should rather be replaced with people-to- people exchanges that promote broader cultural interaction, respect, tolerance for diversity, dignity and solidarity that will inform future Africa–US relations on all other issues of trade, peace and security, environment, health and the like.

The appeal, by way of conclusion, is for the US to listen more to what Africans say their needs are and the kinds of engagements they seek. To identify these needs requires that the necessary dialogues and

conversations are held with a broad range of stakeholders. It is not sufficient for the Biden Administration to assert 'America is Back'. It must be a different America, one that thinks anew, innovatively and collaboratively; an America that practises leadership, rather than seeks to lead; an America that captures and articulates a vision for the growth, prosperity, equality and dignity of all.

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

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Kwame Nkrumah and the Quest for Independence[1]

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Depending on whether you looked from the North Atlantic or the Black Atlantic, the year 1957 appeared to signal two different political futures. On 6 March, Ghana finally secured its independence from Great Britain after a decade-long nationalist struggle. At the independence celebrations, Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the Convention People's Party and the new prime minister, declared that Ghanaian independence marked the birth of a new African 'ready to fight his own battles and show that after all, the black man is capable of managing his own affairs' (Nkrumah 1957: 107). Less than three weeks later, on 25 March, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). For the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, the treaty was one more step in 'the great work of fostering durable international reconciliation and a community of nations for the good of Europe' (Vogel and Buchstab 2007). While Ghanaian independence marked the emergence of a world of nation-states from the ashes of European imperialism, the birth of the EEC in the empire's metropoles looked forward to the transcendence of the nation-state itself.

Over half a century later, we continue to operate within the terms of this opposition. As new nationalist movements, this time in the North Atlantic, have repudiated internationalist institutions like the European Union, their critics reject calls for independence and autonomy as fantastical and dangerous. Such a view assumes that nationalism and internationalism are incompatible. Yet if we return to Ghana in 1957 and trace Nkrumah's vision of decolonisation, we find a view of national independence that could only be realised through internationalism.

In the early days of independence, Nkrumah insisted that African states had to unite in a regional federation to overcome economic dependence and international hierarchy. Emerging concurrently with the EU, this account of regionalism was distinctively postcolonial. Rather than taming the sovereign state through regional economic linkages, Nkrumah's Pan-African federation sought to realise the nation-state's promise of independence.

Securing 'complete independence'

Born in 1909 as a subject of the British Empire in the Gold Coast colony, Nkrumah had circled the Atlantic world as a student, worker, intellectual and political organiser before he returned to lead the nationalist movement in 1947. When Ghanaian independence was finally achieved, Nkrumah warned that the fight was just beginning. Ghanaian independence, he insisted, 'is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent' (Nkrumah 1957: 107). In seeking this liberation, Nkrumah urged fellow African nationalists to follow the Ghanaian example and 'seek ye first the political kingdom' and secure 'complete independence and sovereignty' (Nkrumah 1957: 107).

Then and now, this nationalist aspiration for complete independence inspires scepticism, suspicion, even disdain. Writing in 1960, Elie Kedourie, the British historian of the Middle East, voiced his fear that this nationalist demand would only produce postcolonial domination. He and other observers of decolonisation worried that colonial elites had grafted the nation-state onto African and Asian societies without the necessary sociological prerequisites: literacy, a middle class and strong political institutions. Nationalism was, in Kedourie's account, an alien, European ideology that elites mobilised to 'sway and dominate' the unready masses. The result in postcolonial societies would be new forms of Oriental despotism (Kedourie 1960: 112). 'Nationalism and liberalism far from being twins are really antagonistic principles',

he wrote (Kedourie 1960: 109). Kedourie's early critique of anticolonial nationalism lives on today in the preoccupation with the insularity, parochialism and anti-cosmopolitanism of nationalist projects. At best, national independence is a naïve aspiration in the context of globalisation. At worst, nationalism is a violent force that undermines transnational solidarities and institutions.

For Nkrumah, nothing could have been further from the truth. When he argued that Ghana's independence must be linked to the fate of colonised Africa, he did not just mean that the rest of the continent had to emerge from alien rule by replicating the nation-state form. Instead, he imagined new political and economic links that would create a United States of Africa. The 1960 republican Constitution of Ghana looked forward to this achievement. At Nkrumah's insistence, it included a clause that conferred on the Parliament 'the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana' once a Union of African States was formed. Guinea and Mali followed Ghana's lead and adopted similar clauses in their Constitutions. The three states formed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, which was to serve as the nucleus for a future continent-wide union. The postcolonial political kingdom was not the nation-state but a Pan-African federation.

Decolonisation, Nkrumah argued, had become a word 'much and unctuously used … to describe the transfer of political control from colonialist to African sovereignty' (Nkrumah 1965: 31). Focusing on this transfer assumed that the primary injustice of imperialism was the denial of sovereignty to colonised peoples. For Nkrumah, however, alien rule was only one component of a larger experience of colonial dependence and dependence was first and foremost an economic relation. 'Imperialism knows no law beyond its own interests', Nkrumah wrote in 1947 (Nkrumah [1947] 1962: 33). And this interest was to transform the colonial sphere into an appendage of the metropolitan economy—a site for the production of raw materials, the exploitation of non-white workers and the sale of European goods to a captive market. The forced integration of the colony into global circuits of trade, production and consumption generated a distorted colonial economy directed by foreign interests. Even after independence, he acknowledged that these form of economic dependence and domination persisted.

Economic dependence structured the social and political conditions of the colony. A people 'long subjected to foreign domination', Nkrumah observed, becomes habituated to dependence (Nkrumah 1970: 50). Echoing Frantz Fanon's better-known theories of colonial domination, Nkrumah highlighted the psychic dimensions of colonialism. 'Under arbitrary rule, people are apt to become lethargic; their senses are dulled. Fear becomes the dominant force in their lives; fear of breaking the law, fear of the punitive measures which might result from an unsuccessful attempt to break loose from their shackles'(Nkrumah 1970: 50).

From the international economy to the everyday experiences of the colonial subject, colonial rule operated around interlocked structures of domination. As such, the demand for 'Independence means much more than merely being free to fly our own flag and to play our own national anthem,' Nkrumah argued (Nkrumah 1967: 55). Independence required a 'revolutionary framework', enacted both nationally and internationally. Domestically, he emphasised the need to institutionalise postcolonial citizenship and democratic self-government. Starting with non-violent mass movements for independence—what Nkrumah called 'positive action'—colonial subjects were to overcome the psychic and social forms of dependence through political practice. While he insisted that the postcolonial state would be a parliamentary democracy, postcolonial citizenship went beyond elections and representation. As Jeffrey Ahlman's recent book, *Living with Nkrumahism*, illustrates, Ghanaian citizenship was a pedagogic practice that instilled the habits of independence through involvement in institutions like the Builder's Brigade, Young Pioneers and trade unions. Youth and workers were enrolled ideologically in the project of nation-building in these organisations. Citizens would learn, practise and perform 'civic duty and responsibility' as well as 'patriotism and loyalty for the country' (Ahlman 2017: 84–148). Nationalism, following this view, was not a backward-looking project that relied on pre-existing ties of language or kinship. Instead, Nkrumah acknowledged the arbitrariness of colonial boundaries and saw Ghanaian national identity as an inventive project, still in the process of collective construction.

Central to the nationalist project of postcolonial citizenship was a developmental and welfarist state that would restructure the national economy to ensure equality. 'The major advantage which

our independence has bestowed upon us is the liberty to arrange our national life according to the interests of our people and along with it, the freedom, in conjunction with other countries, to interfere with the play of [market] forces,' argued Nkrumah (Nkrumah 1970: 110). An interventionist state, as Nkrumah quoted Gunnar Myrdal, could 'alter considerably the direction of the market processes' that had produced dependence (Nkrumah 1970: 109–110). As with developmental states around the world in this period, Nkrumah's economic policy centered on modernising agriculture, investing in industrialisation and providing key social services, including universal education and healthcare.

But the postcolonial state was still trapped between *de jure* political independence and *de facto* economic dependence. For Ghana, reliance on the export of a single cash crop, cocoa, to finance development projects, exemplified this entrapment. International prices for products like cocoa fluctuated wildly, leaving the Ghanaian state vulnerable to global markets and unable to fund its national economic programme. International financing and aid, which also supported development projects, only exacerbated the externally oriented character of the postcolonial state.

Neocolonialism and economic dependence

Nkrumah's famous neologism—neocolonialism—diagnosed this persistence of economic dependence. Imperialism, he argued, had reinvented itself, adjusting to the 'loss of direct political control' by 'retain[ing] and extend[ing] its economic grip' (Nkrumah 1965: 33). From former imperial powers to international financial institutions, external actors played a dominant role in securing the postcolonial state's budgets, shoring up its financial systems and providing the markets for its primary goods. These actors could use their outsized economic power to shape domestic policy.

In his 1965 book, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, Nkrumah detailed the concessions and privileges former colonial powers demanded as part of the transfer of sovereignty: 'setting up military bases or stationing troops in former colonies and the supplying of "advisers" of one sort of another', demanding 'land concessions, prospecting rights for minerals and/or oil; the "right" to collect customs, to carry out administration, to issue paper money; to be exempt from customs duties and/or taxes for expatriate enterprises; and, above all, the "right" to provide "aid"'(Nkrumah 1965: 239–255). The result was a distorted form of postcolonial sovereignty where the elected representatives of the postcolonial state 'derive their authority to govern, not from the will of the people, but from the support which they obtain from their neocolonial masters'.

A Pan-African federation

If the nation-state had failed to overcome the problem of colonial dependence, if sovereignty could not shield new states from external compulsion, then the postcolonial political kingdom had to be reimagined. Nkrumah's vision of a Pan-African federation was an effort to do just that. A federation of African states would overcome colonial dependence by constituting a larger regional market and enhancing the capacity for regional development. Through economic integration, African states would create an African common market. Organised on the continental scale, African states could forego their dependence on international markets and reorient their economic relationships towards other African states. Having broken the political and economic boundaries' that separated them, African states could eliminate competition among them and collectively achieve a purchasing and bargaining power to rival other regions and international powers (Nkrumah 1970: 162–163).

A Pan-African federation was not simply a free-trade area or a customs union. Instead, the linkages between new African states would need to be invented. As Nkrumah often noted, given the character of colonial dependence, African states were more connected to international markets than to each other. Railways led from the resource-rich interiors to the ports in order to facilitate extraction. Telephone lines and postal services were routed through Europe. Nkrumah argued that a federal state organised at the continental level with equal representation for all member states could gradually transform these conditions. A political federation with powers to levy taxes, raise loans and engage in economic planning could establish infrastructural connections and diversify the regional economy. A strong federal centre would also ensure that the economic integration was egalitarian. In the absence of federal redistributive mechanisms, Nkrumah's government concluded, 'There is a real danger of existing urban and proto-industrial sectors capturing all the gains', recreating dependent relations among the union's members.[2]

Nkrumah led the fight for this model of a Pan-African federation until he was deposed from office in a 1966 coup. By 1963, however,

the debate had shifted decisively against his project. A majority of states backed a weaker model of integration—the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

National independence and internationalism working together

The failure of Nkrumah's programme might be taken to confirm that projects of nationalism and internationalism are ultimately incompatible. Yet the debates leading up to the formation of the OAU also began from the view that under existing economic dependence 'the emergence from colonialism is but illusory'.[3] Unity, they argued, 'is the accepted goal', but they offered competing conceptions of the precise combination of integration and independence. Today the dream of Pan-Africanism persists under the auspices of the African Union, which has begun the process of constituting a continental free-trade agreement as part of Agenda 2063. Before signing that agreement on behalf of the continent's second-largest economy, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa echoed Nkrumah, noting that 'by trading among ourselves, we are able to retain more resources in the continent'.

Nkrumah's commitment to developmentalism and economic planning are tied to his mid-twentieth-century context, but recovering the internationalism of anticolonial nationalism can help us navigate the impasses of our contemporary moment. In his vision of decolonisation, national independence had to be secured against a backdrop of imperial entanglements that generated hierarchy and dependence. To imagine you could entirely escape those entanglements was, Nkrumah argued, a kind of 'blind nationalism'. The contemporary crisis of neoliberal globalisation has birthed its own versions of blind nationalism. On the left, German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck and others defend a model of the democratic nation-state against the EU. On the right too, the fantasy of a national sovereignty unmoored from international law and institutions persists in the authoritarian populism sweeping across the global North.

Against this effort to cordon off the nation, Nkrumah insisted that international co-operation and regional federation were mechanisms for securing national independence. At the same time, he refused to reject national solidarity—the basis of 'political unity'. It helped to give form to the collective 'self' in self-determination. And it could do so without appealing to a distant past, but rather through the shared work of overcoming colonial domination and founding the postcolonial state. The problem was not the aspiration for national independence as such but that the institutional form of nation-state appeared ill-suited to secure that aim.

Those committed today to internationalism tend to see nationalist claims as insular, exclusionary and frequently violent. But the age of decolonisation reminds us that nationalism was also a vehicle for demanding democracy and international equality. Anticolonial nationalisms were not elite ideologies, as Elie Kedourie concluded, but mass movements that sought to overcome the layered structures of colonial domination.

These insights about the imbrication of the domestic and international as well as the necessary relationship between national independence and internationalism emerged from the global circuits that anticolonial nationalists inhabited. Nkrumah's formative years were spent in the United States and the United Kingdom. In these metropoles of imperial power, Nkrumah, like many other nationalists, cultivated subaltern internationalist networks. He studied at the historically black Lincoln University, following a path that Nigerian nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe had already travelled. During his student days, he joined black internationalist organisations like Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association. Tracing the long history of black seamen, he worked on a shipping line between the United States and Mexico. When he travelled to London, he helped to organise the Fifth Pan-African Congress with the Trinidadian Marxist George Padmore.

Nkrumah's nationalism emerged from these global and subaltern networks. These same networks also shaped the administration and political programme of the nascent postcolonial state. When Nkrumah became prime minister, Padmore served as his adviser of African affairs, while another West Indian, the St Lucian economist W. Arthur Lewis, took the post of economic adviser. W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois arrived shortly after independence as guests of Nkrumah. Accra became a black cosmopolis, hosting nationalists and freedom fighters from across the continent. Ghanaian nationalism, born out of black internationalism, became home to that internationalist project. Ghanaian policy also borrowed and adapted from global repertoires of nation-building. Programmes like the Young Pioneers and Builder's

Brigade were not home-grown and particularistic projects, but drawn from models used in places that ranged from Israel to the Communist bloc.

These global circuits that help constitute nationalist projects are not distinctive to anticolonial nationalism. Contemporary right-wing nationalisms deploy and inhabit their own transnational circuits—from the deadly vigilante violence in Charleston and Christchurch, to the lobbying efforts of white South African farmers.

The point then is not to recover a 'good' nationalism that is sufficiently or appropriately internationalist and cosmopolitan. Neither left nor right has a monopoly on internationalism. Moreover, Nkrumah's project, like anticolonial nationalism more broadly, was riven by its own contradictions. The conception of citizenship as ongoing political practice tied Ghanaians to the state and the Convention People's Party, closing the space for individual freedoms and reproducing the alienation it was meant to overcome. Moreover, Nkrumah's internationalist vision vacillated between a defence of national sovereignty in the United Nations and the delegation of sovereignty to a regional federation. Whether and how these positions might be reconciled was never addressed. As a result, the failure of the Pan-African federation culminated in the entrenchment of state sovereignty within the OAU.

Rather than search for a good nationalism, we need to pose the question of the value of the nation in historical context. The answers depend in part on the international background against which the national drama plays out. Even the most autarkic nationalists have to consider the external conditions required to make their project possible. There are no true hermit kingdoms and there is no meaningful choice to make between nationalism or internationalism as such. The question is how those interested in human emancipation may work within the nation-state to undo the global hierarchy of nation-states—to achieve an internationalist solidarity from the specific ground upon which we stand and to oppose the reactionary internationalism that our antagonists embody. Nkrumah saw the world in the questions Ghana faced; we must do no less.

Notes

1. This essay is republished from Dissent, a magazine based in the United States. It is drawn from Adom Getachew, 2019, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
2. Union Government Is Essential to Economic Independence and Higher Living Standards, in Files of Ex-Presidential Affairs, Folder RG/17/2/1047 OAU Papers, Public Records and Archives Administration Departments, Accra, Ghana.
3. Address by His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I at the Conference of Independent African States, June 16, 1960, Bureau of African Affairs Papers, Box 483 Conference on Independent African States, George Padmore Research Library on African Affairs, Accra, Ghana.

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Recommended Additional Readings

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FORTHCOMING / À PARAÎTRE

The Prophecy of Self-Emancipation: Walter Rodney and the Scholarship and Praxis of Defiance in the African World

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Walter Rodney joined the ancestors just over three decades ago. Yet his defiant scholarship—and defiant praxis—remain instructive, with vital lessons for contemporary toilers and strugglers in the African world, meaning the continent and the diaspora. His scholarly endeavours, invariably characterised by defiance, were no intellectual abstraction. Rather, they were linked to the pursuit of the liberation of Africans, at home and abroad, along with sufferers of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. He was at once an African world revolutionary and a world revolutionary.

He died, aged 38, in his native land of Guyana in 1980 on Friday, 13 June. The then president of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, promptly gave out that Rodney was a victim of misfortune. Rodney, Burnham said, had had bad luck. Burnham was as cynical and calculating as he was superstitious and cold-blooded. He failed to add that he had conveniently arranged Rodney's supposed bad luck, by ordering his assassination, presumably to be carried out on that day. Rodney's offence was in opposing Burnham's strongman rule—in other words, his dictatorship.[1]

Eusi Kwayana was prominent among those who fought in the trenches alongside Rodney in the struggle against Burnham's rule. In 1986, six years after Rodney's assassination, Kwayana published a biography of his fallen comrade. As biographies go, Kwayana's sketch of Rodney's life, at a breezy fifty-three pages, is rather abbreviated. Nor was Kwayana's work brought out by a marquee publisher in Europe or North America. It was published, instead, by the *Catholic Standard*, a weekly newspaper in Georgetown, Guyana. For these reasons, Kwayana's biography remains little known, having, alas, found no place of honour in the scholarship on Walter Rodney (Lewis 1998). Yet Kwayana's text brims with first-hand insights into Rodney's last, and most consequential, political campaign—the one to rid Guyana of the Burnham dictatorship (Westmaas 2004).

The leading theme in Kwayana's biographical sketch is self-emancipation. And Rodney, Kwayana offers, was preeminently a 'prophet of self-emancipation'. As an intellectual activist, Rodney's chief mission was 'preaching the gospel of the class of earners' (Kwayana 1986), a gospel that insists on the capacity of the working people, at all times and in all places, to bring about their own liberation—in fine, to fulfill the prophecy of self-emancipation.

Viewed in its totality, Rodney's literary output amounts to an organising manual centred on the prophecy of self-emancipation. We should take Kwayana at his word, meaning we should grapple seriously with the language he uses to describe Rodney. It bears emphasising that Kwayana did not call Rodney a 'theorist' of self-emancipation, terminology that is de rigueur in the secular academy. Rather, he describes Rodney as a prophet, using sacerdotal language, sacred terminology, religious diction. On Kwayana's telling, Rodney was a prophet preaching a gospel; he was not a preacher pontificating about self-emancipation. There is a difference, and a crucial one, between the prophet and the preacher. The preacher's task is largely one of reconciliation—reconciling congregants to current reality, to the powers that be. Soothing, encouraging, bearing good news—such is the mission of the preacher. The prophet, on the contrary, is the bearer of bad news—but with this important caveat: the news may be bad, but it needn't remain that way. A better world is possible.

The prophet's is a call to repentance, reparation, reconstruction—in other words, revolution. Small

wonder that the powerful generally have had such great aversion to prophecy and prophets. Preaching may be reconcilable with power; prophecy rarely is. The job of the prophet is a dangerous line of work, hazardous to his or her health. Hence Forbes Burnham's declaration about Walter Rodney and bad luck—a fate the powerful seem to have an uncanny ability to confer on those who challenge their hold on power.

Burnham could have had the good luck of hosting the event at which Rodney made his world debut as a prophet of self-emancipation. That event was the Congress of Black Writers. The key organisers of the Congress, most of whom hailed from the Caribbean but were based in Montreal, Canada, discussed with Burnham holding the Congress in Guyana. In publicly expressing interest in hosting the Congress of Black Writers, he was pretending, as always, taking his interlocutors for the proverbial ride. Ever the dissimulator, and never wanting to appear to be out of ideological fashion, Burnham was not really serious. The Congress, planned amid the global ascendancy of Black Power, was a quintessential Black Power event. Burnham, however, opposed Black Power, even as he feigned interest in it, just as he would later and with equal mendacity affect conversion to socialism and Marxism-Leninism. In fact, the only 'ism' the Guyanese strongman ever supported was Burnhamism—personal rule. Accordingly, the Congress of Black Writers convened not in Georgetown, but in Montreal, in 1968—a year of rebellion and revolutionary fervour all over the world (Austin 2018).

Even as the Congress was in session, Burnham's ambassador to Canada was offering a rejoinder to it. There was no need for a Black Power movement in his country, the ambassador offered, as Black Power was already in effect in Burnham's Guyana. The Zairian strongman, Mobutu Sese Seko—to whom Burnham bears comparison, from self-fashioning to ideological appropriation—would later, and more infamously, make a similar proclamation. Black Power is sought all over the world, Mobutu made his billboards broadcast on the occasion of the epic pugilistic contest in Kinshasa in 1974 between Muhammad Ali and George Foreman, but it is realised in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Characteristically, the Zairian strongman lied. Mobutu, like Burnham, was slandering Black Power. But unlike Burnham, Mobutu—who was deeply implicated in the murder of Patrice Lumumba—mercifully refrained from appropriating the Marxist moniker. As the first high-profile victim of neocolonialism in postcolonial Africa, the martyred Lumumba necessarily became part of the iconography of the Congress of Black Writers, alongside other male icons, most notably Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X and Kwame Nkrumah.

Walter Rodney was invited to the Congress by its lead organiser, Rosie Douglas, who later became prime minister of Dominica. He was in his element at the Congress, arguably the single-most consequential Black Power gathering ever. It was there that Rodney, then all of twenty-six years old, a freshly minted PhD from SOAS and a little-known lecturer in African History at the Jamaica campus of the University of the West Indies, strode onto the stage of history.

Horace Campbell attended the Congress of Black Writers and wrote an assessment of it, which was published in the student newspaper at York University in Toronto, where he was then an undergraduate (Campbell 1968). Unless he is a meticulous archivist, Campbell likely does not have a copy of that article. The York University library certainly does not, since it began microfilming the student newspaper only in 1969, the year after Campbell wrote his postmortem. But not to worry. There is an ace in the hole—or, as Kwayana, a biblical scholar of sorts, may have phrased it, a ram in thicket. The rescuers are those outstanding, if unwitting, archivists of the global black liberation struggles and, more generally, antinomian movements everywhere. These would be the imperialist and capitalist intelligence services, in this case the special branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, popularly known as the Mounties.

Naturally, the Mounties took a keen interest in the Congress of Black Writers. Their eyes and ears, including some black ones, were present at the Congress. The Mounties were also avid collectors of material generated by and about the Congress, including Campbell's postmortem in that student newspaper. Of the Congress, the young Campbell wrote: 'No one who went will really be the same again.' (Campbell 1968). From all indications, Horace Campbell was among the transformed. So, too, was Walter Rodney, who—despite all that Horace Campbell would later write about him (Campbell 1987)—did not figure in Campbell's postmortem of the Congress of Black Writers. Rodney did figure in the calculations of the neocolonial authorities in Jamaica,

who banned him from returning to the island after his attendance at the Congress of Black Writers, the case for doing so having been provided by the local intelligence apparatus inherited from the British colonialists (West 2006).

Prophecy is a function of sociology, not biology—which is to say, prophets are made, not born. As a prophet of self-emancipation, Rodney first displayed his calling in Jamaica. There, his chief interlocutors were Rastafarians and radical intellectuals, many of whom were also Rastas, albeit mainly of the autodidactic sort. Notably, too, Rodney's Jamaican interlocutors were largely male, as seen in the title of his collection of Jamaica-based, Black Power-aligned speeches and essays, *The Groundings with my Brothers* (Rodney 1969).

Rodney's expulsion from Jamaica, which in turn led to a social and political explosion on the island, raised his stock up and down the radical Caribbean (Meeks 1996; Quinn 2014). The Trinidad Revolution of 1970, that epochal Caribbean event in the era of Black Power, may well have happened without Rodney's expulsion from Jamaica. But it likely would not have happened the way it actually did without the regional after-effects of Rodney's expulsion from Jamaica. For those involved in it, the organising manuals of the Trinidad Revolution were manifold. Notably, however, they included *Groundings with my Brothers,* which was read alongside textbooks on guerrilla warfare by such figures as Ernest 'Che' Guevara, Mao Zedong and Kwame Nkrumah (Ryan and Stewart 1995).

Another fortunate outcome of Rodney's expulsion from Jamaica was his best-known book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, which, like his overall message of self-emancipation, remains relevant today (Rodney 1972). This book certainly would not, could not, have been written the way it was, if it could have been written at all, without his presence on the African continent and more particularly at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. (Harisch 2020). Certain deans of African Studies had given a cool reception to Rodney's first book, *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast*, his revised doctoral thesis (Rodney 1970). Their response was far chillier to *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, which they practically put on intellectual ice, generally refusing to review in their journals. They peremptorily dismissed it as a work of polemic unworthy of serious scholarly attention (Johnson 2021). It was not the first, or last, time that a defiant text on Africa was declared by deans and dons to be polemical, tendentious, undeserving of their erudite attention—as if erudition was theirs to grant or withhold at will. Inherent in the prophecy of self-emancipation is the imperative to break the stranglehold of the intellectual gatekeepers and to pry loose the tyrannical grip of those who uphold academic orthodoxy. That is the purpose of defiant scholarship on global Africa, as practised by Rodney.

Defiance rang out, too, in Rodney's last outstanding work of scholarship, *A History of the Guyanese Working People*, an essential handmaiden to his political project upon returning to Guyana after his Tanzanian sojourn (Rodney 1981). Predictably, Rodney taught and practised the essence of his prophetic message. Rodney's students, Kwayana, said: 'Left his courses interested in discovering the story of the oppressed classes … and learning of their efforts and limited successes in the destiny of self-emancipation, for which, Rodney taught, there was no substitute (Kwayana 1968). If the struggles of African peoples in the modern world—a world they were so instrumental in making—proves anything, it is just that: There is no substitute for self-emancipation. This is the prophetic message, the revolutionary doctrine, of Walter Rodney for toilers and strugglers in the twenty-first century.

Note

1. Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to Enquire and Report on the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of the Late Dr. Walter Rodney on Thirteenth Day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty at Georgetown [Guyana], 8 February 2016. Available online at https://radar.auctr.edu/islandora/object/coi%3Arodney_report.

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Walter Rodney (1942–1980)

https://www.nofi.media/2018/02/dr-walter-rodney/1316

Reparations, Knowledge and the Decolonial University[1]

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USA

In the introduction to *Decolonising the Academy* (2003), an intellectual project developed to place African Diaspora Studies as one of the major vectors of the unfinished decolonising process, I asserted that the academy, the university and the larger knowledge production apparatus is perhaps one of the most colonised of spaces. In every discipline, one is confronted with a production of knowledge that assumes European epistemologies, ideas, timelines, as the defining frameworks for intellectual work. This thereby creates a hierarchy of knowledge in which African peoples' experiences still remain at the bottom or outside of consideration, in the same measure as are Black Lives still today.

A few other related and relevant texts must be indicated here. Sylvia Wynter advanced an ideological position that arose through her work at the Institute of the Black World in the 1970s, along with her generation of scholars, including Sterling Stuckey, Howard Dodson, Vincent Harding, Walter Rodney. The larger context was an understanding of Black Studies as an insurgent field organised to provide the knowledge component of the various political and social movements demanding correction at the epistemological or knowledge-production level. Thus, in succeeding years, best described in her chapter, 'On How we Mistook the Map for the Territory and Reimprisoned Ourselves in Our Unbearable Wrongness of Being, of *Desêtre*: Black Studies Toward the Human Project', Wynter saw the current iteration of Black Studies as having lost its way. She recalls some of those aesthetic and political movements that actually wanted a 'whole new system of ideas' and concludes that, instead, we never arrived at the 'new territory' and remained without the connection from the 'map' to this new place (Wynter 2005).

Never fully arriving at that territory or place where we could claim to rewrite the script of anti-Blackness, we ended up still being re-territorialised under whiteness in the Euro-American model of the university with its assumption of the control of knowledge. This status remains particularly salient when the university is often that assemblage of theoretical positions that inform and cohere state practices. Thus, in my view, is enacted a continued violence at the epistemological level, which also leaves a variety of subjects defined as non-conforming to the 'mythical norm' (Lorde 1984) unable to breathe, i.e. to live fully in the world. The graphic representations of the visual 'I can't breathe' suffocations ended up having symbolic resonances and multiplicative effect, as we saw during the killing of George Floyd in May 2020 and the activism that followed.

In this context we can indicate relatedly as well the caution offered by Walter Rodney, that the academics in the neocolonial or postcolonial context are the ones often creating the limits. For Rodney, the caution had to do with the fact that:

> Black people are here in these institutions as part of the development of Black struggle, but only as a concession designed to incorporate us within the structure … I am thinking also of the books, the references, the theoretical assumptions, and the entire ideological underpinnings of what we is taught and studied in every single discipline. (Rodney 1990: 112–113)

We can conclude, therefore, that the ideas of a certain acceptance of the status quo are built into the academic enterprise if these ideas are not challenged. For example, Africana Studies as a field has not extended to match the current scholarship and knowledge in African Diaspora Studies. Its geographical reach contains only partial coverage of the United States and perhaps a little or no African history. There is miniscule Caribbean coverage except in relation to larger topics, but without really accessing the

full range and breadth of Caribbean Studies as representing not just the archipelagic islands but also the circum-Caribbean and the Caribbean diaspora (Boyce-Davies 2013). Afro-Latin America is often not included in the frameworks of the larger understanding of what is African American in hemispherical context.

Cornell University's Africana Studies, for example, the founding unit in the field, is emblematic of the inability of the field to move outside of the reductions into which the academy has placed this unit. Illustrative of this is the rejection of a Caribbean Students Association request for a minor (Stamm 2020). In this writer's view, this rejection comes across then as amazingly short-sighted in a field which was founded by student demands for studies that challenged the Eurocentric education that was then and still is dominant in the academy. Thus, the current chair's assertion, even as he has written articles about 'global Africa' (Taiwo 2015) in the past, that the Africana model has 'worked for the last fifty years, it has continued to inspire others both within the country and in other parts of the world' (Stamm 2020), leaves no room for innovation or extension or elaboration. Indeed, in the current version of Africana Studies at Cornell, administratively managed by continental African scholars, the rejection of a Caribbean Studies minor indicates a certain myopia, perhaps along with a conservative political orientation or, more generously, a limited understanding of the breadth of the African diaspora, or global Africa as it is called in the Social Sciences. The importance of a field organised then to create an intellectual paradigm that challenges Eurocentric knowledge dominance comes across as not having evolved. In other words, an innovative field is no longer to innovate again or move out of a colonised status in the academy.

So how do we repair this continuing damage that accepts limitations and begin again to reclaim some of the lost direction, i.e. to go back to our map as it were? First of all, every discipline in the current university context needs minimally a counter-discourse (internal and external) represented within its curricular and research frameworks. Anthropology, for example, cannot continue to deny its gendered colonialist beginnings but should also include the work of Black women anthropologists like Zora Neale Hurston, who still has no real place in the discipline. One can say the same for History and Political Science and the range of fields in Arts and Sciences.

In this regard, in the wake of the Black Lives Matter activism following the killing of George Floyd, calls from students to #DoBetterCornell led Martha Pollack, president of Cornell University, to welcome institutional anti-racist projects. As members of one of the departments that historically maintained an entrenched British imperial white supremacist framing, faculty of colour proposed a change of the name of Cornell's English Department to the Department of Literatures in English. With that change was also assumed a redistribution of its curricular representations, so that medieval and pre-eighteenth-century England would not be the dominant required mandate for students who were majoring in English. My colleague Mukoma wa Ngugi and I argued then, following Ngugi wa Thiong'o et al, 'On the Abolition of the English Department' (1968), that English Departments have tended to be linked to the advancement, maintenance and acceptance of the culture of the British Empire and are thereby among those institutions complicit in maintaining dominant structural inequities by the very nature of their naming and orientations in terms of what they teach and how they teach that literature. The faculty responses were overwhelmingly favourable and we were pleased that, in a department which included a vibrant body of subjects of inquiry not captured by the current naming, a series of discussions to challenge ourselves and our contexts resulted in a document that our colleagues affirmed, by their signatures, as demonstrating precisely this need to create a 'more just and equitable department'. We asserted then that a move to a Department of Literatures in English would do the following:

- Present a more accurate description of the wide range of literatures that we teach and study already;
- Open the Department to a wider pool of students who see English as limiting their study with us (it leaves us always explaining that an English Department actually does literary studies);
- Move beyond the privileging of 'English' rather than 'Literatures' as the primary descriptor.

We saw this move, while being first among the major universities in the United States and Europe, as also following similar moves at the University of the West Indies, which created a Department of Literatures in English, and other universities like University of Brasilia, which created a Department of Literary Theory and Literatures, both in the early 1990s. This formal change to being named Department of Literatures in English was fully approved

by all levels of the university in February 2021, though we learned subsequently that Bryn Mawr College had approved a similar name change in November 2020, influenced by the Cornell move but actually formally occurring in advance of our final approval. They describe the basis of their change as also wanting to demonstrate their 'commitment to de-colonial approaches to literary studies'.

Reparative justice, then, becomes a major and substantial point as we think of an imagined decolonial university. The CARICOM Reparations Commission created a plan, which represents a renewed aspect of an ongoing historical conversation about what is still owed to Black people, approachable from a variety of viewpoints, from the demands of the enslaved for reparations and return to the continent, to Rastafari's continued articulations of the need for those reparations and returns, to those of the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA) and the current CARICOM reparative justice claims. In fact, if we use the lens of the Black Lives Matter movements, we can assert that all these continuing claims carry at their core the argument that Black lives are often without value in the scheme of national projects and are therefore simultaneously subject to police brutality on the streets and subordination in the academy, and these two sometimes converge. The normalising of Black abjection, then, always has to be challenged and a new reclaimed humanity put back on the table, it seems historically. Thus, it is worth recalling Frantz Fanon (1963) on this point: 'Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it.'

The CARICOM Ten Point Reparations Plan is listed as follows:

1. Full Formal Apology
2. Repatriation
3. Indigenous Peoples Development Program
4. Cultural Institutions
5. Public Health Crisis
6. Illiteracy Eradication
7. African Knowledge Program
8. Psychological Rehabilitation
9. Technology Transfer
10. Debt Cancellation

The claim specific to this discussion of reparative justice is Number 7, an African Knowledge programme. Yet, we hasten to assert right away that a reconfiguration of 'African Knowledge' is one among the group of reparative items that conscious academics in the various iterations of Black Studies can do themselves. While we recognise that several of these reparative justice claims, like debt cancellation, require government intervention, reparations clearly cannot assume that it is only a government-to-people process or the stereotypical handout. Instead, a series of reparative steps to reverse the conditions in which African peoples globally still find themselves must come from multiple directions, including the academy or educational complexes.

Though often still a site of necessary contestation in the institutional academic context in which we work, what is under our control, is the knowledge-production area, the epistemic, therefore. I want to linger on knowledge here as it is the centre of what this discussion asserts.

Under the category of African Knowledge, this is what CARICOM states (my emphasis):

> The forced separation of Africans from their homeland has resulted in **cultural and social alienation from identity and existential belonging.** Denied the right in law to life, and divorced by space from the source of historic self, Africans have craved the right to return and **knowledge of the route to roots.**
>
> A program of action is required to **build 'bridges of belonging'.** Such projects as school exchanges and culture tours, community artistic and performance programs, entrepreneurial and religious engagements, as well as political interaction, are required in order to **neutralise the void created by slave voyages.**
>
> Such actions will serve to **build knowledge networks** that are necessary for community rehabilitation.

Doing quick cultural analysis as we do, some items jump out right away, as indicated in bold font above: cultural and social alienation from identity and existential belonging; knowledge of the route to roots; building 'bridges of belonging' and neutralising 'the void created by slave voyages'. Cumulatively, then, building 'knowledge networks that are necessary for community rehabilitation' is paramount.

How does all of this matter in the current university, a site for colonised identities as we already know? The decolonial university is clearly an imagined university, an im/possibility in that larger meaning, aspirational nonetheless and therefore possible. A very detailed lecture by Rinaldo Walcott, 'After Equity: "Another University Now"', offers a range of possibilities (Walcott 2021).

As we consider a range of subjects for a larger advancing of knowledge, there remains an

incomplete knowledge acquisition process—that continued epistemic violence on our students in the form of missing areas of study, i.e. the what is left out. First of all, the distribution of knowledge should ensure an equality of exchange whereby the scholarship, thinkers and ideas from the global south are more readily available or sourced in the United States and Europe rather than the exportation of knowledge products in the North to South direction only.

My range of suggested reparative possibilities include:

- Going back in history to reclaim an originary impetus, by examining the Black experience throughout the last century, from the 1900 Pan-African conference in London and subsequent Pan-African conferences to the range of forums, meetings, organisation's resolutions and principles and conferences on Black Culture in Paris, Rome, Senegal, Nigeria. All of these included resolutions for the amelioration of the cultural and social alienation indicated in the wake of enslavement and colonialism.
- Studying and offering means of transforming knowledge from many different fields and angles that include full representations of all contributors from different geographies.
- Reclaiming the initial impetus of Black Studies centres, programmes, departments and institutes, many of which remain captured by sometimes very specific interests, still battling for space in that same university hierarchy.
- Creating new paradigms that go beyond the received nation-state formations that dominate now in which primacy is given to each country as opposed to studying these relationally.
- Rewriting the script of Haiti and by extension Black subjectivity in the Americas in general.
- Providing ways to examine contemporary health, food, environmental and wellbeing vulnerabilities of African peoples globally, using models such as those of the Cuban medical system, which has global impact.

Caribbean Studies is often a drop in the academic ocean and rejected even by the leading Africana Studies department. As we have indicated above, the knowledge generated in Caribbean Studies should be one of the key themes or concentrations of Black Studies units anywhere, particularly given the mobile nature of the Caribbean experience and the circulation of its ideas, which impact on the global Black condition. But what about Afro-Asia or Afro-indigeneity in a remodelled reparative knowledge framework? For example, the misguided, limited and distorted understandings of 'caste' in recent publications that deliberately ignored the work of Oliver Cromwell Cox, whose *Caste, Class and Race* is still one of the most advanced analyses of these interconnecting systems of oppression, has to be challenged. In the United States context, African-American Studies should be available in all its historical and socio-economic and cultural relations but with a knowledge that there is also another available African-American (or Afro-Latin American) community in South and Central America.

Perhaps the language of Trans-America, as with Trans-Africa, should be similarly argued. Finally, how does a university respond to its local community's needs? In any given community, the university of necessity has an obligation to represent the largest range of intellectual interests in the broadest movement of that term but always with an eye to advancing the interests of local Black and indigenous populations in their orbit.

As we move beyond the settler-colonial university, including the University of the West Indies, we can begin to imagine and create the decolonial university. We navigate always between, on the one hand, a past of dignity and legendary greatness, and on the other, the starkness of the initial history of dispossession and economic difficulty, brought on sometimes by horrendous leadership, often in collusion with external actors—environment, climate, location. But through it all there remains an amazing resistance of its people matched by an outstanding creativity. We live with a series of conflicting representations, but above all a definition of an unrelenting humanity for African people, from what it takes to survive in the harshest conditions to how one begins again after everything falls apart, to how one lives a life of beauty and joy in spite of institutional and state-level attempts at continued subordination.

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has also published thirteen critical editions on African, African Diaspora and Caribbean literature and culture, such as the two-volume collection of critical and creative writing, *Moving Beyond Boundaries* (1995): *International Dimensions of Black Women's Writing* (volume 1), *Black Women's Diasporas* (volume 2); the three-volume *Encyclopedia of the African Diaspora* (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2008) and *Claudia Jones Beyond Containment: Autobiographical Reflections, Poetry, Essays* (2011). A member of the scientific committee for UNESCO's updated *General History of Africa*, she edited the epistemological forum on Global Blackness for the African Diaspora volume. Her forthcoming contracted monograph is titled *Alternative Presidents. Black Women's Right to Political Leadership*.

Note

1. A preliminary version of this paper titled Towards a Decolonial University, which included the place of Haiti in academic frameworks, was presented at the inauguration of the Haitian Studies Institute at Brooklyn College in 2016, and the current version which linked it to reparative justice at the The University in an Age of Activism forum, organised by the University of the West Indies, December 2020.

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FORTHCOMING / À PARAÎTRE

The central idea of this book is that African children are future-makers. The book explores the connections between changing childhoods and versions of African futures to develop insights into how children are living embodiments of history and prospective agents of social change. Drawing on research in diverse cultural ecologies, the authors of ten chapters discuss findings linked to apprenticeship, learning, work, rights, schools, peace, education, aspirations, conflicts and refugee integration—and how these are encountered by children in everyday life. They describe studies in Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The book moves beyond hegemonic notions on African children, affording them the capacity to aspire, widening their creative imaginations in ways that deepen our knowledge of past and present childhoods. While tracing the problems of childhood in the exigencies of society, children are conceptualised neither as victims nor heroes. Instead, they are social participants whose experiences, values, desires, practices and hopes create a fertile analytical ground from which we may theorise the future and temporality more fully.

Cyberpower and Pan-Africanism

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A revolution is taking place that is transforming almost every aspect of society on a global level. Africa has been engulfed by this transformation, as has the entire African diaspora. Pan-Africanism, too—the discourse and action that links Africa and the African diaspora—is being transformed in the digital age. The purpose of this article is to present key discussion questions and a conceptual framework for cyberpower and its effects, based on a summation of the authors' experience.

After several decades of using home computers for our own reasons, we began to help others do the same. We taught low-income mothers how to use an Apple computer. We joined forces with a community-run computer lab in an African-American central city. We created loads of Web content about Black people. We studied public computing at community libraries. Most recently, we partnered with local government and others on community broadband. And we wrote about these projects and posted the results online. (See links on our own websites and most recently http://eblackcu.org.)

Among the important themes we identified were:

1) The value of cyberpower;
2) Overcoming the digital divide;
3) Three guiding principles for the digital age; and
4) Pan-Africanism.

We expand on these themes below. The studies were conducted primarily among Black communities in the United States, part of the African diaspora, and in the following paper we highlight some of the lessons we learned. We urge CODESRIA's audience not to adopt them wholesale, but to critique and repurpose these ideas for the African continent.

Cyberpower

In the age of the Internet, if someone can't send an email or browse the Web they are much like people in the age of print who could not write but had to sign their name with an X. Yet many people and communities are still catching up to the Information Age and what digital tools offer. One word for what they offer is 'cyberpower'—power in cyberspace.

The usefulness of this word can be understood in comparison to another useful word, 'e-commerce'. E-commerce sums up what businesses, coders and consumers do in the online marketplace. The word itself helped to steer more people to buy and sell online, and e-commerce advanced as a result. Our experience with the word cyberpower is much the same: the word came into use based on practice, then it mobilised more people to exercise their cyberpower. As with e-commerce, when you wield cyberpower, the results are visible as power in the real world, in a cycle from actual to virtual to actual.

Digital inequality tends to impact the same people that older inequalities such as poverty, oppression, discrimination and exclusion do. But the new digital tools are so powerful that not using them sets individuals, groups and communities even farther apart. The hardware and software are still changing. Only those who use them are able to help shape them and shape the future. And a global conversation is taking place every day online. They're talking about you—but can you answer back? If not, cyberpower is what you need.

Even as technology changes, diffuses and becomes cheaper, digital inequalities persist. For certain populations, access is impossible or is controlled, skills are more rare, support isn't there, or the tools and resources themselves just are not relevant to them. If the core conversations and the rich information sources are all online, yet not everyone is participating or even able to observe, how do we maintain democracy? Recent calls from the United Nations and elsewhere for a dialogue of civilisations, rather than a clash of civilisations, could be taking place online, but only if everyone can see, hear and speak in cyberspace.

It is not yet well understood, but communities in crisis—caused by poverty, disaster, war or some other adversity—are known to turn to technology for response and recovery. Cellphones, pop-up cybercafés, the Internet, all helped with recovery when America's Gulf Coast was hit with hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita and Wilma in 2005. During England's deadliest foot-and-mouth-disease outbreak in 2001, farmers on quarantined farms quickly mastered home Internet use. The US armed forces now strategise in terms of land, sea, air and cyberspace. Immigrants all over the world have created digital diasporas. Whatever language people use to describe it, cyberpower is the driver in all these cases.

Hip hop can be seen as a technology-based African-American response to the crises of poverty, oppression and exclusion and a cyberpower project. In a community-based seminar, we proposed to create an album of original raps about IT. Students and community members were sceptical. One said, 'We don't know anything about computers.' But all the music-making was digital, put together in bedrooms and basements, and the result was a compilation of fifteen tracks advocating cyberpower. Sample these lyrics by one of the artists, S. Supreme:

> Information technology
>
> Skipping the Black community with no apology
>
> Flipping the power off
>
> On an already alarming deficit,
>
> So please, please, PLEASE, PASS THE MESSAGE KID!
>
> Ohh Umm Diddy Dum Dum
>
> If he don't turn his Ice off
>
> And turn his head past the gas of Microsoft
>
> He'll really be lost like the tribe, 'cause the time is now and that's a bet
>
> How you throwing up a set and you ain't on the Net,
>
> Yet you say you're a G?
>
> I said I'm not Chuck D, but welcome to the terror
>
> If you ain't ready to build in this information era
>
> Survival of the fittest, our rights get diminished, cats be on their Crickets
>
> But don't know about Linux.

Another example of cyberpower is our experience with a 2002 auction of Malcolm X's papers. The sale was discovered online, then thousands protested online and the sale was stopped. The incident began as we were monitoring eBay for items related to Malcolm X. We discovered that eBay's auction house, Butterfields, was about to sell thousands of pages of Malcolm's diaries and notes, recovered from a storage locker, for an expected price of USD 500,000. Using the listserv H-Afro-Am (moderated by Abdul Alkalimat), this news spread across multiple communities of scholars, librarians, activists and others. The American Library Association created a story about it on their online news site. *The New York Times* did a story. The *Guardian* newspaper ran an article about the impending sale and the online groundswell against it. The listservs and the news articles alerted the family as well as the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture at the New York Public Library. They negotiated the cancellation of the sale. A final agreement with the seller transferred ownership to the family and housed the materials at the Schomburg. In our terms, actual life went into virtual space to create actual change. The important historical papers (actual) were being auctioned (virtual); thousands of people were mobilised (virtual); traditional media carried the story (virtual and actual); and ultimately the materials were withdrawn from sale and placed intact in a public library archive for access by scholars and the public (actual).

Yet another demonstration of cyberpower comes from Wilmington, North Carolina. Faced with a teardown of their public housing project, in 1994 tenants made use of the relatively new public library computers and within a few months wrangled their own computer and Internet access (actual). By means of email and listservs (virtual) they recruited architects and planners to help them obtain, digest and answer developer and city plans. In this way, they won a seat at the negotiating table and, more importantly, were able to effect changes to the teardown plan, which included interim and long-term housing for residents.

All sorts of new tools for exercising cyberpower are available. Using them locates you in a lively community where you can share ideas, do battle and change the world. Cyberpower is involved in two related activities in the process of empowerment: 1) in the use of digital tools by individuals, groups and organisations for their own goals, and/or 2) the use of digital tools as part of community organising. The general idea is that people can use cyberpower in the virtual space to get power in the actual space. Cyberorganisers help get people cyberpower just as community organisers help get communities empowered.

Overcoming the Digital Divide

In the 1990s, the 'digital divide' became a concept and a rallying call to overcome the new inequalities that came with the digital age. Early surveys in the US defined the digital divide as the social gap between those who have access to and use computers and the Internet and those who do not. The digital divide has evolved with new technologies, but the haves are still ahead of the have-nots, and even the have-somes. This is because these technologies have been created not to serve the people, but to serve the powerful. Yet we have seen them serve the people.

A digital divide movement has arisen in each country that adopted digital ways of working and living. This movement discovered four parts to the divide: access, literacy, content and support. Access means having electricity, broadband or wifi, and computing devices of all kinds. Literacy means knowing how to use these tools or knowing how to learn them. Content means information that is relevant to you—is it in your own language? Can you make your own life better with it? And support means someone to provide help and advice. The only way to overcome the digital divide is to tackle all four parts.

For example, organisers from our university reached out to a local Black community. Their goal was to create a website of the history of this community. We held community meetings to celebrate and talk with local leaders. We met one-on-one with those who had saved documents and audiovisuals of the history. We recruited high-school students to scan documents and found ways to convert old tapes. We used the open source Web publishing platform Omeka to organise and display the collection. The breakthroughs came when we found the community's 'Facebook archivist' with 9,000 photos uploaded in one year, and when we linked the Omeka collection to Facebook so people could find it. Seven years later visitors continue to use the site.

Another example: A community-based computer lab needed more visitors. They organised one of us (Alkalimat) to speak on several occasions at the local public library. At every session, a packed house listened to Abdul explain what the Internet was about and why they needed to get online. Visitors then found their way to the local computer lab, where students and community members taught small classes to give people basic skills in digital literacy and helped them discover it was not hard. Success brought us more computers. Elementary school students and retirees were the biggest participants. A community garden became a summer project. We produced a booklet to explain what had been done and spread the word.

And: We connected with Chinese students who were looking into a project based on the Chinese diaspora. This project began when Chinese-American professionals decided to partner with teachers in rural China. They donated computers and the teachers taught community members as well as students. Individuals who had migrated to China's cities sent a few computers back to their families, and the learning process engaged many people.

And: A million-dollar grant built three large public libraries in Namibia. The design was created in Washington, DC and librarians did not receive any training. The final libraries held books and computers for public use. Even though the librarians expected people to check out books, the heaviest use of the libraries was community members at the Internet-enabled computers and printers, which were otherwise basely available in the country.

And: A US national broadband plan attracted attention from telecom reformers who wanted to bring fast Internet to their entire community. A year of fact-finding and grant-writing got underway. The 'Below Ground' project, was to bring fibre to the community. The 'Above Ground' project was to educate and support people who had not previously used high-speed Internet. However, with heavy lobbying from the telecom industry, money was directed mostly to the Below Ground aspect, with many conditions. Without efforts at building literacy, content and support, the Below Ground project—directed only at access—could not make nearly as much headway, and the community remains digitally divided.

And: After at least five years of many individuals and groups setting up experimental computer access spots in many US communities, the funding dried up and volunteers were flagging. But public library systems had embraced the task. Public access computers, printers and scanners became the norm in community libraries nationwide. People asked the library staff for help in using them. A new role had been invented for libraries, as cybernavigators, or tech helpers. Demand for this help is now so high that even during the pandemic some libraries are providing help by phone to people under stay-at-home orders. The library has become a public computing place.

Three values: cyberdemocracy, collective intelligence and information freedom

Our work has identified three fundamental values that are both desirable and possible in the digital age. They guide our understanding of social justice in this revolutionary technological transformation. They will ensure that our new society does not reproduce the social inequality of the past, but is inclusive, democratic and as revolutionary as the technology.

Cyberdemocracy

Everyone has to be included in the digital age. On one level this is like fighting for public education, the public library and even public health. Our cyber rights must be protected as civil rights. This is in opposition to the surveillance that is practised by tech companies.

Cyberdemocracy is also one of the great targets of any serious digital-age reparations programme. To repair what has been done to Black people means re-establishing them securely and fairly in the twenty-first century. That includes equity in digital access, content, literacy and support. Plus, cyberdemocracy is a call for public computing. The leading sites for public computing so far have been public libraries and schools at all levels. But cyberdemocracy means Internet access for all.

Collective intelligence

Large datasets are the rule today for corporations and rich governments. Open access journals that offer free online content are surging in number. To go further, the primary documents of Black history, such as every slave narrative, must be digitised and formatted as a searchable dataset. A digital archive can include the research done on the texts. Our knowledge is about to leap exponentially.

A major aspect of collective intelligence is consensus. Consensus is the ultimate summation of consciousness. On the basis of cyberdemocracy we can build connectivity to achieve consensus. This will require shifting our focus from hierarchy to egalitarian interdependence.

Collective intelligence overpowers the segmentation of knowledge. Different disciplines contribute to our databases without prejudice. The community contributes as well as the campus, on the basis of lifelong learning. The map of knowledge structures and clusters, now organised in distinct academic disciplines, is about to be reconceptualised and reorganised.

Information freedom

The new information technologies produce and distribute information in such a way that drives its exchange value down towards zero. For example, new software is soon discounted and then distributed with hardware in a bundle at minimal cost. This new thinking has impacted scholarly discourse and the exchange of information so that global networks are emerging based on information freedom. Early examples are the organizations H-Net in the US and JiscMail in the UK. These organisations established servers to enable scholars and others to create free discussion lists on topics in the Humanities, Social Sciences and, in the case of JiscMail, the hard sciences as well. These services continue today. Another is the US National Institutes of Health, which has decided that it is in the general public interest that government-sponsored, health-related research is made available for free.

The privatisation of global culture is a dangerous trend. Cultural and scientific information about and from all of humanity has to be preserved and shared for all, and for our descendants. It doesn't make sense in the age of the Internet and the World Wide Web that we still have to pay to read the major leaders in our intellectual tradition, be they W. E. B. DuBois, Martin Luther King or Malcolm X.

Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism has one foot in the reality of each African country and the other in the African diaspora and its connections with African descendants everywhere. The most powerful manifestation of Pan-Africanism is how collaboration and joint action takes place between countries in the African continent, involving governments, institutions, movements and people in general. Cyberpower involves all of this.

Unity within the African continent is a refutation of the colonial system if based on the autonomous self-determination of African people themselves. Extending this unity to pro-Africa forces in the African diaspora reverses the evil destruction of the slave trade and can lead to an era of rebuilding. Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century must mean cyberpower for the African masses guided by the principles of cyberdemocracy, collective intelligence, and information freedom.

The Danger of ADOS: How Disinformation Campaigns Threaten Reparations and Pan-African Movements through Digital Media

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Disinformation is the intentional spreading of false information for manipulative purposes (Fallis 2015). It has been used on digital media platforms by various campaigns, nationally and internationally, to attach false narratives to Black activist movements. The false narratives are then amplified by bots, fake accounts and accounts using digital Black face (Freelon et al. 2020). Disinformation campaigns are also driven by online influencers or spokespersons and amplified by manipulated followers.

From 2016, the long-standing US-based reparations movement has struggled with a targeted disinformation campaign aimed at disempowering and derailing the long-standing reparations movement. The American Descendants of Slavery (ADOS) movement, branded as a new civil rights and reparations advocacy group, has used digital media platforms to spread disinformation, attack US-based reparations activists, derail federal reparations legislation and promote right-wing anti-immigration policies (Drayton 2019; Media Matters 2019; Nkonde et al. 2021).

The implications of digital media-amplified disinformation campaigns targeting Black activist movements are widespread and present a potential threat to Pan-Africanist movements for civil and human rights.

The creation of ADOS: Pushing nativism into the reparations movement

The American Descendants of Slavery movement was founded in 2016 by Antonio Moore, an attorney, and Yvette Carnell, a social media commentator. Commonly referred to by its acronym ADOS, Carnell and Moore promoted the hashtag-powered movement through their weekly YouTube shows focusing on African-American economic issues. With each live broadcast reaching approximately 30,000-plus people, Carnell and Moore's new 'identity' spread quickly.

Carnell and Moore promote ADOS as a unique ethnic identifier for African Americans. They assert that the term ADOS is a legal marker that would make reparations finally attainable in the United States due to its 'specificity' for the African-American justice claim. The new identifier would reject Africa as the original homeland for African Americans, it would reject African identity, and most significantly, it would reject Pan-Africanism (Carnell 2018).

Previously, a similar movement was launched in Louisville, Kentucky, by businessman, Norris Shelton. Shelton founded an organisation called American Slaves Inc, in 2001. He also founded a political party called Descendants of American Slaves (DOAS) in 2012 (Pohlman 2012). Much of the writings and rhetoric of Shelton's DOAS are similar to what is now shared by Carnell and Moore. Additionally, Carnell and Moore maintain close ties to Louisville as their first ADOS conference site.

For generations, African Americans have called for reparations that would repair the centuries of violence, enslavement and racial injustice endured by Descendants of Africans Enslaved in the United States (DAEUS) (Randall 2015). Two of the most notable reparationists in history include Callie House, leader of the National Ex-Slave Mutual Relief, Bounty, and Pension Association, and Audley Queen Mother Moore, co-founder of the Republic of New Afrika and founder of the Reparations Committee for the Descendants of American Slaves (Perry 2010; Farmer 2019).

The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA) was founded in 1987 after a convening of lawyers, activists and reparationists (Aiyetoro 2003). Raymond Jenkins (aka Reparations Ray), co-founder of N'COBRA, influenced the H.R.40 Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, introduced in 1989 by US Representative (Rep.) John Conyers Jr. (Miller 2009).

According to activist-lawyer and N'COBRA co-founder, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro:

> Through its various chapters, N'COBRA got state and local legislatures to pass resolutions to support Conyers' bill, submitted each Congressional session in the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, usually designated H.R. 40. The varied resolutions usually cited the work of N'COBRA. The coalition developed legislative, litigative, direct action, and economic development strategies to fuel the train and increase the speed with which it was moving to its destination—reparations. (Aiyetoro 2001)

Following Rep. Conyers's retirement, Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas became the sponsor of H.R. 40 and the key legislator advocating for its passage (Congress.gov 2019). As the struggle for reparations continued, the National African American Reparations Commission (NAARC) was established in 2015, convened by activist-scholar Dr Ron Daniels.

Co-opting the movement: Xenophobia, disinformation and project takeover

Much of the current grassroots reparations movement has been sustained by decades of activism by N'COBRA and NAARC, through their national and local-based advocacy. However, one of the greatest influences on the current mainstream conversation concerning reparations was Ta-Nehisi Coates's 'The Case For Reparations', published by *The Atlantic* in 2014. The new explosion of interest concerning reparations helped garner mainstream appeal among the US media, coupled with a new-found enthusiasm among Black Americans.

The ADOS movement was founded two years later as a Black isolationist ideology that uses the reparations issue to promote anti-immigrant policies, nativism and birtherism, and disconnect African Americans from the global African world.

According to journalist Farrah Stockman, at the first ADOS conference:

> The audience was told that they should trace their origins to American slavery, not Africa. They were told that their ancestors had built the country with slave labor and that the country owed them a debt. They were told that they should demand reparations, and withhold their votes in 2020 unless the Democratic nominee outlined a specific economic plan for ADOS. (Stockman 2019)

Historically, the US reparations movement has been part of a global movement with support from the African diaspora (CARICOM Reparations 2016). Yet, ADOS rhetoric aims to fracture any sense of kinship among the various Black/African diasporic communities. Carnell and Moore refer to collective Black identities in the United States as a 'flat Blackness' that they label as harmful to ADOS (Moore 2020b). In their videos, Carnell and Moore fan the flames of anti-Black xenophobia. On 25 May 2020, Minneapolis police officers arrested and killed an African-American man named George Floyd. Carnell placed partial blame for his death on programmes that support Somali refugees.

In a live YouTube broadcast, Carnell stated:

> You have to talk about what he didn't have and why he didn't have it. You have to talk about Somalians being placed in [*sic*] and the refugees being placed there, and they're [*sic*] being resettled with money and he not having any. You have to talk about the generational wealth that we are missing because that is what defines him even being there in the moment where he was killed by police. (Carnell 2020)

Similarly, Moore in a now-deleted video stated:

> He was using a $20 counterfeit bill because he didn't get his reparations. I'm gone go into the whole ... what they do for refugees. Minneapolis, not even the federal government. Minneapolis and how inviting they are to refugees. And what they did to lock Black people out of neighborhoods for a hundred years. Black people meaning ADOS Black people. (Moore 2020a)

Moore and Carnell's xenophobic rhetoric ignited an influx of social media accounts using the hashtag #ADOS while viciously attacking Black immigrants, activists and politicians who rejected their message. One such social media account referred to Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee as a 'sneaky African/Caribbean immigrant masquerading as a native born Black American' (ADOS Watch 2019). Additionally, Carnell and Moore frequently ignite online debates over Black movie roles and received international

press for their condemnation of British-born actress Cynthia Erivo, of Nigerian heritage, for her portrayal of Harriet Tubman (EurWeb 2019). These arguments are tools for gaining media attention and getting free access to millions of readers or viewers.

Black nativism is not a new occurrence. In response to an influx of white immigrants in the early 1900s, African Americans sometimes embraced nativism to advocate for employment inclusion and prioritisation in the face of expanding whiteness (Rubin 1978; Brietzer 2011).

There were also conflicts between first-generation Caribbean immigrants and African Americans in the 1930s and 40s. Both groups endured racial discrimination and employment disparities while also experiencing conflict and shifting racialised identities. Class dynamics and white-influenced racial stigmatisations also played a role in these conflicts. However, ultimately, both groups were economically exploited and formed merging identities (Warner 2012).

The ADOS co-founders' usage of black nativism merges reparations, disinformation and hashtag-powered manipulation, making it a special case deserving attention. ADOS leaders call for limits to the H1-B Visa programme to limit Black immigrants' entry into the US (ADOS Black Agenda 2019). Carnell and Moore's talking points are similar to those of white nationalists and right-wing politicians, repeating the false claims that Black immigrants are taking jobs away from African Americans (Scott 2019). Most of their anti-immigrant rhetoric is aimed at Black immigrants and minimally towards white immigrants.

In 2019, Carnell and Moore shared their plans to take over the reparations movement. They publicly called for a project takeover, encouraging their followers to join established Black organisations, like the NAACP and Urban League local chapters, and spread the ADOS ideology from within (Russ 2019).

Simultaneously, Carnell and Moore sought to discredit existing reparations organisations. They spread disinformation about both N'COBRA and NAARC, stating that the two groups were purposely hindering the reparations movement. Carnell and Moore repeatedly sought to turn audiences away from long-standing reparations advocacy groups. Carnell stated falsely that N'COBRA was 'opposed to reparations' and falsely claimed that both groups sought to give away Black-American reparations to Black immigrants. Carnell told viewers, 'N'COBRA did nothing. They are nothing,' and encouraged followers to write to the media and tell journalists that N'COBRA was 'not a real reparations movement' (Carnell 2021). This disinformation about reparations activists was streamed to thousands of followers during her live broadcasts.

PFIR, white nativism and Black anti-immigration front groups

Another key piece to ADOS's origin story is Yvette Carnell's membership on the Progressives for Immigration Reform (PFIR) board, an organisation linked to the Tanton Network (Lee 2014; SPLC 2010). White supremacist and eugenics supporter, John Tanton, helped create and fund several organisations to keep America white through anti-immigration policies. A few of the Tanton-affiliated organisations are the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) and NumbersUSA. PFIR's former executive director also worked for FAIR and maintained close ties (Zaitchik 2010).

To gain buy-in from African Americans, PFIR and its affiliates create front groups attempting to appeal to Black economic concerns. These initiatives are used to blame African-American employment disparities on Black and Brown immigrants and push anti-immigrant policies. There have been at least three previous Black economic front groups affiliated or linked to the Tanton Network.

1. In 2006, FAIR created a group astonishingly similar to the current ADOS Movement called Choose Black America. The organisation's now-defunct website stated, 'mass illegal immigration has been the single greatest impediment to Black advancement in this country over the past 25 years'.
2. In 2012, FAIR created the Blacks for Equal Rights Coalition, another Black economic issues organisation used to limit immigration.
3. In 2013, CIS created the Black American Leadership Alliance. Bertha Lewis, of The Black Institute, published a warning to Black communities titled, 'On Immigration: Beware of the Black American Leadership Alliance' (Lewis 2019).
4. In 2016, ADOS was co-founded by Yvette Carnell, a former board member of PFIR using the same anti-Black immigration rhetoric. PFIR rejoiced at the success of ADOS in a newsletter to members (PFIR 2019).

From obscurity to legitimacy: The three pillars of ADOS

The ADOS hashtag picked up steam on various platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram. However, it moved from obscurity to legitimacy among mainstream media, institutions and academics through three academic pillars: Dr William A. Darity Jr, Dr Cornel West and Dr Kevin W. Cosby. The new anti-Pan-African reparationists, many of whom had never engaged in reparations activism before, brought with them sensationalism that skyrocketed social media engagement.

This engagement helped boost the national platform of the first pillar of ADOS legitimacy, Duke University professor Dr William A. Darity Jr. Carnell, Moore and Darity partnered on promoting the ADOS ideology through forums and publications. Darity's work was often shared and promoted by the ADOS co-founders among their thousands of followers. In 2020, Dr William A. Darity Jr and Andrea Kirsten Mullen published *From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black Americans in the Twenty-First Century.* Like Carnell and Moore, Darity and Mullen write through a Black nativist lens, distancing the African-American experience from the rest of the African diaspora by minimising the experience of slavery and racism in the Caribbean.

Dr Shennette Garrett-Scott addresses these issues in a review of *From Here to Equality*, stating:

> Darity and Mullen reject the notion that the experiences of Afro-Caribbeans and other Blacks across the Diaspora living in the United States are 'synonymous [with] the experience of … African Americans.' Their contention that 'voluntary immigrants to the United States' (emphasis in original) make a conscious choice to live in a country that has benefited from racism means that these groups assume the debt their adopted country owes. The logic here is troubling on many levels, not the least of which is the assumption that immigrants don't suffer racism and other forms of discrimination in the United States. Darity and Mullen try to smooth over the nativist implications by adding that reparations encompass collective, national redemption rather than individual, specific guilt.
>
> The most serious flaw in limiting the deserving groups is that the authors' plan ignores the history of enslavement in the United States, which extended to the Caribbean. The practice of slavery in both places was intimately bound together, even after the US won its independence from Britain. Darity and Mullen also ignore the aspects of slavery, particularly white supremacy and anti-Blackness, that animated twentieth-century US imperialism in the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Pacific. (Garrett-Scott 2021)

Additionally, *From Here to Equality* celebrates and casually introduces the ADOS movement to readers as innocuous.

Darity and Mullen state:

> Unexpectedly, the 2018 congressional midterm elections were followed by an even greater surge of interest in black reparations. A movement blossomed in early 2019 on electronic internet platforms under the label #ADOS, an acronym for American Descendants of Slavery. This campaign asserts that black American descendants of persons enslaved in the United States have a unique and exceptional claim on the nation's government for justice. (Darity and Mullen 2020)

Darity and Mullen's description of the ADOS 'campaign' is misleading and glosses over the movement's questionable beginnings, xenophobia, disinformation, voter suppression and online harassment (Media Matters 2019; SOVAW 2020; Stockman 2019).

The second pillar of ADOS legitimacy is Dr Cornel West. West participated in several online ADOS forums and was a speaker at the ADOS 2019 conference. During a 2019 speech, West repeated the talking points of ADOS, minimising slavery and its impact on the Caribbean, stating:

> I know my dear sister Yvette Carnell and others have been trying to zero in on the varieties of Blackness in the United States. And it's very important. We ought to love all people, we ought to love all Black people; but when you come from a people that have been enslaved in their own country and built that country and still ended up being lynched after they were so-called freed. There was no Jim Crow in Jamaica. There was no Jim Crow in Barbados. No Jim Crow in Antigua. No Jim Crow in St. Kitts. We love our brothers and sister there but no Jim Crow there. (West 2019)

The third pillar of ADOS legitimacy is Dr Kevin W. Cosby, the President of Simmons College of Kentucky, the site of the 2019 ADOS conference (Corsey 2019). Cosby has repeatedly used the institution's resources to host online forums featuring ADOS co-founders. Cosby pushes the ADOS nativist ideology into spiritualism. He posts 'ADOS Sermons' online and refers to Black immigrants as

'PIMPS' and 'replacement negroes' (Cosby 2020; Moore 2020). Cosby, West, Carnell and Moore promoted an initiative called the National Coalition of Churches for Reparations to attract Black church leaders to the ADOS movement (Simmons College 2020).

Protecting Pan-Africanist movements from disinformation

Academics, researchers and activists are taking notice of the ADOS movement's usage of disinformation on Black communities in digital spaces, with various bad actors participating. In 2019, Media Matters warned that white supremacists planned to use the ADOS hashtag on social media with the specific purpose of confusing Black communities (Media Matters staff 2019). They planned to create accounts using 'digital Black face', the practice of a non-Black person pretending to be Black through a social media account (Freelon et al. 2020). Shireen Mitchell of Stop Online Violence Against Women (SOVAW) warned that bots were using the ADOS hashtag as part of a coordinated Black voter suppression effort (SOVAW 2020). In January 2020, I published a report detailing part of the ADOS movement's origins and its harassment tactic referred to as 'swarming' done by ADOS members online (Aiwuyor 2020).

In February 2021, Harvard Kennedy School's *MisInformation Review* published 'Disinformation creep: ADOS and the strategic weaponisation of breaking news'. The researchers did a content analysis of 534,000 #ADOS tweets. Their analysis found that ADOS co-founders Carnell and Moore used breaking news cycles to manipulate online discussions and move Black communities towards adopting a right-wing agenda.

The authors referred to this as:

> ... disinformation creep, a phenomenon in which legitimate positions and information are slightly distorted and reinterpreted to leverage a separate position entirely, one that may even be at odds with the interests that it purports to support. (Nkonde et al. 2021)

From #BlackLivesMatter to #EndSARS, Pan-Africanism's future depends on increased awareness of online disinformation campaigns, indoctrination and digital Black face. The rise of ADOS must not be treated as a one-time event. The manipulation of Black social media users coupled with the promotion of Black 'isolationism' threatens Pan-African activism's future growth and can recur under new groups or campaigns.

Activism has become heavily dependent on digital spaces for education, discourse, advocacy and collaboration. Pan-Africanists must develop and implement strategies to counter disinformation campaigns and protect Black communities from Trojan Horse initiatives or 'disinformation creep' seeking to disrupt Black activist movements. There must also be continued education in digital media and strategic communications.

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FORTHCOMING / À PARAÎTRE

This book covers diverse histories of student movements in post-apartheid South Africa, taking note of the historical moment of the 1976 student uprisings and the evolution of student activism since that seminal event. Decolonization and reform of the higher education sector are important themes of the book. The volume aims to understand how student movements comprehend and articulate demands for the process of decolonization and Africanization of the curriculum, their transformative effect on the university and the role that a decolonized and African university should play in South African society's pursuit of freedom. The book explores transformation of universities specifically with regard to race, gender, patriarchy, sexuality, and people living with disabilities in relation to student experiences. The book also deals with aspects related to institutional racism, funding, class, access, violence, and student services. It explores the nature of contemporary student mobilization as a quest for education as freedom in a democratic country, deconstructing the Rhodes Must Fall and Fees Must Fall movements that have reignited interest in the role of student activism in South African society. This book is timeless and timely: celebrating and critiquing student activism in transforming higher education, society and our times.

Debates / Débats

A Response to Lloyd G. Adu Amoah's 'Ghana's Democracy and the 2020 General Election: Signs of a Fading Promise?'

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Introduction

Amoah's pessimistic assessment of Ghana's democracy published in *CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 7*, dated March 2021, focused on the uniqueness of its 2020 general elections outcome by using the 2016 elections as a proximate benchmark. While reflecting on the post-2016 alternation of power between the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the country's main political parties, he noted that even though 'no cudgels, loss of life, or loss of property' had attended power tranfers, any euphoria expressed over the health of Ghana's democracy may be premature. Further, under the rubric of 'the policy pathology: democracy without development', he buttressed his assertions with evidence that, within the context, comes across as hard historical fact. He noted that Ghana's post-1966 'political and economic turmoil' gives the 1992 Constitution 'an unmistakably material rationale' and that the state's 'stability and consolidation', judged over two decades relative to the pace of material progress of the Asian Tiger economies, is mixed. The author also suggested that while corruption and 'the lack of prosperity' decided the outcome of the 2016 elections, 'the 2020 election results vividly showed the waning patience of Ghanaian voters towards' the dominant parties. The author also blames the lack of material prosperity on the 'the pervasive party system' working in tandem with a culture of ' winner-takes-all' 'that has come to control every facet of Ghanaian life'.

The author's use of the outcome of the 2016 elections to pessimistically assess the 2020 elections necessitates a review of his piece. At the risk of failing a causality litmus test, one may argue (as in the subsequent sections) that the post-2016 NPP government, unlike the electorate, waivered in its commitment to nourish the Republican spirit. Given this, the relative reduction in the votes garnered by the president plus the NPP's loss of parliamentary seats, as noted by the author, counts as a positive course correction effected by the electorate to vigilantly defend the sanctity of the democratic social contract as enshrined in the 1992 Constitution. Thus, rather than the 2020 election results 'vividly' showing 'the waning patience of Ghanaian voters' towards political parties, as the author suggests, it is rather the case that the electorate demonstrated a maturity beyond the political party manipulation of power and projected an independent capacity to correct deviations from its democratic path of development.

A sample of the NPP's post-2016 democratic deviations

To begin with, the author's suggestion that 'no cudgels, loss of life, or loss of property' attended the transfer of power is at variance with the effects of the extremist tendencies that characterised the NPP's tenure after the 2016 elections. For example, in 2017 members of a militant group associated with the party, known as the Delta Force, stormed a court session, vandalised property and freed thirteen of their members on trial for assaulting a Regional Security Coordinator (Modern Ghana 2017; Ghana Web 2017). Also, during a 2019 by-election in the Ayawaso West Wuogon (AWW) constituency, an NPP stronghold, violence perpetrated by masked national security operatives, who were later identified as associates of the NPP, led to eighteen people sustaining gunshot wounds as well as an NDC Member of Parliament being assaulted (GhanaWeb 2019). In the same year, an investigative journalist un-

covered the use of an annex in the seat of government to recruit and train NPP militia. In what amounted to the use of state power to illegally seize private property in 2020, about 500 excavators confiscated by a government task force set up to curb illegal small-scale mining (*galamsey*) went missing (African Eye Report 2020). Lastly, at least five people lost their lives and others were maimed in the heat of the 2020 elections (Al Jazeera 2020). These illustrations of deviation from the normative expectations of democracy served as the backdrop to the 2020 elections, during which the electorate voted to demonstrate that its commitment to guarantee the democratic ethos, unlike the NPP government, was beyond doubt.

Republican fidelity and democratic development

The author asserted that the lack of material prosperity in Ghana implies that its democracy is developmentally deficient. Stretched to its logical conclusion, this observation implies a loss of faith in the current democratic dispensation. Nevertheless, an Afrobarometer study reported that a supermajority of Ghanaians (79 per cent) (Fig. 1) are willing to honour their tax obligations to the state even though 61 per cent do not know what the revenue raised is used for.

This finding suggests that in as much as unmet material needs may be a source of frustration to the electorate, there is politically significant fiduciary trust by the Ghanaian electorate towards the incumbent parties in government. This observation raises questions about the author's take that the 2020 elections signify the waning patience of Ghanaian voters towards political parties.



Fig.1: Views of Ghanaians on tax legitimacy, 2019

Source: (Bortey 2021: 3)

The author also noted that 'Ghana's democratic promise is failing to materialise' due to the unmet material needs of the citizenry, which can be blamed on a 'pervasive party system' thriving on an 'electoral system of winner-takes-all'. Again, this assertion does not stand the test of the bare facts of Ghana's political experience. Indeed, the country's democratic promise has been gradually materialising on a path of consistent consolidation since the 1966 crisis cited by the author. Although the evolutionary progress has been crude and deficient in human development, the polity has attained the necessary and sufficient conditions for the pursuit of other dividends, including material security: it evolved from political stability between 1981 and 1992 and transformed from an anocracy (1992–2000) into an inter- and intra-party power alternating democracy from 2000 to the present. Another indicator of consolidation is the sprouting of countervailing centres of power and agency beyond political parties. A few classic examples include the following. First, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), an independent and non-partisan network of civil society groups, faith-based organisations and professional bodies, has been vigilantly observing Ghanaian elections since 2000 (CODEO Ghana, n.d.). Second, the National House Chiefs (NHC) in 2018 led successful agitation against an attempt by the NPP government to railroad the election of metropolitan, municipal and district chief executives (MMDCEs) on the ticket of political parties (Gyimah-Boadi; GhanaWeb 2019). Third, in 2020 there was effective resistance by a broad coalition of civil society actors to an NPP government attempt to pass a Public Universities Bill (PUB), which was deemed as inimical to academic freedom (CDD-Ghana 2020). Fourth the Coalition of Car and Spare Parts Dealers stopped an NPP government attempt to pass the 2020 Customs Amendment Act to ban the importation of salvaged vehicles (Bediako 2020). Against this background, the outcome of the 2020 elections, which technically curtailed the reach of the president's power by splitting parliamentary seats evenly between the two parties, rather than being indicative of 'waning patience' was a sign of a mature and confident electorate capable of keeping political parties on a short accountable leash in defence of the Republic.

The author also singles out the tendency of a 'pervasive party system' that thrives on a culture of 'winner-takes-all' as the main drawback of Ghana's democratic development. There are two problems with this

assertion. First, it fails to recognise that the current dominant-party system has exorcised destabilising ethno-partisanship from Ghana's body politic, the core reason why the previous Republics failed (Chazan 1982; Boahen 1996). Even though the country is not yet out of the woods (Throup 2011), its parties have been compelled by the 1992 Constitution to internally even out ethnic group imbalances and project a national character. If Ghana's post-independence experience is anything to go by, the alternative to the current 'pervasive party system' will surely be the persistence of the 'pervasive ethnic-party system' of the past with all the turbulence it entailed (Moroff and Basedau 2013). Also, the suggestion of a culture of 'winner-takes-all' working in tandem with the dominant-party system smacks of exceptionalism and the non-assessment of a political dynamic on its merit. Ghana's political parties, just as any other in the world and history, are constituted and elected (during primaries and national elections) based on exclusive ideological/transactional affinity. Given this, it is not to be expected that the principle of inclusion, the alternative to 'winner-takes-all', will be a default option. Be that as it may, unlike the author suggests, a 'winner-patron-of-all' culture is a more apt attribute of Ghana's democracy: the state funds discretionary political expenditures of Members of Parliament (MPs) whether or not sitting MPs and the president belong to the same party (Citi Newsroom 2020). Given the foregoing, Ghana's democracy is developing with an internal logic of its own. It may not be in the same economic league as the Asian Tigers, but there are credible indicators to suggest that Ghana's democratic self-correcting capacity is steadily taking shape.

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The African Humanities Program (AHP) Survey

Programme de l'Association Africaine des Sciences Humaines (AHP) / Une enquête

African Humanities Association Projects

The African Academy of Sciences
Situation Analysis of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts Research Leadership Capacity Development in Africa Project

WHO ARE WE? / From AHP to AHA

The African Humanities Program (AHP) was established in 2008 under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) and funded by the Carnegie Corporation with the principal objective of rejuvenating humanities research in five African countries, namely, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. The African Humanities Association (AHA) was formed by the adoption of its constitution at a Regional Assembly held in Abuja in February 2020. After twelve years of AHP activity the time had come for a new initiative, driven by the needs of African scholars and designed by us to extend the transformative impact of our work to the development of the continent.

WHAT'S THIS RESEARCH ABOUT?

The AHA has been commissioned by the African Academy of Sciences (AAS) to: Generate evidence to inform the trajectory of Social Science, Humanities and Arts Research Leadership Capacity Development (SSH&A RLCD) initiatives within the African Academy of Sciences and particularly the DELTAS Africa program.

WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Please fill in this questionnaire as it will have a direct impact on the kinds of programmes which the AAS designs for the Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts.

SOME IMPORTANT DETAILS

Please be aware that this survey is very long and detailed to ensure that we get the most accurate and useful information possible. Please set aside at least 30 minutes to work through the survey methodically without distractions. The survey is anonymous and no identifying information is gathered about you, the respondent. Please ensure that you only submit one response, do not submit multiple copies. **The survey is available in Arabic, English, French and Portuguese languages**. You can choose to respond in whichever of those languages you prefer, but **please submit only one response in only one of the languages**. Multiple responses from one responder will result in inaccurate results when the information is analysed.

Because we are trying to reach as many people as possible who might have important information that is relevant to this survey, we encourage you to share the survey with any colleagues who you feel should be responding. At the same time, this means that you may have received a link to the survey from multiple sources. We do apologise for that. As we stated above, **no matter how many times you receive a link from someone, please only fill in the survey once**.

Survey in English (https://sites.google.com/a/rucis.co.za/aha/projects/surveys/english)

Projet de l'Association Africaine des Sciences Humaines

QUI SOMMES NOUS
De AHP à AHA

Le Programme Africaine en Sciences Humaines - African Humanities Program (AHP) a été établi en 2008 sous l'égide de l'American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) et financé par le Carnegie Corporation dans le but de redynamiser la recherche en sciences humaines dans cinq pays africains, à savoir le Ghana, le Nigéria, l'Afrique du Sud, la Tanzanie et l'Ouganda.

Le African Humanities Association (AHA) a été formé par l'adoption de sa constitution lors d'une Assemblée Régionale tenue à Abuja en février 2020. Après douze ans d'activité par AHP, il était temps de concevoir une nouvelle initiative, régi par les besoins des chercheurs africains et conçu pour élargir l'impact transformatif de notre travail au développement du continent :

A PROPOS DE LA RECHERCHE

L'Académie Africaine des Sciences (AAS) a commandé le AHA de fournir des preuves pour fournir des informations sur le trajectoire des initiatives sur la capacité de leadership de recherche en sciences humaines et sociales, en lettres et dans le domaine des arts (SSH&A RLCD) dans l'Académie Africaine des Sciences (AAS) et en particulier le programme DELTAS Africa.

POURQUOI CETTE RECHERCHE EST-ELLE IMPORTANTE?

Veuillez remplir ce questionnaire puisque vos réponses auront un impact direct sur les types des programmes conçus par le AAS pour les Sciences Sociales, les Sciences Humaines et les Arts.

Ce questionnaire a pour but d'obtenir les réponses des chercheurs en sciences sociales et humaines et en arts dans le cadre d'une étude portant sur le statut des disciplines et leur capacité à diriger des recherches. Veuillez donner votre opinion et vos réponses en toute honnêteté.

Nous reconnaissons que votre participation est entièrement volontaire et nous vous assurons que vos réponses sont totalement confidentielles car elles ne sont pas conçues pour être liées aux répondants.

Enquête en français (https://sites.google.com/a/rucis.co.za/aha/projects/surveys/french)

Samir Amin : Recueil de textes introduit par Demba Moussa Dembele* Note de lecture

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Forum du Tiers Monde
Dakar, Sénégal

En mars dernier, Florian Rochat, ancien directeur du CETIM et responsable de la collection « Pensées d'hier pour demain », avait écrit à plusieurs personnalités susceptibles de faire entrer Samir dans sa collection avant le dernier trimestre 2020. La proposition de Moussa Dembélé fut retenue. Dans son livre *Samir Amin : Intellectuel organique au service de l'émancipation des peuples du Sud,* le choix du titre et le contenu montrent qu'en Afrique tropicale dite francophone, il était le mieux placé pour faire entrer Samir Amin dans la collection du CETIM. Je crois que si Samir avait été consulté au moment du lancement de la collection, il aurait proposé de l'appeler « Pensée et action militante ». En effet, il s'était déjà approprié la fameuse phrase de Marx : « Les philosophes n'ont fait qu'interpréter diversement le monde, ce qui importe, c'est de le transformer. »

Moussa Dembélé a relevé le défi et proposé en un temps record un recueil de textes qui reflètent une des préoccupations majeures de Samir : refonder le matérialisme historique à la lumière des grands évènements historiques concernant la lutte pour l'avènement d'un système mondial socialiste/ communiste, dans le sens que Marx lui donnait. De cette refondation, j'ai retenu trois axes principaux :

(i) Pour comprendre le capitalisme il faut prendre le monde comme unité fondamentale de l'accumulation, ce qui fait apparaître le phénomène de la polarisation, et donc du développement inégal qui détermine les rapports entre les centres et les périphéries.

(ii) Le socialisme est une nécessité historique à cause de l'exploitation, de la précarisation de la condition des travailleurs en général et de l'oppression des peuples dans les périphéries, mais il n'est pas inéluctable, car des catastrophes sociales ou écologiques locales ou globales sont des issues possibles des crises capitalistes. A titre d'exemple, dans le cadre du matérialisme refondé, c'est la montée en puissance de la perspective socialiste et humaniste à l'échelle mondiale qui, de 1917 à1980, avait imposé en Occident le compromis social-démocrate comme cadre politique de la gestion des conflits entre le monde du travail et celui du capital. Et depuis lors, c'est la crise de cette perspective qui est dans cet espace la principale cause de la banalisation du recours aux soft totalitarismes ploutocratiques pour gérer les conflits que génèrent la croissance scandaleuse des inégalités et le désarroi des classes moyennes inférieures.

(iii) Les luttes pour la consolidation ou la construction nationale des peuples du tiers monde n'aboutiront que si les forces de la perspective socialiste y jouent un rôle essentiel.

Je me permets de classer les 13 textes du recueil en trois catégories. Les premiers textes portent sur la polarisation, la loi de la valeur-travail et le matérialisme historique (pp. 17-55). Les seconds sur la critique de l'eurocentrisme en sciences sociales et sur la dynamique du capitalisme réellement existant depuis les origines (pp. 55-72). Les derniers sur les stratégies de sortie de la spirale périphérisante, sur le concept de la déconnexion, les projets souverains, la Cinquième Internationale et l'avenir du socialisme en Chine[1] (pp. 73-90). Sans doute le manque de textes spécifiques sur l'égalité homme-femme et sur l'écologie s'explique-t-il par le format des livres de la collection.

En définitive, ce recueil permet de mettre en évidence le fait que pour Samir Amin, les intellectuels et les organisations en lutte contre le «virus libéral» et pour le socialisme et la souveraineté doivent considérer l'enracinement du matérialisme historique dans la culture politique savante et populaire comme une condition de succès durable dans d'autres domaines. Il a fait de son mieux pour que cela se réalise. Le premier recueil des textes et le Symposium Samir Amin de février 2020 et autres hommages à Dakar montrent que la réponse au défi de la relève peut se faire aussi à partir de l'Afrique occidentale, région dans laquelle l'auteur de *La Déconnexion* et de *L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquée* a passé 57 ans de sa vie d'intellectuel organique universaliste.

* Président de l'Africaine de recherche et coopération pour l'appui au développement endogène (Arcade). Auteur de : Samir Amin, Intellectuel organique au service de l'émancipation du Sud (Livre d'entretiens). Dakar, Codesria, 2011, et de Contribution à la déconstruction des théories conventionnelles sur le développement de l'Afrique. Paris, L'harmattan, 2015.

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Note

1. Pour ceux qui veulent aller plus loin, M. Dembélé propose trois pages de bibliographie comprenant les principaux livres de Samir Amin, une liste de livres sur son œuvre et huit sites électroniques.




Samir Amin
La déconnexion
Pour sortir du système mondial
Cahiers libres 452 Éditions La Découverte


Samir Amin
L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquée
L'économie politique de la colonisation 1880-1970
Oeuvres complètes

CODESRIA Bulletin

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CODESRIA

Ce Bulletin est distribué gratuitement à tous les instituts et facultés de recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique et au-delà afin d'encourager la coopération en matière de recherche entre les chercheurs africains. Les personnes et institutions intéressées peuvent également s'inscrire sur la liste de diffusion du CODESRIA pour recevoir le Bulletin dès sa parution. Les contributions sur des questions théoriques et les rapports sur les conférences et séminaires sont également les bienvenus.