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Genocidal Violence in the Making of Nation and State in Ethiopia

Abstract

Based on a qualitative historical-sociological investigation of the incidents of mass-killings that have been registered during the last one hundred and fifty years, this study concludes that both the unification of the Abyssinian state between 1850s and 1870s and the creation of the Ethiopian empire state during last quarter of the nineteenth century were accomplished through wars that were clearly genocidal. Though their aims were building a state, there were differences between the types of state and nation envisaged by the two 'categories' of rulers. The attempts of the nineteenth century rulers were to purge the Abyssinian state of non-Abyssinian religious and ethnic communities they perceived as 'alien' in order to build an exclusive Abyssinian state and a homogenous Abyssinian nation. The nationalism of late nineteenth century rulers, as represented by its architect Menelik II, was expansionist. Abandoning the idea of Abyssinian homogeneity, they opted for hegemony over other peoples they had conquered in the heyday of the European scramble for Africa. The result was a multinational empire state. This study shows that policies used to build and maintain the empire state were implemented using methods that were ethnically oppressive, immensely exploitative, and genocidal. This had triggered ethnic nationalism that has been at logger-heads with the 'official' nationalism of the dominant ethnic group. Moreover, the conflict between the two brands of nationalism had increased in tandem with rising ethnic consciousness and intensified since the mid 1970s as a consequence the policies of the Dergue. In order to legitimate the state, control dissent, and stay in power the ruling elites built a huge military apparatus and used retributive genocidal killings. The study confirms that there is clear nexus between authoritarian rule, man-made famines, and genocide in Ethiopia. It suggests that there are several warning signs showing that genocide is in the making today. Taking the international context into account, the study indicates that the role of some Western states has been abetting rather than deterring genocide in Ethiopia.

Introduction

It is reported that, during the colonial and post-colonial periods, genocides have occurred in a number of African countries (Kuper, 1981; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993, 2002; Hendricks, 2002). Fred Hendricks notes that 'in South Africa the San people, who had refused to be subjugated to outside rule, were systematically exterminated' (2002: 234). In its former colony of South West Africa (Namibia), Germany also used a genocidal colonial policy aiming at the extermination of the indigenous Herero and Nama peoples who were opposed to German colonialism (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990: 230-248; Hendricks, 2002). Hendricks (ibid: 234) argues that, while the purpose of colonial genocides was to eliminate threats to external domination, 'post-colonial genocides were structured by a different set of internal and external forces'. In other words, attempts to forge and legitimate new states were reasons for many horrendous atrocities.

While genocides committed in Africa are associated with colonialism or explained as a consequence of consolidating the post-colonial African state, Ethiopia, which according to most writers had avoided European colonial rule, is mentioned along with Rwanda and other African countries as a 'genocidal state' in the works of many scholars (Rittner, Roth & Smith, 2002, Hendricks, 2002, Harff, 2002). For the last thirteen years, thousands of the officials and functionaries of the former regime have been in prison accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. Paradoxically, it is maintained that Ethiopia is one of the countries with an 'active' genocide risk today (Harff, 2002:128-127; Stanton, 2004). At the International Association of Genocide Scholars' Conference held in 2003 at the National University of Ireland, Galway, a panel on Ethiopia discussed the ongoing violation of human rights in the country, stressing its resemblance with genocidal killings that had occurred in other parts of the world. The panel concluded that the motives and preconditions for genocide are apparent in Ethiopia today (Hameso, 2003; Hassen, 2003, Abdulkadir, 2003). A recent report by Genocide Watch (2004) also accused the current Ethiopian government of committing genocidal killings against the Anuak of the Gambella regional state in 2003 and 2004. However, apart from a few conference papers and pieces of information from international and local human rights organisations, there are no proper studies on genocide or genocidal killings in Ethiopia.

The purpose of this article is to initiate structured studies and debates on mass violence in Ethiopia. I will discuss genocidal-violence in relation to the process of state and 'nation' building in the history of Ethiopia. I will assess the intent and magnitude of mass-killings that were committed by different regimes since the middle of the nineteenth century. My aim is to identify the key factors precipitating state-sponsored mass violence and explore the conse-quences of genocide and genocidal killings not only for the society whose

members were the victims but also for the perpetrators' society or Ethiopia as a whole. The role of external factors in abetting or constraining the violation of human rights and mass violence in Ethiopia will be also briefly discussed.

The method used in the study is qualitative, and the empirical data are gleaned from published and unpublished historical documents, and reports compiled by human rights organisations. Sociological theories of genocide inform the analysis. The study is carried out with the following humanist perspectives. Firstly, I share the widespread consensus that we must develop our knowledge and understanding of processes of organised mass violence in order to develop strategies of prevention. I also concur with the proposition that the 'scientific study of genocide is not a matter of morbid fascination or mystic divination but of the need to assert the historical reality of collective crime. Only by such a confrontation can we at least locate moral responsibility for the state crimes even if we cannot always prevent future genocides from take place' (Horowitz, 1997: 258). I am aware of the fact that accusing a person or a state for genocide is a serious matter. I also consider taking lives is too a serious crime to be ignored or overlooked. Having said that, I will leave to other researchers the responsibility to confirm or reject the conclusions I have drawn.

Genocide Defined

Genocide is a violation of the most fundamental human right of the individual, namely right to life. Consequently it is the gravest of all crimes. The sociologist Jack Porter argued that 'The study of genocide is important because ultimately so many sociological concerns are related to it'. These sociological concerns, according to Porter, include 'the process of war, and colonialism, the experience of death and extreme deprivation, the meaning of survival and resistance, and the very nature of society itself' (Porter, 1982: 4).

But how do we define genocide? What types of mass-killings are categorised as genocide? Under what conditions are genocides committed? Based on the works of other scholars, I will try to answer these questions before I proceed to discus the recurrent mass-killings in Ethiopia.

First coined by Raphael Lemkin (1944), a Polish lawyer and survivor of the Holocaust, to explain Hitler's population policy against European Jews, the concept genocide is now understood as an extermination of a people or a community by mass murder. The objective of genocide can include both the social disintegration and the biological destruction of target groups (Fein, 1993: 9). According to the UN Convention on Genocide (UNCG, Article II, 1948) 'Genocide is any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)

imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The UN definition is criticised by scholars as too narrow for not including politicide, the deliberate annihilation of political groups and social classes, as well as ethnocide or the destruction of a culture without killing its bearers (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990: 11, 23). Consequently, several other definitions have been suggested to supplement the UN definition. The sociologist Helen Fein defines genocide as 'sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim' (Fein 1993: 24). For Jack N. Porter, 'Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by government or its agents, of a racial, sexual, religious, tribal, ethnic or political minority. It may involve not only mass murder, but also starvation, forced deportation, and political, economic, and biological subjugation' (Porter 1982: 12). Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990: 23) define genocide as 'a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator'.

The goal of state-sponsored mass killing is not always or in all places to kill of the whole ethnic or religious group, etc.; often the intent is to 'maim' by destroying parts of them, in order to make the group dysfunctional as a collective. Therefore, there many scholars who use the concept of genocidal killings to denote actions perpetrated by states to debilitate a political or religious community or an ethnic group (Kuper, 1981; Fein, 1990; Markusen & Mirkovic, 2003). Justifying the use of such a concept, Huttenbach (1988:294 cited in Markusen & Mirkovic, 2003:187) stated that 'In the process of categorising acts of genocide, a secondary category ought to be included under the rubric of "genocidal" indicative of events that can be clearly identified in character though the crime was not consummated in toto'. In this article the concept genocidal killing is used in that sense.

A Crime of the State

It is generally accepted that genocide primarily is a crime of the state. It is instigated and often perpetrated by agents of the state. Since it has access to the technology and may possess the organisational means for carrying out systematic mass murder, the modern state has, indeed, been the greatest perpetrator of genocide. However, the means used to commit genocide vary from state to state depending on the technological and organisational resources they can command. As the 1994 mass killing of the Tutsis in Rwanda, where the machete was used as the main weapon, indicated, the organisational efficiency of the state can be a deadly instrument even in the absence of technological sophistication (Prunier, 1995). Depending on their resource bases, authori-

tarian regimes are capable of perpetrating genocide using the most sophisticated technology as well the cheapest means – famine.

In *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*, I. L. Horowitz (1997: 24, 32) notes that genocide involves selective and systematic rather than individual and random killing. The human objects selected are chosen 'anthropologically' – on the basis of religion, race, ethnicity or other ascribed features. Whether states may or may not have elaborate plans when committing mass murder, a genocide is executed most often only partially. Though the intention of the Nazis was a 'final solution' to a purported race problem, even the Holocaust, despite the technology and rational planning with which it was executed, was not total. As Helen Fein (1993:18) put it aptly, in most other cases the victimisers do not have the capacity or may not even have the intention to kill all of the target group's members. Therefore, 'it is important to emphasize that to study genocide is to examine not simply the successful liquidation of entire peoples but also attempts at liquidation' (Horowitz, 1997:265).

The Genocidal Process

There are three general conditions under which a genocidal process can take place. These are colonial conquest and occupation, formation of a new social order based on a particular ideology, and shifts of power under conditions of deep social cleavage. These conditions can overlap in some situations. This, for example, is the case of the history of genocidal violence in Ethiopia.

One of the pioneering sociologists of genocide studies, the late Leo Kuper, noted that mass killings occur at different stages of the colonial process. The initial stage of conquest involves mass slaughter, usually of combatants. In other cases the initial campaigns of conquest are followed by the mass killings of non-combatants (Kuper, 1981). Horowitz (1997: 22) suggests that one of the fundamental characteristics of nineteenth century European imperialism was its systematic destruction of groups or communities outside the 'mother country'. He gives the decimation of the Zulu by British troops, the Dutch-run slave trade, and the depopulation of Congo by Belgians, as examples of this form of colonial genocide. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) have discussed several cases of genocides perpetrated on indigenous peoples in Africa, the Americas and Australia by European colonial settlers. In the past, colonisers generally took for granted that they had the right to *Lebensraum* – space for expansion – at the cost of those they considered 'inferior' and could annihilate or subjugate and assimilate. Where and when the indigenous peoples or ethnic groups were seen as hindrance to a colonial project there was often nothing to prevent their destruction (Jack Porter, 1982: 14). In the view of colonialists, space was needed for the progress of humanity and history – that is their humanity and history. Inhabited by a 'sub-human race' lacking history, the territories to be colonised were perceived as 'empty spaces'.

Secondly, the genocidal process is also instigated when a group with a new model or vision of reality takes power of the state and utilises state resources to establish and consolidate a new social order, or revitalise a threatened one using coercion. Whenever a group – ethnic, class or religious – is seen to pose a threat to this vision of reality, unbridled violence is used against it. Since the end justifies the means, normative and legal constraints are often ignored or eroded and genocidal processes are unleashed. This may mean purposeful collective or selective murder of members of a target group(s). The Armenian genocide of 1914-1918 (see for example Hovannisian, 1986) and Cambodian genocide of the mid-1970s were two examples of such mass murder (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990:398-407). The 'disappearances' of leftist political activists in Argentina in the 1980s was an example of selective murder.

It has been argued that whenever a revolution occurs in a situation where most social institutions have been undermined and the identity of the political majority in question threatened, the tendency among members of the dominant majority is often to blame minorities for the problem. Quite often the blaming suggests their elimination in order to reinvigorate the 'life', identity, etc. of 'the people', 'the nation' or 'the race'. 'The Young Turks movement before and during the First World War attempted to establish power and authority in order to fulfil its ideal of forging a new Turkish identity and destiny' (Porter, 1982: 13) as the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Christian minorities in Asia Minor were considered a hindrance to the realisation of the Turkish state and identity that the Young Turks had in mind and were singled out and deported or massacred (see for example Hovannisian, 1986).

Thirdly, potential genocidal processes may emerge under conditions of substantial shifts in power. This is particularly the case in pluralist societies with deep socio-cultural or religious cleavages (Kuper, 1981). Given the hierarchical ethnic structure of such polities, struggles over political and economic power often develop into mass violence when a dominated ethnic group attempts to seize power while a dominating ethnic group is trying to retain it. This was the case in Burundi in 1961 as well as in 1972, when thousands of Hutus were massacred by the Tutsi to maintain their political dominance (Wingert, 1974). A similar dynamic was also at work in Rwanda in 1994, when, in an attempt to maintain their dominant position, the Hutu killed hundreds of thousands of the Tutsis (Prunier, 1995). The Tutsi killed mainly the educated class with the aim of depriving the Hutu of leadership, while it seems that the Hutus' aim was to exterminate the Tutsi minority in toto. In the case of Burundi, genocide was used by a dominant minority to terrify and pacify a dominated but feared majority, while in Rwanda it was used by majority to mete out collective punishment to a once dominant minority as a response to challenges to the structure of domination (Newbury, 1999).

There are also elements of ideology, myth, or articulated social goals used by perpetrators to justify the selection and destruction of victims. The victims are defined as 'enemies of the people' and devalued as inferior or sub-humans who are outside the moral universe of the perpetrators. In other words, they are to be exterminated to prepare the way for the perpetrators' vision of society or state to become reality (Fein, 1993; Staub, 1989).

Based on a comparative historical survey published in their important work, *History and Sociology of Genocide*, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990) distinguish the following four major reasons for which states perpetrate genocides: (a) to eliminate a real or potential threat; (b) to spread terror among real or potential enemies; (c) to acquire economic wealth; or (d) to implement a belief, a theory or an ideology. These are analytic categories and one or several of them may overlap in the explanation of a particular genocidal episode. By and large, this is also the case with the recurrent genocidal killings discussed in this article.

Background to Recurrent State-Organised Mass Violence in Ethiopia

The present state of Ethiopia was constituted of two parts that are referred to by scholars as 'the north' or the traditional Abyssinian state, and 'the south' – the regions conquered and annexed by the north. The terms north and south refer not exactly to geography but rather to culture and power relations. Geographically, the north refers to the central part of northern Ethiopia that is inhabited mainly by the Abyssinians – the Amhara and Tigrean peoples. It constituted, by and large, the traditional state of Abyssinia. As pointed out by a historian, the Habesha (Abyssinians) saw themselves as a people inhabiting a historically and geographically identifiable region, sharing a common linguistic origin (Geez), a common religion in the Tewahdo or Orthodox Church, a mythically derived common cultural frame of reference best articulated in the *Kebre Negast* ('Glory of Kings') and a mode of production that, despite regional and local variations, was essentially the same (Tareke, 1996: 36).

The indigenous peoples in the south speak mainly Cushitic languages and have different religious faiths, including Christianity, Islam and traditional religion. Though they are given phenotypical and sometimes even racial characteristics in the writings of scholars (see for example Ullendorff, 1969), the differences between the Abyssinians and these peoples are cultural rather than 'racial'.

As mentioned above, the two groups were brought together when the north conquered the south at the end of the nineteenth century. The conquest not only coincided with, but was also influenced by, the European colonisation of Africa (Marcus, 1969; Keller, 1986; Jalata, 1993, Tareke, 1996: 26). So also was the

behaviour of the conquerors towards their subjects. As Gebru Tareke (ibid: 71), himself a northerner, noted,

> Exhibiting different manners and habits, the new rulers were not without the pretensions
> to a 'civilizing mission'. They tried much like the European colonizers of their times, to
> justify the exploitability of the conquered peoples by stressing the historical inevitability
> and moral validity of occupation.

Explaining the genesis of ethnic nationalism among southerners, Keller notes that the Oromo, for example, consider the conquest 'as a colonial experience, not least because of its coincidence with the European scramble for Africa', but also 'the vast majority of the Oromo came to see the Amhara and the state they represented as colonialists, bent on exploiting and striping them of their culture' (Keller, 1995: 625-626).

While conquest and colonisation may explain the genesis of much of the present socio-cultural, and socio-political cleavages that characterise the relations between the north and the south since the creation of the modern Ethiopian state, it should be noted here that the history of conflict between the Semitic-speaking Abyssinians and the Cushitic-speaking peoples predates the conquest. Historians have argued that the history of Ethiopia in the last 500 years is essentially the history of the relationship between two great antagonists – the Abyssinians, particularly the Amhara, on the one hand, and the Cushitic-speaking peoples, particularly the Oromo, on the other (Tibebu, 1995: 17; Hassen 1990; Asma Giyorgis, 1987). In the past, for the Abyssinians, the Oromo were 'heathens and enemies fit only for massacre or enslavement' (Perham, 1969: 300). This was not just a matter of belief or ideological discourse, but what had often been practised. In his *History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Shawa*, the Amhara historian, Asma Giyorgis, himself a Shawa Amhara, wrote for example, that Sahle Selassie who ruled Shawa for thirty years launched expeditions against the Oromo three times a year until his death.

The deep-seated animosities between the two peoples were reflected not only in the many wars fought between them, but also in images they painted discursively about each other. For centuries, the Oromo were depicted in Abyssinian historical and religious literature in dehumanising terms (Hassen, 1990: 1-3; Sorenson, 1993; Tibebu, 1995: 16-18). A student of Ethiopian history writes that since the time of Abba Bahrey, the Ethiopian cleric who wrote History of the Galla in 1593, 'the purported brutality of Oromo manners has been magnified and embroidered with grotesque distortions of history, which depicts the Oromo as "barbarian hordes who brought darkness and ignorance in their train"' (Hassen, 1990: 2). The negative image of the peoples of south, who were often generally referred to as 'Galla' (heathen), was used to justify their treatment not only during the actual conquest but long after the colonial rule was consolidated.

I will present a brief account of violence that devastated many Muslim communities in the process of the unification of the Abyssinian state in the

north in the nineteenth century in order to indicate its connection and continuity in the atrocities committed in the creation and maintenance of the Ethiopian Empire state later.

Ethnic Cleansing to Rebuild a Christian Abyssinian Nation: 1855-1968

The modern history of Ethiopia started, arguably, with the exploits of a man named Kasa Haylu who became the Emperor of Abyssinia in 1865, taking the royal name Tewodros II. The reign of Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) is glorified in Ethiopia as an era of reform and change (Rubenson, 1976). Although historians regard him as the man who inaugurated the modern history of Ethiopia (Zewde, 1991:27), he tried to unite only the north, that is the traditional Abyssinian state, that had fallen into its regional or provincial components of Gojjam, Amhara, Tigray and Shawa during a chaotic period called the 'zemene mesafint' or 'Era of Princes' in Ethiopian history. Traditionally, the three regions were ruled by feudal lords who were vassals of the 'negusa-negast' ('king of kings' or emperor). During the 'zemene mesafint' that lasted from 1769 to 1855, the emperors were confined more or less to the capital city, Gondar, and were reduced to mere puppets in the hands of the warlords.

As a unifier of the Abyssinian state, Tewodros was regarded by generations of Ethiopian rulers and intelligentsia as a national icon. He is considered as the hero in and of Ethiopian history. However, while taking him as a hero and a model leader, the Ethiopian historical and political discourse tends to ignore the fact that 'Tewodros is one of the most violent of all monarchs – probably the most violent' (Crummey, 1971: 107). As I will describe in a moment, he literarily hacked thousands of people to death. That such a figure is considered a national hero among the ruling elite and intelligentsia says a lot about the values underpinning the dominant political culture as well as the related problem of the violation of human rights by Ethiopia's ruling regimes.

Tewodros, who manage to become an important figure during the zemene mesafint, had no genealogical claim to royal titles. He started his career as a 'shifta' (bandit) leader in the lowlands bordering on the Sudan. As success in banditry and battles against rivals helped him attract many followers, he fought his way up to the Abyssinian capital, where he was crowned 'king of kings' or 'negusa-negast'. He chose the royal name of Tewodros to exploit a myth about a messianic king of that name who 'would appear to destroy Islam and conquer Jerusalem' (Trimingham, 1976: 117), and 'reign in Abyssinia for a thousand years' (Bruce, cited in Levine, 1974). It was also believed that during the reign of the messianic king Abyssinia would enjoy 'an era of peace, joy, and piety' (Bruce, 1805; Levine, 1974: 157). The myth was effective and Tewodros was recognised as a legitimate leader and emperor.

Leaders who 'act out messianic fantasies' or propagate ideologies of manifest destiny tend often to blame scapegoats for problems facing the society. And scapegoats are groups that are often easily distinguished from victimisers. Tewodros found scapegoats for the problems of the Abyssinian state and society in the northern Oromos – those of Wallo, Yejju and Raya. However, the main target of 'the violence of Tewodros', to borrow Donald Crummey's (1971) words, were the first two groups.

The Wallo and Yejju Oromos were not only in conflict with the Abyssinian state since the sixteenth century, but also were influential in internal Abyssinian politics. Firstly their geographical location affected the emperors' control over their Shawan vassals. Since Wallo separated the southern Abyssinian province from the rest, the emperors whose seat was Gondar in the north often had to negotiate with the largely autonomous rulers of Wallo for access to Shawa. Secondly, the Abyssinian kings and warlords often enlisted Oromo fighters for internal Abysinian power struggles. Thirdly, men and women from a Yejju Oromo ruling family were even able to dominate the political scene in the Abyssinian court at Gondar during the Era of Princes. Although most of the Oromos who had played significant leadership roles in Gondar were Abyssinianised – Orthodox Christians who spoke Amharic – it seems that their Muslim background did not endear them to the Abyssinians (Bruce, 1805: 96-146). It is plausible to argue that, whether they were Christians or Muslims, the northern Oromo 'were seen as a rough, sharp-edged bone in throat of the Geez [Abyssinian] civilization, tempted to choke it, but preferring to bleed it' (Tibebu, 1995: 16). Indeed, despite some degree of inter-marriage, fear and prejudice characterised the relations between the two peoples.

According to sociologists, there are three general characteristics that mark relations between perpetrators of mass killings and communities to which its victims belong. Groups or communities from which victims come (a) are alien or perceived as alien by perpetrators, (b) they are seen as unassimilable either for racial or religious reasons, and (c) their elimination either removes a threat (real or symbolic) or opens up opportunities (or both) to members of the perpe-trator group (Fein, 1993:34). This was also more or less how Tewodros perceived the Oromo when he came to power. Upon his ascent to the Abyssinian throne in 1855, he vowed to punish and drive them out because they were 'intruders' and 'the spearhead of a Muslim attempt to take over Ethiopia [Abyssinia]' (Crummey, 1971: 188). He appealed 'to the latent anti-Galla [Oromo] feelings of the Amhara' for support in his 'war of extermination' (Crummey, 1971: 111). His very first campaign against the Wallo Oromo began with 'terrorism; both by mutilation of prisoners of war and by destruction of property' (Zanab cited Crummey, ibid.). In 1855, Plowden, the British Consul in Abyssinia, reported to his home office: 'The King is now I hear

wasting Warraimano (a Wallo district) with fire and sword' (cited in Crummey, ibid: 111-112).

It is impossible to estimate how many people were mutilated or killed during the thirteen years he was on the throne. However, scattered information indicates that those who were mutilated alone were counted in thousands. For example, Zanab, a court historian and witness to Tewodros's cruelty, noted that during one campaign in 1859 the emperor cut off the hands and feet of about 1000 men. He mutilated 777 of them just on one occasion and in one place. Several episodes of mass killings were reported during the period, including the extermination of peasants who showed their allegiance to their local leaders (Zanab cited in ibid: 118, fn. 48).

Claiming victory over the Oromo, and pleading for support for his crusade against the Turks, he wrote in 1862 to Queen Victoria of England and Emperor Napoleon III of France saying:

> Since the kings of Ethiopia, my father, in times past had forgotten their Creator, he with-drew his Spirit from them and deprived them of their kingdoms, which he gave to the Galla and the Turks. At my birth, God picked me up from the dust, gave me strength, raised me up, and by divine power I have chased away the Galla. The Turks, however, resist the will of God, and since they refuse to surrender the land of my fathers, I am going out to fight them (letter published in Rubenson, et al. 1994: 203).

Scholars have stated that in order to ascertain whether a mass killing is an act of genocide or not, it is important to examine what perpetrators say, especially before they commit it (Fein, 1993). What they say reflects their intention or an ideology legitimating their acts. Though Tewodros could have not committed a full-fledged genocide against the northern Oromo, there is no doubt that his intent was, as the quotation above indicates, 'ethnic cleansing'. The Oromo and the Turks (meaning the Ottomans who controlled the Red Sea coast) were to be purged from his dominions in order to restore its lost glory. However, notwith-standing his many campaigns, '[he] never controlled Wallo closely and even seriously threatened the activities of the rebels there... By 1862 he may have resorted to mass deportations of the Wallo to western Ethiopia, still without significantly resolving the problem. What his Wallo campaign established was, above all, 'terrorism as a major instrument of control' (Jewish Records, NS, no. 28 and 29, 1863, cited in Crummey, 1971: 118-119). The intent to exterminate the northern Oromo was unsuccessful because of Tewodros's lack of resources and the fierce resistance he met.

Generally, genocidal killings tend to spill over, affecting people who actually belong to the perpetrators' group and hence may have not have been targeted in the first place. As proposed by Ben Kiernan, 'In practice, genocidal regimes also tend to be both domestically repressive, even of their own "favored" ethnic community... They usually commit both crimes against humanity and war crimes, and often ethnic cleansing as well, along with genocide' (Kiernan, 2002: 141-142). And indeed Tewodros's terror was not

limited to the destruction or ethnic cleansing of Muslims or Oromos. Seen in a human rights perspective, his thirteen-year rule was a reign of terror that caused the death of tens of thousands of Abyssinians. What started as a campaign against the Wallo Oromo developed into indiscriminate terror against all types of real or imagined enemies, including the clergy of the Abyssinian Orthodox Church (Zewde, 1991:35).

According to Tekla-Tsadik Mekuriya's *The History of Ethiopia: From Tewodros to Haile Selassie* (1969: 30), 'having created a new type of punishment, he burnt men, women and children, guilty and innocent in *saqala bet* [wooden buildings] where he had them locked up. Ordinary wayfarers and peasants working their lands were rounded up and massacred'. Here it should be mentioned that historians have recorded many Amharic ballads and dirges depicting the gruesome killings that Tewodros had committed. The ballads grieved the fates of men who were deprived limbs and life, the of the numerous women who were turned into widows and about those who died from thirst because of Tewodros's wanton cruelty (see ibid: 16-18, 29-37).

Though he was a cruel man, it seems that he was not in any sense 'mad', although his erratic behaviour during the latter part of his rule may suggest the possibility. There is ample evidence indicating that his acts were purposeful and that he was particularly consistent in his violence against the Wallo and Yejju Oromos. According to Crummey (1971: 111), 'From the beginning, Tewodros's treatment of the Galla [Oromo] in general and the Wallo in particular, differed from his treatment of the Amhara'. The fixation of Tewodros with Wallo indicates the intent and determination with which he pursued the destruction of those he saw as the ideological enemies of the Christian state. Although his government was facing serious threats from other provinces, he concentrated his energy on Wallo. Crummey (1971: 117-118) has written:

> Following the urging of Plowden [British consul in Abyssinia], in February 1859, Tewodros moved his camp to Wadla, a district of Begemder, more strategically placed to deal both with Wallo and the Tigré rebels. But before long he was back in Wallo, and this time his campaign was really terrible. As his army advanced, it looted, burned and killed prisoners, while Wallo resistance took the form of retreat. What the king did not demolish, the Wallo themselves destroyed in scorched earth policy, effectively designed to deprive the royal army food and fodder. Mass mutilation took place, while many children were seized and forcibly removed from their homes.

Crummey argued that because he was so 'obsessed with Wallo, a province of limited strategic value, [he] paid an unjustifiable high price in pacifying it'. According to Crummey the Wallo did not constitute the major threat to Tewodros's power, as the activities of other rebellious groups in the Christian Amhara and Tigrean districts did (ibid.: 115). However, for Tewodros 'the Wallo Gallas are still worse, for they want to make all Abyssinia Muhammadan' (Kienzlen, cited in Crummey, ibid: 117). The Christian rebels,

being in his view a lesser evil, he deemed them less threatening as they posed no threat to the nation.

Bahru Zewde (1991:33) maintains that 'before his sense of justice fell to his indiscriminate violence, he was severe towards any of soldiers caught looting. Yet, when Wallo rebels killed his night guard and stole some mules, he gave his soldiers permission to loot the locality in retribution'. There are indications that even in the Amhara heartland of Gojjam and Gondar, districts that were identified with Oromo settlements were affected (Tibebu, 1995:38). This seems to have been, for example, the fate of Macha, a district north of Lake Tana (Zanab cited in Crummey, 1971: 112). According to Tekle-Tsadik Mekuriya, on one occasion, he imprisoned and condemned about 400 men to die of hunger and thirst with the allegation that they had plotted against him. Unlike the Wallo who as Muslims were blamed as proxies of foreign Islamic powers intending to destroy a Christian nation, these were assimilated into the Abyssinian culture, spoke Amharic and were Orthodox Christians.

In addition, Tewodros's Shawan campaign of 1855 provides evidence of his intentions of destroying the Oromo as an ethno-national category. While treating the Amhara who had rebelled against his rule with consideration and respect, he decimated the Oromo living in the same region, though the resistance they had offered was scarcely distinguishable from that of the Amhara (ibid: 112).

Historically, dispersion was one of the methods used by communal groups to eliminate their enemies after defeating them in battles. Dispersion was by selling them into slavery or deporting defeated enemies from their homeland, which prevented them from recouping their losses and again pose a threat (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990: 32-33). Deportation was also one of the methods he used to eliminate the northern Oromo. Thus Tewodros even authorised his soldiers to enslave the Muslims of Wallo (Zewde, 1991:34), or as stated by the German missionary, Theophil Waldmeier, 'allowed to be distributed to his soldiers in lieu of pay' (cited in Pankhurst, 1968: 93) contradicting an official ban he had put on the slave trade in his realm.

It seems that Tewodros vented his anger on the Oromo even for things that non-Oromos did at his court. This was, for example, the case when Shawa's crown prince, Menelik, escaped from a prison attached to Tewodros's fort at Maqdela in 1865. Though it was planned by Shawan prisoners with the connivance of Tewodros's elder son Meshesha, who had long been out of favour of his father, the Wallo paid a 'terrible price for Menelik's escape' (Prouty, 1986: 6-7). Soon after he was informed about the escape, Tewodros took 25 Walllo hostages, 'had their hands and feet amputated and the bodies thrown over the precipice to die in agony'. As stated by Prouty (ibid.) and Darkwah (1975:53, fn. 55) it is indeed remarkable that the Shawa Amhara prisoners 'who remained behind at Maqdela should have remained unmolested while the Wallo prisoners were executed'.

It should be noted also that even during last hours before his death, Tewodros was killing prisoners from Wallo while releasing others, including the English. It was noted by a historian that 'He... released the English prisoners, Shawa prisoners and Gojjam prisoners... He threw the rest of the Ethiopian Balabbat and Wallo Balabbatoch [nobility], who numbered more than 500, down the precipice of Maqdala after having shot each of them with a bullet' (Asma Giyorgis 1905/1987: 599).

The documented pattern of onslaughts perpetrated by Tewodros against the northern Oromo, preceded by the statement of his intention 'to throw the "Galla intruders" out of Ethiopia [Abyssinia]' (Tibebu, 1995: 41) in order to restore her glorious past, suggests acts of genocidal killing and ethnic cleansing. Inferring from the narratives about his destructive and discriminatory acts, it is plausible to conclude that both deep-seated fear and deep-seated hatred led to the Emperor's genocidal killings of the northern Oromo.

Paradoxically Tewodros became at last a de facto prisoner in the midst of the people he attempted to destroy or drive away. Thus when a British rescue force arrived at Maqdela in 1868 to free British citizens and of several other European countries imprisoned by Tewodros, he was deserted by most of his soldiers and was confined to his isolated fortress on an amba – a flat mountain top-surrounded by Oromo enemies. According to historians (Tekle Tsadik Mekuriya, 1969:35; Rubenson, 1976), when Tewodros realised it was futile to resist the 32,000-man strong British force, he tried to escape from Maqdela but was unable to do so because the only exit from the fortress was blocked by the forces of Queen Warqitu, the ruler of Wallo. Her son was one of the many prisoners whom he had had mutilated and cast over the edge of the Maqdela cliff to die. As Flad (1887), one of the Europeans imprisoned at Maqdela, artic- ulated the situation, Tewodros 'was already a king without land and almost without people [when he] ended his life by committing suicide' (cited in Rubenson, 1976: 285).

A Tigrean warlord named Kassa Mercha became Emperor Yohannes IV of Abyssinia-cum Ethiopia in 1872. Yohannes was a Christian fundamentalist and he was fanatically intolerant of Islam. The 'thrust of his repression was directed against Wallo, the same province which had earlier been the main target of Tewodros's fury' (Zewde, 1991: 48). However, he knew that Tewodros's policy of ethnic cleansing was counter-productive. Therefore, he adopted a policy of forced religious conversion and cultural assimilation. In a decree issued in 1878 at Boru Meda in the middle the Wallo territory, he declared: 'Now let all, whether Muslim or Galla [pagan] believe on the name of Jesus Christ! Be baptized! If you wish to live in peace preserving your belongings, become Christians' (Caulk, 1972: 24). The policy was not confined to Wallo. The Emperor passed orders to his vassals in Gojjam and Shawa to implement the decree in their respective provinces without any delay.

To implement the policy of religious conversion and cultural assimilation, the emperor immediately set out building churches, and baptising the northern Oromo by force as well as 'exterminating those who refused' (Asma Giyorgis, 1905/1987: 689). As a court historian expressed it, 'the Muslims were offered only the unenviable choice of leaving Yohannes's dominions if they would not convert' (Abba Garima cited in Caulk, ibid: 28). In other words, they were given a choice between deportation and ethnocide.

The Muslims' response to Yohannes's religious policy was varied, and included acquiescence, flight, and resistance. Notwithstanding the threat of death, it seems that a small minority of the population was acquiescent and accepted conversion. Amongst them were many prominent members the ruling families in Wallo and Yejju. Apparently a smaller number who chose exile to forced conversion fled to different territories in north-east Africa. According to historical sources, many fled to Matamma, in the Sudan in the west, to join the Mahdists; and others to Gurageland and Jimma in the south, and Hararge in the southeast – the last three were Muslim states that were conquered and incorporated in Ethiopia later in the nineteenth century. Tekle-Tsadik Mekuriya (1990: 200) maintains that siding with the Mahdists, those who fled to the Sudan had participated in the Battle of Matamma where Yohannes was killed in 1889. The majority of the population went against the imperial decree; they stayed at home resisting forced conversion.

As his policy of ethnocide met resistance, Yohannes resorted to physical annihilation of the recalcitrant. The records indicate that he had marched several times into the Wallo country to subjugate and baptise the population. There are no estimates of how many people were killed during the many campaigns in which the emperor's vassal, Menelik of Shawa, also participated. The historian Asma Giyorgis, who, at that time was in the service of Menelik, wrote:

> Human blood was sheld [sic] in every river... Menelik... asked [Yohannes]: 'Janhoy [Your Majesty or Emperor], will God be pleased if we exterminate our people by forcing them to take Holy Communion?' Janhoy [Emperor] is said to have replied: 'I shall avenge the blood of Ethiopia [Christian Abyssinia]. It was also by force of sword and fire that Grañ islamized Ethiopia. Who will, if we do not, found and strengthen the faith of Marqos [St. Mark]?' And this was told as a glorious thing by the contemporaries... Yohannes spent the rainy season in Wallo offering Holy Communion, exterminating those who refused and constructing a church at Boru Meda (1905/1987: 689).

As noted by a social anthropologist, since the sixteenth century, fears of Islam and of the Oromo have dominated the political consciousness of the Amhara ruling elite, and 'he thought of the two in combination has been a recurring nightmare' (Baxter, 1983: 132). The proposition is supported by a historian who argued that 'In the collective memory of the post-sixteenth-century Ge'ez [Abyssinian] civilization, the "barbarian infidel" is pictured as a two-head hydra: one "Galla", and another Muslim' (Tibebu, 1995: 17). Thus,

Yohannes's association of Grañ, the sixteenth century Harari leader who invaded Abyssinia, with his campaigns against the northern Oromo, was to activate his audience's Christian nationalist sentiments.

Notwithstanding their resistance to forced conversion, it is interesting to note here that the Wallo, Yejju and Raya/Azabo (hereafter Raya) Oromos are the most liberal people one may come across in Northeast Africa (Wylde, 1901: 383; cf. Isenberg and Krapf, 1843: 323-324). As individuals they easily abandoned one religion for another. Intermarriage between Muslim and Christian Walloyee (Wallo people) was not only very common, but also the wife and husband often maintained their respective pre-marital religion. Collectively, the Oromo in Wallo or elsewhere, adopted Islam 'as reaction against Abyssinian nationalism' (Trimingham, 1976: 197, Donham, 1986: 45), but not for mobilisation against Christian Abyssinians. Since Orthodox Christianity is a defining element of Abyssinian (Amhara-Tigre) nationality, the Muslim Oromo resistance against forced conversion attempted by Yohannes IV was to maintain their collective identity and their freedom to profess a religion of their own choice (Asma Giyorgis, ([1905], 1987: 135).

One can discern at least two of the four general motives that genocide scholars (Chalk and Jonassohn) have identified with genocidal killing clearly reflected in Yohannes's policy against northern Oromos. Yohannes wanted not only to impose a religious ideology on them but also to eliminate a real or potential threat. As mentioned above, the thrust of his violence was the Muslim population Raya, Yejju and Wallo (the latter two inhabiting a region designated later on as the Wallo province of the Ethiopian empire). Justifying this policy, the historian, Zewde Gebre-Sellassie (1975: 96), commented 'It was apparent to him that the Muslims in the centrally located core-region province of Wallo, whose leaders have assumed the title of Imam (the leader of the faithful), could no longer be left in authority to propagate Islam, for they constituted practically a foreign state in the midst of the Christian heartland' (my emphasis). If we believe Gebre-Selassie, there was a clear-cut case of two nationalisms in conflict in Abyssinia during in the nineteenth century. Although the myth and fear of a fifth column of Muslims who might ally with the external enemies of the Christian nation was, as with Tewodros, an important reason for his use of violence against the northern Oromo, it seems that Yohannes's main concern was the religious 'purity' of the nation rather than the threat from outside. Consequently, he did not even tolerate other branches of Christianity that were being practised in his dominions. He threatened Catholics that they would 'be shot down like Taltal or Galla' (Caulk, 1972:29) if they did not convert to Orthodoxy. 'Taltal' is a derogative term for Afar and 'Galla' a derogative term for Oromo. According the Emperor, the Afars and Oromos, who were also Muslim, could be killed without any remorse.

As has been argued by scholars of genocide (Horowitz, 1997: 263; Markusen & Mirkovic, 2003: 198-199), malignant nationalism, as a political

ideology, 'instils not only a sense of difference between those who belong and those who do not belong, but also the inhumanity of those who do not belong and thereby the right of the social order to purge itself a alien influence'. This was also the ideology reflected in the nationalism that both Tewodros and Yohannes represented. They sought to purge the Abyssinian nation of those they considered alien; Tewodros used murder and deportation, and Yohannnes mainly assimilation that is, the elimination of non-Abyssinian religion and culture, but also the physical extermination of those recalcitrant to religious conversion.

Yohannes IV, like his predecessor, Tewodros II, died without achieving his goal. His aspiration of building an ethnically homogenous Abyssinian nation based on an Orthodox Christian faith and culture did not materialise. Islam persisted as the religion of the northern Oromos. However, the legacy of authoritarianism, religious and cultural Manicheanism, state-sponsored terrorism and mass killing, entrenched during the reign of these two emperors, remained the characteristic elements of the political culture of Ethiopia's ruling elite. The suppression of northern Oromos continued by Emperors Menelik II (1889-1913) and Haile Selassie I (1930-1974). One of the most devastating onslaughts took place against the Raya and Yejju in connection to the Weyane revolt in 1943 (Tareke, 1996: 89-124).

Conquest, Genocide and the Creation of the Ethiopian Empire State

As pointed out by a historian, 'Tewodros's vision of Ethiopia [Abyssinia] was limited to the central provinces, with Shawa making the southern limit. Yohannes's conception, while extending further in the north, was broader in the south by proxy, through his vassal[s]', the kings of Shawa and Gojjam (Zewde, 1991: 60). Unlike his predecessors, Menelik's territorial ambitions were not limited to the Abyssinian heartland. He had adopted a policy of conquest and colonialism even before ascending the Abyssinian throne. Since he was receiving many European travellers, fortune-seekers and adventurers at his court, Menelik was informed about developments in other parts of Africa. Thus, impelled by 'the appearance of European colonialist in the region', he 'embarked on a much larger scale of colonization in the 1880s' (Tareke, 1996: 40) than what was attempted previously. Arguing along the same lines, Bairu Tafla stated that though the Ethiopian (Abyssinian) sovereigns frequently attacked and plundered various neighbouring peoples, they did not attempt to occupy them permanently before the mid-nineteenth century. He adds, 'European colonial acquisition in Africa awakened the interest in the minds of the Ethiopian rulers of the late nineteenth century' (in Asma Giorgis, 1905/1987: 405, fn. 584). This was particularly the case with Menelik who wrote to contemporary European leaders, the participants in the Scramble for Africa, saying that he would not watch while they divided Africa between

themselves and that 'he intended to conquer as far as Khartoum and Lake Nyasa if circumstances allowed him' (ibid.). What was declared implicitly in the letter was that the Abyssinian state had a right to a lebensraum – the right to expand by colonising peoples and territories in Northeast Africa just as the European colonial powers were doing.

The Abyssinians succeeded in conquering and annexing many independent states and nations, including the Oromo. They met resistance from those they invaded, but they were able to defeat them because of the large arsenal of firearms Menelik II was able to buy using revenues from the slave trade (Marcus, 1974; Darkwah, 1975; Jalata 1993; Hassen, 1999; Bulcha, 2002). Thus, the Abyssinian kingdom 'not only survived European colonial occupation but increased its size by more than 65 percent in the wake of the Scramble for Africa... [T]he Ethiopian state attained more or less its present spatial organization during precisely this period (Tareke, 1996: 27).

Many European adventurers and fortune seekers helped Menelik in the race for colonies. Fortunately, some of them had kept notes providing us with valuable information that they collected during their sojourn in the region. For example, the Russian Cossack Captain, Alexander Bulatovich, who served as logistics officer under the command of Ras Wolde Giyorgis, the emperor's general who conquered the Kingdom of Kafa and the adjacent territories in 1896-1898, wrote two books: *From Intoto to the River Baro*, and *With the Armies of Menelik II*. In the summary of the second book, Bulatovich wrote:

> Summing up my stay with the army of Menelik II, I consider it necessary to say the following: By order of the emperor, a fifteen-thousand-man corps, in spite of the immense region over which it was quartered, concentrated incredibly quickly and set out on a campaign to annex to the real of Ethiopia vast lands which lie to the south of it, which no one before this had explored, and which were completely unknown. In the course of just four months, this corps annexed to Abyssinia an area of just over 40,000 versts [18,000 sq. miles]. Garrisons are posted in the newly conquered lands, and these regions should now be considered definitely lost for any other power which might have had pretensions on them. An expedition which would have cost any European power millions, was carried out by the Abyssinians almost free, if you don't count several hundred men killed and several thousands cartridges shot ([1898], 2000: 381).

Concerning the points raised in the quote two things should be noted. The first is Bulatovich's reference to competition between the colonial 'powers' over lands and peoples hitherto 'completely unknown' to them. It is important to underline this because the Abyssinian conquest of the south was, by and large, a colonial undertaking and not as maintained, post factum, by politicians and Ethiopianist scholars, 'a reunification of Ethiopia', or an 'ingathering of peoples with deep historical affinities' (Levine, 1974). In the quotation, Bulatovich alludes to a British expedition that was in the vicinity at the same time but was not authorised to make territorial claims or did not have forces on the spot to prevent the Abyssinians from claiming the territory (see Bulatovich, 1898/2000: 319-322) and setting up garrisons.

The second point concerns the cost incurred by the Abyssinian compared to the size of the territory they had annexed. It indicates the predatory nature of Abyssinian colonialism rather than the overall cost incurred as the consequences of the conquest. As indicated by Markakis (1987: 28), 'Menelik took full advantage of his soldiers' ability to live off the land'. His commanders and soldiers were not paid salaries but promised 'a unique opportunity to win fame and get livestock and prisoners' (Bulatovich, 2000: 239). Having been promised glory and a lot of spoils, the soldiers looted and carried away whatever they could carry away and often destroyed the rest. They killed the men and captured the women and children as slaves. Bulatovich indicated that after about three weeks, 'Our marching column had increased now almost double what it had been before, from the quantity of livestock that had been taken, and captive women and children'. In the meantime, 'several dozen captive women and children died' because 'they were unaccustomed to protracted walking and endured thirst badly' (ibid: 354).

Although he was apparently disgusted by what he termed the barbarity of the Abyssinian soldiers against the indigenous peoples (see ibid: 300ff.), he continued his service in the expedition, often participating in battles. Back in his tent after a very tiresome campaign against the Maji (Dizi) people, he noted in his diary on 23 April, 1898,

> [H]ow many victims had the conquest of this land cost? It seemed to me brim-full of violence and injustice. Of course, a new phase in the history of peoples is always paid for with sacrifices. But world justice and individual justice are quite different from one another. Murder always remains murder for us whatever goal it may accomplish and it is especially immoral in relation to these peaceful, industrious people who never did harm to us, whose land we now take away by force, using the superiority of our weapons (Bulatovich, ([1898], 2000: 370).

In this statement, and in several parts of his report, Bulatovich referred to the one-sidedness of the killing he had witnessed. The victims, according to his descriptions, were not only non-combatants, but were also often murdered indiscriminately. The onslaught he witnessed was a clear case of genocidal killing. It is plausible to suggest that the annexation of most of the other regions had followed the same pattern. Consequently, at least four to five million people were killed, died of the attendant diseases, or were captured and sold into slavery during the conquest of the south. One may argue that the mass killings were the results of war. But none of the conquered peoples declared war against the Abyssinians. Some 'never even heard of the existence of the Abyssinians' (ibid: 168), or were able to put up any meaningful resistance when invaded by them. In addition to Bulatovich's reports, there are several other eye-witness descriptions of Menelik's *zamacha* (expeditions) that explain why and how so many lives were taken during the conquest. The Italian diplomat and arms dealer, Pietro Antonelli, followed the king on some of his expeditions against the Arsi Oromo and wrote that Menelik's army fought

against tribes 'who have no other weapons but a lance, a knife and a shield, while the Amharas, infinitely superior in numbers, always have in their army several thousand rifles, pistols, and often a couple of cannon' (Antonelli, 1882, cited in Marcus, 1975: 64). Describing the havoc they caused when in action, he noted:

> one sees thirty or forty thousand men running in one direction... soldiers no longer think about their generals, nor... of the king... [who] in these moments is a simple soldier. It is a flood of men following a giddy course. After eight or ten hours of assault the soldiers return to camp with herds of cattle and groups of women and children; captive able-bodied males and elderly were killed. The severity of the zamacha was aimed at the eradication of all resistance... Wherever the army surged forward, there was the utmost destruction; houses were burned, crops destroyed and people executed (ibid: 67).

Marcus reports that the commander-in-chief halts the assaults only after the enemy surrenders. Then the king or his surrogate assigns an Amhara nobleman along with colonists (soldiers who participated in the war) to administer the ravaged land, divides the rich booty, and returns home (ibid: 68).

Ras Tesemma, Menelik's most trusted general and commander of many of the expeditions in the conquest of the south, told the head of a French military delegation in 1899 that, 'Up to now, I have made war to kill, ravage, pillage and collect beasts [livestock] and slaves. Now His Majesty Menelik wants no more of this aggression' (Prouty, 1986: 206). Although the conquest of the south was almost complete at that point, the atrocities did not cease. They continued, by and large, until the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in 1936. However, the statement throws some light on the genocidal process. The perpetration of mass death committed in the process of the conquest reflected three of the four categories of intentions ascribed by scholars to perpetrators of genocides namely, elimination of real or potential resistance to the empire building project; spreading terror among real and potential enemies; and acquiring economic profits (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990).

Firstly, the conquering forces committed mass killings, particularly against the Arsi Oromo, the Walaita, and the Kaficho, to eliminate what was perceived as real or potential resistance to their empire-building project. Put in a comparative perspective, the case of the Kafa, Gimira and Maji/Dizi bear similarities to the atrocities inflicted on the Herero and Nama peoples of Namibia by the German colonisers almost at the same time. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990: 24) wrote that 'No fewer than 80 percent of the Herero and 50 percent of the Nama had... fallen victim to colonial rule'. They indicated that the Herero and Nama were exterminated for opposing German colonial rule. They added that 'the staggering human cost of German colonial rule in South-West Africa' was accompanied by plunder. The sources suggest that more than 90 percent of the Maji or Dizi, about 80 percent of the Gimira, between third thirds and three quarter of the Kaficho and about half of the Oromo population had lost their lives as the consequence of the conquest and colonisation The small kingdom

of Walaita also lost a large proportion of its inhabitants. An Abyssinian expedition in 1894 slaughtered about 119,000 men, women and children (Prouty, 1986:115) in less than two weeks.

The Frenchman, Gaston Vanderheym, who accompanied Menelik on that expedition, described the offensive against the Walaita as 'some kind of infernal hunting where human beings rather than animals served as game'. Not only were the surrendering Walaita killed and mutilated, but the invaders made no distinction between fighters and civilians. 'It was a terrible butchery of living or dead flesh... by soldiers drunk from blood... [O]ur mules turned aside continuously from recently killed corpses which encumbered the country. The wounded, terribly mutilated, were trampled by the cavalry men' (Vanderheym, 1896: 181; Marcus, 1969: 449-450). Chris Prouty wrote that captive women and children were forced to carry the severed parts of their dead husbands and fathers, and that 'Menelik's Christianizing-colonizing objective was achieved but at a terrible cost'. He added that 'Despite the fact that Menelik, "in his mercy", gave the Welamo back some of their herds, the cattle he took to Addis Ababa still numbered 36,000' (Prouty, 1986: 116). The conquest was followed by confiscation of land and property on an extensive scale (Markakis, 1987: 39).

Indeed, as Jack Porter (1982: 16) pointed out, 'Genocide can become a military and political tool in subjugating the land and its people in the colonial conquest'. This was even more evident in Kafa, which was conquered three years later. Kafa (also spelt Kaffa, Keffa) was invaded in December 1896, and the poorly armed Kaficho (as the people of Kafa call themselves) bravely faced an army of 30,000 Abyssinians. Since his forces were equipped with outdated arms, Chenito, the Tato King, resorted to guerrilla war. He resisting the invading forces and eluded capture for nine months. In their effort to eliminate Kaficho resistance, the invaders laid waste the country, ravaging it village after village, 'taking prisoner the women and children who were hidden in the forests, and setting fire to everything that could burn' (Bulatovich, [1898], 2000: 220). After nine months of evading the Abyssinian forces he was captured and brought to Shawa in chains. On the way, he threw his regalia of a golden ring into the Gojeb River on the northern border of his kingdom exclaiming: 'The end of the Kingdom of Kafa has arrived, let her royal ring lie under your silt undisturbed forever!' (Nyonyo, 1991:35).

As remarked by Prouty (1986:199), genocide characterised the conquest and colonisation of the Kingdom of Kafa. In its ferocity and the number of lives taken, it exceeded the mass killings perpetrated against the Oromo or the Walaita. Frank de Halpert, who as Haile Selassie's adviser in matters concerning slavery, toured the region in 1933 and estimated that judging by the traces of abandoned villages the population of Kafa had probably decreased by three-quarters since the conquest. He also wrote that 'the old commerce had died out', and a 'traveller would rarely see a Kafa native on the tracks, and often

when he did the native would flee in fear' (cited in Perham, 1969: 321). It is clear from the records that the desolation and insecurity were consequences of the mass killings and slave raiding that continued long after the conquest.

The Kingdom of Kafa never recovered from the consequences of the genocidal onslaught. Its last king, Chenito, died in 1918 having spent twenty years of misery in an Ethiopian prison. Its population never recovered from the demographic collapse caused by the genocide. It was indicated by some sources that the population of Kafa was about 1.5 million at the time of conquest (see for example Newman, 1936: 93). The official national census conducted in 1994 shows that there were, at the time of the survey, 599,188 Kaficho; that is, by far less than half of the estimated number of the Kaficho who lived about a century ago.

Secondly, to spread terror among real and potential enemies, the Abyssinian forces committed acts of mass murder and mutilation against the different peoples they conquered. Here, unlike in the north, mutilation included even women. In that respect the best-known case was the mass mutilation of the Arsi Oromo during the wars of conquest fought from 1882 to 1886. What was remarkable here is that mutilation did not stop with Abyssinian victory at the battle of Azule in 1886 that cost the lives over 12,000 Oromo fighters (Haji, 1995; Zewde, 1991: 63). Weeks after the Arsi were defeated at battle of Azule, the commander of the conquering forces, Ras Darge Sahle Selassie, ordered thousands of Oromos to gather at a place called Anole. Thousands came obeying the order and were killed or mutilated – the men of their hands and the women of their breasts (Haji, 1995: 15-16). As argued by Helen Fein, 'were the victims during war to surrender, the killing should cease (assuming adherence to the war convention) but surrender of victims in genocidal situations does not avoid their mass murder but expedites it' (Fein, 1993: 21). The Arsi mass mutilation and murder was undertaken with intent and sanctioned by the highest authority, the commander of the Abyssinian forces. The intention was not to embark on the impossible task of killing off the numerous Arsi Oromo, but to secure their submission and exploitation. The method was effective, at least for a while.

It is difficult to know the exact number of people who died during the wars of conquest. However, the war as well as the attendant epidemics and the famines that were caused by the destruction and looting of property took their toll in great proportions. Alexander Bulatovich, who visited Oromoland at a time when the Oromo were still reeling from the shock of conquest, wrote that the dreadful killing of more than half the population during the conquest took away from the Oromo all possibility of thinking about any sort of uprising. Bulatovich estimated the Oromo population to be at least five million at the time of his tour, 1896-1898. As he was a highly respected and decorated friend of Menelik and his generals he had no motive to exaggerate what he observed. In addition, the estimates he made were corroborated by those which were

made by a French missionary who lived among the Oromo for decades (De Salviac, 1901). Oral sources and notes made by European travellers during the early decades of the twentieth century indicate that mass murder was committed in the process of conquest and consolidation of the Ethiopian rule in the south.

Thirdly, the acquisition of economic profit was a driving force behind the genocidal colonial policies. During the protracted war of conquest and the pacification that lasted for several decades, vast amounts of property belonging to the conquered peoples was confiscated or destroyed, and millions of head of livestock were looted. Tens of thousands of captives were deported and sold into slavery. This was even the case of with the Maji or Dizi, Gimira, and other peoples in what is now south-western Ethiopia who submitted with little resistance to the conquerors. It was reported that, 'in contrast to the genocide that characterized Ras Wolde Giorgis's conquest of Keffa, the colonization of the area up to Lake Rudolf... was almost bloodless' (Prouty, 1986: 199). But that did not save the inhabitants from being captured and deported en masse to be sold into slavery later (Darley, 1926). Tens of thousands of them died resisting enslavement. The hardships of deportation also took their toll. It was reported that in 1912, about 40,000 of the Gimira were rounded up and taken to the north, and that half of them died on the way while the rest were sold as slaves and scattered within and outside the Ethiopian empire (Pankhurst, 1968: 107).

While, in the case of the Arsi Oromo, both resistance and surrender to the conquering forces led to mass murder and mutilation, the initial passive incorporation of the Gimira and Maji/Dizi expedited their enslavement and mass deportation from their land (Hodson, 1927: 02). Writing about the Maji/Dizi, the German anthropologist Eike Haberland (1984: 47) notes that

> Before the arrival of the Amhara troops in the 1890s and the subsequent forced incorporation of the Dizi into the Ethiopian empire, the Dizi probably numbered between 50,000 and 100,000. The conquest had profound consequences in the decades that followed: subjection to... economic exploitation and oppression; the abduction... of innumerable peoples as slaves, servants or carriers, only a few of whom were ever able to return; famine, disease and a growing sense of hopelessness and resignation, engendered by a total absence of justice. These things not only caused the number of the Dizi to shrink (in 1974 there were probably scarcely more than 20,000) but shook their whole culture to its roots.

Chalk and Jonassohn have noted that 'The part played by genocide in the destruction and crippling of so many societies spread over a vast area and colonized by settlers of many different nationalities and social systems is complex and still poorly understood' (1990: 176, 203). They maintain that these took many forms but that genocide through famine was the most important form. Famine was caused by destruction or confiscation of the victims' source of livelihood, and raised their vulnerability to disease, increased their mortality rate and limited the birth rate of those who survived. It

seems that famine was an important factor in the genocide not only against the Dizzi, but also the other conquered peoples. Enslavement and deportation were the other factors that contributed to their demographic collapse. Enslavement resulted not only in deportation but caused physical extermination as slave-hunters murdered men in order to capture women and children.

Nationalism and the Rationalisation of Genocide

Helen Fein notes that because they lack contacts and visibility, 'the victims of genocide and genocidal massacres are often the least likely to raise accusations of genocide' (1993: xviii-xix). This applies also to the peoples who were conquered by the Abyssinians in the late nineteenth century. They were voiceless because they lacked not only contacts with the rest of the world, but also their leaders were killed and their institutions incapacitated or completely destroyed by the conquest.

It is argued that in some cases, academics play key roles in obfuscating genocide by justifying the discrimination and persecution of target groups (Markusen, 2002: 85). This was (is) the case in Ethiopia, where in the writings of some scholars (Wolde-Mariam, 1972; Marcus, 1969; Levine, 1974), the atrocities of conquests were either blamed on the victims or are rationalised as a necessary evil in building a nation and state. Writing about the works of early twentieth century Abyssinian intellectuals, Bahru Zewde (2002: 131) argues that even the most liberated among them had few sympathetic words for the conquered peoples. They applauded the conquest, describing jubilantly Menelik's 'campaigns of expansion into the Oromo country', and ignoring the human costs involved. The attitude of many Ethiopianist scholars is not different even today. What is also remarkable in this regard is that whenever writers mention the violence perpetrated by the conquerors, it is often to justify rather than explain its consequences.

However, notwithstanding the rationalising discourse and taboo that distort the history of the atrocities or the denial that genocide had occurred in Ethiopia, memories of past injustices together with present forms oppression are under-pinning ethnic nationalism and political conflicts in the region. According to researchers the cultural trauma caused by the atrocities still linger (Lange, 1979:70; Haji, 1995:15-16).

The Dergue's Reign of Terror, 1974-1991

Following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie's autocratic government, a group of low ranking officers from the armed forces and the police called the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), or more generally known as the Dergue, took power in Ethiopia. During the first two years of the revolution the country experienced not only freedom of speech but also a radical change in its political and social structure. Following land reform in

1975 that made urban and rural land state property, the feudal power structure of the Ethiopian state was abolished. However, the initial period of democratic opening provided by the revolution was closed brutally when an uncompromising faction of the junta led by Mengestu Haile Mariam took power, assassinating General Teferi Benti, the Chairman, and other moderate members of the Dergue on 3 February, 1977.

The Red Terror

Following the coup against General Teferi Benti, Mengistu launched what he officially labelled the 'Campaign of Red Terror' on 4 February, 1977. Initially, the campaign was declared against the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), one of the urban-based leftist organisations opposed to the regime. Since the EPRP was using assassination in its opposition to the military regime, Dergue leaders and their supporters came out with such slogans as 'We shall carry terror into the camp of the anarchists', 'Their blood shall serve as the water we will put out the fire of counter-revolution' (Tola, 1989), etc., to justify the genocidal killings that followed. In a statement he gave news reporters about the liquidation of Teferi Banti and other Dergue members, Mengistu bragged that, 'Making decisions promptly and without hesitation or constraint can be counted as decisive factors for the triumph of our revolution. That is to say, the anti-people forces who had lined us up for their lunch – we had them for breakfast' (Schwab, 1985: 112).

Irving L. Horowitz (1997: 36) has argued that 'Those states with long histories of internal repression tend to be the same ones that have exhibited patterns of genocide in modern times'. This is also evidently true for Ethiopia's history of which the Dergue's reign of terror was the most barbaric episode. The barbarism was manifested not in the number of victims killed but the extent of the dehumanisation of the society as a whole. It revealed not only the level to which 'despots can sink to fulfil their cravings for power', but also 'stained the respect given to intellectuals when some of these were found to be no better, if not worse, than the illiterate killers employed by the regime'. It 'damaged the whole nation in a way which needs decades to overcome and erase' (Tola, 1989: 159).

There are, of course, those who argued that the end justified the means. They maintained that terror was used for 'revolutionary ends that benefited needs of the masses' and that therefore it was wrong to blame the Dergue. For example, reflecting the stand of many scholars and politicians inside and outside of Ethiopia, and arguing against the debate that branded the Dergue as killers, political scientist Peter Schwab (1985: 23) argued that

> Whatever its image, the Dergue consisted of a group of men who took power, and intended to use it for the benefit of the peasantry of Ethiopia, and were willing to use virtually any means to achieve their ends; to a large extent, the Dergue was often forced into the position of using extreme violence to achieve a successful revolution.

According to Schwab, the Red Terror was directed only against the EPRP 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'anarchists' who by the end of 1978 were either 'either dead, in jail, or in exile' (ibid: 41). Therefore, he concluded that 'Peasants and the urban proletariat are finally, and fortunately, obtaining their primary human and social, political and economic needs. The country is unified and more at peace with itself than it has been for decades' (ibid: 113). The facts depict a radically different picture. Indeed, Schwab's attestation in defence of the Ethiopian revolution is useful only as reminder of what Alexander Solzhenitsyn said in *The Gulag Archipelago* (1988: 215) about Western 'observers' who, after having listened only to the officials running the gulags, wrote with admiration about the 'humanity' and 'dignity' which the labour camp administration epitomised. Solzhenitsyn wrote:

> [Oh], you well-fed, devil-may-care, nearsighted, irresponsible foreigners with your note-books and your ball-point pens….how much you have harmed us in your vain passion to shine with understanding in areas where you did not grasp a lousy thing!

Although Schwab was recognised as an area expert and had 'written and published extensively' on Ethiopia, he did not grasp 'a lousy thing' about what was going on in that country. The terror was not limited to 'coun-ter-revolutionaries' or ended with their extermination as he maintained. It engulfed the society as a whole. Though some cities and regions experienced the consequences of the terror more than others, every region and town in the entire country was affected (Tola, 1989). According to one writer, 'the Oromo had been living a life of terror since colonization, but this one [life under the Dergue] was different and total... the whole of Oromiyaa became a prison house and killing field' (Ibsaa Guutamaa, 2003: 172). The same can be said about any region in the country, particularly for the period between 1977 and 1991. The country was not only at war with itself when Schwab wrote the above lines, but the peasants and urban proletariat were dying in thousands from war and man-made famine.

What made the Dergue's Red Terror so pervasive was the active involvement of two mass organisations known as the *kebele* and *gabare mahber* or urban dwellers' and farmers' associations. Together, the two organi-sations controlled every individual and household in the country. Though initially organised to promote the interests of the people in their respective areas, they were brought under the control of the regime and were used as instruments of its terror. As I have discussed elsewhere, places of detention increased at least tenfold when the kebele and peasant associations were proclaimed and given the power to have their own local tribunals (Bulcha, 1988). Between 1700 and 2000 kebeles, and about 23,500 peasant associations were established throughout the country. The associations were empowered inter alia with the right to impose sentences of imprisonment up to three months and hard labour up to fifteen days. In other words, they had a total control over

the population: they kept strict surveillance over them through registration of households, individual identity cards, roll calls at compulsory weekly meetings. The movement of people from one place to another was controlled through a pass system, whereby everyone was required to have written permission from the officials of the associations to leave their village or city for another.

Members of the kebele and peasant associations were armed, and at the height of the Red Terror, the defence guards of the kebeles were given, without any restrictions, the power to arrest and execute anybody they suspected of being 'anti-revolutionary'. This prerogative to kill without restriction was called *netsa ermijja* (Lefort, 1983; Bulcha, 1988). It was conferred not only on the armed guards and militias of the kebele and peasants associations but also on the regular security service organised in different auxiliary branches. The netsa ermijja, which in Amharic means instantaneous execution of suspects without any pretence at judicial procedures, turned the revolution into an orgy of blood shedding. An extensive search for 'counter-revolutionaries' called *fitesha* in Amharic was conducted involving every house in the kebeles. Large numbers of people were arrested and many were executed and dumped in mass graves. It was in the prisons of the kebeles that the worst cases of torture and killing took place. Here, the netsa ermijja was exploited not only by rapists and thieves but also by psychopaths who tortured, maimed and killed for pleasure. It was, for example, using the fitesha and netsa ermijja as pretexts that in May 1977, a kebele official could kill over thirty people, including an eight-month pregnant woman and mother of many children in one urban neighbourhood in the centre of Addis Ababa (Tola, 1989: 138). Torture was the main part of the terror campaign and was carried out with indescribable cruelty regardless of the gender and age of victims: flogging victims with the head dumped in a barrel full of water, rape, mutilation of the private part of victims, shoving iron rod or bottle in the private organ of female detainees, mental torture, etc., were among the methods used to solicit information from prisoners.

Since it was meant to terrify and control, the results the Red Terror were often brought to the attention of the public. To inculcate a feeling of helplessness against the power of the regime, and cultivate apathy among the population, dozens of corpse were displayed in public squares or placed near the homes of relatives. The mutilated and disfigured corpses characterised the torture of the Red terror. The corpses were left lying there in the street for a day with placards attached to them some of which read: 'I was an anarchist', 'I was an enemy of the people', etc. The victims were denied customary burial and relatives were not allowed to display even signs of grief for their murdered children. Since the majority of EPRP's supporters were secondary school and university students, most of the victims were very young. Relatives and the public were often forced to go and look at the corpse. But 'One could be arrested, tortured and shot for shedding tears for corpse one saw on the street'

(Tola, 1989: 177). Traumatised mothers often sat in anguished silence on the spots where the corpses of their children were thrown for display before these were dumped in unmarked mass graves. In the beginning, when the regime allowed parents and relatives to fetch the remains of the victims, they were made to pay for the bullets the state 'spent' on them.

The number of those killed in the Red Terror is unknown. Estimates of the total number of people killed during the reign of terror vary between 150,000 (Tola, 1989) and 200,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1999) for the country as a whole. The number of people who went through the prison system that mushroomed in every neighbourhood all over the country is unknown. According to one estimate, about 125,000 people were detained in Addis Ababa's conventional prison establishments and 335 kebele detention centres alone (Bekele, 1980). Given the fact that each kebele and peasant association was empowered to have a detention centre there were perhaps over 25,000 prisons in Ethiopia during the Dergue's reign of terror.

The Red Terror helped to suppress only overt urban opposition. Opposition to the regime continued throughout the country on a broad front. There was the wanton killing in the countryside where much of the repression was exercised during the later half of the 1970s and the 1980s. Summarising the consequences of the atrocities committed by the military regime, Dawit Wolde Giorgis (1989: 369-370) wrote:

> The world has never had and may never have an accurate count of the victims of famine, internal conflicts and repression, but the best estimates stagger the imagination. In the last ten years, 2.6 million people have died as a result of war and famine; over 3 million have been made refugees in the neighboring countries and around the world; 6 million have been displaced internally; 500,000 children have either been abandoned or orphaned; and more than 400,000 people disabled, while the entire population lives in permanent poverty, fear and terror.

How do we explain the violence of the Dergue? Was the Red Terror the work of irrational individuals? Are there cultural or structural links between the genocidal killings of the past epochs and the Red Terror?

For Halliday and Molyneux (1981) the Red Terror was not the work of irrational individuals or a product an irrational process: it was used deliberately for demobilising an enemy and consolidating obedience to the regime. Indeed, we may have a better grasp of the phenomenology of the Dergue's reign of terror if we place it within the context of Ethiopia's political culture of violence. The Abyssinian-cum-Ethiopian political system was and even today, is autocratic. The power of the king or ruler was unlimited. Therefore, not only his person but also his name stirred awe and fear in the minds of his subjects. According to an Amharic dictum, 'When demanded in the name of the King, the running water stops let alone a person'. The dictum indicates that for centuries, Ethiopian rulers used fear as an instrument to control their subjects. Though they used socialist rhetoric to castigate the former Ethiopian kings and

emperors as feudal dictators and oppressors, the role figure of the military rulers was not a socialist or democratic African or world figure but an emperor of feudal Ethiopia. In the self-image that the regime tried to portray, Mengistu was deliberately compared to Tewodros (Haliday and Molyneux, 1981: 153), the most violent of all Abyssinian rulers. He even made a 'pilgrimage' to Tewodros's grave in the remote hills of Megdela, paying homage to a leader he adopted as a role model, and 'drums were beaten and the media poured praises on this great event as a hero visiting the grave of his own image' (Guutama, 2003: 63).

The difference between how the nineteenth century emperors and Mengistu or the Dergue used violence for political purposes is simply a matter of style, organisational scale and sophistication. Like the emperors, the Dergue also committed genocidal killings that were ideologically motivated. The difference was only in the terminology and the justifications used. In the discourse used by the military regime the old religious terms were changed to Stalinist concepts: pagan or heretics were changed into reactionary, tsere Mariam (enemies of St. Mary) and sinners became *tsere hizb* or enemies of the people. As mentioned above, Tewodros hacked off the limbs of victims and cast them from cliffs, hanged them to die or sent them home to terrify the population. The Dergue displayed mutilated corpses to achieve the same goal. It used, without any compromise, the gigantic bureaucratic structure and immense military power it had built to implement its version of Ethiopian nationalism based on the ideology of Etiyopiya Tiqdem – 'Ethiopia First'.

The Dergue mobilised the society to wage war against the very foundation on which it stood. It attacked its institutions, including the family, undermining solidarity and trust between members of the community, household, and citizens at large. Children were used against their parents and siblings, husbands and wives were pitted against each other. A refugee who escaped the Red Terror and settled in Australia told a researcher in Melbourne that 'Life was cheap at that time, you couldn't trust anyone, even your own family... that's what Mengistu wanted us to think... it was terror that we all felt. Mothers were forbidden to cry for their murdered sons' (Gow, 2002: 14).

The natural reaction of parents to the situation that made human life so cheap was to send their children out of Ethiopia to save their lives. As I have noted elsewhere, 'Families sold their property and... even their houses, to pay exorbitant fees to guides who could lead a threatened son or daughter through deserts and wild terrain to one of the neighboring countries' (Bulcha, 1988: 106). The traumatic socio-economic consequences of the Red Terror were not confined to families that were deprived of their members. Since its main target was the literate section of the society, the Red Terror had dire consequences for the country as well. As I will discuss later, it triggered the flight of educated and skilled men and women that developed later in the 1980s and 1990s into an

incessant brain drain that severely damaged the economic and social development of the country.

The political consequences of the Red Terror were even more dramatic. It contributed to the proliferation of what George Markakis called 'dissident nationalism' (Markakis, 1987). Although the raison d'être for their grievances was the conquest described above, the direct reason for the mushrooming of nationalist movements in the south was the Dergue's reign of terror. In the north, it contributed not only to the development of the Tigrean Liberation Front (TPLF) but also signalled to the Eritreans that the ongoing political conflict was not to be solved by peaceful means. The result was also an unprecedented increase in the number of young people fleeing the urban centres and joining the fronts in the bushes. It is plausible to suggest that the reign of terror of the 1970s was instrumental in cementing the foundation for Eritrean independence but also the 'ethnic' nationalisms that came to dominate Ethiopian politics.

Misplaced Priorities and Genocide by Attrition

During the last three decades millions of Ethiopians lost their lives because of starvation. For outsiders, Ethiopia has become the epitome of hunger and starvation. The frequent large-scale loss of life due to famine in Ethiopia is often blamed on drought. The question is: Why does this occur only in Ethiopia and not the neighbouring African countries that are also affected by the same drought? Why is it that Ethiopia, which, in the 1960s, was described by development specialists as a country 'having the potential to be the bread-basket of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East' (Cohen, 1987: 39) is poorer than for example Somalis and Kenyans whose land is less fertile and less endowed with natural resources? Why it that it is always the Ethiopians who die from famine in great numbers when drought affects the whole region? How come that Egypt which depends entirely, for its agriculture, on water from the Nile produces surplus food while Ethiopia, from which more than eighty percent of the water in the Nile originates, blame its recurrent famine on drought?

It is indicated that some of the worst human rights catastrophes in modern times have been 'famines created or manipulated by governments', and that therefore 'When mass death results from hunger, governments, not God or nature, deserve scrutiny for their relationship to the catastrophe' (Marcus, 2003: 245). Can we blame then the Ethiopian famines on the conduct of those in power? Economists and sociologists have stated that large-scale loss of life due to famine does not occur often in a functioning democracy. Such famines occur often in states ruled by autocratic or military dictators. Being chronically undemocratic, consecutive Ethiopian rulers have exposed millions of their own citizens to starvation and death for decades.

According to Horowitz (1997: 250, 262), the higher the level of repression within a society, the greater the need for an apparatus capable of exercising maximum control. He notes that the mechanisms aimed at ensuring maximum control are in themselves exceedingly costly, and that at the same time they increase the potential and even the necessity for more manifest resistance. The same vicious circle was apparent in the way the Dergue ran the state. As indicated above, the suppression of opposition through the Red Terror in the urban centres was followed by a dramatic increase of conflict in the peripheries as many of the regime's opponents joined armed fronts fighting against the state or created new ones. In order to fund its expanding control apparatus the regime increased taxes on peasant households and introduced new methods and ways of extracting more rents called 'contributions to the defence of the motherland'. To pay the 'contributions', many peasant households were forced to sell their possessions including oxen and other means of production thereby destroying their means of livelihood. Thus the consequence of the Dergue's belligerency against the opposition was an astronomical rate of increase in military expenditure and the parallel decline in economic growth in the 1980s.

The agricultural sector was hit most severely, and from 1980 onwards, agricultural production declined successively. The war interfered with food production in various ways. Continued conscription of able-bodied young men into the militia significantly reduced the labour force everywhere in the south. In 1975, there were about 50,000 men in the Ethiopian army. In the 1980s these were about 400,000. In the 1980s, the Ethiopian army and air force possessed one of the largest fleet of armoured cars, tanks and jet fighters in Africa. Thus, with a GNP per capita of about US$100 (one of the lowest in Africa), Ethiopia became one of the most militarised states in the world. In 1974, when the regime came to power, the annual military expenditure was about 134 million birr, or about '30 to 40 percent of the expenditure of the imperial state' (Markakis, 1987: 92). By 1990 it had risen to over 2.3 billion birr, an astronomical increase of 2,075 percent in just fifteen years. While spending billions of dollars on arms, the regime was negligent of the basic needs of the citizens. Its policy created the horrendous 1984-1985 famine that killed about a million people.

David Marcus (2003) mentions four types of government conduct ranging from least deliberate to deliberate in creating or abetting famine. He ascribes least deliberate conduct to 'incompetent or hopelessly corrupt regimes', who, when faced with food crises are unable to respond to their citizens' needs. The second type of regime conduct is characterised by complete indifference to the fate of the citizens. According to Marcus these regimes may possess the means to respond to crises, but they 'turn blind eyes to mass hunger'. That was also the response of the autocratic regime of Haile Selassie I during the 1974 Ethiopian famine. Because the regime ignored, and even hid, the plight of its needy

citizens, the famine killed over 200,000 people in the province of Wallo alone (Keller, 1988: 168).

The third type of regime conduct is marked by recklessness, by which 'governments implement policies that themselves engender famine, then recklessly pursue these policies despite that they are causing mass starvation'. The fourth type of regime conduct is intentional, that is, governments use famine as a tool of extermination against troublesome populations. Although it is difficult to conclude that it was intentional, such policies were the cause of the 1984-85 famines (Clay and Holcomb, 1986; Wolde-Giorgis, 1989) rather than drought. Marcus argues the Dergue 'took advantage of existing faminogenic conditions, namely severe drought, to direct starvation against insurgent population in Tigray and Wallo' (2003: 258). Food shortage developed into famine because of 'the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the government, and the restrictions and burdens imposed on the populations of non-insurgent areas in the name of social transformation'. The regime manipulated and abetted famine, and this, according to Marcus, should be regarded as 'first degree famine crime' (ibid.), or genocide by attrition. Attrition or the wearing down the resources of an opposition or recalcitrant population is one of the oldest methods used by many regimes to overcome resistance. This includes obstruction of the targeted groups' access to food or destruction of their means of food production.

Using famine as a pretext, the Dergue embarked on a project known as the resettlement programme, forcibly relocating northern peasants hundreds of kilometres away from their homes in the south and the southwest. The purpose of the relocation was perceived by the opposition and scholars as an attempt 'to drain the sea to catch the fish', or deny support to the armed opposition, but the result was disastrous for the victims of the deportation. As reported by a Norwegian researcher, the operation was an 'unbelievable cruelty to the Ethiopian people' (Eide, 1996: 296). In the process of recruiting and transporting settlers, thousands of families were torn apart. The senseless brutality with which the settlement was conducted was such that the husbands and wives, and parents and their children were dragged to different sites hundreds of kilometres apart, never to meet again (Wolde-Giyorgis, 1989: 128). A Norwegian nurse who witnessed the physical and mental distress of the settlers reported that the conditions in resettlement camps were horrendous, and that 'Mothers cried in despair because they had been separated from their families or their children had died during the transportation. They had been forced to leave' (cited in Eide, 1996: 297).

Many died people during the arduous transit from north to the south that took weeks. According to Dawit Wolde-Giyorgis (1989: 304) who was the head of the state's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) at the time, about 20,000 died during the transit. He also noted that almost 500 people were executed trying to escape. A report compiled by Medicines Sans Frontiers

indicated that between 50,000 and 60,000 men, women and children had died during the movement from north to the southwest (Malhuret, 1985: 64). The death rate soared at the settlement sites, lack of food and of medication against malaria and other diseases being the main factors behind the increase. After resettling some 600,000 of the 1.5 million targeted peasants, the regime stopped the deportation because of lack of resources and criticism from aid donors. Of the 600,000 resettled in 1985-86, a survey conducted by the Ethiopian Central Statistical Office in 1988 counted 425,164 persons on site (CSO, 1991: 190-191). In less than three years, over 170,000 of the settlers had died or deserted, becoming refugees in neighbouring countries. The government-sponsored survey also uncovered the intensity of the settlers' resentment against the programme, confirming that the fact that the resettlement was deportation and not something that the people joined voluntarily (cf. Lemma, 1988: 21; Galperin, 1988: 182-183).

The resettlement programme had negative effects on the lives of the indigenous populations and the environment wherever it was located (Cultural Survival, 1988; Wolde-Meskel, 1989; Bulcha, 2001). One of the indigenous minorities adversely affected by its resettlement programme were the Anuak of the Gambella region who came into direct and sustained genocidal conflict with the settlers and the state. To that, I will return later.

Parallel to the resettlement programme, the Dergue also forcibly moved about 12 million peasants from their traditional habitat into hastily set up villages. This programme when started in 1978 targeted only Oromo peasants, and is known as villagisation. The motive then was to isolate the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and curb secessionist tendencies among the population in the south-eastern part of the country. When villagisation was implemented in 1984-1985 on a larger scale, again the Oromos were the first to be affected. Elsewhere I wrote:

> villagization disrupted agricultural activities as it was conducted even in the middle of the harvesting or planting seasons. Thus the state owned daily, *The Ethiopian Herald* (28 October, 1986), reported that about 554,000 households with about two million members were moved into new villages between October 1985 and February 1986. The period coincides with the harvesting season in Ethiopia. That means that the peasants were tearing down their homes while weather and wild animals were destroying their harvests (Bulcha, 2001: 142-143).

In order to realise its model of society, the Dergue used quick, and often very cruel, methods to terrorise the peasants and solicit their obedience. Its cadres set fire on the houses of peasants who refused to move from their homes, and shot leaders who were vocal in their opposition to villagisation (Clay, 1986; Vallely, 1986). In 1985-86, about 140,000 Oromos fled villagisation from the Hararge region to Northwest Somalia (Zitelmann, 1989:5). More than two thousand of the 'villagisation refugees' died of starvation and a cholera epidemic that broke out in an overcrowded refugee camp near the border town of Tug Wajale in

Northwest Somalia (Skari, 1985; Godwin, 1986). The Sudan also received thousands of 'villagisation refugees' from the western regions of the country. In this connection, an extract from Claude Ake's description of post-colonial African despotism explains the behaviour of the Dergue. He wrote:

> Having abandoned democracy for repression, our leaders are de-linked from our people. Operating in a vacuum, they proclaim their incarnation of the popular will, hear echoes of their voices, and reassured, pursue with zeal, policies which cannot, therefore, mobilize them. As their alienation from our people increases, they rely more and more on force and become even more alienated (Ake, 1987: 7).

The resettlement and villagisation projects did not lead to the expected results: they did not prevent the insurgents from growing in strength and influence. Christopher Clapham (1987:219) suggested that 'the villagisation campaign, which seeks to increase control at the expense of an inevitably increased alienation, may well prove to be the touchstone of central government success or failure'. Indeed, it proved to be the touchstone of the Dergue's failure. It intensified the dissatisfaction of the peasants who joined the ranks of refugees abroad or swelled the number of the guerrilla forces from which the regime wished to keep them separated. The growth of the liberation front and the intensification of dissatisfaction of the population as a whole led to the demise of the Dergue in May 1991. Mengistu Haile Mariam and hundreds of the Dergue's officials are now being tried for genocide and crimes against humanity.

Still a Genocidal State

Following the demise of the Dergue, a conference was held in Addis Ababa in July 1991 to map out a political course for Ethiopia. The conference was attended by twenty-two organisations and groups reflecting different political interests and views which adopted a Transitional Charter which laid out guidelines for respect for human rights, a geographical reorganisation of Ethiopia, and adopted democratic principles for sharing power between the central and regional governments. In other words, a new situation was created to reverse a history of centralised autocracy and violent political conflict. What the Charter promised was a new model of nation and state-building that would involve the different ethnic groups – or nations and nationalities, as they are designated in the Charter – in decisions affecting their lives. The principles enshrined in the Transitional Charter of 1991 and the Constitution of 1994 do not seem to have given the people freedom to exercise their rights. It has been also argued that the facade of autonomy for different nationalities, peoples and nations, hides centralised control by the minority Tigrean elite.

The reasons which led to the failure of the constitutional changes to yield the promised and expected returns have been discussed by scholars and politicians (Tronvoll & Aadland, 1995; Leta, 1999; Robinson, 1997). There is no need to mention them here. Studies made on current human rights situation in Ethiopia

confirm that 'A decade after the EPRDF came to power, human rights violations occur throughout the country, and are at times very grave' (Waugham and Tronvoll, 2003: 18-19). Although we may not conclusively state that genocidal killings are occurring at the moment, it is plausible to argue that the economic and human rights situation indicates that Ethiopia is moving along what Irving Straub (1989) called a continuum of destruction. The country still remains a fertile soil for genocidal killings.

The economic conditions have been deteriorating for the majority of the people. Even if it is difficult to make estimates, it is clear that people are dying en masse as the consequence of the prevailing socio-economic conditions. Between ten and fifteen million Ethiopians are threatened by starvation every year and need international assistance to stay alive. Indicating that at least 12 million Ethiopians are in immediate danger of death by famine, the *Herald Tribune* (30 July, 2003) stated that their survival depends on external assistance. The paper added that 'rural Ethiopians never fully recovered from the famine of 1984, nor the severe droughts that have come after, especially in 1999 and 2000'. During the period famine killed up to 50,000 persons. In October 2004, the United Nations (UN, 2004) reported that as many as 200,000 people, mainly children, died during the last eighteen months. The death toll is comparable to that which was caused by the Wallo famine in the early 1970s. The recent UN report indicates that the current food crisis, as many others before it, is the result of the government developmental policy or lack of it rather than bad weather alone. Rejecting the arguments that the food crisis resulted from drought, it criticised the government for failing to deal with regular crises facing the people. The statement is also an indictment, albeit an indirect one, of the government for mass deaths.

A comparison of EPRDF expenditures on medical care and armaments will reveal the recklessness that characterised the conduct of the previous regime. It seems that waging war and keeping a huge military force rather than keeping the taxpayers alive, has been the top priority of the EPRDF. The *Herald Tribune* wrote that 'Ethiopia spends only $1.5 per person per year for health, although Ethiopia now has more than two million people with the AIDS virus and the infection is exploding' (ibid.). From 1998 to 2000 the current regime spent US$2.9 billion dollars sending 123,000 young men and women to their death in what observers have characterised as a 'meaningless war' with Eritrea (*The Economist*, 2002). While thousands of people were dying of famine, the EPRDF was spending daily about one million dollars on the war against Eritrea. The sum of one million dollars is enough to give proper medication to thousands of patients in Ethiopia for weeks or dig dozens of waterholes in the drought-affected areas, preventing the death of thousands of children and domestic animals from lack of drinking water. It is plausible to state that authoritarian regimes in general, and the Ethiopian rulers in particular, do not think often in such terms or make this kind of calculation. Consequently, while

maintaining its position as the largest military force in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

It is remarkable that the consequences of previous genocidal killings for the perpetrator have failed to deter the present government from treading the same path. Many of the factors which scholars see as precursors of genocidal killings such as extra-judicial executions, 'disappearances' or assassinations of leading members of the target group, the denigration or stigmatisation of the target group through campaigns in the press and media, etc., characterise the regime's treatment of many of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Particularly, the peoples of southern Ethiopia are undergoing an ever-escalating political oppression and psychological stress that can ignite a genocidal eruption. As pointed out by a scholar of ethnicity and conflicts in Africa, the current Ethiopian regime

> perpetuates not only violence but also intensified conflict and warfare among groups of peoples outside and within Ethiopia. In effect, it creates an atmosphere of animosity and fear that create conducive atmosphere for genocide. The policy of handling such conflicts is based on arming/favouring one group and disarming and jointly attacking the other group which led to the destruction of sizeable communities.... This is genocide by other means. The causes of bloodshed among peoples hardly get independent scrutiny and acceptable resolution (Hameso, 2003: 14).

Genocide, as perceived by many scholars, is not a result of a sudden eruption of new violence, but often the culmination of successive and diverse violations of human rights by the state (Kuper, 1981; Staub, 1989; Ould-Abdalla, 2002). In other words, 'recurrent "small" or "retail" violence could be signs announcing that "wholesale" killings could be expected' (Ould-Abdallah, 2002: 178). During the last two years several incidents of state-sponsored massacres were reported from several regions. I will discuss briefly two of the most recent incidents below.

Warning Signs of Genocide

Reporting on mass murder perpetrated against the Annuak of the Gambella Regional State, Genocide Watch and Survival International (2004: 2) wrote that the 'government forces and settler militias initiated a campaign of massacres, repression and mass rape deliberately targeting the indigenous Anuak minority' on 13 December, 2003, and that this 'has led to a severe escalation of violence' in the region. Here, a brief note on the Anuak is in order before going into the discussion of the recent incident.

The Anuak or Annywaa are one of the three indigenous groups who inhabit the Gambella regional state in south-western Ethiopia. The oppression of the peoples of this region started about a century ago when their territory was conquered by and partitioned between the two colonial powers of the day: England and Abyssinia. Like most of the other parts of the south-western marches of the Ethiopian Empire, the Gambella region also became hunting fields for ivory and slaves. Eisei Kurimoto (2002: 223), who conducted field

studies during the Dergue period and after, notes that the clashes with the imperial agents who came to exploit local wealth such as ivory, cattle and slaves after the advent of the empire are vividly narrated.

The end of slave hunting, with the Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941, brought some security to the peoples of south-western Ethiopia. However, following the restoration of the Haile Selassie government in 1941, the Annuak, like most of conquered peoples of the region, were treated like third class citizens (Cultural Survival, 1988). They were denied educational opportunities, and had no part in the affairs of the country.

Although the Dergue brought the Anuak some benefits like schooling, it also created problems that made life very difficult. A respondent told Kurimoto that the Dergue brought upon them 'taxation, poverty, hunger, and forced military recruitment', and that 'Our life has changed. It became bad. Our fields were taken, our children have nothing to eat' (ibid: 224-225). The establishment of settlements in areas led to the loss of their traditional land and disrupted their agricultural and non-agricultural modes of producing subsistence. It undermined their traditional subsistence security system: fishing and hunting to supplement the food they produced for consumption. According to the respondents, the customs and institutions of the Anuak were also affected. It seems that, among others, the introduction of alcoholic beverages by the settlers had demoralising effects on the Anuak society. According to one of the elderly informants, many young men do not marry and build families as before. He complained, 'Now those young people, why do they not multiply at all? It is because of the beer. Those young boys who did not drink, now they have started to drink. Now those young boys, they do not raise around ten children as their fathers did' (ibid.: 226).

Despite their numbers (between 40,000 and 50,000 in Ethiopia), the Anuak were one of the ethnic groups that formed an ethno-nationalist movement, the Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM) to fight the Dergue. In the 1980s, GPLM struggled against the Dergue in co-operation with other nationalist movements. Therefore, following the demise of the Dergue in 1991, the GPLM participated in the transitional government (Cultural Survival, 1988; Kurimoto, 2002: 222, 230). Though the coalition with the EPRDF looked promising in the beginning, violent clashes followed. The conflict was between the EPRDF and the regional organisations. It also involved ethnic conflicts between the Anuak and the Nuer, the largest indigenous groups in the region (about 60,000 in Ethiopia), and the indigenous populations and settlers. As it escalated the ethnic conflict claimed thousands of lives (ibid.: 236). Apparently the situation developed into what Straub (1989: 239) called 'difficult life conditions', and which included oppressive anxiety, hopelessness and an unpredictable future because of political, social and economic deterioration. Kurimoto wrote 'Life as they [Anuaks] saw it was in a process of continued deterioration. The common themes were death, poverty, and the destruction

and breakdown of community. They did not see anything good in the present' (Kurimoto, 2002: 231). Hopelessness and the breakdown of the community were exacerbated by the fact that young people were leaving home for other countries because of fear and poverty. Meanwhile tension was developing between the EPRDF and the Anuaks.

Genocide Watch and Survival International (GWSI, 2004: 3) reported that on 13 December 2003, 'Soldiers using automatic weapons and hand grenades targeted Anuaks, summarily executing civilians, burning dwellings (sometimes with people inside), and looting property. In four days, some 424 Anuak people were reported killed, with over 200 more wounded and some 85 people unaccounted for'. Sporadic murders and widespread rapes have continued for the rest of the month. Based on eyewitness reports the GWSI (ibid.) wrote:

> Reminiscent of the Interahamwe civilian militia involved in the attacks against Tutsis in Rwanda, victims shot or beaten by soldiers were typically then set upon by groups of Highlanders who mutilated and dismembered bodies. Such symbolic dehumanization is an early warning sign of genocide. Highlanders used rocks, sticks, hoes, machetes, knives, axes and pangas (clubs) to kill people; they also worked independently of soldiers. Several witnesses described hearing Highlanders [settlers] chant slogans as they hunted down and killed Anuak people.

The GWSI concluded that, confronted with the spectre of genocide, 'members of the Anuak community have taken both defensive and offensive military actions' (ibid: 4). Retaliatory attacks and counter-attacks continued into 2004, claiming many lives on both sides. The incident also sparked the flight of thousands of Anuaks into Sudan and Kenya.

Although 'there have been regular massacres of Anuak since 1980', there are many unanswered question regarding the latest incident. The GWSI notes that the conflict 'was sparked by the killing of eight UN and Ethiopian government refugee camp officials... on December 13, 2003', and that 'there is no evidence attesting to the ethnicity of the unidentified assailants'. However, 'the incident provided the pretext for a major political pogrom against the Anuak minority carried out by EPRDF soldiers and Highlander militias' (ibid.). Why were the Anuak targeted? Why did the government authorities order their forces to kill the Anuak immediately (on the same day) after the attack on the UNHCR officials?

It seems that the explanation is, at least partially, what the GWSI called 'powerful incentives to control the natural resources of the region' (ibid: 8). While the conflict over resources started during the Dergue regime, it may have been intensified under the present government. There is ample evidence confirming that increasing need for timber in the north, and the discovery of minerals including gas and oil in Gambella, have brought local and international prospectors and exploiters to the region. The experience the indigenous

seem to be similar to the experience of many of other indigenous peoples elsewhere and discussed by other scholars (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990).

The Japanese anthropologist, Re'ya Sato who has been studying the Majang neighbours of the Anuak, reported that 'Since the early 1990s... wood-felling by several private companies has been taking place in the forests around Meti, and Majang leaders have began to feel that their habitat and resources were no longer inexhaustible' (Sato, 2002: 193). The private companies are apparently not from Gambella, but the north. The income from timbering benefits those who come from outside, while indigenous people's source of subsistence is being destroyed.

The GWSI argues that 'The Anuak situation has grown markedly worse since oil was discovered under Anuak lands' (SWSI, 2004: 9). The central Ethiopian authorities have signed concessions with foreign prospectors and therefore have powerful incentives to seek to control these resources. The GWSI argue that even conflict over gold may be relevant in explaining the repression of the Anuaks. They indicate that Anuak subsistence miners mine gold in Gambella district, which the Ethiopian authorities may be interested in gaining control over (ibid.).

Warning signs for genocide are coming not only from Gambella but also from other regional states, particularly the Ogaden (Abdulkadir, 2003), Sidama (Hameso, 2003) and Oromia (Hassen, 2003). Reports on serious violations of human rights are most frequent from the Oromia regional. According to a Norwegian sociologist who acted as an international observer in the 1992 and 1994 election, 'the fear of the colonised Oromo appears sometimes stronger than the spirit of democratic competition' (Pausewang, 1994: 5). The fear concerns Oromo political domination of Ethiopia, given their numbers, and this in turn fuels the need for absolute control over them through systematic state violence (cf. Fein, 1993: 89). Consequently, detention without trial, torture, 'disappearances' and extra-judicial executions are regularly reported (Waugham and Tronvoll, 2003: 19). During the last ten years, thousands of men and women have gone through prisons and detention centres. Following the withdrawal of the OLF in 1992, the EPRDF government imprisoned between 20,000 and 45,000 men, women and children accusing them of being members or supporters of the OLF (HRW, 1994; Pollock, 1996). Although the actual number is unknown, it is widely believed that thousands of detainees had died of malnutrition, torture and diseases in official and hidden concentration camps.

The UK-based international human rights NGO, the Oromia Support Group (OSG), has reported 3,566 extra-judicial killings and 901 disappearances of civilians suspected of supporting groups opposing the government. The OSG noted that 'most of these have been Oromo people' (OSG, 2004). Although those who are victims of the extra-judicial killings come from every sector of the society, the majority are civic leaders, teachers etc., with the potential of

providing leadership. Those who 'disappeared' also belong to this social category. It is plausible to argue that, functionally, the unexplained disappearances of Ethiopian citizens have their parallels with the disappearances of the regime opponents in Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s. They are meant to terrorise and control the local population while avoiding responsibility and accountability.

While the extra-juridical killing and the disappearance of prominent members of the different ethnic communities continue to occur, there are also indications of systematic suppression of civic organisations and the collective persecution of intellectuals. For example, the Macha Tulama Association was closed down in 2004 and its leaders were imprisoned following their abortive attempt to stage a peaceful demonstration to protest the evacuation of Oromo organisations, particularly the offices of the Oromia regional state, from Addis Ababa, which originally was an Oromo district of Finfinnee. Apparently, government repression also increased even against educational institution as well as teachers and students across the country. The Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2003a: 3) stated that:

> Being educated can be a risky business in Ethiopia. Students and teachers, often among the most politically active elements of society, are frequent victims of human rights violations including extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and denial of freedom of association and expression.

In 2003, for example, the EPRDF conducted what may look like ethnic cleansing when it dismissed over 350 students of Oromo ethnic background from Addis Ababa University following a demonstration. Similar measures were taken in other universities and colleges and many students of Oromo ethnic background were purged. The repression against students and teachers is not limited to universities. During the last two years, many incidents of state-sponsored violence involving the death of many school children have been reported (see for example, ibid.).

There are three well-known cases of massacres perpetrated on school children by oppressive regimes in Africa since the 1960s. These were the 1976 massacre in Soweto by the apartheid regime of South Africa, the Bokassa regime's massacre on school children in 1977 in Central African Republic (Hendricks, 2002: 235), and the massacre of over 500 youngsters by the Dergue on 29 April, 1977 (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981: 122). Compared to these incidents the EPRDF's violence against Oromo school children bears similarity with Soweto. In both cases the victims were ethnically defined. But unlike the Soweto massacre, the violence against school children in Ethiopia is hidden from public scrutiny. While this can be partly explained by the absence of a free press in the country, it seems that the relations between the Ethiopian government and the Western countries also played a role.

Genocide and the International Context

To develop into genocide, violence needs an enabling international context. As was the case on the eve of the Rwandan massacre of 1994, genocide occurs when the international community remains indifferent or inactive because the perpetrator government is successful in disinformation; when foreign observers do not take the killings they see for what they are and the UN will not criticise a member state (Smith, 2002). As has been remarked by human rights scholars, 'genocide lurks largely in the darkness of irresponsibility, which prevents too little and intervenes too late' (Rittner, Roth and Smith, 2002: 205).

Although evidence collected by local and international human rights organisations is mounting, little is being done to prevent the ongoing serious human rights violations in Ethiopia. And Western governments seem to have full knowledge of events in Ethiopia, but they are complacent in their belief that Ethiopia is making moves towards a democratic state. It was pointed out by a researcher that 'reports by NGOs and churches, submitted since 1992 on human rights violations and election fraud, have not been taken seriously' by governments in the West (Englert, 2000: 7) As stated by a sociologist, the ultimate meaning of democracy is respect for the lives of people and that 'Life itself a precondition for the democratic social order' (Horowitz, 1990: 263). Indisputably, the extra-judicial killings and disappearance of real or suspected political opponents of the EPRDF, reported by researcher and human rights organisations, constitute a blatant violation of this principle.

The attitudes of Western states towards the EPRDF government have been, by and large, a mixture of indifference to its violations of human rights and appeasement of its economic and diplomatic needs. Consequently, the present Ethiopian government has been a recipient of large US and European economic aid without the constraints of conditionality.

As Mark Levene (2002: 71) aptly remarked, genocide in the age of globalisation 'is a dysfunction not just of particular societies but our entire community and of the political economy that goes with it'. It was also suggested that 'Appeasement or international indifference to arbitrary government action and the cruel treatment of people by their own government also makes fertile soil for genocide' (Rittner, Roth and Smith, 2002: 179). It is a well-known fact that self-interest weighs more than the concern for economic development and respect of human rights in the Third World in the international policy decisions of many of states in the West. The observation applies to US relations with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is considered an important regional partner of the US in its war on international terrorism, and the country also supported the US invasion of Iraq. For several years, US special operations forces have been cooperating with and training an Ethiopian army division in 'anti-terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism' (GWSI, 2004). Thus as pointed out by Dieter Oberndörfer (2000: 5), the

'Americans... have repeatedly been moved by geo-strategic considerations... in establishing their policy of "benign" neglect of the ugly aspect of Ethiopia's policies'. Drawing similar conclusions, the American sociologist William Robinson maintains that given these geo-political interests, 'it should have come as no surprise that the United States has continued to support the EPRDF regime... ignoring (and even supporting) the systematic repression of the Oromo and other groups (Robinson, 1997: 31). The fact that the EPRDF is using Western aid to fight the opposition confirms Robinson's statement. Like many other authoritarian regimes around the world, the current Ethiopian government is also using 'counter-terrorism' to suppress legitimate political demands (HRW, 2003b).

A senior State Department official told Human Rights Watch that, after the attacks in the US on 11 September, 2001, the US is even less inclined to demand respect for human rights in Ethiopia because it is completely dependent on the cooperation of this strategically located country, which borders Sudan and Somalia in the horn of Africa. Ethiopian government security forces have taken advantage of this international climate to systematically repress students, teachers, civil society organisations, and journalists (HRW, 2003a).

The counter-terrorism alliance with the U S after 'September 11' has emboldened the EPRDF leaders to label the political opposition such as the OLF as 'terrorist' organisations 'in order to give legitimacy to their handling of the Oromo question' (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 131). Indicating that the human rights situation is worsening in Ethiopia, Oberndörfer (2000: 4) argues that development co-operation 'by the international community has primarily served to stabilize the dictatorship of the EPRDF'.

What should be noted here, however, is that there is a limit on how long terror can be used to cow a whole country into obeying the dictates of political elites whose social base constitutes less than ten percent of the population. Although militarily the balance is in favour of the EPRDF, the political conditions in the country are tense and threatening. What should be taken into account also is the fact that the current Ethiopian government can readily resort to genocidal violence if its power is threatened. The Ethiopian military apparatus has killed more citizens than the enemies of the nation during the last fifty years. As a scholar stated, 'States of terror can become states of genocide when rulers detect members of a distinctive group are challenging the state' (Fein, 2002: 46). Apparently, the EPRDF is not less reserved in its use of terror if much more subtle than the Dergue.

Consequences of Genocide

Raising the important question why genocides occur so often and in such a variety of situations and historical epochs, Kurt Jonassohn (1990:415) explained that 'The answer seems to lie in their efficacy'. He maintains that

genocide solves the perpetrator's 'problem' sufficiently and permanently and that 'the costs of such solution are born by the victims'. In addition, when the victims are located outside the perpetrators' society, which had often been the case historically, the perpetrators' material benefits have been often enormous. However, Jonassohn also notes that the victims of genocides, particularly of those committed for ideological reasons, are often located within or are part of the perpetrator state and society. Consequently, the costs and benefits of such genocides have to be absorbed by the perpetrator societies. He maintains that 'An empirical study of relevant cases will show that the costs of ideological genocides are enormous, but also that it takes a very long time to recover from them' (ibid: 416). Using these propositions as analytical tools I will discuss very briefly the costs and benefits of genocidal killings committed by Ethiopian rulers in the past. Obviously, my analysis concerns the gains made or the costs incurred by the perpetrators, that is, the Abyssinian-cum-Ethiopian state(s) and its agents.

In three out of the four Ethiopian episodes described above, the genocidal atrocities perpetrated by the Abyssinian-cum-Ethiopian rulers were committed to solicit ideological conformity from victims located within or on the fringes of the perpetrators' society. This was particularly the case with those committed by Emperors Tewodros II and Yohannes IV to create a homogeneous Abyssinian nation. The costs of their unsuccessful nation-building project were borne not only by the victims, as intended by the emperors, but also the Christian community. In the case of Tewodros, his cruelty against Muslims spilled over to the society he aimed to benefit, thereby causing resistance to his rule. Although not studied or apparently not even recognised by researchers, there are indications that his violence had damaging effects on the economy of northern Abyssinia. For centuries, Muslim merchants were responsible for the long distance trade on which the traditional Abyssinian state survived. Therefore, the prosperity of Gondar, the capital city of Abyssinia, was mainly based on the activities of its large Muslim community (Bruce, 1805: 386-387), which exported African products, both from Abyssina and the surrounding countries, and imported foreign goods. As the destruction of this trading community that was started by Tewodros was exacerbated by the religious policies of Emperor Yohannes, the long distance trade centred on Gondar dwindled decades before the railway redirected international trade to Djibouti on the Gulf of Aden. Politically, the violence of Tewodros also erased the importance of Gondar not only as a seat of power but also as the traditional cultural capital of Abyssinia.

Although the resistance of the northern Oromo to religious conversion was quite successful, the long-term effects of the assault perpetrated on them by the two emperors were socio-politically and economically disastrous. One of the effects of the onslaught on the Wallo, Yejju and Raya Oromos is the perpetuation of famines in these areas. For decades, the provinces of Wallo and Tigray

became the location of what journalists have designated as 'the Ethiopian or African famine' (cf. Sorenson, 1993). In the two provinces, the *awrajas* (sub-provinces) suffering the highest number of famine deaths have also been those that were repeatedly ravaged by the armies of emperors Tewodros (1855-1868), Yohannes (1872-1889), Menelik (1889-1913) and Haile Selassie (1930-1974).

The economic and subsequent political consequences of the onslaught on the northern Oromo were profound. The depletion of resources and destruction of the environment caused by the many invasions resulted in a regional chronic food deficit which quickly develops into famine during the periodic droughts affecting Northeast Africa. When the terrible pictures of the hidden famine taken by a BBC journalist was broadcast on the Ethiopian television on the eve of the Ethiopian new year in September 1974, the nation was shocked. The famine, as portrayed by the film, not only made a terrible dent in the national pride and citizens' self-respect, but also brought about radical changes in Ethiopia's national politics. The traumatised nation not only despised the aging Emperor, but also revolted against the system that he represented. The military leaders exploited the trauma and anger caused by the pictures from the famine affected areas to de-legitimise the old system. Haile Selassie was made to pay for his 'murderous neglect' of the plight of his subjects. It was claimed that the emperor wilfully left the Wallo and Raya peasants and herdsmen to their sorry fate to punish them for having opposed his regime in the past (Lefort, 1983: 44-45). He was deposed, arrested and put in prison the morning after the BBC's film was broadcast on Ethiopian TV.

Regime change did not help to mend the social, demographic and productive fabric that was torn asunder repeatedly by genocidal violence of the past governments. The structural changes brought about by the nationalisation of land did not result in increased food production or income for the peasants and herdsmen. As the owner of land, the state replaced the former landlords as their exploiter. As mentioned above, the policies of the Dergue even exacerbated the violation of human rights in Ethiopia. Ten year later, in October 1984, it was again the BBC that took the initiative and brought the horrifying images of famine from the same region and site, the town of Korem, to startled television viewers around the world. As was the case in the past, other regions were also affected by the drought, but the famine killed more people here than elsewhere in the country.

An assessment of the costs incurred by the country as the consequence of the policies of the Dergue needs an extensive investigation that cannot be made here. Therefore, I will make some remarks on only damages caused by the Red Terror to the socio-economic development of the country through its assault on educated men and women who provided the society with skilled personnel. As mentioned above, the Red Terror not only killed people but also sent into exile thousands of citizens, many of them with vital skills and education needed for

Ethiopia's socio-economic development. The consequences of the reign of terror become clearer if we compare the post-1974 behaviour of Ethiopian youth and intellectuals with their pre-revolution attitudes towards their country. Although we lack statistics, it is common knowledge that the vast majority of the Ethiopians who studied overseas before the mid 1970s returned, while almost all who graduated from local institutions of higher education stayed at home and served the country. In this respect the consequences of the reign of terror have been dramatic. Targeted by the Red Terror, the preoccupation of most of most men and women with higher education and skills became staying alive. Those who were outside the country decided not to return, while those inside used all available means to get out of the country.

The flight of this category of men and women from Ethiopia not only continued in the post-Dergue period, it intensified during the last ten years. This is reflected in the behaviour of the present generation of Ethiopians, called by observers the 'exit generation' (Shinn, 2004). According to some observers, the behaviour of the 'exit generation' is characterised by a combination of a 'breakdown of basic principles', cynicism and a compelling desire to leave their country (ibid.). No study has yet been made of the phenomenon. However, one plausible explanation could be the trauma caused by the violent disruptions caused by the Dergue's reign of terror and the severe social, political and economic problems the country continues to face even today. Thus, the 'brain drain' triggered by the Red Terror increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s and has now developed into a debilitating haemorrhage. Here are some indicators of this trend. Of the 22,700 students who went abroad for higher education between 1980 and 1991 only 24.4 percent returned to Ethiopia (Sethi, 2000). More than 75 percent stayed abroad. About 37 percent of staff of Addis Ababa University who went abroad between 1981 and 1997 failed to return (Mengesha, 2000). Some institutions were affected more than others. It was reported for example that of the 20 staff members of the physics department of the university, not a single one returned. A third of Ethiopia's doctors have left the country (Tadesse, 2002, cited in Shinn, 2004), and hundreds of those trained abroad since the mid-1970s did not return. According an official of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), today Ethiopia is ranked first in Africa for losing highly trained professionals to other countries (Sethi, cited in *The Daily Monitor*, 8 November, 2002). Since Ethiopia is among the countries with the lowest literacy rates, it is needless to underline the dire consequences of this brain drain on its socio-economic development. For a country with a doctor-population ration of one to 300,000 and where millions of citizens are infected and dying of HIV/AIDS, the loss of such a large proportion of its physicians is calamitous.

While the socio-economic and political consequences of the violence perpetrated by emperors Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, Haile Selassie I and the Dergue were negative for the state and society at large, the violence of Menelik's

conquest in the south was enormously profitable both to himself, his followers and, by and large, to the Abyssinian state. From the king to the ordinary fighter, the conquerors gained enormous benefits, not only in terms of territorial expansion and farm and pasture land that were confiscated from the indigenous populations, but also in terms of the size of movable property looted and captives marched to the north to be kept as slaves or sold. However, this does not mean that the negative consequences of the conquest was and will be limited to the conquered areas. As reflect in the many uprisings in the past and current conflict in the Somali (Ogaden), Sidama, Oromo and currently also Gambella regional states, there is a simmering residue of bitterness from the conquest and the subsequent ethnic oppression. Unless the problem is addressed properly, it may develop into a war, causing unprecedented destruction that may have political and economic repercussions far beyond Ethiopia's borders.

Concluding Remarks

The history of genocide often reflects the history of state and nation building, the ideology and strategy of political elites, who dominate a polity with ethnic and religious diversity, and of the institutionalised means of dealing with diversity. As discussed in this article, it reflects the authoritarian behaviour and coercive methods used by leaders who would build a nation and state that reflects the culture, language and identity of the dominant group. Thus, the genocidal violence perpetrated by Tewodros and Yohannes was designed to settle religious and ethnic differences and create a homogenous Abyssinian nation and state. They perceived the Muslim as aliens, who not only did not fit into the national whole as perceived by the emperors, but whose very existence, they deemed dangerous to the state. Both used violence to realise their conception of the new social order, perpetrating the mass killings and displacement of Muslim populations within Abyssinian state or in its eastern peripheries. Their successor, Menelik, used genocide to subjugate, control and exploit the peoples he had conquered. As Helen Fein (1993) argued, colonial rulers and masters act not only as oppressors and exploiters but also as enemies of the peoples they colonise. Consequently, killing and terrorising the colonised subjects has been also the modus operandi of the rulers of the empire state of Ethiopia.

As mentioned above, the victims of state-sponsored violence were not only the non-Abyssinian subject populations. Those who belonged to the dominant group were also affected, albeit less frequently. This was particularly the case during reign of the Dergue. In an attempt to construct a new social order – a 'socialist' state and society – the Dergue used brute force and often terror almost indiscriminately. The regime believed that its vision of an Ethiopian state and society could be established quickly, using violence when needed,

and that in doing this the ends justified the means. Thus, while implementing their brand of Ethiopian nationalism, the regime made few substantial compromises with existing conditions and groups, but went ahead with impunity to realise the model of society and state they aspired to establish, and which they believed was for the good of the country.

The Dergue also carried out deportations and forced relocations of populations, causing the death of thousands of citizens in the process. Though the motives for moving populations on such a massive scale were mixed, it is plausible to argue that the primary objective was political. The short-term political objective was to control the growth of dissident nationalism by curtailing insurgent mobility among the population and depriving them of sources of material and human support. It was thought that by placing armed settlers (who depended for their survival on government) among the indigenous population, the state would have better control. The long-term political objectives were to change configurations of popular memories, cultural repertoires and moralities of the different ethnic groups in the country by breaking down social solidarities that had evolved historically. The attempt was to realise a vision of a homogenous nation which previous Ethiopia rulers failed to achieve. In general, excessive coercion and mass murder did not produce acquiescence or stop collective action among the target groups. Instead, it seems that coercion rekindled the indignant memories of the oppressive past and strengthened opposition to the state authorities. As peasants' sympathy for the liberation fronts increased, the demise of the Dergue was accelerated. The end of the Dergue did not stop political conflict and mass murder. The question remains then: How long does it take to change the ethos and the political culture? Can the South African model of truth and reconciliation be applied to lay bare past misdeeds, heal old wounds and prevent an eruption of genocide in Ethiopia in the future? These and other questions concerning the issues of democracy and citizenship need to be addressed by researchers and policy makers.

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The 'politics of poverty' in a post-apartheid South African metropolis

Abstract

More than ten years after South Africa celebrated its first democratic election the post-apartheid state finds itself confronting mass protests reminiscent of popular struggles in the apartheid era, as poor people demand houses, jobs and speedier delivery of basic services. South Africa is currently experiencing high levels of poverty and widening gulfs between the wealthy and poor of all racial groups.[1] Whether the circumstances of the poor are getting worse or not in post-apartheid South Africa has been a subject of heated debate between government officials, academics and civil society activists. Whilst government points to social grants and poverty alleviation programmes in place, critics suggest that the adoption of neo-liberal policies, rising unemployment and the failure to elicit the participation of the poor in constructing ameliorative interventions have undermined attempts to reduce economic hardship and improve people's lives. In this paper I draw on selected aspects of recent research on poverty by the University of Pretoria[2] in four communities in the vicinity of the city. The most striking findings, in analysing and comparing the quantitative and qualitative data, relate to grassroots perceptions of unchanging or worsening socio-economic circumstances and of the exclusion of poor communities from the benefits of a transforming political economy. In seeking to situate and explain the responses, the paper argues that the deep pessimism that infuses popular discourses is shaping a robust critique of state institutions as fundamentally indifferent to the plight of the poor. In addition, although the data reflect 'group specific' differences insofar as poverty and insecurities are concerned, there appears to be a coalescing of political discourses and rituals of protest across racial divides.

1.   Background: Some basic facts

In 1994, at the time that a new political order came into being, seventeen million South Africans could be considered 'poor', with about seventy percent of them in rural areas. Seven of the nine provinces were particularly hard hit with high proportions of households enduring poverty: Limpopo (62 percent), Free State (57 percent), Eastern Cape (40 percent), Northern Cape (38 percent),

Mpumalanga (34 percent), Gauteng (30 percent), North-West (15 percent) and the Western Cape (14 percent) (May, 2000: 31). Most of those who were broadly categorised as 'poor' in the 1990s had limited access to basic services such as safe drinking water, electricity and sanitation. Many also did not enjoy adequate housing or have secure and decently remunerated work. Socio-economic inequalities were fairly entrenched and defined along racial lines. At the same time, intra-racial group inequalities were becoming fairly evident. For example, in their 1994 study of the distribution of income in South Africa, Whiteford and McGrath highlighted South Africa's serious problem of economic inequality and pointed to the shifting circumstances of black house-holds. They argued that whilst the richest twenty percent enjoyed significant growth in income in the 1990s (much higher than other sectors of the population) the poorest eighty percent suffered, in this same period, a decline in income. With respect to the poorest forty percent of households, they claimed:

> The bottom 40 percent of [black] households have fared extremely badly with the mean income of this group declining by almost 40 percent since 1975. Households in this group would no doubt have been living in poverty in 1975 and the worsening of their situation would indicate a deepening of poverty in South Africa over the past two decades (Whiteford & McGrath, 1994: 43).

Between 1995 and 2000 the gap between South Africa's rich and poor generally widened. Statistics South Africa (2002) data suggest that in this period mean household income declined by 19 percent, with the poorest half of the population earning only 9.7 percent of the total national income. The Gini-coefficients[3] per racial groups depicted in Table 1, and as summarised by Daniel, Southall and Lutchman (2004), confirm that inequalities deepened within all four racial groups, but that the divide between wealthy blacks and poor blacks is becoming more striking than the inter-racial divide between blacks and whites.

Table 1: Gini coefficients by population group using per capita income

Year	1970	1975	1993	1995	1996	2000
African	-	0.49	0.56	0.57	0.68	0.59
White	0.43	-	0.47	0.47	0.52	0.49
Indian	0.42	-	0.50	0.49	0.53	0.51
Coloured	0.53	-	0.47	0.52	0.57	0.55

(Source: Daniel, Southall & Lutchman, 2004:495)

In offering a summary of key poverty-related data, Landman (2003: 1) maintains that there is now some consensus amongst analysts that (on average) about forty percent of South Africa's population is enduring poverty, with the bottom fifteen percent facing 'a desperate struggle to survive'. Seekings and

Nattrass (2002: 2) identify the three principal classes in post-apartheid South Africa as being: (i) an extremely wealthy and multiracial elite or upper class, (ii) an intermediate 'middle class' group incorporating professionals and the organised working class, and (iii) the marginalised (or underclass) including lowly paid farm and domestic workers and the unemployed. The increase in the numbers of people without work and material resources remains a central factor in the resilience of poverty and the inhibition of transformation efforts. Thus, it is important to offer a further comment on unemployment in South Africa. South Africa's formal employment growth rate has been declining steadily since the 1970s: from an annual growth rate of 2.9 percent in the 1960s, it dropped to 0.7 percent in the 1980s and has been negative since the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1995, with shifts from labour-intensive production to capital-intensive processes, an average of 82,000 jobs a year was lost (Erasmus, 1999: 28). Between 1996 and 2001 some 600,000 formal sector jobs were lost (Naidoo, 2002). Recent estimates of unemployment differ and range from 45 percent (Torres, 2002) to 31 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2003). In general though, it is conceded that there is a serious discrepancy between the high demand and the slow creation of jobs (Bhorat, 2003). While alarmingly large numbers of people are without work, it is also clear that underemployment, declining wage rates in certain sectors, and wage discrimination also feature amongst the causes of poverty. For those excluded from activities of the 'formal economy', intermittent involvement with informal sector activities, and even illicit forms of earning a living, emerge as viable alternative survival strategies (Simone, 1998).

2.   Issues: Contemporary understandings and responses to 'poverty'

Poverty has a range of dimensions and meanings. Although early approaches to poverty simply equated the state of being poor with insufficient material resources, today more complex conceptualisations also take account of 'capabilities'', 'livelihoods', 'social exclusion' and 'rights' (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 2004; Hall, 2003). While many academics working within the field of poverty acknowledge, as Amartya Sen (1983) does, that 'there is an irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty', there is, at the same time, criticism of the reductionism inherent in approaches focussing almost exclusively on basic needs or minimum requirements for physiological survival. As Kabeer (1994: 139) states: 'Human need is about more than physiological survival; it is also about living a healthy active life and participating in the life of the community. These are the "beings and doings" that people value...' More inclusive definitions, such as that offered by Robert Chambers, strive to link both the tangible and non-tangible aspects of socio-economic hardship. The link that Chambers (1988:8-9) makes between 'poverty proper' and physical weakness (the tangible aspects) to isolation, vulnerability and powerlessness (the intangible

aspects) is very relevant in the South African case. There is an important connectedness of material well-being with political and socio-economic rights. Intangible needs might include a desire for incorporation and participation in the institutions, political processes and social networks of society. Barriers to inclusion (as was evident in apartheid society) deprived groups and individuals of access to state resources, and prevented them from pursuing independent livelihoods. Although contemporary analyses of poverty in South Africa tend to place much emphasis on economic determinants, there is also some interest in the ways in which enfranchisement and the acquisition of rights have led to the shifting of 'poverty proper'. Poverty in South Africa manifests itself as more than material hardship and involves simultaneously the ability (or not) to wield power, display agency and control personal destinies (Kabeer, 1994; Du Toit, 2005).

Much current writing on poverty in South Africa wrestles with the paradox of change and stasis. From one angle a lot appears to have improved, from another, things remain the same. Clearly South Africa in 2006 boasts a greatly altered political landscape from the one suffered more than a decade ago. Legal racism no longer exists and democracy has replaced the segregationist doctrines of separate development. There is freedom of movement and expression in place of influx control, pass laws and detention without trial. Notwithstanding this new political reordering, anecdotal evidence consistently reiterates that for the poor not much has changed in terms of the larger socio-economic context the government sought to confront in 1994 (see the recent work of Schlemmer, 2005). It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the post-apartheid state has initiated few or no steps to address poverty. A quick perusal of the reports of government departments will serve as a reminder that a fair amount of energy has been invested in addressing basic needs (such as housing, water and electricity) over the past ten years. In addition, state departments have established numerous poverty relief projects, including more substantial pensions, grants and feeding schemes, human resource development and training, and a series of anti-poverty funds for indigent individuals and households (Van Donk & Pieterse, 2004). Government officials often confront critics, sometimes with much emotion, by pointing to the initiatives in place to address poverty. They have been at pains to 'correct mistaken views that the poor were worse off [in post-apartheid South Africa] than they were during apartheid years' (Roberts, 2005: 485). On the eve of the first democratic election in 1994 the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), with a strong social development orientation, provided a blueprint for the large-scale building of infrastructure, the provision of basic services and the 'opening up [of] previously suppressed economic and human potential in urban and rural areas' (ANC, 1994: 6). The RDP's effective lifespan, however, was short. As pressure to appease local and international capitalist interests mounted, the neo-liberal, market-orientated, Growth, Employment and Redistribution

Strategy (GEAR) replaced the RDP in 1996, contradicting its developmentalist spirit with considerable negative effects (Everatt, 2003: 82). Many critics of post-apartheid state policies have blamed growing intra-group inequalities, increases in job losses and the resilience of poverty on the adoption of GEAR, which some regard simply as a self-imposed structural adjustment programme (Desai & Pithouse, 2003: 2). With its focus on growth, GEAR has encouraged privatisation, the opening of markets, the commodification of services and cuts in social spending (ibid). There has been a lack of fit between GEAR and other pro-redistributive state strategies initially in place (Bornstein, 2000). Thus, while access to infrastructure and basic services has increased in parts of the country, the positive spin offs have been considerably undermined by job insecurity, unemployment and declines in household income of the most economically disadvantaged of all racial groups. The contradiction between pro-growth and pro-redistributive strategies has led to what Bornstein (2000:202) calls 'institutional dissonance'. Dissonance has also been at the base of the triggering of numerous, and spontaneous micro-uprisings that South Africa has been witnessing, particularly over the past five years, as poor people resist the high costs and the cutting of municipal services due to their inability to keep up payments. The visual images of poor people being tear-gassed and assaulted in confrontations with police have ignited critical discourses striving to make sense of the impasse of the poor and the conditions structuring their life chances.

In this paper I offer some newly acquired data on the politics of the poor in four sites in the vicinity of South Africa's administrative capital, Pretoria. As a case study of poverty the data offer a snapshot of quite large numbers of people dealing with an assortment of hardships. The data are used to describe their political perceptions and attitudes, and the paper finally considers the implications of what can be termed the 'coalescing of discourses' and experiences across racial boundaries.

Numerous studies utilising survey data have recently shown the increasing unhappiness of working class communities and the generally negative evaluations of state performance. This developing trend is attributed to perceptions of 'a general economic downturn and the accumulating political problems confronting the Mbeki government' (Mattes, 2002: 31-32). A consistent curiosity in recent years has been to assess which categories of the poor have begun to feel the effects of democracy and socio-economic transformation. Discourses can be deemed to be useful instruments to track changes in people's lives: invariably shaped by history and past practices of privilege or disadvantage, they shift us closer to the 'true nature' of the current state of affairs (Foucault, 1971). To summarise: against the context sketched above, the paper seeks to achieve two specific aims. The first aim is to offer comparative data on poverty and vulnerability as they affect people in the four selected areas of Pretoria. The second aim is to assess the changing politics and assimilating

conditions of deep poverty that are acting to connect the poor across racial divides.

3.   Pretoria: Limited profiles of the racially demarcated areas

Pretoria, once the headquarters of a repressive apartheid state, now hosts the administrative machinery of the new democratic order. Pretoria is located within the larger Tshwane unicity, a vibrant, densely populated, economic hub. Despite political transition, most residential areas in Pretoria continue to exhibit the general racialised contours of the apartheid era. Thus, four histori-cally racially demarcated areas were intentionally selected for study in this region.

Danville, a white working class area situated relatively close to the Pretoria central business district, as well as to other white residential areas like Phillip Nel Park, Elandspoort and North View, was regarded as an appropriate choice to capture 'white poverty'. The area is adjacent to the black and Indian townships of Atteridgeville and Laudium. The original suburb dates back to the 1940s when it was created specifically to cater for Afrikaans-speaking blue-collar workers employed on the industrial and steel (ISCOR) plants in Pretoria West. Since the closing down of these plants, and the change in government, white workers in Danville have been reportedly disgruntled about their inability to find permanent public-sector jobs and attain promotion and security of tenure. In field trips the physical deterioration of the area in terms of run-down homes and disused facilities creates an impression of steady degen-eration. It was also noted that a small number of households were dependent on feeding schemes and soup kitchens for their survival. The area remains predominantly white, but changes can be witnessed, as black civil servants buy up properties, particularly in the newer extensions, at relatively cheap prices. Danville has held much interest for scholars over the years because of its class character and right-wing politics.

Eersterust is Pretoria's only 'coloured' township and was therefore selected on that basis. It lies about twenty kilometres east of Pretoria. The township was established in 1963 to accommodate scattered populations of coloured people forcibly removed from places like Marabastad, Lady Selborne, Eastwood, Claremont and Booysens which were set aside in 1958, ten years after apartheid became official policy, for white occupation only. Recent statistics suggest that about 35,000 people reside in Eersterust. Most economically active residents hold working class occupations, with nearby Silverton and Watloo being the main places of employment. Levels of unemployment are increasing and a growing number of people (both young and old) are becoming self-employed or seeking paid work in informal sector enterprises. Media reports consistently draw attention to illicit forms of making money and to survivalist strategies adopted in Eersterust, particularly regarding the drug trade and sex work.

Faith-based organisations have a strong presence, but community-based and political organisations have dwindled in number and significance. In August 1997, violent protest erupted in the area as people demonstrated against the cutting off of power supply to the area. This action by the municipal authority was in response to non-payment for services. Many residents, particularly in the section known as Nantes, continue today to struggle to meet payments for basic services.

The vast majority of Indian South Africans living in Pretoria in the 1950s resided in the area known as Marabastad (or the Asiatic Bazaar). With the passing of the Group Areas Act, Indians were forcibly removed by 1962 and relocated to *Laudium*, a relatively small area about 30 minutes away from the Pretoria city centre. Since the dismantling of the Group Areas Act in 1991 many wealthier, and younger, Indians have moved out into previously white suburbs in the Pretoria vicinity. Laudium currently has an established middle class and professional sector, but a sizeable minority of people live in sub-economic houses with insecure and ad hoc jobs. Networks of friendship and religious affiliation appear to exist, as does some semblance of kinship and familial bonds. Most of the Indian poor live in a demarcated section (a social ghetto) known as the 'White Blocks' area. The residents of White Blocks have been accused on many occasions of offering a safe haven for drug dealers. In 1996 about 500 people in Laudium from the nationwide organisation PAGAD (People against Gangsterism and Drugs) demonstrated against the drug peddling they believed was occurring in White Blocks. The selling of drugs persists today as an illicit alternative livelihood strategy. Although a number of civic and political organisations in Laudium were active in the 1990s in mobilising people around a range of grassroots issues, today few such groups remain. Laudium was selected as a site, despite its concentration of middle class residents, because it is the only historically Indian area in Pretoria.

Soshanguve is a historically black residential area approximately thirty kilometres away from Pretoria central. Prior to Bophuthatswana's 'independence' in December 1977, Soshanguve was known as Mabopane East, forming part of the greater Mabopane-Boekenhout-Winterveld Complex. Mabopane East was renamed 'Soshanguve' in 1977 when the area was incorporated into the Bophuthatswana Bantustan. Since the late 1970s, Soshanguve has been a vast expanse of semi-developed territory with formal housing flanked by informal settlements, some well-established and some less so. As a dynamic and expanding area, it exhibits all the problems of a peri-urban settlement that has become home to migrants from all over Gauteng, the North West Province and Limpopo. The bulk of Soshanguve's residents, however, have over the years come from a range of surrounding black townships such as Mamelodi, Wallmannsthal, Mabopane, Winterveld and Atteridgeville. Population estimates have ranged from 440,000 to about a million people. Studies in the 1990s claimed that more than forty percent of Soshanguve's residents were

unemployed or underemployed. Poverty levels are high and informal sector trading and illicit forms of earning a living are common. Since formal employment rates are low, only small numbers of people have been organised by trade unions. Support for the ANC is strong, with negligible support for other parties. Soshanguve was selected as a site for this study, as opposed to the range of other black areas available, simply because its history and dynamics are a source of much current academic interest and scrutiny.

None of the four areas are racially exclusive anymore, although, as places in which the poor and marginalised are concentrated, they retain strong pre-1994 characteristics with predominantly white, coloured, Indian or black populations (Anon, 2004; Faul, 1989; Schurink, 1995; Freund, 1995; SA townships, 2004; Huggins, 1989; Anderson, 1992; Gaither, 2000).

4.   Research design and methods

The four separate survey sites were purposively selected to meet a set of study objectives. A probability sample of 1567 households was proposed across the four areas; a dissimilar number of households was allocated to each area in a fairly judgmental fashion, taking account of the relative sizes of the areas, the heterogeneity of each sample area, and the probable presence of individuals from the target population, that is, people enduring poverty and unemployment and who manipulate various survival mechanisms in their day-to-day lives.

Table 2: Allocated sample size

Area	Sample size	Percentage	EAs X Vis pt/EA
Danville	354	22.6%	13 x 28
Eersterust	270	17.2%	9 x 30
Soshanguve	676	43.1%	24 x 28
Laudium	267	17.0%	9 x 30
TOTAL	1567	100.0%	

(Source: Poverty and Health Recode File, Department of Sociology, UP, 2003).

Enumerator areas (EAs) were randomly selected in each area using multistage cluster sampling and the 1996 Census Enumerator Areas. Although preliminary results of the 2001 census had already been released by the time the samples were drawn in June 2003, the full census 2001 data-set was still awaited. In the absence of sufficient information to draw the various samples, older data from the 1996 census had to be used. Approximately thirty households were allocated per EA. Field workers systematically selected households across selected EAs using an interval and a random starting point. In case of multiple households on a stand, a single household was randomly selected.

A single questionnaire (with household and individual sections) was used to gather survey data. In the household section, information on all household members was gathered, whilst the individual section was applied to randomly selected individuals from these households. The questionnaire included a range of questions probing the broad research concerns of the study. Any individual, preferably the head of the household, was entitled to serve as a respondent for first section (household section) of the questionnaire. The respondent responsible for the second section (the individual section) of the questionnaire was selected using a random grid. To be eligible for selection household members had to be at least 18 years old. No substitution of visiting points was allowed. The number of visits as well as the outcome of each visit was indicated on each questionnaire.

Fieldwork was contracted to MarkData (Pty), a reputable Pretoria-based market research company. This company was responsible for the execution and co-ordination of fieldwork in the four selected areas. All activities were co-ordinated by a Project Manager and a Project Leader in the organisation. Fieldwork co-ordinators were appointed in each location to co-ordinate data collection by trained field workers. As minimum requirement, all field workers had to be in possession of a matriculation certificate, or equivalent, and be fully bi- or multilingual. A coding co-ordinator was responsible for the coding of questionnaires using separately trained and supervised coding clerks. An independent team performed fieldwork back-checks. Fieldwork was conducted between 13 August and 3 September 2003. Data quality was ensured during this time by maintaining frequent contact between field workers, MarkData, and the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria.

Just over 94 percent (94.4 percent) of the anticipated 1567 households were surveyed successfully. The lowest completion rate (82.5 percent) was observed in Danville and the highest in Laudium, where the full complement of households was sampled. Slightly more than 99 percent of sampled households were enumerated in Eersterust and about 97 percent in Soshanguve. The greatest proportion of refusals was noted in Danville (12 percent) followed by Soshanguve (2.4 percent). Correspondingly, Danville also led the way with the largest proportion of non-contact situations (4.5 percent), again followed by Soshanguve with one percent.

The survey was followed in 2004 by in-depth qualitative interviews in the poorest sectors of all four areas. Graduate students of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria completed a total of 62 in-depth interviews. The vast majority of these interviews were conducted in the same vicinities as the households surveyed, but with different respondents. Thirty-eight of the respondents within the randomly selected households were women, and twenty-four were men, with ages ranging from eighteen to eighty-one. The fieldwork was intended to illuminate discourses predominant in all four areas and amongst all racial groups; thus a systematic attempt to engage poor people

representing the different groups in the respective field sites was made. Some of the discourses will be referred to in the sections that follow specifically to explain current perceptions of the poor.

5.   Considering the data: general and particular findings

5.1   *Glimpses of hardship and vulnerability*

Two broad categories of data will be presented here. First, an indication of 'hardship' and 'vulnerability to poverty' is offered in Table 3. These findings will be followed by a more detailed focus on political perceptions in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Hardship can be defined in both subjective and objective terms. People's perspectives regarding their own socio-economic situations offer a lens into subjective estimates of 'lived poverty'. These perceptions need to be supplemented by more objective criteria. In this paper, these criteria pertain only to household income, households dependent on welfare, and numbers of people facing food insecurity and unemployment. Although not comprehensive, they offer what are considered to be an objective indication of people enduring 'hardship'. 'Vulnerability' in the present study is measured only in terms of proportions of households that have no social networks or support structures that could be drawn upon in the event that income-earners die, disappear or become unemployed.

5.1.1 *Subjective assessment of poverty*

One of the questions in the survey required respondents to categorise their 'household situation'. Notwithstanding the problems associated with such intrusive kinds of inquiry in one-off surveys, and the possibilities of respondents offering expected comments, we found it useful to invite respondents to offer subjective accounts. About 21 percent of all respondents categorised their households as 'poor' and a further 39 percent as 'struggling to make ends meet'. In Soshanguve, more than one-third (35.5 percent) claimed that their households were poor. A larger proportion of white respondents described their households as facing financial struggle than did coloureds and Indians. This is despite the fact that in objective terms, particularly with regard to employment and access to welfare, whites were in a better position than the other groups. Although the objective indicators showed coloureds in Eersterust to be experiencing much hardship, a larger than expected proportion chose to dignify their situations by categorising them as adequate and not struggling. When probed in the course of fieldwork, a far greater number of individuals in similar households admitted contending with enormous financial difficulties. Surveys, as demographers, commonly concede have an inherent tendency to reflect a downplaying of subjective experiences.

Table 3: Hardship and vulnerability, by area

	Danville ("white area")	Eersterust ("coloured area")	Laudium ("Indian area")	Soshanguve ("black area")	Totals
Subjective categorisation: of economic position					
Well off	10.4%	10.5%	18.2%	1.9%	8.1%
Adequate	32.5%	44.0%	48.2%	18.8%	31.3%
Struggling	45%	33.1%	28.5%	42.9%	39%
Poor	12.1%	12.4%	4.8%	35.5%	21.1%
Don't know			0.4%	0.1%	0.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Objective indication: of hardship & vulnerability					
Households: income below R2000	23.4%	51.3%	13.1.2%	59.7%	42.4%
Households: enduring food Insecurity	19.1%	20.5%	7.6%	33.1%	23.4%
Households: Dependent on welfare	21.6%	21.6%	17.4%	19.1%	19.7%
Individuals: unemployed and actively seeking work	10.3%	34.3%	12.9%	42.2%	29.2%
Individuals: without any support networks	30.66%	37.83%	35.87%	49.22%	41%

(Source: Poverty and Health Recode File, Department of Sociology, UP, 2003)

5.1.2 Indicators of economic hardship and vulnerability

In the qualitative work, roughly R2000 per month tended to be talked about as the absolute minimum required to sustain a household of about four people. This amount covered payment for rent, water, electricity (or energy resources), food, school fees and other basic necessities. Since South Africa does not have an official or generally accepted poverty line, households in which the accumulated income is less than R2000 per month will be viewed as being very poor. Recently the All Media Products Surveys conducted a national survey in which 'the poor' in mean national terms were assessed as those earning 'less than R1400' (Schlemmer, 2005: 6). It is reasonable in the case of Gauteng, however, to propose a slightly higher minimum household subsistence level because poor communities, locked into the urban economies of South Africa's industrial heartland, are subjected to higher living costs than most other places. This

also correlates well with the Bureau for Market Research's minimum living level (MLL) of R1871 for a household of 4.7 people in 2003 (cited in Landman, 2003: 4). With this figure as the indicator, more than forty percent of all households in the areas surveyed revealed themselves to be enduring economic hardship. Soshanguve and Eersterust have the largest concentration of low-income households as well as the largest numbers of people actively seeking work. It was interesting to note that close to twenty percent of households in all four areas are dependent on state welfare (state pensions, child and disability grants). Compared to most other African states, South Africa's welfare system is well established. Notwithstanding this situation, in the course of fieldwork, many people (once again, coloureds and blacks) claimed to be eligible for welfare benefits but could not find a route around the cumbersome bureaucratic welfare system to access these entitlements.

A clear indicator of hardship is, of course, food insecurity. Apart from Laudium, the Indian area, the other areas revealed sizeable proportions of people who stated that they periodically endured hunger because they could not afford to buy food. Both the survey and the qualitative work reveal that the majority of Pretoria's poor live a socially isolated existence. Few have close friends. The most destitute of people spoke of the absence of friendship networks and of abandonment by close kin. In general, though, if faced with financial crises, most people will rely on themselves and household members only, relatives to some extent, and to a lesser extent, neighbours. Whilst the most vulnerable in these terms was the black area of Soshanguve, very high numbers of respondents in all other areas also make reference to inaccessible or unreliable familial networks of support. Partly in response to this, many people were aligning themselves to organisations and extra-familial groupings.

National estimates of poverty per racial group have been calculated by May, Woolard and Klasen (2000) to be sixty-one percent for blacks, thirty-eight percent for coloureds, five percent for Indians, and one percent for whites. Although such statistics consistently reinforce the idea that Indians and whites are not affected by poverty, the present study reveals large numbers, representing all race groups, categorising their households as 'struggling' and 'poor' and with monthly household incomes below R2000 (See Table 3). This background on experiences of economic hardship of the different racial groups in the Pretoria region helps, in part, to explain an emerging politics and critique of the state that is beginning to reshape and connect discourses prominent in the poor sectors of Pretoria.

5.2   *Grassroots perceptions of state responses to poverty*

Respondents were asked a range of questions in the survey about voting behaviour and whether they were going to be voting in the 2004 general elections. Table 4 shows that whilst many people voted with much optimism in 1999, the political mood has become quite pessimistic. Respondents (repre-

senting all class categories) described the state as ineffective and as not addressing their needs. In fact, most people of all racial groups claimed that since 1994 the government has 'not at all' taken into account their needs. Black respondents in Soshanguve were more aware of the presence of local government representatives than people in the other areas, indicating a stronger link to political processes than is the case with residents in the other areas. Interest in politics was strongest in places where mass-based organisations had previously been active: that is mainly in Soshanguve, to some extent in Eersterust, and less so in Laudium and Danville.

Table 4: Voting and political participation, according to suburbs

	SUBURB				
	Danville ("white area")	Eersterust ("coloured area")	Laudium ("Indian area")	Soshanguve ("black area")	Totals
Percentage that voted in the 1999 local election	62%	59.5%	60.8%	74.1%	66.6%
Percentage that voted in 1999 general election	62.3%	68.4%	60.4%	75.9%	69.1%
Extent to which the state has addressed the needs of people (since 1994)					
A lot	4.2%	5.2%	1.5%	4.9%	4.2%
A little	27.3%	34.2%	24.8%	41.4%	34.3%
Not at all	68.5%	60.6%	73.7%	53.6%	61.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage that know who the local government representative is	9.6%	37.8%	21.7%	52.1%	35.6%

(Source: Poverty and Health Recode File, Department of Sociology, UP, 2003)

The survey was followed by qualitative work that sought to engage 'the poor' of all four areas. Thus, the selected vignettes that follow have been taken out of interviews conducted only with people in households that were enduring much hardship and struggle.

5.2.1 Interviews with whites in Danville

When interviewed in 2004, many 'poor whites' in Danville expressed ambivalence on the question of whether or not they were going to vote in 2004. Whilst

for some it was a 'pointless exercise', others were being urged to vote to sustain some platform for white concerns. Many of these concerns related to perceptions of 'reverse-discrimination' which were reiterated consistently in the interviews. As one person said:

> These days it's mainly about [reverse] racism. The whites do all the work while the others get bigger salaries for doing nothing. It's happening all over. There are a whole lot of people resigning because the whites are being discriminated against (D7).

Whilst there was much animosity directed at employers and the state for sidelining white workers and denying them privileges, there was also a perception that whites in general do not present a united front, and that poor whites are a distinct and disadvantaged stratum, operating separately from a prosperous white middle class. Thus, there were interesting references to the mingling of the poor with other poor people – and across racial divides. Two people made the following general points:

> Some rich people don't want to make friends. They are in the rich circles and they will want to do things like play tennis. They will tell their children that certain people are not good to join. There are those sorts of things. I think that poorer people have more friendships and can more easily associate with each other and other people (D10, a).

> Man, you know. I have so many black male and female friends. I don't go to white people and ask them for help because they will say, 'no'. When I go to my black friends for help they will just take out the money if they have any to spare (D3, a).

5.2.2 Interviews with coloureds in Eersterust

In Eersterust coloured people expressed considerable frustration with retrenchment and widespread unemployment. There were three dominant discourses, all of which resonated powerfully during the apartheid era as well. The first relates to the futility of voting for institutions that are not committed to the plight of the poor; and the second to the marginal status of coloureds (not white enough in the apartheid era and not black enough in the post-apartheid context) who find themselves consistently excluded from enjoying state resources. A third set of voices claimed that poor coloureds endure immense poverty and that their circumstances were undergoing a process of systematic deterioration. The following quotations from interview material illustrate:

> I am not interested in voting. I don't think the new government will be any different from the old. New is always worse. Everything then will be as is. Everything now is more expensive than in the past. Everything is getting worse. They promised that there will be no more school fees and all the usual things. Look now at our own high school here. You must get everything at your own cost... the school fees are higher, you must buy your own books... yes, everything has become much worse (E9, a).

> When de Klerk and Mandela were sitting in the chair, there was work for everyone. Now that Thabo Mbeki is sitting... there's nothing... When Mandela was elected many people had registered. Now people are not worried about elections. They are not interested... it makes no difference. They keep saying that the youth must go... the youth must go and

vote... what for? There is no work. I am not working and I can see that there are many young people sitting at home in Eersterust... and it is also worse now in Mamelodi (E4, a).

In Eersterust people constantly compared their situations to that of black people in other areas. In the quotation above there is an indication of sympathy and identification with the black youth of Mamelodi who struggle to find work but at the same time strong antagonism is expressed towards the state for discriminating against coloureds. One of the field workers wrote the following after a long house visit:

> From fieldnotes: Their ideas on politics are that nothing has changed since 1994 and they predict that the next five years will be even worse. They say that the new government has just taken off where the white government left off. They still feel as if they (coloureds) are being discriminated against, only now by blacks. They say that in the past they, the coloureds, formed a collective front, but today they are more disintegrated and must form a united front based on their common economic difficulties. The whole family but Robert has registered to vote. He says that it won't help to vote. The people must rather take action themselves in improving their lives and not sit around and wait for the government to do it for them (E3).

5.2.3 Interviews with Indians in Laudium

Like the poor living in Eersterust and Danville, the Indian poor in the White Blocks ghetto of Laudium described themselves as marginal both in terms of their separateness from Laudium's middle class, as well as a discriminated group in post-apartheid South Africa. Again, the prevailing sense was that the poor continued to suffer, and that there were no champions of the poor fighting for changes, despite the transition to a democratic system. Whilst here in Laudium there was some identification with the coloureds (in Eersterust) and blacks (in Atteridgeville), there was some sense that blacks are prioritised as state beneficiaries. There were also consistent commentaries about Laudium's wealthy exploiting the less fortunate. Some snippets of the many conversations are recorded below:

> I don't think much has changed in the last ten years... Nothing... Nothing has changed... They just made it worse, now we are going to carry on for another five years to suffer... Can I tell you something? First, as Indian people being the minority in the country. First we were the wrong colour of white, now we are the wrong colour of black, and I mean, does it make sense to you? We are in the middle of everything. There is no way forward, so we do feel neglected by government (L11).

> So what happens to the Laudium and Eersterust people if it's only for Atteridgeville people? So even the RDP houses is a one-bedroom house, one bedroom with kitchen and toilet and very small, half the size of this. But even that they don't want to give us. So I'm just telling you now how the people do things out there... You don't see any changes, you don't see nobody coming here and saying, you know, we are going to fight for Laudium... or that people in Laudium are not going to suffer anymore. You know the rich exploit the poor and that's what's happening here (L5).

The area that you are in now is poor. It is a poor area... Like all the people here battles and... it's like poor people that's only living here. There's no one rich in this area. We live in the same way as they live there in Atteridgeville. It is just the same (L4).

5.2.4 Interviews with blacks in Soshanguve

Although people complained bitterly about the lack of employment and about food insecurity in Soshanguve, some were sympathetic in noting the challenges of the post-apartheid state. Several respondents also spoke positively about having access to water and electricity, though there were many complaints about these services being discontinued because of inability to pay for them. Whilst there is currently much discontent throughout the country as regards the state's delivery of basic services to poor communities, in Soshanguve many people acknowledged the installation of water and electrical services as playing some part in improving their situation. Thus discourses restating that 'the government is trying its best but the problems it confronts are very big' were echoed frequently. At the same time, there was some cynicism about the slow delivery in respect of job creation, infrastructural development and welfare services which led to regular claims that 'things are getting worse'. Although the tendency of poor whites, coloureds and Indians was to argue that their black counterparts were given first preference when it came to jobs, housing and welfare, the fieldwork did not reveal any discourses in Soshanguve that showed poor people to believe that they were especially entitled. On the contrary, poor people in Soshanguve suggested that they too were being systematically overlooked by state agencies because of the area's historically marginal status. Black people in Soshanguve were regarded as being treated less favourably than other blacks in Atteridgeville or Mamelodi (and were subsequently not part of 'the lucky ones'). Statements, often contradictory, such as those below were commonly heard.

The municipality has cut off water supply in our home, saying that the water is not for free and we owe them. If you owe an amount from R200 to R300, you are presented with an option of making payment arrangements, wherein you pay as little as R19 and as much as R110 to settle your debt. And with electricity, you get R20 and R60 worth of volts per month. But since we have electrical appliances such as a fridge, stove and Hi-Fi, they never last for long (S9, s).

Our government is trying hard. It is just that there are many people in our country and that is why not everybody will be catered for. The government is doing all it can and unfortunately some of us are not part of the lucky. It is impossible to create employment for everybody in ten years (S11, s).

During the period of the Boer's government you would find that the jobs are there, poverty similar to this one was not there. Nowadays we are failing by the ANC that we voted for and the ANC that we used to protect. What can we say if things are like this? ... A poverty of a person is a government that is not providing for the people... I have registered already, and yes, we are going to vote for the ANC. But on the other side I am crying (S18, s).

> You see the government, if they can, must just change the situation of the people now. It must not look like the past situation, they must make everything better for us... I think it is getting worse, it is worse... The people of Soshanguve are the poorest of the poorest because of government's neglect (S7, s).

The survey revealed some important data on people's sense of 'being enfranchised' and 'having power' to shift poverty and live better lives. People saw themselves as having rights in varying degrees. This was measured by the extent to which they could influence progressive changes in their lives.

Table 5: Perceptions of changing circumstances, according to suburbs

	SUBURB				
	Danville ("white area")	Eersterust ("coloured area")	Laudium ("Indian area")	Soshanguve ("black area")	Totals
Rights/Power to shape your life course?					
No rights	18.1%	43.1%	20.5%	16.7%	22.5%
Few rights	17.7%	12.3%	17.2%	30.6%	22.5%
Some rights	19.1%	15.2%	29.3%	31%	25.4%
Most rights	25.9%	14.9%	24.7%	17.7%	19.9%
All rights	19.1%	14.5%	8.4%	4%	9.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Socio-economic circumstances improved or not since 1994?					
Improved	16.2%	14.5%	10.2%	37.8%	24.3%
Stayed the same	20.3%	26.0%	39.1%	35.0%	31.2%
Worsened	63.6%	59.5%	50.8%	27.3%	44.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Parents living conditions better or worse than yours?					
Better	64.7%	50.7%	56.1%	58.7%	57.9%
The same	21.7%	16.8%	23.1%	20.7%	20.6%
Worse	13.6%	32.5%	20.8%	20.7%	21.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Believe that your children will be better or worse-off than you are?					
Better	36.3%	48.3%	25.6%	59.8%	47.1%
The same	18.1%	13.8%	29.5%	13%	17.1%
Worse	45.6%	37.9%	45%	27.1%	35.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

(Source: Poverty and Health Recode File, Department of Sociology, UP, 2003)

Table 5 shows that whites in Danville consider themselves to have more rights than do blacks in Soshanguve. In an era of black empowerment and enfranchisement, these statistics resonate in a strangely familiar way with inequities of the past. A large proportion of whites nonetheless consider their circumstances to be generally deteriorating. This is unsurprising since white workers no longer enjoy the range of privileges that they enjoyed under an apartheid government. Amongst blacks, the mixed fortunes of Soshanguve are clearly apparent: some acknowledged better circumstances, some did not see any real change since 1994, and a substantial section suggested that conditions are getting worse. It is this latter section that expressed deep resentment and animosity towards state officials during field trips. A majority of coloureds and Indians saw their positions as getting worse. As minorities there was ambivalence and insecurity about rights and entitlements in the post-apartheid era. It was surprising to note the high proportions of people in all four areas who similarly claimed that their parents lived better lives in the past than they do at present. This deep pessimism was also extended to people's beliefs about the way their children would live in the years to come. The most pessimistic were whites and Indians, though high proportions of coloureds and blacks were also fairly negative when contemplating the future.

6.   Concluding comments

The empirical work reveals that only small proportions of people in the selected racially demarcated areas of Pretoria consider their material circumstances to have improved over the past decade, with surprisingly large numbers of people claiming that their lives have become worse. In general, poverty in these four micro-contexts resembles the larger South African scenario in terms of white and Indian historically demarcated areas having considerably fewer people enduring poverty than coloured and black areas. Recent descriptions of South Africa's class dynamics show the easing of the coincidence of race and class, but also the deepening of poverty for the bottom strata (Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). Although debate persists on the extent of social and economic changes the poor have reaped in post-apartheid society, there is little argument about growing divisions between the better off and the poor of all racial groups. As Butler (2004: 69) puts it: 'There are new "income gaps" in the society, between a multi-racial middle class and the rest of society, and between an African urban and industrial working class and the African unemployed and very poor'. The further dip downwards of poor households is attributed in part to the adoption of middle-of-the-road policies and a series of bureaucratic inefficiencies that have led to the sustaining of high unemployment, inadequate redistributive mechanisms and the reduction of the poor's share in the national income. The proportion of black respondents in Pretoria claiming to be living under more challenging times now than in the past (27 percent) compares quite favourably

with recent Afro-barometer survey results which show that 31 percent of blacks in South Africa perceive their lives as being worse now than during apartheid (Mattes, 2002: 32). These perceptions of deteriorating conditions are accentuated by the starkly visible contrast between those deemed to be benefiting and those effectively excluded from a growing economy: it is the 'sense of inequality' and not just large-scale absolute poverty that is most threatening to the survival of democracy and social solidarity in South Africa (Sen, 2000: 93; Everatt, 2003).

The debate on poverty is often reduced to talking at cross-purposes when lack of clarity surrounds use of the concept 'poverty'. The uncertainty over meanings is most often apparent when analysing state discourses alongside positions articulated within non-government sectors. Whilst much is made of conflicting meanings within these respective sectors, the range of meanings that poverty holds in the everyday language of the poor is not interrogated with the same vigour. Even amongst the very poor, poverty is not simply about physiological survival but about living meaningful social existence: this necessitates simultaneously political enfranchisement, socio-economic rights and the power to actively intervene in shaping one's future (Chambers, 1988). As Harrison (2002: 83) states: '[O]ne cannot separate political and economic rights, therefore it makes no sense to celebrate a process of political opening which makes no difference to the material well-being of the masses... This is not just a question of understanding democratisation as "bread and butter" issues; it is also a question of keeping an eye focussed on the scope of democratisation, that is the boundaries of state action and popular influence over the latter'. Against the background of a highly acclaimed constitution it was startling to note the very small proportions of all racial groups who acknowledged the possession of 'rights' and the many conversations in the field in which people argued that they felt generally excluded and disempowered.

Ironically, more blacks saw themselves as being without rights and power than whites. It was also noteworthy that these responses were recorded on the brink of a general election. The strong critique of the state's disregard for the poor can be interpreted as being particularly heightened because of the fervour of election time. As political rituals, elections attempt to reinforce or engage national traditions and bonds but can also facilitate rituals of protest as people secure opportunities to offer complaints, make claims and express dissent (Baringhorst, 2001: 300). In January 2006, on the eve of the national municipal elections, violent demonstrations erupted in Soshanguve. The anger was not simply about a lack of service delivery but because active attempts over a ten-year period to negotiate with the state for delivery had borne no positive results. Thus, the popular claim that democratic transition and the acquisition of political rights is a necessary condition for the promotion of socio-economic rights does not resonate in the poor enclaves of Pretoria's communities. For the poor, dichotomised understandings of rights (as 'first' and 'second' gener-

ation) do not really exist. Acknowledgement that poverty is not shifting and that attempts to influence state structures through democratic processes has not been entirely fruitful led to claims that 'rights' in general have not yet been attained. Whilst such feelings were strongly expressed in Soshanguve, they were also expressed in the other areas where 'rights' and 'power' to shape personal destinies were regarded as both ambiguous and fluid.

There are two points regarding the 'voice' of the urban poor that should be added here: the first concerns poor people's turn to local organisations that have greater legitimacy than popular organisations of the past, and the second suggests possibilities of alliances between poor people, despite differing racial identities, in pursuance of common interests. With regard to the first point, criticisms were directed not only against the state but also against civil society organisations that have either disappeared, remained ineffective or no longer speak for the poor within the different communities. Poor people's references to 'nobody is fighting for us' and 'the people must take action themselves' highlights what Friedman (2002) describes as one of the characteristics of the current political scenario, which is the pro-poor groups' lack of a base among the poor. He states: 'the fact that the poor remain without effective political representation ensures that political support for fighting poverty is weakened. The lack of a voice for the poor also means that even where political support is available for fighting poverty, the policies misread the needs of the poor and are therefore ineffective' (Friedman, 2002: 4). The survey revealed that the vast majority of people in all four areas align themselves to a wide range of organisations. A listing of the most important of these organisations shows 310 different groups to which people affiliate. Few of these groups are political in nature; most ensure that individuals are not completely isolated but linked (to some extent) to social structures and networks. Despite the limited incorporation of the very poor into market and mainstream activities, much agency is reflected in the way people seek inspiration from and connectedness to these various local groupings. A critical element in addressing poverty and mobilising around the key concerns of the poor would be to develop substantive understandings of these structures to which people are attaching themselves and through which they exchange information, ideas and thinking about their situations and how they could and ought to be addressed.

In the current era of global connectivity much is being written about strategies and alliances that connect struggling poor communities within and across national boundaries. As Patel et al., (2001) state: 'Partnerships and alliances need to be established, nurtured and expanded so that voices, concerns and needs and aspirations of micro-grassroots communities are heard, listened to and ... Become part of the choices that are made by policy makers wherever they are'. On this point of building alliances, it was intriguing to note in assessing the discourses that many of the grievances of Pretoria's urban poor were articulated in very similar language. Whilst different insecurities and

fears of disempowerment temper the discourses, a more widespread pessimism regarding the state's disregard for the poor is serving to connect the poor across geographical location and social and historical contexts. In a recent legal battle in Pretoria, both black and white inhabitants of an inner-city block of flats came together to resist the city authority's attempts to forcibly relocate them to the outskirts of Soshanguve (Neocosmos & Naidoo, 2004). This, together with other evidence of spontaneous and grassroots organisation in the vicinity of the city, suggests that it is not impossible to imagine adversaries in the past and competitors for state resources, coming together to explore spaces for engagement and common struggle. The glimpses of sympathy and identification with the poor of 'other' communities or racial groups represent starting points of larger networks of alliance bringing together previously segregated sectors of Pretoria's urban poor in common struggles against poverty and inequality.

Notes

1. Notwithstanding political transformation, the use of racial classifications is still common practice in South African social science research and used frequently for the purposes of comparative analysis. Consequently, this paper makes reference to 'whites', 'coloureds', 'Indians' and 'blacks' as the four primary racial categories.

2. The study was made possible by a generous three-year grant (2002-2004) from the Andrew Mellon Foundation, New York.

3. As an indicator of inequality, the Gini-coefficient measures absolute equality as 0 and absolute inequality as 1.

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Isaac Olawale Albert

Explaining 'godfatherism' in Nigerian Politics

Take it or leave it, the archetypal godfather in Nigeria is more than the ruthless Mario Puzo's kingpins in the Italian Mafia setting. While the fictional godfather is characterized as 'a shadowy, dare-devil recluse, who combines immense underworld financial muscle with near mythical powers of enormous proportions', which is to attain a further greasing of the ever-increasing vast financial empire, the Nigeria type has the added character-ization of conceit, ego, loquacity, pettiness, envy, strife, crudity, and confusion.[1]

Introduction

The works of Plato, Aristotle, Tacitus, and other classical philosophers are largely focussed on the concentration of political power in the hands of a few in the early Greek and Roman society. Thinkers such as Pareto, Mosca, Michels, and Marx[2] too devoted their political analysis to how power is used and misused by the elite class in different contexts. The domination of power by the hegemonic class in many parts of the contemporary world can thus be said to be nothing new but has a robust pedigree. The main lesson from all these works is that the study of political elites and leadership is very important for under-standing the trajectories of development in any society. As Welsh observed,[3] political elites 'participate in, or influence the making of, decisions that allocate resources within and among social units'. A variety of conflicts are produced in the process.

Discourses on political elitism raise two important questions: hierarchy and inequality. Both of them are necessary for understanding the issues to be raised in this paper. 'Hierarchy' has to do with the vertical ranking of people in the society into two categories, namely, those at the top and those occupying the lowest positions. Those at the bottom are assumed to be less important than those on top. These social hierarchies are assumed to be pyramidal in nature. There are more people at the bottom of the hierarchy than those on top. The latter are the *crème du sac* of the society and are responsible for exercise of social, economic and political powers. Their powers consists largely in their ability to 'articulate ideas, to persuade, to cajole and coerce, to mobilize, to embody and advance symbols top which large numbers of people respond'.[4] It is in respect of this point that the notion of political elite is associated with inequality. The political elites simply organise themselves in a manner that makes them superior to the rest of their society. This inequality makes it easy for us to differentiate between 'rulers' (the political elites) and the ruled (the masses).

An important issue raised by Pareto and Marx in their works is that political elites insulate and isolate themselves from their society and try as much as possible to reproduce themselves from within. They do all possible within their reach to ensure that non-elites do not join their membership. To ensure this, the political elites maintain a safe, functional distance from the rest of the society. They reproduce themselves on an individual and selective basis in a process which Pareto specifically referred to as the 'circulation of elites'. The criteria for such elite recruitment are often parochial and the process is usually done in a manner that does not in any way compromise the traditional integrity of the dominant elite class. As Pareto argued, the dominant class often tries to frustrate any efforts at the 'collective circulation of elites' and would rather support individual recruitment. Marx supports this position but argued that an element of revolution is needed for enthroning a new social class or occupational grouping in such a society.

The position of Mosca is slightly different from those of Pareto and Marx. Mosca disagrees with Pareto that elite recruitment is only possible on an individual basis. He believes in the possibility of one social class replacing another. He however disagrees with the Marxists that this is only possible through a revolution. He believes that it is possible for a non-elite member to join the elite class through 'collective social mobility'. The latter refers to the status that people attain as a result of their social, economic and professional efforts. Mosca also believes that there exists already in many societies of the world a group of people that could be referred to as a 'sub-elite'. These are the people that facilitate communication between the elite and non-elite and are thus potential tools for relatively large-scale elite recruitment.

Those referred to as sub-elites by Mosca include all manners of professionals, most especially those public servants who translate the policies of the elites into concrete developmental issues in the society. This sub-elite is, in the modern world, not only interested in facilitating effective communication between the elites and non-elites, but they themselves do all they can to join the mainstream political elite class. What is easily noticed in a developing part of the world, such as Africa, is that the transition of such group of people into the political elite class is facilitated by one or other form of 'godfather' (a prominent member of the elite class). In many parts of the developing world where democracy has not been allowed to have a sound footing, it is still a case of selective individual recruitment, as Pareto and Marx argued. The Nigerian situation, which we seek to examine in this paper, however makes it possible for both sub-elite and non-elite to become recruited into the political elite class, so long as they can meet the parochial conditions for such a recruitment exercise. This paper deals with how 'godfatherism' serves as a medium for such selective elite recruitment in Nigeria. The paper also discusses the implications of such elite recruitment.

The word 'godfather' conjures up different meanings to different people. In many parts of Europe and America, it is simply associated with a cuddly uncle. The word has almost the same meaning in the Catholic Church tradition. A young man trying to become baptised or married in the Catholic Church is expected to have a godfather. The Catholic Church's godfather is simply chosen from among the larger congregation and need not be a relative to the godson. The latter counsels the young person on how to live a responsible life. In France, the term 'godfather of industry' is used to depict corporate titans, that is, businessmen with the most clout, and an intriguing class of people who keeps the economy running. The French 'godfathers' can be broken down into two types: the first are those who manipulate the economy for their own benefit, and the second those that can be referred to as crisis fixers, social reformers, and populist advocates of the poor.[5] Another type of godfather is one often seen in American 'cowboy films'. Such people are associated in the films with mafia gangs. The godfather is usually the 'big boss'; he surrounds himself with all manner of criminal, often violent, clientele. The latter take orders from the 'big boss' and defer to his 'good judgment' in virtually all things. The godfather defends his adopted sons when they run into problems, either with law enforcement agents or members of other gangs. Godfatherism sometimes manifests itself in the politics of developed countries of the world and Latin American countries in terms of some criminal underworld groups sponsoring politicians during elections in return for the protection of contracts. This kind of situation is euphemistically referred to as 'party machine' politics in the American political science literature.[6]

Our interest in this paper concerns political godfathers. They are slightly different from all the others identified above. Such people are found all over the world. They consist of rich men whose contributions to campaign funds of some candidates have helped the latter to win elections. Even in the developed world, such people invest heavily, most especially in the media, to shore up the image of their candidates while at the same time helping to discredit rival candidates. An example is Carlos Slim, a low profile businessman whose financial support helped Vincente Fox break the Institutional Revolutionary Party's seventy-one-year grip on power in the 2000 presidential elections in Mexico.[7] Such power brokers are sometimes referred to as 'godfathers'.

Nigeria has all the above types of godfathers: most especially those who serve others, those who expect the society to serve them, and even those who channel their resources into criminal activities. Our interest in this paper is in the godfathers in the political sector. Dr Jibrin Ibrahim defined this category of Nigerians, during an interview granted to the BBC on 10 November, 2003 as 'men who have the power personally to determine who gets nominated and who wins [an election] in a state'. Governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu, who had a running battle with his godfather, Senator Jim Nwobo, for over two years, defined godfather from his own personal experience as follows:

…an impervious guardian figure who provided the lifeline and direction to the godson, perceived to live a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the oracular personality located in the large, material frame of opulence, affluence and decisiveness, that is, if not ruthless... strictly, the godfather is simply a self-seeking individual out there to use the government for his own purposes.[8]

The 'political godfathers' in Nigeria build an array of loyalists around them and use their influence, which is often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate the rest of the society. Political godfathers use their influence to block the participation of others in Nigerian politics. They are political gatekeepers: they dictate who participates in politics and under what conditions. The role of such people is highly injurious to the advancement of popular, participatory democracy in Nigeria. Political godfathers are responsible for most of the pre- and post-election violence that we have seen in Nigeria. It is thus necessary to have a better understanding of their activities as a way of generating new ideas on how to make the political process in Nigeria less violent and more democratic. Our goal in this paper is to problematise how individuals become a basic cluster in patron-client relationships in Nigeria and in the process begin to negatively affect the political process in the country, often negatively.

Power, Clientelism and Transactional Leadership

Political figures in Nigeria often start their career by being accorded important leadership positions in their political parties. This could be as a result of the length of time they have spent in party politics. It could be because of their wealth or ability to mobilise grassroots support. They are accorded prominent positions at party meetings and no important party decisions are taken in their constituencies without taking into deep consideration their often narrow interests. Can we therefore find explanations in leadership theories for the ways they manipulate others within the party machinery?

The relationship between godfathers and their clients reminds us of the distinction that leadership scholars make between 'leaders' and 'followers'. In this case the godfather represents the leader and his client, the follower. As Burns rightly argued, 'the essence of the leader-follower relation is the interaction of persons with different levels of motivations and of power potential, including skill, in pursuit of a common or at least joint purpose'. This interaction, according to Burns, takes two fundamentally different forms: transactional leadership and transforming leadership.

Transactional leadership takes place when leaders and followers interact with a view to exchanging valued things. What is exchanged could be economic, psychological or political: trading of votes, hospitality to a person on the account of a contribution to helping to sustain the leader's position, etc. In other words, both the leader and the follower are familiar with what they benefit from each other, and the relationship is solely based on this. A major shortcoming of this kind of leader-follower relationship is that the parties 'have

no enduring purpose that holds them together; hence may go their separate ways. A leadership act took place, but it was not one that binds leader and follower together in a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose'.[9]

In contrast with transactional leadership is transforming leadership. Like the former, both leader and follower are tied together by what they benefit from each other, but the two are flexible enough to recognise the importance of pursuing higher levels of motivation and morality that can benefit their larger society. In other words, transforming leadership enables the goals of leaders and followers to fuse: 'Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for common purpose... transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both'.

The phenomenon of godfathers, most especially of the type that is seen in Nigerian politics, is a worst case scenario of transactional leaders. They are in a strictly instrumental relationship with their clients. Their main goal is to use their client to attain selfish goals; the latter too do the same. The relationship between the two of them thus has little or nothing with the larger society the two of them claim to lead. The relationship between the godfathers and their clients has little or not no enduring purpose that could hold both of them together. It is thus common to find them going in separate directions shortly after a 'contractual agreement' is reached between them. The problem is that both of them lack a higher goal that could bind them together. Instead, they have often contradictory higher goals.

Richard Joseph's work[10] set the tone for the issues to be discussed in this paper when he described the phenomena of 'prebendalism' and 'clientelism' as two of the most important principles of political organisation and behaviour in Nigeria. Both are mutually reinforcing and affect and even determine the allocation of public goods in the country. He graphically illustrated the two phenomena that led to the collapse of the second republic in Nigeria. The same problem led to the demise of the third republic. If care is not taken, it is going to lead to the collapse of the present democratisation process in Nigeria. Richard Joseph's work is thus an important project that must be read by all those trying to understand not just the past, the present but also the future of party politics in Nigeria.

Joseph developed his thoughts on 'prebendal politics' from the works of Marx on the feudal systems in Europe and China. He presented a 'prebend' as constituting an office of state which an individual procures either through a formal process or as a reward for loyal service to a feudal lord. His work focuses on making the reader perceive prebendal politics from the latter context: namely the attainment and use of public office as a reward for loyalty to a lord or ruler.

Prebendalism, as operationalised by Joseph, thus focuses on the extra-legal activities of ethnic groups in Nigeria in order to capture state power. What are to

be 'captured' in this case include appointment into important political positions, employment opportunities, funds for developmental purposes, educational opportunities, etc. The strategies used for capturing the state power are clientelist in nature. It is in this respect that he described clientelism, often referred to as 'patron-client relations ties', as an essential tool for advancing prebendal politics. The leaders and sub-leaders ethnic groups or sub-groups trying to capture state power in a divided society like Nigeria would normally establish clusters of patron-client relationships. A combination of the clusters eventually becomes a power base for manipulating the rest of the society. Shedding further light on the nature of patron-client relationship in prebendal politics, Joseph observed that:

> An individual seeks out patrons as he or she moves upward socially and materially; such individuals also come to accept ties of solidarity from their own clients which they view as fundamental to the latter's security and continued advancement as well as their own. Clientelism therefore is the very channel through which one joins the dominant class and a practice which is then seen as fundamental to the continued enjoyment of the perquisites of that class.[11]

In an argument that sets the tone for the issues in the present paper, Joseph suggested that it is a common practice in Nigeria for individuals to seek the support and protection of 'an *oga* or a "godfather"', while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods'.[12] This kind of political behaviour manifests itself not only in the allocation of state resources but also in the private sector. As those vying to get ministerial or board appointments go shopping for godfathers who can help push their cases, they meet and interact with less privileged members of the society shopping round for those that could help to support their quests for loans, scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land, employment, and promotion. The difference between these clients and their patrons is that the latter have 'a piece of the state' in their pockets. The power of the patron lies in his position in government, the number of privileged people he has or has successfully planted in government, and hence his ability to directly or indirectly manipulate bureaucratic regulations. The issues raised above are better understood in the context of the attempt made by Scott to define patron-client relationships:

> The patron-client relationship – an exchange relationship between roles – may be defined as a special case of dyadic [two-person] ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status [patron] uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits or both, for a person of lower status [client] who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services to the patron... a patron-client link originates in a power relationship, with genuine affective ties reinforce that link.[13]

Further shedding light on the instrumental nature of the relationship between patrons and their clients, Joseph noted that:

To obtain and keep clients, one must gain a predenbal office: and to be sure that in the distribution of prebendal offices an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of procuring one, clients must be gathered together to make their collective claims as well as to prove that the aspirant patron [or potential holder of prebendal office] is a person of consequence who co-optation would be rewarding to the 'political entrepreneurs'.[14]

Individual clientelistic strategies as evidenced in godfather politics in Nigeria can partly be explained in the context of what Charles Tilly[15] described as a 'security [protection] racket'. In this case, a prominent person or institution creates a security problem and turns around to ask his society to pay for solving the same problem. What a typical godfather does is to create tension in the political system and then present himself to members of the public as the only person that could help others to find their ways out of the 'dark tunnel'. He makes it difficult for members of his political party who fail to recognise his authority to get nominated for elective offices. Those who recognise his 'worth' thus go to him to be 'specially anointed' and things work positively for them automatically.

The Emergence of Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics

The word 'godfather' appears in parenthesis in many western political studies. The situation is different in Nigeria. The patron/client relationships that popularised the term in Nigerian politics have cultural roots among many Nigerians peoples. It is not a totally new experience in the sociology of the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo for people to have one or other type of 'godfather'. For example, the word 'godfather' has a local equivalence in Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo languages and these words have been in usage since the pre-colonial era.

A godfather is known among the Hausa as a 'maigida' (landlord or the head of a household). The word 'maigida' goes beyond its literal meaning. Abner Cohen, Paul Lovejoy, and Polly Hill[16] used the term in their works to refer to those who provided brokerage services to Hausa traders in transit in different parts of West Africa. These Hausa traders brought cattle from their homeland to different parts of southern West Africa and took back kola nuts to the North. At the various transit centres where they have to stop to do businesses, they rely on a maigida to facilitate their economic activities. The maigida provides them with accommodation, storage and brokerage services. The maigida receive compensations for their services and many of them became rich from the number of clients they had. Even in Hausaland, from where these itinerant traders came, this kind of patron/client relationship is popularly known. As Ferguson observed:

In Hausaland, when a stranger with kola is staying in the house of one man, and a potential buyer is staying in the house of another man, they bargain over the kola and on each calabash they set aside two kola nuts, 'yan k'ida', as a gift: one goes to each of the landlords.[17]

The Hausa sell kola nuts by the hundred (k'warya). One kola nut is added to every hundred that is counted or sold. This is what the maigida gets for commission. In other words what a broker gets is just one percent of everything that is sold. This is what is known as 'd'an k'ida' (plural – 'yan k'ida). What is paid as commission to a landlord in cattle trade or other kinds of business is generally referred to as 'la'ada'.[18]

A 'godfather' is referred to in Yorubaland as 'baba kekere' (the small father), 'baba isale' (the father of the underground world), or 'baba nigbejo' (a great help in times of trouble). The most historical of these terms is 'baba kekere'. It was used to depict community leaders with whom people of less social status identified as a way of providing physical, social, political and economic security for themselves. For example, most of the Yoruba refugees who came to settle in Ibadan in the early nineteenth century settled with the 'baba kekere' in the city.[19] These were military chiefs and patrons appointed to be in charge of certain Ibadan colonies by the town's traditional council. The migrants who settled under these Ibadan chiefs paid the 'baba kekere' tribute, part of which the 'baba kekere' transmitted to the Ibadan authorities. In return, the chiefs were obligated to protect those under them against any act of violence that characterised Ibadan at this time.

Dikson Dinia too has observed that the idea of godfatherism is grounded in the sociology of traditional Igbo society.[20] He made reference to the popular relationship between 'Nnam-Ukwu' (my master) and 'Odibo' (the servant) in the Igbo world view. A younger person is entrusted to a more mature and experienced person for training in social, economic and moral adulthood. The role played by the man in this kind of relationship is akin to that of a godfather. The latter is expected to set the boy up in his business after undergoing whatever training the master must have given him.

In the three cases mentioned above, a person of lesser social status attaches himself to another person, usually of higher status, for support, which could be social or economic. The godfather gets something in return from the adopted son for the transactional relationship. It is probably on this understanding that the modern notion of godfatherism in Nigeria is based. In other words, the phenomenon of godfatherism is not strange to the cultural world of the Nigerian people. The giving of kola by a client to his patron is also not strange. What is probably strange is that the transposition of this social or economic system into the political arena and also the ridiculous nature of what patrons now ask for from their clients as compensation for providing them with 'brokerage services'. The present-day godfatherism is a primordial tradition taken to a criminal extent. The phenomenon has far-reaching negative effects on the democratisation process in Nigeria.

The founding fathers of party politics in Nigeria were godfathers of a sort. They were preceded by the first generation Nigerian elites to establish contact with the European in the late 1800s. The leading figures were the traditional

rulers who later became the hub of the indirect rule policy of the British in the country. Between the early 1900s and the late 1940s, the educated, religious and business elite competed for influence with the traditional rulers. These people acted formally and informally as the middlemen between the British colonial officials, European trading houses and the local people. Those who could not read nor write depended on the 'professional' letter and petition writers for making their cases before the colonial officials. The business-minded among this first generation of Nigerian elite competed with European firms for the sale of imported goods. For example, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and a few others invested in the transport business and gradually launched themselves into political activities. It was impossible to reach the Europeans without the facilitative roles of these godfathers. This provided many of them with the opportunity to become gatekeepers or godfathers; they determined who and who could not meet the Europeans. Those who wanted the favours of the white men had to go through these godfathers.

Political godfatherism started with nationalist activities of the 1950s. The educated elite which constituted just six percent of the total Nigerian population championed this struggle for Nigerian independence.[21] The educated elites, most of whom had only primary education, were respected for their knowledge and bravery in confronting the white man. They became idolised by their people and their personal opinions became the formal interests of the ethnic groups they claimed to represent. People who wanted to join in politics went to them and deferred to their 'good judgment' in almost all things. These father figures were the leaders of regional political groups that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s: the Northern People's Congress for the Hausa-Fulani dominated northern Nigeria; the Action Group for the Yoruba-dominated south-west, and the NCNC for the Igbo-dominated eastern Nigeria. The role of the godfathers at this time was to show the way for the other Nigerians in a colonial system. As an Ibadan politician that belonged to this era noted, 'our job at this time was to teach our followers how to disrespect the white man who wanted to rule us for ever'. The political godfathers of this era included the then Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who led the NPC; Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who led the AG, and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC leader. The other elder statesmen that fell into this category in Nigerian politics include Mallam Aminu Kano and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. These political leaders, up to the point of their death, dictated who could occupy political offices in the geo-political regions they led. They were 'clearing houses' for political oppor-tunities.

The godsons of Sir Ahmadu Bello later became a mythical political cabal, known as the 'Kaduna mafia'[22] in Nigerian politics. The godsons of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo in South-western Nigeria, collectively known as 'Afenifere' (those who wish others well) included the late Chief Bola Ige, Alhaji Lateef Jakande, and Chief Bisi Onabanjo, all of who were state

governors during the second republic in Nigerian history (1979-1983). Dr Azikiwe's godsons in Eastern Nigeria included Chief Jim Nwobodo and Chief Sam Mbakwe, both of whom were also governors in Anambra and Imo states respectively from 1979 to 1983. Alhaji Abubabakar Rimi and Alhaji Balarabe Musa, who were governors of Kano and Kaduna states during the second republic, both recognised Alhaji Aminu Kano as their political godfather throughout his lifetime. The only difference between these early godfathers in Nigerian history and their contemporary peers is that they supported and nurtured their godsons positively rather than negatively. The emphasis of this generation of godfathers was on developmental issues and not money. They also did not demand, figuratively, pounds of flesh from their adopted sons as the present day godfathers do. These godfathers of blessed memory motivated their adopted sons to higher levels of political morality and made it necessary for them to be accountable to those who voted them into office. They also provided the regimes of their godsons with logistical support.

Some of the godsons produced by Ahmadu Bello, Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe (most especially Alhaji Jakande, Chief Bola Ige, Chief Jim Nwobodo, Chief Mbakwe, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, Alhaji Balarbe Musa, etc.), later became godfathers themselves, most especially during the ill-fated third republic and the present political dispensation in Nigeria. Many of them however lack the commitment to democracy needed for reproducing the godfathers that produced them. In the South-west, many claimed and still claim to be followers of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. They dress like Awolowo and profess his political ideals but do something else. This duplicity was one of the reasons why the AD 'was allowed' by the Yoruba people to lose the 2003 elections in the southwest to the PDP.

The ACF tried during the 2003 to make the people of the region see themselves as being led by the 'children of Sir Ahmadu Bello'. But the people could see through the smokescreen that most of the people that now claim to represent the 'old North' are in fact individual godfathers who simply decided to cluster together with a view to forging a more reliable platform for protecting their narrow personal interests.

The problem with ACF is with the contradicting interests of the individual godfathers in the group. The interests of M. D. Yusuf, Chief Awoniyi, etc., for example, are not the same. This explains why M. D. Yusuf decided to contest the 2003 election even when ACF had maintained the position that it was going to back another candidate against Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. The role of the Muslim leaders who dominate the ACF in the introduction of the sharia legal system in Northern Nigeria and their complicity in the many bloody inter-religious conflicts that took place in the region between 2000 and 2003, made many, including some Muslims, distrust them. The people would rather listen to individual godfathers who could put some immediate benefits into their pockets than to leaders who were perceived only to be interested in using

the people and the now shop-worn slogan of 'One North, One People' to feather their own nests. This is why the people of northern Nigeria are scattered in the many political parties in Nigeria. What the 2003 election results demonstrated is that ACF does not have the political clout of 'individual godfathers' under the present political dispensation in Nigeria. They asked the people of the North not to vote for Obasanjo but Buhari but the people did the opposite.

The contemporary godfatherism in the country is one of the ruinous legacies of the Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha regimes (1993-1998). The two regimes commercialised politics and made it difficult for people to get anything in Nigeria simply through hard work. Mediocrity and hypocrisy were an acceptable state philosophy.

The problem was at its worst during the Abacha regime. Individuals who were ready to compromise their group interests were needed during this period to run errands for Abacha. The system provided them with sufficient financial resources to enable them build formidable clienteles. Such people spied on their ethnic groups, universities, pro-democracy and human rights groups, military officers etc.; they organised 'rent-the-crowd' solidarity rallies and 'mass demonstrations' in support of the Abacha administration and in the process became 'big men and women'. Some of these people went as far as supplementing what they got from Abacha with criminal activities – sometimes across international borders. Security officers turned a blind eye as these people were let loose by the regime they diligently served. Many of these people were those that took over power during the 1999 elections in Nigeria. They were the ones that released Chief Olusegun Obasanjo from prison and made him the president of Nigeria.

Many Nigerians did not believe that the regime of General Abubakar was truly committed to returning power to civilians in 1999. They therefore maintained a safe distance from the political transition programme. This was how the godfathers took over power. They have been consolidating their grip on power since then. By the 2003, there were more political godfathers in many parts of Nigeria than those interested in vying for public offices. The 2003 elections thus took off with the godfathers fighting it out at party conventions: it was a 'Naira for Naira fight; Dollars for Dollars; Pounds for Pounds'. Most of those who lost their chance of nomination at the party conventions did so not because they were not qualified but simply because their godfathers were not strong enough. The ordinary Nigerians had no voice whatsoever in all the fights; they watched from far off.

The media play important roles in the making of most of the godfathers in the country. The trick is evinced in the popular adage: 'a lie when told over and over again soon becomes a fact'. Godfathers pay media men to report their activities over and over again. They are granted regular interviews and in some cases deliberate efforts are made by the media to help launder the image of these godfathers. There are also situations where the godfathers pay their

followers to place congratulatory messages about them in the media. Such messages are usually concluded with statements on how valuable the godfathers are for advancing the interests of the down-trodden in Nigerian society. In the process, all these godfathers are better known to members of the public and this enhances their public image.

Patterns of Manifestation

Five types of political godfathers are discernible under the present political dispensation in Nigeria. The first type is 'geo-political' or 'ethnic' organisations that arrogate to themselves the right to decide who represent their jurisdiction in government. Such movements under the present dispensation include 'Afenifere', the Yoruba socio-cultural organisation; Arewa Consultative Council (ACF) which presents itself as the authentic voice of the North; Ohaneze, the pan-Igbo cultural group that considers itself to be the only body with the power to determine Igbo interests. The powers of all these organisations have been receding recently. This is to the extent that their candidates for political offices are often defeated by those sponsored by 'individual godfathers'.

The second category consists of 'geo-political' or 'ethnic father figures'. These are some prominent individuals within some geo-political or ethnic organisation who are popularly respected by members of the movement they belong to, as a result of some past 'nationalist activities'. Such people, very few in the Nigerian society, have occupied public positions in the past and were found to have served their people to the best of their ability. Their political opinions are thus much respected. The best known example of this class of godfathers was the slain Nigerian Minister for Justice, Chief Bola Ige. He was the Deputy leader of Afenifere, but his influence in Yoruba politics towered above that of the pan-ethnic group. He was a godfather to many south-western Nigerian governors between 1999 and 2003. He was considered to be a true scion of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. During his tenure as the Executive Governor of the defunct Oyo state (1979-1983), he performed so well that he became idolised by the Yoruba people of south western Nigeria as an embodiment of 'free education, free health' policies of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo. In his lifetime, politicians in south western Nigeria made sure that he was on their campaign train. Even after his death, politicians (most especially members of AD) campaigned under his name. He is believed to have played a prominent role in the choice of the governors of Oyo and Osun states during the 1999 elections. His name consistently came up during the Bisi Akande vs. Omisore conflicts in Osun state 1999-2002 as the godfather to Governor Bisi Akande. One thing with this first set of godfathers is that they are well-known and have the support of grassroots people. The respect people have for them is also tied to concrete developmental issues.

The third category of political godfathers consists of some rich Nigerians who see sponsorship of political candidates as a source of upward social and economic mobility. Such politicians go around, like a typical businessman, looking for 'materials' (not necessarily marketable) to invest their money in. The clients are usually people who are interested in winning elections 'by all means' but who do not have the grassroots support, the money, or the violent dispositions for winning elections. The godfather assures the candidate of easy availability of this possible assistance in exchange for some personal benefits for the godfather after election. Many of these godfathers keep their promise of making the candidates win their elections. This could be any form of electoral malpractice, but is hardly through any honest political activities. Uba, the best-known political godfather under the present dispensations in Nigeria, is a good example of this kind of godfather. He nominated and ensured the victory of Governor Ngige of Anambra State during the 2003 elections.

The fourth type of godfathers consists of those who only deal with rich clients. Such people, for want of appropriate terminology, can be said to be 'political entrepreneurs'. They live on politics. The only asset they have is that they are well schooled in the tricks of winning elections among the grassroots people. They are familiar with all constituencies to be won over in a political contest and what it formally and informally takes to win them over. They often are not rich people but their clients are. The contractual relationship between the two is simple: the client provides the money and the godfather delivers the votes. In other words, this category of godfathers does not invest their own money but that of their clients in politics. In exchange, they are accorded important status in the government formed by their clients after election. They are given juicy contracts as well as slots in ministerial and board appointments.

The fifth type of godfather consists of rich patrons who are willing to provide what it takes for either rich or poor clients to win elections. He is willing to provide poor candidates with money and logistical support to win elections and he is ready to contribute to the campaign funds of rich candidates as well as provide him with logistical support. Dr Sola Saraki of Kwara State has played this kind of role in the past. He supported several poor people to win elections in Kwara State. Governor Mohammed Lawal, the governor of Kwara State with whom he has his major running battle cannot be said to be a poor man. He is a retired naval officer and a former military governor. He was a man of immense means before he was nominated by Saraki to become the governor of Kwara State in 1999.

For godfatherism to flourish with the dimensions that are now witnessed in Nigeria, a number of enabling environments are needed. The first is a profit-motivated political patron, a pliable political process that serves the interests of just a few in the society, a weak civil society and electoral system, some do-or-die office seekers, and a greedy mass media willing to serve the interest of the highest bidder.

Every political transition programme in Nigeria is started with the formation of new parties. The founders of many of these political parties often have agendas, positions, interests and needs that are in most cases kept secret. Those who later come to join the parties thus have to depend on what the 'godfathers' in the party say or do. Those who want to do well in the parties thus have to attend secret meetings in the houses of their godfathers. This provides them with access to 'privileged information' about party processes and how to navigate them. To enhance their own positions in the party, the godfathers ensure that party officials are over-regulated. The regulations in the system are themselves devices for making the political process become easier for manipulation of both state and party officials. To be able to survive under this kind of system, a politician must be very daring and ready to supplant the general will of the people by their own selfish interests. This goal becomes easier to achieve in a society that contains an army of unemployed youths willing to be used to attain criminal objectives. Things work better where the political environment in which all these are taking place consists of a docile 'anything-goes' civil society. The last but not the least important father for godfatherism to flourish in Nigeria is a malleable criminal and social justice system.

The over-regulation of the political process in Nigeria is partly evident in the many hurdles that members of political parties are expected to cross before being nominated for elective office. Every regime in Nigeria specifies who and who cannot vie for a political position. The problem started with General Ibrahim Babangida when he tried to ban 'old breed' politicians from participating in politics between the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was his own way of creating new political culture in Nigeria.[23] Lacking confidence in themselves and ability to successfully navigate the money-dominated Nigerian politics, many of the new breed politicians had to 'enrol' as private candidates of the old breeds who dominated the informal political arena. In addition to this sometimes unnecessary official intervention in the political process, godfathers create all forms of uncertainties in their political parties with a view to making the other members appreciate their worth. They are usually the brains behind the factionalisation of all major political parties in Nigeria. They woo members into their own faction of the party with money and other favours and in the process make pawns out of them.

Leaders of the political parties run their affairs secretly. Dates for party convention, criteria for party nomination, what makes a person to be qualified for a party position, and the like are constantly changed. All these uncertainties make party members lose confidence in their ability to do well in the parties on their own. They rely on personal loyalties, clientelism, all of which makes the entire political process open to corrupt practices. This and its consequences weaken public acceptance of the democratic process. Most of the big parties in the country charge ridiculously high fees for collecting nomination forms. What the candidates are asked to pay for collecting the forms are usually not

realistic given the state of Nigeria's economy. The fees are sometimes as high as what an average Nigerian earns in six months. Some candidates thus have to go and sell some of their property or take loans from friends to raise the money. The most popular alternative is to approach a godfather for support. That a candidate successfully raises the funds for buying the nomination form does not suggest that he would be given the mandate of the party at the party's convention. He needed somebody to help facilitate this process. Party conventions in Nigeria are usually a forum for enthroning new godfathers and dethroning old ones. The competition starts when the regulations for the conventions are being drawn up. Every godfather builds into the process some problems that would later give him an edge over others. Disagreements resulting between godfathers over this explain why party members in Nigeria sometimes go to court to stop the holding of the convention of their parties; it explains why convention dates are endlessly fixed and cancelled, and it explains why Nigerian political parties become more divided after party conventions.

At the party conventions, money, and not necessarily meaningful political issues or questions of integrity, plays an important role in deciding who carries the day. Candidates who want to get the nod of their parties for whatever office, even those vying to the office of the president, must have identified with one prominent godfather or the other. The godfather puts in place 'all it takes' (money, violence, rigging of elections, etc.), for his candidate to win. After getting nominated at the party's convention, the godfather goes from there to ensure that his candidate wins the election 'by all means'. After election, Nigerian public officers are only loyal to the godfather that put them in office rather than to the party they belong to or the Nigerian state they pretend to serve.

A godfather recognises two types of clients. The first consists of those whom he seeks to put in power, and the second are those to be used to facilitate his transactional relationship with his principal godson. I refer to this second category in this paper as 'foot soldiers'. The second type of follower ensures the electoral victory of the godson. Immediately after elections, when the godson had successfully been 'voted' into power, the 'foot soldiers' are sent out once in while to fight in defence of either the surrogate in power or the godfather that imposed him on society. Should a godson fall out with his adopted godfather he quickly raises his own private army whose primary duty is to neutralise the foot soldiers of his former godfather. In many parts of Nigeria, supporters of godfathers and their adopted sons engage each other in bloody encounters. Where a godfather has no problems with his 'son', he deploys the foot soldiers around the godson to provide extra security. In other words, those who suffer under all these situations are the unemployed youths employed as foot soldiers or as a private army. Neither the godfathers nor godsons are directly affected by the physical violence associated with godfather/godson conflicts.

Godfathers of all categories have different strategies for making their clients behave accordingly. A candidate is enlisted as a son to godfathers only when an agreement has been reached between the two on what the latter has to benefit from the relationship. The candidate is expected to talk at party functions, meetings, conventions etc., only when he has been given clearance by his godfather. Even then, he has to speak so carefully that he does not say anything that could injure the interests and needs of his 'mentor'. The closer a candidates gets to the party convention, or the general election, the less freedom of speech he enjoys. He is only free to say or do what the godfather, who is now the 'political strategist', dictates. The godfather becomes a more powerful person as soon as the party has nominated his candidate for election. At this stage, the godfather adds to the list of what his adopted son must do for him once the election is won. Encouraged by the magical ways the godfather helped them to win the party primaries, many godsons would readily agree to accommodate the new conditions. Some godfathers insist on oath-taking at this stage and put in place all kinds of extra-legal structures for ensuring that the godson does not betray them. Speaking on this subject, Governor Nnamani observed that godfathers 'create parallel structures to that of the government to fan the embers of disaffection against the government. If the godfather cannot successfully to this, he quickly propels disloyal projects like suborning non-political organisations to embark on a blitz of blackmails against the godson in government. If other institutional structures are not wielded to create unrest in the system, they begin to fabricate imaginable and unimaginable charges against the godson, using even the most sober and decidedly apolitical institutions to make his point and keep the godson under the most snapping pressures'.[24]

The Context of Godfather-Godson Conflicts: Two Case Studies

Godfathers are powerbrokers in Nigerian politics. People throng into and out of their houses on a daily basis, running errands or seeking one favour or another. The relationship between political godfathers and their adopted sons is usually transactional in nature: it is a case of 'you rub my back, and I rub your back', as Nigerians say. Like every businessmen, godfathers invest in their 'grandsons' and expect returns after elections. This is often through juicy ministerial appointments, contracts, land allocations, sharing of political influence and power with incumbents, and if the accusations against some of them are to be taken seriously, unjustified demand for allocation of state financial resources.

The favours a godfather demands and gets from his godson are for strategic reasons. In most cases, he asks for the right to nominate about eighty percent of those to serve in the cabinet of his godson. Many godfathers also ensure that they control the majority of the members of state houses of assembly in Nigeria. They readily use these people to threaten the governors with impeachment any time there is a disagreement. All these strategic antics provide a godfather with

the effective control of the regime he helped to put in place. Should the godson prove stubborn later, the godfather can always use his nominees in the regime to intimidate him. His nominees in the regime are also another source of money-making. This enables the godfather to 'eat with both hands'. As the principal godsons bring monthly 'kola' ('ransom fees') to the godfather, those imposed as commissioners, permanent secretaries board chairmen, etc., make similar monthly payments. At the end of the day, the godfather makes more money from the political process than any other person. This enables him to become a more powerful godfather and engage in more daring political activities.

Troubles start when what a godfather makes from his instrumental relationship with his clients falls below expectation. As noted earlier, a godfather uses his powers to ensure the electoral victory of his clients. Once in office, the godsons help to further beef up the power base of their patrons. Most godfather-godson conflicts in Nigeria surface immediately after election. This is when the 'arrangee governor' is expected to begin to implement the agreement reached with his godfather. The trouble starts when the godfather becomes so overbearing that the godson is unable to fulfil his mandate to the people. The godson becomes rebellious when it becomes obvious to him that the godfather would not allow him to enjoy anything from the instrumental relationship. The godfather too becomes apprehensive when he realises that the godson does not want him to have all he wants from the government, such as jobs and contracts. Commenting on the difficulties godsons soon find themselves in after getting into office, Governor Nnamani observed that 'The godfather wouldn't take pleas on leanness of resources nor would he take the prayer of the godson for alternative personnel in recruitment into the high level and strategic positions in government because he must extort his "pound of flesh", or power of influence in all cases'.

The first godfather-godson conflict to become public knowledge under the present political dispensation in Nigeria was the one between Governor Mala Kachallah of Borno state and Senator Ali Modu Sherriff, popularly known as 'SAS'. Mallam Kachallah chose SAS as his godfather during the 1999 gubernatorial elections in Borno state. SAS had two qualities which Kachallah could hardly pretend not be aware of. He was wealthy and influential in All Nigeria Peoples Party (formerly APP), both at local and national levels. SAS was a major financier of ANPP in Nigeria. His opinions mattered a lot to the party on all things. On this account he made Kachallah win the 1999 gubernatorial election in Borno state. He also won a seat for himself at the Senate and rode on this achievement to become senate leader of All Nigeria Peoples Party (formerly APP).

The relationship between SAS and Kachallah did not just start with the 1999 elections. The two of had always been family friends. Kachallah was the best man when SAS's father was married to his mother. SAS thus addressed him as

'baba' (my father). Politics changed all this. By 1999, Kachallah started to accord SAS the status of a godfather and vice versa. Kachallah condescended to this level simply because he wanted power which he did not have the money to acquire. He wanted to become a state governor though he lacked the money and grassroots support needed for winning an election. SAS had all that Kachallah needed, and the two of them entered into a patron/client relationship. Kachallah had what he wanted by winning the gubernatorial election but SAS hardly got what he wanted: 'profit' from his investment.

The conflict between Kachallah and SAS started immediately the results of the 1999 election were announced. Several factors must have led to the problem but the most popularly known was that Kachallah rejected the list of commissioners suggested for his cabinet by SAS and drew up an 'integrated' list consisting of those suggested by his godfather, 'Borno elders', and himself. He was opposed to a situation where SAS would have to dictate everything. The political environment of Borno state became heated as a result. This was to the extent that the last military administrator of Borno state noted before handing over to Kachallah that there were already plans to impeach him.[25] As predicted, Kachallah's problems became more compounded immediately he took over power. He had to contend with a hostile House of Assembly dominated and led by other godsons of SAS. Most of those invited to serve in his cabinet were later found to be die-hard supporters of SAS as well. All these people, known in Borno politics as 'Bama mafia', soon started to attack the governor on different fronts.

SAS adopted a two-pronged approach in dealing with his son. The first was to work with the state House of Assembly to get Kachallah impeached. The second is an alternative to the first: to discredit Kachallah so much that it would be impossible to be given a second term in office in 2003. Supporters of Kachallah had to fight back using political thugs known as 'ECOMOG'. The camp of SAS established its own ECOMOG as well. The opposition party in the state, PDP, which hoped to benefit from the confusion in Borno state, also established its own ECOMOG, thus turning Borno into a violent state. Several lives were lost in the process. The Borno state House of Assembly was also set on fire by ECOMOG. As the ANPP in the state became factionalised, Kachallah went to court claiming that his own faction was the authentic one. The court agreed. The camp of SAS challenged the court judgment and won the case. This enabled SAS to formally take over the control of ANPP in the state. Kachallah had no other option but to decamp to Alternative for Democracy (AD). He contested the 2003 election on the platform of the party and lost. SAS dropped his senatorial ticket and contested the governorship position and won. This was how SAS became the governor of Borno state. He is still threatening to probe the regime of his former godson.

The latest, the most controversial and most celebrated of godfather-godson conflicts in Nigeria is the ongoing one between Governor Chris Ngige of

Anambra state and Chief Chris Uba. Dr Chris Ngige's ambition during the 2003 elections was to become a senator, having lost in his first bid for the position in 1999. He soon came in contact with Chief Uba, who pledged to make him a governor and not just a senator. Ngige was said to have rejected the offer initially, citing the risks, the money involved and the tradition of political violence in Anambra State as his excuse. Uba assured Ngige of all necessary support and encouraged him to accept the nomination. He provided Ngige with all that was needed to become the governor of the state.

Uba and Ngige first became friends in 1993. The two became very close friends by the time Ngige joined politics. Uba supported Ngige when he tried to run for the post of National Financial Secretary of PDP in 1999.[26] Ngige lost the opportunity because the then governor. Mbadinuju, failed to support him. This made Ngige and Uba draw closer to each other. The conflict between Governor Mbadinuju and his godfather, Sir Emeka Ofor created the opportunity for Uba to become the godfather of Anambra politics. Uba was in Mbadinuju's camp – against Emeka Ofor – until December 2002, when it became obvious that Emeka Ofor and the people of Anambra state who accused Mbadinuju of several state offences would not allow the governor to get PDP nomination for the 2003 election. Uba decided to raise his own candidate for the governorship position. He chose Dr Chris Ngige, a medical practitioner, whom he thought he could easily control. The two agreed to work together but Ngige had two other candidates to contend with, both sponsored by the former godfather in the state, Emeka Ofor. Emeka Ofor's candidates were Phil Agbasa and Captain Nnoruka. The PDP primaries in Anambra were thus an opportunity for Ofor and Uba to prove which of them was a greater godfather in Anambra state. The party primaries were held and cancelled several times by the PDP headquarters in Abuja, until Uba's candidate finally emerged the winner.[27]

Getting PDP's nomination was however not going to be as difficult as having Ngige voted into office by the people of Anambra state. There were several complications on the ground. The first was that the supporters of Emeka Ofor, the former godfather of Anambra politics, were going to work against Uba and his candidate, Ngige. The second major problem was that the then governor, Mbadinuju, who was denied the PDP ticket, had now decamped to the Alliance for Democracy and been given the gubernatorial ticket. He was bent on punishing the PDP for humiliating him. This was also a time when a new party, the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) started making waves as an Igbo party. The party's presidential candidate, Chief Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, came from Anambra State. It was thus feared that the people of the state might prefer the gubernatorial candidate of the party to the candidates of either PDP or AD. Uba did not see any of these as a problem. He knew how to win the election. He assured his candidate of victory but bargained hard with him. Part of the agreement reached with Ngige was that Uba would get seven out of the ten commissioner positions in the state if Ngige won the

election, and that Uba would identify the juicy ministries to be manned by his commissioners.

Ngige later won the election and Chris Uba, his godfather, announced his success in a grandiloquent manner:

I AM THE GREATEST OF ALL GODFATHERS IN NIGERIA

Because this is the first time one single individual has single-handedly put in position every politician in a state.

– The State Governor and his deputy;

– The 3 Senators to represent the State at the National Assembly;

– 10 out of 11 members of the Federal House of Reps;

– Twenty-nine State House of Assembly members;

I also have the power to remove any of them who does not perform up to my expectations anytime I like.[28]

The present state of political confusion in Anambra state readily shows that Uba is a man of his words. He is no doubt the greatest godfather in Nigeria. The shoddy way in which the Nigerian state reacts to the many problems Uba created shows that the man is truly 'above the law'.

Like many other godsons, Ngige started his administration by doing his best to please his godfather. He started his administration by formally acknowledging the eminence of Uba. We can illustrate this point with what happened on 9 May, 2003 when Ngige was to be sworn in as the executive governor of Anambra state. The crowd that came to witness the event at Dr Alex Ekweme Playground in Awka, was surprised that the event did not start hours after the scheduled time. Many of them wondered what happened. The news went round that the event was held up for an important dignitary that was expected for the occasion. Who could this important person be when the governor-elect himself was already seated? The only answer the people could suggest was Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the President Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian armed forces. But the Head of State was also being sworn in for the second term at Eagle's Square, Abuja and could not have abandoned his own swearing-in ceremony for a lesser one in Awka.

The question was answered minutes later with the arrival at the scene of a convoy of vehicles, including two limousines amidst the shrill blast of sirens. Immediately, the governor Dr Ngige and all the dignitaries at the occasion arose as a mark of respect to the new arrival, Chief Chris Uba who was comfortably seated at the back of one of the limousines. It was only after Uba had taken his 'executive' seat that the others, including the governor-elect, took their seats. For those in the know, they were not only there to swear-in the new governor, but also (and more importantly) to officially unveil the new godfather of Anambra politics, Uba, popularly known as Eselu.[29] Ngige's

inaugural speech at the ceremony further illustrated how important Chris Uba was in the politics of Enugu State. He attributed his victory at the 29 April gubernatorial election to Uba and God.

The conflict between Ngige and Uba started when the latter started making efforts to take over Anambra state from the governor. The problem started immediately after Ngige was nominated at the PDP primaries, and began to gather more steam after his victory at the 27 April, 2003 poll was announced. Commenting on this event, Ngige noted:

> I noticed some new developments. At one time, they asked me to resign my nomination. They met in what they called a caucus. Him, Chuma Nzeribe, Senator Abana, Okechukwu Udenze. In fact he formed a caucus of all those who vied with me and failed. The election proper was bumpy. Every time they would bring one problem or the other. However, we went into the election. I came out from the election and the differences widened. They accused me of all sorts of things... Chris Uba will always try to find fault even in my governor-elect position.[30]

Immediately Ngige won the election, his godfather insisted on nominating all the commissioners, special advisers, personal assistants etc. Ngige did not disagree with Uba on this but on the criteria to be taken into consideration in determining who filled the vacant political positions: 'He insisted on appointing for me a principal secretary who does not know what a file looks like, with the result that I, the governor of the state, keeps on writing memo and correcting memo for this so-called principal secretary'. The other source of conflict between Ngige and Uba had to do with how state money should be spent:

> Chris Uba took my former accountant-general into his hotel room in Abuja at NICON. And they typed a letter to the Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, opening up an Irrevocable Standing Payment Order, ISPO, on his project that has been on before then. He told me that Dr Nbadinuju stopped his ISPO because of the political crisis between them. So he called me to sign this document directing the Central Bank to pay him from the federation account N10 million monthly for the next 87 months totalling N870 million. I said I could not do that for two reasons: First and foremost, I would not be in office for 87 months. I will only be governor for 48 months that is four years. That if I will ever sign an IPSO, it is for 48 months. Secondly, there are no accompanying certificates to prove or show that you are entitled to N870 million. Thirdly, it is wrong for you to bring my accountant-general into a hotel room with a prepared letter by him and yourself and you expect me to sign it for you. He did not like it. He started making trouble... Again, he said his election expenses total N3 billion and that he wanted a cheque from me. I told him that nobody can give a cheque of N3 billion. He insisted I should also sign an agreement. But I asked, 'how did you come about the N3 billion?' He flared up...[31]

It was probably at the end of the above encounter that Uba decided to sack the governor. Ngige could vividly see the problems that lay ahead. He tried to dump Uba but he was already encircled by his men as deputy governor, commissioners, secretary to the government, members of Anambra state house of assembly, private secretaries etc. Not even the Accountant-General of the state was spared. He was always in the company of Uba rather than Ngige.

The attempted 'coup' against Ngige took place on 10 July, 2003. It was facilitated by an Assistant Inspector General of Police, Raphael Ige, who led over fifty policemen to Anambra Government House and arrested the Governor. Ige claimed to be acting on orders from above. Ngige was abducted to a hideout while his 'resignation from office' was read by the state house of assembly at a hurried session. The house 'thankfully accepted' the purported resignation and Ngige's deputy, Chief Chris Ude, was sworn in as the Acting Governor. The snag in the entire set up was that Ngige's 'successor' was not sworn in by the state's chief judge as required by the constitution. The latter disappeared as soon as he got wind of what the house of assembly planned to do. Ngige later came out of where he was detained to claim that he did not resign his appointment. He claimed that he was forced to write the resignation the house considered before he became the governor. He admitted to have signed the letter under duress. The political system in the state started to experience a hiatus that has been escalating since then.

The second major violent event in the state between the followers of Uba and Governor Ngige took place on 10 November, 2004. A band of hoodlums in a convoy of buses invaded Awka, the capital of Anambra state, and also Onitsha, the state's commercial nerve centre, and unleashed violence on the two simultaneously. Counting his losses, Governor Ngige observed that Everything we inherited from the former East Central State and old Anambra State were destroyed in two to three days: Governor's office, other offices, the state House of Assembly Complex, Assembly members' village, the judiciary complex, Women Development compound, Ikenga Hotels, Governor's Lodge, Onitsha, ABS Radio, Enugu-Ukwu, ABS Radio, Awka and ABS Television at Onitsha..It is a setback of a lot of years'.[32] On 30 November, 2004, the government of Anambra state suffered yet another loss. A bomb exploded in Government House, Awka. Once again, Dr Ngige narrowly missed being killed.

What Nigerians found quite baffling, and which readily suggests the kind of influence that Uba wields under the present political dispensation in Nigeria, is that the police just watched as these hoodlums operated for three days in the state. The federal government too maintained an attitude of indifference to everything. Commenting on this, Ogunleye, a popular Nigerian columnist observed: 'If the police's reaction to the Anambra mayhem was shocking, President Olusegun Obasanjo's handling of the matter was, to say the least, scandalous. As far as the President was concerned, it was a political and party affair. Nothing was said of the criminality, nothing was said about the billion naira worth of property destroyed. Pray, what is going on? Did Uba drag Obsanjo to the famous Okija shrine to take an oath

(of indifference)? One does not need a prophet to predict that Anambra will erupt in violence again. Ngige's enemies will not rest until they have taken over the government. The President is conniving with influential criminals to murder sleep in Anambra State.

This is tragic'.[33] He predicted that if things remained as they were in Anambra state, Governor Ngige might eventually be killed by the agents of his former godfather. He missed death by a whisker during the 10 November attack. He was outside Awka when the state house was attacked.

The same fear expressed by Nigerians that President Obasanjo had a hand in the Anambra crisis was expressed by chairman of the ruling party in Nigeria, Chief Audu Ogbe, in a letter addressed to the President on 6 December, 2004. Among many other things, Chief Ogbeh observed that:

> It would appear that the perpetrators of these acts are determined to stop at nothing since there has not been any visible sign of reproach from law enforcement agencies. I am now convinced that the rumours and speculations making the rounds that they are determined to kill Dr Chris Ngige may not be unfounded.[34]

Impact on Democratic Governance

Godatherism in Nigerian politics is a contest between elitism and democracy. Elitism, as Welsh (1979: 10) argued, is a system 'in which the exercise of political control by a small number of persons is institutionalized in the structure of government and political activity'. The typical godfather in Nigerian politics basically seeks to manipulate state officials and institutions for his own interests. Conflicts occur only when their clients refuse to be manipulated. This kind of situation does not augur well for the development and growth of any democratic process. Democracy has to do with the protection of the interests of all and should not only focus on the narrow interests of the privileged in the society. The matter becomes more serious when the intention of these powerful elites is to exploit the state.

The other point that must be made is that true democracy comes from the grassroots and not from the top; it evolves from effective participation of the citizenry in the political process. In a democracy, the governed do not only come out to exercise their voting rights, they also have the right to be voted for. Political godfathers use their influence to block the participation of others in Nigerian politics. They are political gatekeepers: they dictate who participates in politics and under what conditions. This kind of situation promotes mediocrity and financial corruption as 'the incumbent godson is at pains to satisfy the whims and caprices of the godfather among other competing demands on the scarce resources of the government, the interest of the larger number is savagely undermined'.[35] Any godson who fails to cooperate with the godfather is subjected to all forms of humiliations and political violence, as discussed above.

Godfatherism is one of the most important factors responsible for electoral malpractices in Nigeria. We should not be surprised about this fact given the assurance that godfathers give to their clients on winning elections when reaching agreements with them. The seriousness of the problem here is better appreciated when the fact is faced that there are many godfathers contesting for

recognition at every election. The point was made earlier that the relationship between the godfather and godfather is instrumental: the godfather assures the latter of electoral success and the godson uses his political power after winning the election to advance the social, economic and political influence of his mentor. This explains why elections in Nigeria are usually a contest of power between godfathers. They come out with all the tricks that could help to given their candidates victory. The tricks include multiple voting, exchanging official ballot boxes with unofficial ones already filled with voting papers, stealing electoral boxes, chasing voters away from constituencies where their candidates are likely to have few votes, killing and wounding political opponents, etc. Such activities help to produce counter-violence during elections. This partly explains why most elections in Nigeria are violent.[36]

Godfatherism, most especially the type that we now have in Anambra state, can encourage the military to take over power in Nigeria. The Anambra case suggests a drift of the Nigerian state towards anarchy. This point was clearly made in the letter addressed to President Obasanjo by the then Chairman of PDP, Chief Audu Ogbe:

> How do we exonerate ourselves from culpability, and worse still, how do we even hope to survive it. Mr President, I was part of the second republic and we fell. Memories of that fall are a miserable litany of woes we suffered, escaping death only by God's supreme mercy. Then we were suspected (by the military who took over power) to have stolen all of Nigeria's wealth. After several months in prison, some of us were freed to come back to life penniless and wretched. Many have gone to their early graves un-mourned because the public saw us all as renegades. I am afraid we are drifting in the same direction again. In life, perception is reality and today, we are perceived in the worst light by an angry, scornful Nigerian Public for reasons which are absolutely unnecessary. Mr President, if I write in this vein, it is because I am deeply troubled and I can tell you that an overwhelming percentage of our party members feel the same way though many may never be able to say this to you for a variety of reasons... I dare to think that we can, either by omission or commission allow ourselves to crash and bring to early grief, this beautiful edifice called democracy. On behalf of the People's Democratic Party, I call on you to act now and bring any, and all criminal, even treasonable, activity to a halt. You and you alone, have the means. Do not hesitate. We do not have too much time to waste.[37]

Chief Audu Ogbe lost his job as the Chairman of PDP for daring to challenge so boldly. The Anambra crisis is still there. The present situation however suggests that Governor Ngige will be in office until 2007 when he is expected to go back to the polls to renew his mandate. The crisis is most likely to become more explosive as we get close to the 2007 elections.

Conclusion

Godfatherism is a hydra-headed monster in Nigerian politics. It will continue to threaten the practice of popular political participation in the country if no concrete efforts are made to deal with the problem. For now, godsons who have problems with their adopted fathers are coming out into the open to provide

information on how they came to power and the type of problems they are consequently subjected to. This development is good for the growth of democratic governance in the country. Now that Nigerians are better educated on how the elite manipulate elections in the country, they are bound to be better prepared for the future.

We seek to conclude this paper by saying that godfatherism obtains in many other democracies around the world. It is common to have influential people in the society giving strong backing to electoral candidates. There is nothing wrong with it if the goal is to use it to get the best people into public offices. What is wrong with the Nigerian system is that the godfathers have turned politics into a money-making business under which elections are rigged with a view to forcing pre-determined candidates into office. The office-holders are in turn subjected to all forms of indecent manipulations by their mentors. The godfathers in Nigeria see their support to their godsons as an economic investment that must yield superlative dividends by all means. In all cases, the godfathers try to exaggerate the extent of their investment on their godsons and the violent conflict between the two starts from there. We noticed in all cases reviewed above that the two sides raise their own private armies for defending their interests. This led to several unnecessary deaths. Most of those killed are unemployed youths that made themselves available to the two sides.

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Gender and Family life in Angola: Some aspects of the post-war conflict concerning displaced persons

1.   Introduction

A strict evaluation of the current social and economic situation of Angolan women is almost impossible due to insufficient data. A few studies have been undertaken on the situation of women in urban areas, but none in rural areas. The situation of women is primarily influenced by the war. This probably explains the development of the diverse social phenomena in Luanda, such as the major migration to the city in colonial times. The influx of women in cities is slightly higher compared of men.

Angola has been faced with a continuously growing population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from three decades of armed conflict. Millions of people have been forced to leave their homes and resettle in new areas. This massive displacement has created many urgent needs and no population-based information is available. The lack of reliable demographic data is a serious challenge in adequately identifying and addressing the needs and vulnerabilities throughout the country. No national demographic census has been carried out in thirty years. Although some studies of variable coverage and quality were carried out in the 1990s, they do not provide the quantitative or qualitative information needed to develop the most basic demographic indicators.

In the last few years, particularly with the outbreak of armed conflict in December 1998, the number of IDPs has increased alarmingly. The Government of Angola and humanitarian organisations estimate that the accumulated number of IDP s reached four million in 2000. Unconfirmed sources suggest that the number of IDPs increased by approximately one million in the year 1999. The living conditions of the population affected have reached increasingly catastrophic levels. The memorandum of Lwena, signed in April 2004, has raised new hopes for a way of returning IDPs to their areas of origin, but many practical problems remain before this goal can be achieved. The previous conditions for resettlement, like basic infrastructure and equipment for the suitable functioning of institutions such as schools, dispensaries, hospitals, administration offices, and so forth are non-existent, without even mentioning the problem of landmines.

Women in Angola face more serious problems, attributable to the war, than in other countries of the region. The cry for peace is very loud among all women

in Angola. Internal displacement, poverty, food security, violence against women, coupled with the wrecked educational and health systems are just some of the major problems facing women in Angola. As a result of the war, entire provinces have been virtually depopulated as large numbers of displaced people, mostly women and children, trek to the cities and towns, which are considered safer and free from landmines. Women are the main victims of war. Illiteracy and unemployment are higher among women than men. Many women and children are on their own as the male family members have been separated from their families because of military mobilisation.

2.   Women and the Law

Angolan constitutional law enshrines equal rights and duties for women and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of gender. Under the terms of the law, all citizens are equal, enjoy the same rights, and are subjected to the same duties, with no distinction on the basis of gender. The law also foresees punishment for all acts that could be prejudicial to social harmony, or that could lead to discrimination on the basis of these factors. This principle of equality defends equal rights and shared responsibilities within the family as well. Yet this constitutional precept of equality also has broader repercussions on the whole legal and judicial system, namely in the domains of labour, civil, penal and procedural laws. Under these laws, they all have equal access to work and employment, to education, land, property and other assets.

The passing of the new Family Code in August 1987 gave impetus to the promotion of equal rights between women and men in marriage, divorce and raising children. One of the fundamental principles was the recognition of all children born within or outside marriage. The new law allows single or married mothers to register a child unilaterally.

The General Labour Law protects women's work and working mothers regardless of whether they are single or married. Women are given the right to a fully remunerated one-day leave of absence per month. Maternity and breast-feeding time requirements are recognised in the law.

The level of women's participation in decision-making either in politics or in economics is very low. The exclusion of women in the decision-making process for peace, disarmament and national reconciliation reflects a negative tendency. The political subordination of fifty-one percent of the population (women) to men is also due to the fact the new political parties (eleven of which are represented in Parliament) do not have enough women in their leadership structures.

3.   Social and cultural structures

3.1.   *Family relationships*

In Angola, as in many other African societies, traditional life and behaviour are based on broad family bonds. This relation plays an important role in the transmission of traditional values from one generation to another. Polygamous relationships are common and socially accepted among both the rural and urban population. It is a common practice among both illiterate and educated members of the society, although it is not recognised by law; in fact the situation is really of promiscuity, a man flirting with more than one woman is seen as social prestige sign, reinforcing male authority and economic household power. The Christian monogamous family and the highly patriarchal model have influenced the shape of family relationships. Other factors include urban and labour constraints, (residence, health assistance, transport and schooling expenses), as well the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the need to take care for protection against the risk of contamination, for example by avoiding multiple sexual partners.

3.2.   *Bantu culture predominant and traditional values*

The cultural traits of Angolan women are not homogeneous. There are the strong Bantu traditions predominant in the rural areas on the one hand. The urban centres however are characterised by a maze of cultures of varying expressions on the other. In this context, Angolan women are the agent of a culture with a strong Bantu influence and their participation is vividly visible in initiation rites, death ceremonies, and celebrations among others. In these events women play a prominent role, symbolising their social function as mothers and as the link between traditional and cultural values and the new generation.

   In Angola traditional values, which are based on kinship relationships, play an important part in the various lifestyles of the population. These norms and traditional values are transmitted from generation to generation, from the elderly to the youth, especially when the latter are socialised into adulthood.

   The end of the war in Angola has not changed the importance of traditional values for women and men. Thus, it is important to assess the weight of these traditional values and attitudes, particularly as they positively or negatively affect women's capacity to be actively involved in development initiatives. These customary traits include traditional attitudes about polygamy, the emphasis on women having children, treating women only as domestic beings in the city, the impact of the economy on women, and so on.

3.3   *Paternity and Maternity*

In family relations, both mother and father have the same rights and obligations. The name of the child is chosen by common agreement, authority over

children is exercised jointly by the father and mother, and in cases of discord between the parents the decision lies with the law court. When parents do not live together, the mother and the father both hold the same responsibilities towards the child, and in the case of the death, absence or incapacity of one, authority lies exclusively with the mother. The paternity and the maternity rights of children born out wedlock are recognised and the Family Law has abolished the difference between legitimate and illegitimate children. In the case of adoption and tutelage, the woman and the man have the same rights and obligations (*Beyond Inequalities; Women in Angola*, SARDC, DW ADRA 2000).

4.   Gender disparities in economic opportunities

The right of women to equal economic opportunities is upheld by the international Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) ratified by Angola in 1985. Article 13 required states to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in social life. This and other articles (notably 11, 14 and 15) established that women have equal rights to men with respect to employment, choice of professions, promotion, remuneration, access to bank loans and other types of credit, ownership of land and other forms of and property and inheritance. The international community has focussed increasingly on the measures needed to realise these rights, notably through the platform of Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, and the final declaration of the special session of the UN General Assembly held in 2000 to review the progress made since the Beijing summit. In traditional rural society, there has always been a division between the sexes. Women are responsible for most aspects of daily family subsistence, including the production of food, crops, the raising of small livestock, the fetching of water and fire wood, cooking and the care of children, the elderly and the sick, while men prepare the soil, cultivate commercial crops (greatly reduced in scope since the colonial era) and rear cattle. Household assets are generally the property of male heads of households, and inheritance, although traditionally matrilineal in most Angola ethnic groups, usually benefits the male relatives of the deceased, leaving widows in a particularly vulnerable situation.

In the urban areas, economic pressures have driven women into the labour force, resulting in an almost equal labour force participation rate among men and women. Data from the IPCVD 1995 gave rates of 66.2 percent and 65 percent respectively in the male and female population ten years old and above (Adauta de Sousa 1995). Nonetheless, traditional concepts about the inferior status and lesser rights of women are still strong, resulting in women remaining at a disadvantage to men in terms of employment opportunities, as well as the ownership of assets and inheritance. Higher levels of illiteracy among women

than men, reflecting inequalities in educational access, reinforce unequal employment opportunities.

As a result, women are concentrated in low-skill jobs, particularly in the informal sector. According to the IPCVD data, women held only 33 percent of jobs in the formal sector, but 63.5 percent of jobs in the informal sector (Adauta de Sousa 1998). Women working in the informal sector are concentrated overwhelmingly in retail trading and are almost all self-employed. In the civil service, approximately 60 percent of jobs are held by men according to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security in 1998 (MAPESS, 1999a). Men occupy 66 percent of professional posts and 725 of the senior professional posts. The situation is similar in the liberal professions: for example, only 29 percent of lawyers are women (OAA).

There is circumstantial evidence, however, that female earning power in the urban areas has withstood inflation better than male earning power, precisely because of the greater concentration of men in formal sector employment, particularly in the public sector, where incomes have declined steeply in real terms since the early 1990s despite periodic large wage adjustments (*Angola: The post-war challenges*, UN system in Angola 2002).

4.1.   *The impact of war, urbanisation and poverty on gender roles*

Under the pressures of displacement, urbanisation and the struggle for survival, traditional gender relations within the family appear to be changing, with women achieving greater economic independence relative to their husbands or male partners, but also working longer hours to combine income-earning activities outside the home with traditional home-keeping responsibilities.

In Angolan culture, there has been a deeply ingrained notion of male supremacy, shared by both men and women, in which men are responsible for leading and for making decisions, while women are subordinate to men and carry out decisions made for them. This notion was related to the division of labour in traditional rural society, which saw women's role as one of bearing and raising children, feeding and caring for their families, and carrying out productive tasks related to home-keeping, including the cultivation of crops, the rearing of small livestock and the fetching of water and firewood. Men were responsible for family and community leadership and, in the productive sphere, for preparing the soil for cultivation, raising cattle and, in some areas during the colonial period, growing commercial crops or supplementing family incomes through migration. Despite male dominance within the family and community, women had some independence in economic matters, as they often engaged in petty trading to earn income, supplementing their farm produce, and they generally retained and spent their income without male control (Akesson, 1992, in *Angola: The post-war challenges*, 2002, p. 19).

The trading role of women has dramatically increased in the past two decades because of the displacement and urbanisation of rural populations. In

the absence of farm tasks, it is culturally accepted that women should seek to earn incomes through trading, which is also the easiest sphere of economic activity for most women to enter with minimal capital and skills. A study on IDPs carried out mainly in IDP camps in Huila, Benguela, Malange and Zaire in 1990-2000, found that men had lost their position of family provider and were in a state of 'existential crisis', a condition that in some cases was conductive to heightened violence against women. At the same time, the study found that women were overburdened as a result of the combination of their traditional domestic duties with their greatly expanded role in the market-place as principal bread-winners (Fonseca id, p.19). Similar findings have come from urban household studies, which have highlighted the increased importance within the family of the income generated by women in the informal sector in a context where salaries earned mainly by men were being wiped out by inflation during the 1990s in much of the formal sector, particularly the civil and parastatal companies (Van der Winden, 1996; UNICEF/GURN, 1999).

This may help explain the unexpected findings in the household income and expenditure surveys in both 1995 and 2000/2001 (INE, 1996; AU, 20001, UN 2000) that a lower proportion of female-headed households than male-headed households are below the poverty line. Preliminary data from the 2000/2001 survey carried out principally in urban areas, indicate that 63 percent of male-headed households were below the poverty line, compared with 68 percent of male-headed households. Extreme poverty is highest in widowed and divorced male-headed households, followed by widowed female-headed households (AU, 2001, UN 2000). Studies in the rural areas indicate that female-headed households are among the poorest and most vulnerable, because they are deprived of male labour for land clearance and ploughing (Robson, 20001, UN 2002).

The high proportion of female-headed households (33 percent in the rural areas and 29 percent in the urban areas according to the 1996 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) is an important facet of contemporary Angolan society (INE/UNICEF, 1997). Again, this is partly war-related, since large numbers of adult males have been killed or conscripted, while others have been separated from their families by displacement or migration. Household surveys have found very low ratios of men and women, especially in the 15-34 year age-groups. However the high proportion of female-headed households also reflects the trend towards non-co-residential forms of polygyny. This trend, which is found in many countries, is partly a consequence of urbanisation, which makes more difficult for wives to live together in the same compound. The lack of legal recognition of polygyny may be another factor in Angola. Along with the slackening of the social norms and controls characteristic of close-knit rural communities, traditional forms of marriage have become looser and less stable, resulting in what some analysts have called serial polygyny. Meanwhile, legally recognised marriage remains a limited

phenomenon in Angola, due both to cultural factors and the breakdown of the civil registration system. The IDR 2000/2001 found that almost four times as many women were in de facto unions as in formal marriages (INE, 2001b).

5.   Data Survey

5.1.   *Demographic profile*

Date reported on this paper were from the survey on reproductive health and family life (SRHL) conducted with technical and financial support of the United Nations Fund for Population (UNFPA) among IDPs in four Angolan provinces (Huila, Benguela, Malange and Zaíre) in 1999 and 2000. These provinces were selected because of the large number of IDPs as compared with other provinces in the north, south and centre of the country. In addition, UNFPA supports two sub-programmes regarding population matters in the provinces of Huila, and Benguela, where the government requested support from UNFPA to evaluate the living conditions of the population and to develop strategies for intervention.

The objective of the survey was to characterise the conditions of family and reproductive health of IDP populations, both those living camps and those living in the peri-urban areas of large cities. The study examined demographic characteristics: migration, fertility, and mortality, as well as the direct effect of the war on the family (deaths and disappearances as consequences of the war). The degree of knowledge about STD/AIDS (that is, of transmission and prevention), knowledge of family planning methods, assistance to pregnant women, male and female prostitution, and finally the use of drugs and alcohol, especially among youth, were studied in an attempt to understand what happens to this population in terms of their reproductive rights and health. The study design was both quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative component used a questionnaire and focus groups, and in-depth interviews were used in the qualitative component.

In the four provinces, 1421 IDPs were interviewed, with 70 percent living in IDP camps and 30 percent in the peri-urban neighbourhoods of four of the main cities. The quantitative component was based on thirteen focus groups and 179 in-depth interviews. This method was necessary to examine in-depth sensitive questions related to sexuality and reproductive health.

Given the objectives of this study, only IDPs over the age of fourteen years were interviewed. As it can be observed in Table 1, there are more women in the study than men, especially in the 14-44 age group, reversing the situation in the higher age group where men are in the majority. Note that the lack of men is higher in the age groups of greater productive and reproductive activity from 20-24 and 25-29 years. This disproportion between men and women is certainly related to the military enlistment of men in these age ranges. The average age is 32.3 years for males and 28.9 for the females. Note that the

configuration of the female population in the reproductive period approximates a typical age distribution, with about seventy percent of the women belonging to the 20-34 age group. Recall that it is in this group that fertility is usually at its highest levels.

Table 1: Distribution of respondents by age and gender group

Age Group	Men	Women	Total
14-19	106	128	235
20-24	64	148	212
25-29	99	154	253
30-34	128	132	261
35-39	81	91	173
40-44	44	55	99
45-49	61	42	103
50 +	61	24	85
Total	646	775	1.421

6. Life before dislocation from the home

6.1. *The rural family: economic and affective relations*

Information about the total number of IDP in Angola comes from diverse sources but an attempt to ascertain the exact number of dislocated women, men and children from urban areas was not undertaken. Data gathered in this study show that the majority originated from municipalities in the interior regions. In these interior areas of the country, the traditional society has the family as its fundamental base, whether conjugal, nuclear, or reduced – that is, father, mother and children. Relationships within these families are ruled principally through the role of the man as economic provider for the family, and his leadership role and the submissive role of woman and children as explained above.

As discussed in the focus group, all IDPs who were interviewed were agricultural workers in their homelands. Some combined these tasks with other functions, such as teacher, nurse, or businessmen, but the principal support came from working the land. Each family has its ploughing fields that consti-tuted a family agricultural business. As the principal mode of survival, life was based on the diverse tasks related to periods of the farming year, and the local culture. Within this system, the family was guaranteed products as such as corn, cassava, peanuts, potatoes and beans, among others. Normally the agricultural activities were combined with raising animals, such as chickens, goats and

cattle that were used to feed the family and to sell. A small segment of this population was dedicated to small business that brought the products from the fields to the city.

> Life was normal. For example, I had my cattle. In my house, I had everything. In my house, I did not lack anything, nothing, I would decide what food that I would eat, if I want to eat what. If I am going to eat, it's what I want to eat. What I want to eat is what I eat. But now, due to the war, we are here waiting. As my colleague said, we are to wait for HAND OUTS. – Male, Chibia.

The life that IDPs led in their home areas was perceived at least of 'good quality, relatively satisfy and comfortable'. According to respondents, the fact that they could work the land provided food security for relatively long periods. Even if they did not cultivate for two years, there was no lack of sufficient food. They had enough by their standards, and enjoyed a relatively stable life without great difficulties. Fundamentally they did not depend on anyone to survive.

About family life and the role of men and women in the homeland, a significant number of IDPs declared that men took care of the animals and the women planted the fields and took care of domestic work. The tasks of the children were divided, that is, the boys helped their fathers and the girls their mothers, which each helping in the ploughing fields. The tasks requiring animal traction normally were handled by men. 'In this way, men, women and children all worked in the fields. And the father felt that he was the head of the family'. – Man, Feira de Lobito. In their family relations, the IDPs felt that their children were better cared for than in their present situation. The role of mother and wife was perceived by men as being more affective and caring because they did not have the worry that they now are burdened with in the cities about sheer physical survival.

> There, we had more caring with my children, here I don't feel caring with my children because (I spend) the day in the market-place, come here at night, and I don't give caring, the child wakes up and dresses himself alone... the children go hungry one more day. It's suffering that we are talking about here. – Woman, 15-45 years, Chibia, Huila.

> The wife and children there were obedient because they saw the wealth. Here is an understanding with the women but for lack of wealth, things aren't very good. – Male, Matala.

It can be said that the original family, regardless of composition and structure in the life prior to armed conflict, after passing through much suffering, arrived at a more secure destination after many transformations (Fonseca, M. C., Ribeiro, J. T. L., Barber-Madden Leitão, A. M., 2001).

6.2.   *The process of displacement in search of secure living arrangements*

Given the increased lack of security provoked by guerrilla activities, especially in the interior of the country, the resident population which perceived the risks sought on their own initiative more secure places to live, without counting on the support of any institutions in the process of displacement.

According to the survey data (SRHFL, UNFPA/ANGOLA, 2001), the influx of IDPs interviewed in the four provinces (Huila, Benguela, and Malange and Zaíre) was characterised fundamentally as being of intra-provincial origin or originating from short distances. They moved principally in the direction of medium-sized cities and provincial capitals. Moderate inter-provincial influx or medium to long distance movement was experienced between 1992 and 1998, particularly in the province of Zaire. Here there were foreigners (refugees) because of the region's closeness to the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also, there was a small influx of returnees to their homelands after the elections in Angola in 1992, and later a return of the same IDPs to the locations where they sought refuge when conflict erupted. Security is a primordial factor of life for these people, and the violence of the war in their municipalities of origin forced them to seek security in others regions.

Particularly those that left the interior municipalities arrived either as individuals or large groups in medium-size cities and provincial capitals seeking protection. In these destinations, government institutions send them to existing camps for IDPs, or to new locations should the size of the group justify it. The camps are located in the centres of cities in abandoned buildings, or in isolated areas, far from the cities, and for the most part with difficult access to amenities. One group of IDPs looked to their family members and friends for subsistence when they arrived in these cities. This group is of considerable size, equal to those in the IDP camps, and one normally finds them in expanding areas in the peri-urban areas, provoking a rapid and disorderly growth in the cities. This group of IDPs depends less on the support of the government and humanitarian assistance.

In the IDP camps each family receives a very small portion of land from the government. Here displaced persons construct their own dwelling, perhaps a small straw hut that with the passage of time may be a place where they can build a small wooden or adobe dwelling with two rooms. These straw huts and dwellings are covered with straw and, as might be expected, do not have water or electricity or basic sanitation. The government and non-governmental organisations work with the IDPs in the sense of trying to give the camps a minimum of order. Assistance of an emergency nature is based mainly on the distribution of food (corn meal and vegetable oil), normally provided monthly in quantities considered by the IDPs to be insufficient. 'The same *fuba* (corn meal) doesn't amount to anything. There are problems with the children. The quantity of corn meal or food that we receive isn't enough for the family'. – UNECA, Benguela.

For oldest IDPs, the government established a plan for the distribution of plots for agriculture, but few benefit compared to the large mass of agricultural workers who lost their fields. The lack of support for agriculture, along with the inability to sink roots in the new location or the loss of the harvest with 'the

arrival of the war' impedes this from happening. The IDP community in the camps with government support must construct social infrastructure such as schools, health posts and a place for administration of the camp, for which humanitarian assistance is provided. In these settlements, groups of three to four families are oriented to construct and maintain their latrine. In summary, the survival of this population depends entirely on humanitarian assistance of the government and the international community. But it is insufficient and irregular, placing the population in the most absolute misery.

7.   Life in IDP camps: Vulnerabilities

There are proportionately more women than men in the camps, especially in the age groups of 14-44, inverting the situation of the older population, in which men are the majority. There is a much reduced number of men in the age groups of 20-24 and 25-29, which are the groups of highest reproductive activity. This disproportion between men and women is certainly related to the recruitment of men into the military in these age groups (Table I). The female population of reproductive age is concentrated in the 20-34 age group, with 70 percent of women in this group. Data show that it is in this group that fertility is highest. The mean age of the population interviewed was 30.4 years, with 32.3 for males and 28.9 for females (ISSRVF, FNUAP, 2001).

7.1   Consequences of the war for the family

7.1.1. Morbidity and Mortality

The level of life expectancy estimated from the survey data (ISSRVF) is extremely low – between 35 and 41 years. According to the Multiple Indicator Survey conducted by UNICEF in 1996, it was then 43 years. Also, these data take into account that in 2000 there was a proportion of the population of 80 years of age and above.

Infant mortality – the probability of death before completing the first year of life – was between 271 and 276 per 1000. In simpler terms, approximately three children out of ten die before reaching one year. The mean for the country, estimated on the basis of the MICS in 1996, was 159 per 1000. It is estimated that the maternal mortality rate for the country is also high, at 1850 per 100,000. Mortality rates among displaced children in some parts of the country have been much higher than these national averages. A UNFPA study in IDP camps in Benguela, Huila, Malange and Zaíre in 1999 found an IMR of 271 per thousand live births and a MMR of 401 per thousand live births (UNFPA, 2002) in the country.

In summary, the situation of extreme precariousness that characterises these IDPs – with regard to nutrition, health and security – affects primarily the children. This explains the very high risk of mortality among infants and mothers.

Table 2: Indicators of mortality for the entire population studied (both sexes)

	Area	
	West Angola	Overall
Life Expectancy	411	352
Infant Mortality	2114	276,5

Source SRHL, UNFPA-Angola 2000.

To gain an idea of the loss of human life among IDP families caused by the war in Angola, the survey questionnaire included questions about the number of family members who died as a direct effect of the war. Another question was asked about the number of family members who had disappeared. Despite the methodological issues, the results indicate that each IDP interviewed lost around 0.81 family members.

Table 3: Family members who died as a direct consequence of the war

	Family member deaths as direct consequence of war			Disappeared family members as a consequence of war		
	Cases reported	Proportion		Cases reported	Proportion	
		Of Responses	Of valid Cases		Of Responses	Of valid cases
Father	285	25%	37%	37	8%	9%
Mother	178	16%	23%	28	6%	7%
Brothers	232	20%	30%	124	27%	31%
Sisters	178	16%	23%	83	18%	21%
Spouse	35	3%	5%	10	2%	2%
Children	7	1%	1%	4	1%	1%
Other family members	229	20%	30%	168	37%	42%
Total	1144	100%	148%	454	100%	113%
Valid cases 771; Missing cases 651				Valid cases; Missing cases 1021		

Source: SRHFL, UNFPA-Angola, 2000.

Most of the family members who died were reported in order of importance (or perceived importance) as father, other relatives, mother and sisters. An

estimated 77 percent of the cases reported referred only to fathers and brothers of IDPs, reflecting how the family of these IDPs was affected. The mean of disappeared relatives was 0.32 persons among all IDPs interviewed. More than one third of the disappeared relatives were referred to as 'other relatives'. Brothers and sisters who disappeared were reported in order of importance.

In summary, each IDP interviewed lost on average, between deaths and disappearances, approximately one person from the family, revealing how the violence of the war reached populations which are indefensible, and which further confirms the de-structuring of the family provoked by armed conflict (SRHFL, UNFPA, 2001).

The majority of IDPs interviewed were female and have a fertility rate that approximates that of natural fertility, being reduced by contraception and by the general and infant mortality rates which are among the highest in the world. The war has been one of the principle causes of material loss and the break-up of affective bonds, contributing to the family dislocation among the IDP population.

7.1.2 *Economic, affective and psychological break-up*

In their new situation, individuals are forced to live in camps or in peri-urban neighbourhoods under precarious conditions (without adequate dwelling, insufficient food, clothing, and lack of health assistance and medication). For those sent to the IDP camps where access is difficult, the situation is worse, because they have no place to go to attend to their needs, and obtain food and health assistance. They are uprooted from their 'habitat' and 'thrown on their own luck'.

In the disorderly process of flight, most of the families were at least partly shattered, as already mentioned. Many respondents from the same family were divided during the escape and in this process many died or disappeared. '...Even some children went for water, they ran away from people who were running after them... and they drowned.' Female, > 45 years UNECA, Benguela.

Some men who tried to resist until the final moment in their area of origin sent their wives and children first to seek a place that was considered more secure. Still others were enlisted by the two warring armies, leaving their wives and children on their own which explains, in part, the large number of women in the IDP camps. In summary, these persons had to abandon their homes, ploughing fields, all of their belongings, and many family members died or disappeared in the process of seeking refuge. They are now solely dependent on humanitarian assistance, without work and living in the most absolute misery.

Other indicators demonstrate the family de-structuring of the IDPs. The number of children without mothers or fathers who count on the support and solidarity of the community to survive is a case in point. The IDP statements

reveal how much more the women suffer than the men, due to the weight of family concerns. The issue is examined in more detail below.

The economic and psychological impact of the 'new life' in the camps has a different weight for the over forty-fives and for the youth. For those over forty-five, the 'hope' of improving life through integration in the new work opportunities, and adaptation/assimilation with other groups, is very tenuous. Perhaps because they are conscious of this fact, they enter into a catatonic state of despair. Refugees still nourish the hope that one day after the war they will return to the exact space from which they departed when they sought refuge from the war. Despite the transformation that they feel, they still think about redeeming the lost link of family ties and community reference groups broken down by the war. 'Let's pray to God, to give us peace... But when finish the war we could return. We have to return.' – Male, Chibia.

The younger generation have a different posture. They seek integration in the communities where they reside. They do not share the expectation of returning home that their parents and grandparents have, perhaps because they are more realistic about their current life, or perhaps they do not feel as uprooted as the more mature members of the family.

Another reason is the chance that youth perceive they have in leaving the existing economic situation of total danger in the IDP camps by inserting themselves in the local labour market. According to various testimonies of the older respondents, youth are already outside the camp working in some type of informal activity as street sellers, selling fruit and vegetables, personal objects or working as domestic help. 'If we have a grown son to sell this firewood and at the end we buy something to eat'. – Male, Matala.

The prospect of survival for all IDPs is so desperate that existing ties of solidarity in small communities of origin can also be transformed into sentiments of individualism. This would not be surprising because other social groups, in diverse cultures, have passed through a similar experience. In moments of extreme economic scarcity what counts is survival of the self. In this case the older ones and children who depend on others for their survival are the ones who suffer the most.

7.1.3. *New survival strategies, permanence, conflict and expectations*

Besides the structure of the family, one other aspect is the family arrangements that operate for the survival of the family in this crisis situation. As discussed above the lack of dwellings, food, clothing, medical assistance, and principally, the lack of work opportunities, place this population in a catastrophic situation.

In the focus groups carried out in the SRHFL, the IDPs were unanimous that in their homeland the situation had been much better before the war. There 'one lives well' because one had fields for cultivation and did not depend on others. All regret the loss of their assets, but basically their greatest worry is their current incapacity to develop an activity that will give them dignity and

guarantee the survival of their families. It is important to note here the term 'live well' referred essentially to the fact they had been independent, work was available by cultivating their fields and they did not depend on anyone for survival. About their current life, all of the IDPs have bitter reflections: 'Our life now is very bad... Here, only thanks to the NGOs, we survive. If it were not like this we would really be very badly off... We ask that others help us, if not we will continue like this. This here is not for a human being.' – Male, UNECA, Benguela.

These families are forced to make a variety of internal arrangements as part of their survival strategies. One of them is to change the type of activity to which they were accustomed. Also, masculine and feminine roles that were rigid within their agrarian cultural paradigm undergo change. More than this: they mix and become diffuse and difficult to assimilate. The group is already aware of this problem, but resists acceptance of it, except that they must face up to the facts of men and women doing the same work, children being dispersed and family relations becoming more fluid. The changes forced on them by circumstances become permanent, with the breakdown of the former rural values in which gender roles were separate and hierarchical.

The changes in gender roles following the unavoidable division of labour in the family encounter considerable resistance from women. For the men, it means an increase in the burden of work because they have to go to the 'market-place' to seek economic security and still manage to support sound family relations. This issue perhaps is the most complex outcome, because the husband or partner, having lost the position of provider implicit in his former role of 'paterfamilias', undergoes an existential crisis. The new situation may create resentment of the wife, resulting in an increase in domestic violence. It could also bring about psychological disturbances that eventuate in the man abandoning his family. A third possibility is that both husband and wife accept the new reality and begin to work cooperatively to confront the new domestic economic situation. It is clear that the gender conflict will remain but the need for survival replaces dissension:

> The man does the same work as the woman, this isn't good, it is because of the suffering; it is a help but not just; the work of the man is for the man; the work for woman is for the woman; it is very difficult. – Female, Matala.

> The wife and children there (in the homeland) were obedient because they saw the prosperity. Here, there is an understanding with the woman but because of the lack of wealth, things are not too good. – Male, Matala.

> For me, there, beginning with the children even the woman, the work went well because of the things we had. We had everything, everything, everything. Here we are weak, but it doesn't complicate us too much. I am not saying that perhaps with the woman [things] are bad or with the children also. There are only difficulties because of poverty. Things... We are that, it isn't good. isn' t bad, they were well because we had food and one could take whatever, the wife accepted and the children obeyed. – Male, Matala.

Economically, their cultivated fields had been replaced by a chaotic and unpredictable market-place, where earning a living became very uncertain, or where the family 'agricultural business' changed to the 'family commercial enterprise', without anyone having the minimum fall-back position. 'There, there were no marketplaces. Certainly, there were no marketplaces. There are fields for ploughing. We here don't have fields for ploughing. Our fields are the marketplace.' – Male, Chibia.

In their new situation, IDPs seek anything that could possibly be used as marketable. 'Everything that you yourself can get has to be sought in the trash. You find cans here bottles there, wash them and the same bottles are sold to get anything to eat.' – Female, > 45 years, UNECA, Benguela.

Seemingly women adapt better than men to the new type of activity of the 'family business'. The market-place is seen as a business for woman despite the fact that the man has the moral responsibility to find something that the woman could sell. The men feel useless because all the phases of the process depend of the woman. Because they do not have control of the situation, they feel that the group sees them as dishonourable. 'At times the hospital prescribes ampoules but the health post doesn't have them, now you have to find a way, and also grab leaves to make business. Now as head of the family this is bad, because it seems there's more business for the women than men.' – Male, Feira, Lobito. Or, 'Now the problem is that the woman does everything, the man is not doing anything. The woman back there was the family, the man was in the front. Here the woman decides more in the family than the man.' – Male, Feira, Lobito.

Within the family, the loss of the family network had profound effects. There are orphaned children and women widowed, separated or abandoned. Besides all the economic difficulties and grief for lost family and friends, they have to confront life alone in the camps where they are sent. The fact that they do not have company makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and gender conflicts because the sex ratio in the camps is very unfavourable for a woman. However the development of new relationships is seen as a 'dream for the future'. On the other hand, the fight for survival leaves little time to have affective relationships, either with spouses or between parents and children, and many of them feel that they do not have time or energy to dedicate to their children.

> There, there was more caring for children, here I don't have caring for children because I send the day in the marketplace, I come at night and don't show caring; the children wake up along, dress alone... it is suffering that we are talking about here. – Female, Chibia.

> Here there is no caring not attention to children because of the suffering; with so much suffering, how can we pay attention; if we have to pay attention, we will not eat, then die. – Female, Matala.

> The mothers go out in the morning and children, even the very small ones, stay alone, some we don't even get into school. There in the village, the situation was different because we had time. – Female, Matala.

The difficulties are so many that the men forget they have wives. – Female, Feira, Lobito.

7.2.   *Vulnerabilities in reproductive health and rights*

7.2.1. *Reproduction*

The total fertility rate (TFR) estimated in the SRHFL was more than ten children per woman, with a distribution by age very similar to a natural fertility. The general desire for a large family was held by both men and women, which is in accordance with rural values in terms of an ideal size of family. However, the situation in which they are living at present as a consequence of the war seems to provoke some impact on family size.

> ... Now in the camp, I don't want more children and now for sure, as God continues to give me more children, I will receive them. I really don't want more than those we have because they will pass through the same situation.

> I ran from the war. I am at the mercy of the government at this moment. I can't have children. We can't have children because of the war. We lost everything. Here we have to use family planning. – Male, UNECA, Benguela.

Table 4: Parturition, Total Fertility Rates (TFR), Average age of fertility, and children desired by pregnant women

Indicator	Level
Parturition	73
TFR	11,1
Average age	29,4
More children desired by pregnant woman	4,7

Source: SRHFL, UNFPA-Angola 2000.

As this population does not have the information and the necessary means for intervention in reproductive behaviour, the situation is the same as with the women, that is reproduction is out of their control. Forces that escape the individual sphere play a major role in the definition of the high number of children desired. On the one hand, it is 'God and nature' who are responsible for their destiny, and on the other, social norms oblige the husband to have more and more children.

3.2.2 *Reproductive rights*

The rights of citizenship defined in the platform of Human Rights of the UN include the right to habitation, health, education and work. For the IDP population which lacks the basic element of survival, food and a bed to rest the body, it would appear to be a fiction to consider the matter of rights. However, it must be remembered that besides the precarious material conditions, this population is subjected to the same vulnerabilities as other populations away

from areas of conflict. Sexual violence involving children, girls and women is a fact observed in a number of camps researched. This type of violence displays no respect for human rights. The individual or group that commits any type of gender-based violence has, above all, a perception of the power they have over their victim. When cultural values reinforce gender inequalities, the violence acquires many faces: the domestic manifested in sexual abuse, in beatings, in psychological torture, in rape, just as in economic exploitation in prostitution of youth and young girls. The absence of access and assistance to reproductive health, besides being a violation of human rights to health, constitutes a violation of the status of women when they are deprived of a healthy sexual life, which implies among other things the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, and remaining safe from HIV transmission. Safe motherhood that also implies the health of the new-born requires access to information and health services prenatally, and that also should provide family planning.

Among the woeful consequences of the weakness of women's reproductive health in Angola are maternal morbidity and mortality, and deaths due to abortion, that according to this survey are quite elevated. The concept of health as defined by WHO in 1956 as being in a total state of physical, mental, and social well being, and not merely the absence of infirmity, is far from the reality of the population studied.

As to AIDS, the majority of those interviewed revealed that they had knowledge of the disease. However, these data when analysed by sex, indicate that women have a lower degree of information than the men – 58.8 percent of men and 36.34 percent of women do not know what an STD is and have never heard of AIDS. This fact demonstrates the vulnerability of women with regard to these diseases, which corroborates the finding of other studies that found that there is a higher incidence of HIV among women, a situation termed the 'feminisation' of AIDS. The following data on this issue are presented below:

Table 5: Information about STDs, AIDS and use of condoms, according to sex of interviewee

Questions about STDs	Total Male		Total Female		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Do you know about sexually transmitted diseases?						
Yes	414	67.65	309	41.42	723	53.24
No	198	32.35	437	58.58	635	46.76
Have you heard about AIDS						
Yes	499	82.89	466	63.66	965	72.34
No	103	17.11	266	36.34	369	27.66

Did you use a condom the last time you had sex?						
Yes	66	13.61	30	6.79	96	10.36
No	419	86.39	412	93.21	831	89.64
Why didn't you use a condom?						
Don't like them	62	31.47	69	32.39	131	31.95
None available	39	19.8	14	6.57	53	12.93
Never saw one	35	17.77	80	37.56	115	28.05
Have only one partner, who is trustworthy	59	29.95	42	19.72	101	24.63
Other	2	1.02	8	3.76	10	2.44

Source: SHRFL, UNFPA-Angola, 2000.

A small percentage of interviewees (10.36 percent) responded that they had used a condom during their last sexual experience, revealing a very high vulnerability among this population as regards STDs and AIDS. With regard to the reasons mentioned for not using condoms, 31.47 percent of men and 32.39 percent of women declared that they do not like the method. The fact of having one faithful partner was also a reason given by respondents – 29.95 percent of the men and 19.72 percent of the women. Various studies regarding this subject have questioned the extent to which these partners can really trust their partner, since there is no way of determining actual conduct and fidelity. Another fact that calls attention is that 37.56 percent of women and 11.77 percent of men responded they had not used a condom because they did not know about them, which reinforces the need for information campaigns about prevention and treatment aimed at the population in this study.

Respondents were asked if they had already suffered from an STD infection. Of these, only 9.9 percent of the men and 7.6 percent of the women answered affirmatively. Perhaps the low percentage of persons infected is due to the lack of information about STDs, which could prevent them from recognising the physiological signs of infection.

Almost all of the respondents who indicated having had an STD infection consisted of health staff at the health posts. It is important to note, however, that among the men seeking treatment, 14.29 percent sought it from family members or friends, which is in accordance with the findings of studies among other societies in which men find it difficult to consult a health professional to treat sexually transmitted diseases.

Table 6: Information about STDs

Questions	Men		Women		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Have you ever had an SDT infection?						
Yes	40	9.88	22	7.64	62	8.95
No	365	90.12	266	92.36	631	91.05
Do you receive treatment for the infection?						
Yes	39	97.5	19	95	58	96.67
No	1	2.5	1	5	2	3.34
Who gave you the treatment?						
Health personnel	27	77.14	17	94.44	44	83.02
Family member/friend	5	14.29	0	0	5	9.43
Traditional treatment	3	8.57	1	5.56	4	7.55

Source: SHRFI, UNFPA – Angola, 2000.

The population in the study reported a low use of contraceptive methods. Only 4.69 percent of the men and 2.2 percent of the women said they had used a method to prevent pregnancy. Among the men, the reason most mentioned for not adopting contraception was a lack of knowledge. A second reason reflects the context of the inequality of gender and the low level of empowerment of women. Some 21.38 percent of the men said that their partners do not use contraceptives because the man 'does not consent'. Among the women, the most relevant reason referred to a desire to have children, which could be explained by the very high child mortality rates, or because they did not reach their desired number of children according to the cultural standards of their homelands. In any case, the low prevalence of contraception indicates the absence of adequate services with appropriate information about reproductive health.

Of the women in the study, 13.5 percent were pregnant at the time of the survey, and the majority, 51.8 percent, desired to become pregnant. When asked about the moment at which they would like to have this child, 32.56 percent responded that they did not make the decision. This finding demonstrates the absence of the power to decide reproductive questions. There is some doubt, however, about who is responsible for the decision – that is it is the husband or partner, or divine will. In any case, this reveals that the reproductive

rights of women are not respected, since they cannot exercise control over reproduction, deciding on the number of children to have, when to have them or not.

Table 7: Reasons for non-use of contraception according to sex

Reasons	N	%
Men		
Do not consent	90	21.38
Partner intends to have more children	57	13.54
Do not know any methods	130	30.88
Want a large family	65	15.44
I don't worry	44	10.45
Religion does not permit	26	6.18
It's not frequently used in the community	9	2.14
Women		
Are you pregnant	4	9.3
Want children	11	25.58
Have a husband or partner	10	23.26
Husband or community wants a child now	1	2.33
Difficult to obtain services	2	4.65
It's bad for health	2	4.65
Don't know enough about methods	6	13.95
Don't know where to go	6	13.95
Other	1	2.33

Source: SRHL, UNFPA- Angola 2000.

The voluntary termination of pregnancy constitutes a practice in use in a number of societies in order to limit unwanted births, principally among adolescent groups who become pregnant 'accidentally'. The problem is that from the point of view of reproductive rights in those countries where the laws are restrictive and cultural values condemn impose sanctions, the effects on the health of those who undergo unsafe abortions are enormous, including the risk of death. The risky conditions encountered by women who submit themselves

to an induced abortion by unqualified persons or in unsanitary conditions, according to WHO, is one cause of elevated maternal mortality and morbidity rates in less developed countries. Unsafe abortion is part of the reproductive reality of female IDPs in Angola.

Table 8: Information about pregnancy

Questions	Total	
	N	%
Are you pregnant at this time?		
Yes	95	13.51
No	584	83.07
Not sure	24	3.41
Would you like to be pregnant?		
Yes	346	51.8
No	322	48.2
When would you like to become pregnant?		
Immediately	64	18.04
Next year	73	21.04
In each year	97	27.95
The decision is not mine	113	32.56

Source: SRHL, UNFPA- Angola 2000.

Among the interviews, 20.34 percent reported knowing a woman or girl who did not want to become pregnant but did so. When asked about what these women did, 74.74 percent reported that they tried to end the pregnancy, which shows that the prevalence rate of abortion may be high. It should be noted that in this case, the interviewees were responding about the reproductive experience of others, but when asked about their own reproductive life, only 24.39 percent said they had had an abortion. Spontaneous haemorrhage was declared as being the major reason (55.19 percent) that led to an abortion, which is legally prohibited and requires recourse to illegal help. Haemorrhages 'post-aggression' were reported by 8.33 percent of women older than 45, which indicates that abortion among these women followed physical aggression against them. Reasons for abortion included 'illness' among all age categories, with the majority among women under 24 years of age (32.35 percent). Despite

a lack of information on the exact illness, it is known that a sub-nutritional status and severe anaemia can lead to a spontaneous abortion. Among women older than 45, 16.67 percent indicated that the reason for the abortion was an unwanted pregnancy, which shows again that the absence of information and access to contraceptive methods costs women dearly.

3.2.3 Violence: Physical, sexual and prostitution

Violence in its various forms is found in a wide variety of societies. It is more common to find a high incidence of violence against women in societies where gender relationships are more asymmetric and the status of women is inferior to men. The social boundaries of domestic and sexual violence for some time supported arguments that persons living in poverty were more vulnerable to the practice of child and spouse abuse. Studies using a gender focus, however, showed that this type of violence is not related to economic class, ethnicity, religion, etc. It is intrinsically related to historical and cultural structures of the predominant gender system through which a society is organised and based on values and norms relative to the conduct of men and women. Fortunately, the data collected from this IDP population, despite all of the methodological and practical difficulties, provided information about violence.

Despite the fact that the gender-based sexual violence was observed historically in the socio-cultural context in internal or external conflicts, a major difficulty in surveys about this issue among IDP and refugee populations is the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the population. Diverse people harbour differing conceptions and characterisations of general violence and of gender inequalities. Populations whose rights generally are not respected in one form or another tend to minimise sexual violence in surveys. Thus in the majority of cases, responses given to questions related to gender-based violence underestimate its extent (McGinn, 2000).

According to the data from the current study, it is observed that violence and maltreatment are often understood as synonymous. But the response varies as to the nature of the violence depending on the sex of the respondent. For some men, for example, the major violence is the war that has deprived them of their material goods or forced them from their prior habitat in which their cultural roots were planted. But the war affected everyone. Men often viewed rape, on the other hand, as a matter of maltreatment, which is in a certain way a cultural banalisation of the act of violence that touches the intimate side of woman. For the men, inter-gender violence might spring from a sense of 'property' and sense of betrayal. For a man, the biological dimension of paternity is culturally relevant, and the fact it is only a woman who biologically controls this fact constitutes violence against his sex.

> A wife is who knows the father of the children, being that you as the husband... The wife will defecate, will urinate, will go to river... meet another husband. If they get on it's a

pregnancy. She goes home and says that this pregnancy is of the husband. In the end, at the bottom of the heart she recognises who is the father of her child. – Male, Chibia.

An approximate overview of the prevalence of forced sex among women and men is given in the following table. Nearly 24 percent of the respondents declared that they knew of cases of women forced to have sex. It is interesting to observe that the degree of information with respect to this issue varies very little between either of the sexes in terms of percentages. Of the respondents, 12.95 percent stated having known of someone, men as well, who had been forced to have sex. Of the 587 men who responded to the question as to whether they would object to being forced to have sex, 75.13 percent responded affirmatively, while among the 721 women the total was 81.69 percent. Of the total of 1,308 men and women, only 21.25 responded negatively to this question. Given the sensitivity of the issue, one could infer how difficult it was for IDPs to respond to this question, since coercive sex is a real possibility that the community cannot control. They could feel threatened if they admitted to such an occurrence that runs against all their cultural values.

Contracting HIV/AIDS seems to be on of the major fears related to forced sex, for men as well as women (61.40 percent of men and 35.88 percent of women). Observe, however, that there is an enormous difference between the sexes that could indicate a major degree of misinformation among women about the risk of contracting AIDS through sexual relations. On the other hand, through the very reproductive function, it is the women who fear unwanted pregnancy from forced sex.

The information about 'forced sex' and 'marital status' indicates that young women are seen as the principal victims (37.22 percent), followed by unmarried women (28. 07 percent). Given that among this latter group are women without partners (widows, separated, abandoned) this group could make up the main victims – about 37.22 percent followed by the group of unmarried women. These women without partners could be expected to constitute the largest number of victims. Among married women, the proportion is strikingly lower (8.40 percent).

The last part of the Table provides data on possible 'aggressors' or those agents who would force someone to have sex. The category 'police or military' was the most cited (43.7 percent) by both men and women in the sample, followed by the category 'any man' (39.2 percent). It seems that the notion that the military are the leading perpetrators of coercive sex is widely diffused among the population, and not only IDPs. A study conducted among an adolescent population of 'students and non-students' aged from 14 to 20 revealed that sexual violence is perpetrated often by police who force themselves on young girls in IDP camps. It may be that there is a double relationship of power in this type of attitude: of gender and of status, constituted and legitimated through the violence of the war, and exercised principally against women.

Table 9: Information about sexual violence by sex of interviewee

Questions	Men		Women		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Do you know women who are forced to have sex?						
Yes	138	22.7	184	24.93	322	23.92
No	470	77.3	554	75.07	1024	76.08
Do you know men who are forced to have sex?						
Yes	78	12.79	96	13.08	174	12.95
No	532	87.21	638	86.92	1170	87.05
Would you be worried if forced to have sex?						
Yes	441	75.13	589	81.69	1030	78.75
No	16	24.87	132	18.31	278	21.25
Why?						
Afraid of contracting AIDS or STDs	237	61.4	188	35.88	425	46.7
Pregnancy	7	1.81	96	18.31	103	11.32
Shame	71	18.39	154	29.39	225	24.73
Stay with a physical defect	71	18.39	86	16.41	157	17.25
Who is more likely to be forced to have sex?						
Married women	24	6.98	43	9.47	67	8.4
Single women	95	27.62	129	28.41	224	28.07
Any woman	131	38.08	166	36.56	297	37.22
Any woman	70	20.35	89	19.6	159	19.92
Other	24	6.98	27	5.95	51	6.39
Who forces someone to have sex?						
Police or military	133	40.55	194	46.19	327	43.72
Father or mother	8	2.44	6	1.43	14	1.87
Uncle or aunt	3	0.91	0	0	3	0.4
Other members of the family	4	1.22	12	2.86	16	2.14
Friend	20	6.1	25	5.95	45	6.02
Any man	138	42.07	155	36.9	297	39.17
Other	22	6.71	28	6.67	50	6.68

Source; SRHFL, UNFPA – Angola, 2000.

When considering social groups less vulnerable than IDPs, the issue of prostitution presents a major analytical problem. The gender connotation is present in any context, but among the IDPs, the combination is with the violence of poverty. Given the socio-economic situation in which this social group finds itself, prostitution may be an economic alternative for many women to sustain themselves, principally due to the break-up suffered by the family along the trajectory of forced migration arising out of the war.

Approximately 40 percent of men and women said they knew of women and young girls who 'prostituted themselves' in order to buy food. As regards male prostitution, the proportion was much lower. While 39.56 percent reported knowing women who 'prostitute themselves' in order to survive, only 24.39 percent said that they were aware of the same phenomenon among men. This difference is related to gender asymmetry. Given that prostitution, in general, is legitimated, culturally, as being 'for men', then tendency is to not reveal, or to ignore, the male practice of prostitution. On the other hand, given that women, in the context of displacement, suffer more because of their gender status, they would be more involved in prostitution.

Regarding the opinion of the younger population about the reasons for prostitution, a study carried out in Luanda with adolescents in Ingombota and Rangel (Leitão, 1996) reinforces the idea of economic necessity: they are prostitutes in order to obtain money. It is a function of poverty, in other words. A relevant finding of this survey is that among the adolescent students, prostitution occurs even in the schools among classmates, and between teachers and students.

Despite the fact that violence is more visible, psychological violence is less denounced because its victims refrain from accusing their aggressors in fear of reprisals. When physical aggression occurs, and is perpetrated by a person close to the family, it becomes more complicated to report it.

Survey information about 'perpetrators' reveals that the majority of cases involve husbands, lovers, and fiancés (71.15 percent), or persons with whom the respondents have an affective relationship. Among young woman (under the age of 24), the 'perpetrator' comes almost equally from one of two categories: husband, lover or fiancé, (46.84 percent) and parents (father and mother – 40.51 percent). In the other age groups, women do not report parental aggression, which may mean that a significant percentage of youth consider parental discipline as aggression, and the finding may be an artefact of their memory.

The data on physical aggression against women among the IDP population are reflected in similar figures in the country as a whole. According to data from the Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women for the period of June 1999 to June 2000, 510 cases of violence were registered, of which 95 percent of the victims were women. Of these cases, the majority were

committed by male family members, conflict between husband and wife being the major cause.

Conclusion

Life in the home areas of the IDPs studied suggested a relative stability in the affective and economic dimensions of the family. With the resurgence of armed conflict and its spread across the territory of Angola, this stability was interrupted in the displacement process, depriving people of their material assets and their affective roots. Displacement is normally a precipitated and disorderly occurrence, and entails movement toward medium size cities and provincial capitals under the jurisdiction of the Angolan government. In these localities, despite all deficiencies, the government and humanitarian agencies provide a minimum of support.

In camps, the IDPs are exposed to innumerable emotional vulnerabilities to which they have to adapt, like any population that has suffered a forced flight from their homes. The material vulnerabilities suffered may be less painful, or perhaps easier to assimilate, than the rupture of the family and the absence of a solution to their wishes to 'return to their roots'. The only reprieve in this situation, according to the interviewees, is that in the IDP camps they can sleep 'peacefully' without fear that the guerrillas will attack them. This is to say that with all of the material and affective losses, the compensation comes down to a 'pseudo-security' that the war is far from them. As they say when they compare the prior situation with the actual:

> We are living well, one does not eat well... Not listen to what is happening with oneself; and even if we are dying of hunger, we will pray to God to give us rain so we can work. – Female, Chibia.

> There, in the homeland... we lived well. One could inhale. We lived another way. Since the war expelled us from there, in a place like this here, you can sleep, even if one here is badly off. What matters is to be alive. – Male, Chibia.

Families are forced to make radical changes to their survival strategy. They must develop types of activities to which they are not accustomed; the shift from agriculture to the market-place is their only chance of survival. In the 'market-place, the opportunities that arise are considered more suitable for women. The men feel ashamed to undertake work considered to be a female preserve, and see themselves as useless to the family because they have lost the economic status of provider. Concomitantly, they are intrinsically linked to rural cultural values in which they were socialised. Thus these changes imply a number of family conflicts.

The woman has to assume a more active role in resolving the financial problems of the family. She must play a larger part in decision making, a fact that generates more gender conflicts. For the women who do not have their husbands or partners present, due to the war, the economic strategies for family

survival weigh heavily on their shoulders. Many, as the data show, pursue prostitution as a survival strategy for themselves and their families. In this situation of a totally precarious economic status, and with their reproductive rights compromised by all kinds of risks, what can be their recourse?

To the material vulnerabilities, we should add the loss of cultural identity due to the forced separation from reference groups in their home areas with whom they shared their lives, material goods and sense of the past. The loss of a focus of reference when not substituted by another can lead to acute anonymous psychological states, especially if the rupture occurs without family support. Among the IDPs, the war affected both dimensions. The rupture of family structure occurred in various stages and in different circumstances. The family experienced a dispersion process during the flight of its members from the villages and their search for an alternative home. They are destined to be lodged in camps and to wait for other solutions to their predicament.

Those who survive to land up in the IDP camps or the peri-urban areas are differentially affected. Those who suffer most are usually the older people, the women and the grandparents who remain to look after small grandchildren. The younger generation look for work in urban centres rather than endure the uncertainty and the increased vulnerability.

In the face of the reality revealed by our data, there appears to be very little prospect for an improvement in the lot of the IDPs. People turn to their beliefs and pray to God to bring peace. Sustained by the dream of peace and by the hope of regaining the human dignity lost in a war they did not provoke and of which they are the principal victims, they carry on.

> ... we did not know if the end of end of the war is near or not. But when the war ends, we can return. We have to return. But in case we can't return, now, we will stay until... a new order. – Male respondent, Chibia.

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Putting Oil First? Some Ethnographic Aspects of Petroleum-related Land Use Controversies in Nigeria

Abstract

This article examines, based on recent ethnographic data, one of the lesser known processes through which petroleum operations sustain social conflict in Nigeria. Focussing on what has come to be termed 'eminent domain abuse' by the international environmental justice community, the article reveals the character of petroleum operations in a number of communities in Nigeria's oil-producing region. The article relates the practices of the transnational oil companies, the disposition of the regulatory authorities, and the oppositional discourses of ordinary people in the oil communities to the laws governing land use and mineral ownership in the country.

Introduction

'Whose land?' This question underpins much of the conflict associated with the exploitation of petroleum, diamond, gold, timber, coltan and other 'strategic' natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a question on which the state (and extractive business corporations) and grass-root groups often substantially differ – one around which, for example, compensation for land expropriated for extractive industrial activities revolves. Differences between the state and stakeholder communities about who has a legitimate claim to land and the natural resources it harbours can become quite complicated. While the state believes it 'owns' the natural resources, and so must determine how best the exploitation of such resources can bolster national economic development objectives, indigenous communities often attach more than simply economic definitions to land. Many indigenous communities regard forests not merely as a collection of trees, an abode of animals or a space for gathering firewood or planting crops. They see the forest as intrinsically a sacred possession (Mitee 2002). The deepening strife in Nigeria's oil producing region, the Niger Delta, epitomises this clash of perspectives and is a powerful example of how conflict around land use sustains Africa's media image as unstable. In some important sense also, it signifies something that Chachage (2005) has recently pondered about: 'Can Africa's poor inherit the earth and its mineral rights?' The Niger Delta crisis is an example even at the global level because the region is a petro-

leum-rich minority ethnic province. As one analyst has noted, 'a majority of the last remaining oil reserves are in low-income or indigenous communities' (*The Washington Times*, 2001).

This article examines the workings of some of the compensation strategies through which the state and oil operators seek to win the co-operation of the local communities in the petroleum-exploitation process, and how such dynamics intersect with the laws that vest land and petroleum ownership rights in the state. Based on the experiences of some of the better known oil-producing communities in Nigeria, the article looks at the controversies surrounding land expropriation for petroleum operations, and compensation. The article is not an overall evaluation of the diverse factors associated with socio-political conflict in Nigeria's oil-producing region, nor is it an attempt to prescribe what land use regimes mineral-rich countries should adopt. Rather, it is a modest contribution to the broader debate on why upstream petroleum operations (especially in Africa) tend to engender strong indignation among ordinary people, especially in the communities where petroleum production takes place. It also sheds some light on why petro-capitalism is often portrayed as a special kind of fundamentalism and violence.

The article is based on ethnographic data obtained in Nigeria's Niger Delta region in 2003. As elaborated later, the fieldwork was done in rural communities in Rivers, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom States.

Land Use and Eminent Domain – Revisiting the Debate

The deepening crisis of confidence between transnational oil corporations and oil-producing communities in Nigeria highlights an important development predicament. Fundamentally, the crisis is about whether the state (working through any number of agents) can exploit petroleum resources as if the oil-producing communities did not matter, since the state 'owns' both the land and the minerals underneath it. It is about what constitutes adequate and equitable compensation to affected communities (or the oil-producing province as a whole) when land is expropriated from communities and indigenous corporate groups for petroleum operations. It is a crisis that strikes at the heart of the state-land-society nexus and this must be interrogated.

Anthropologists have long argued that land tenure – the web of relationships among social groups and individuals vis-à-vis different and competing land-use options – is by its very nature fraught with problems. This, they argue, is fundamentally because human beings are land users, unlike other primates who merely occupy land. Because of their status as land users, humans must maintain certain interests in land, although such interests are themselves constantly impacted upon by both population growth and changes in the broader socio-economic and technological environment (Uchendu 1979:63). While it is easy to think that people hold interests in land, anthropologists hold

that interests are, in reality, held against other people and not on land as such (Lloyd 1962:60).

Because of the differing and competing interests that often exist in a particular piece of land, anthropologists generally differentiate between those holding 'allodial or plenary interests' in land and those holding 'dependent interest or contractual occupancy' (Uchendu 1979:63). These two sets of interest constitute a land tenure system. Uchendu (1979:63) defines allodial or plenary interests as the 'claim and exercise [of] the most comprehensive rights in a piece of land'. The second category of interests pertains to people 'whose interest falls short of the plenary or allodial'. As indicated later in this article, in most rural Southern Nigerian communities (the Niger Delta region in particular), communities exercised allodial interest in land, the trustees characteristically being family heads and chiefs. As also shown later, petroleum operations constitute the single most important process through which such interests have become threatened, and through which there has been a deepening crisis of confidence over the years between local communities and the state on the one hand and between communities and oil corporations on the other.

An overarching dimension of this discourse is the power of the state to utilise land anywhere within its territorial boundaries for developmental purposes irrespective of existing webs of private allodial interests or contractual occupancy. This 'ancient attribute of sovereignty', as Jacoby (2004) calls it, is what is commonly known as 'eminent domain'. It is the power by which the state can 'condemn private property and take title for public use' (Cato Institute 2002). Through this power, the state directly controls land or aspects of it, or can expropriate land from private owners for projects ranging from oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way and airports, to public highways, sports stadiums and low-cost housing. For example, in the petroleum-rich Alberta province of Canada, the Surface Rights Act (enacted in January 1977) vests mineral rights in the government of the province: individual landowners control only the 'land surface and the right to work it, in addition to any sand, gravel, peat, clay or marl which can be excavated by surface operations' (Alberta Department of Energy 2004). Accordingly, the right to 'explore for and produce oil, gas, and other minerals' rests with the state – although a fundamental difference between Canada and Nigeria is that in Canada the mineral rights vests in the government of the oil-producing province rather than in the national government.

The problem with the exercise of eminent domain – one that has become a major subject of international social justice activism – is the 'justness' of the compensation paid to affected individuals, families or corporate groups. This is because the power of eminent domain has historically been restrained by the need to pay 'just compensation' to the landowners. According to the Cato Institute (2002), eminent domain is prone to abuse in the sense that a government can 'take property from one owner, often small and powerless, and

transfer it to another, often large and politically connected, all in the name of economic development..' As shown later, this is how ordinary people in the study communities tended to frame their petroleum-related land use grievances. Seen in this light, the contemporary eminent domain-related activism in many parts of the world may very well reflect a desire by ordinary people to put 'teeth back into public-use restraint' (Cato Institute 2002).

It will be difficult to grasp the conflict impact of land expropriation and compensation on ordinary farmers and fishermen in Nigeria's oil region – or, indeed, how the compensation framework plays out at the grassroots – without some acquaintance with the history of the country's upstream petroleum industry.

The Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Industry – A Historical Sketch

Although the early search for oil in Nigeria dates back to 1906, it was Shell (the Royal Dutch consortium then known as Shell D'Arcy Petroleum) that, on its arrival in Nigeria in 1937, began the search for oil in the Niger Delta. This is a region at the southernmost tip of Nigeria reputed to be the world's third largest wetland, after The Netherlands and Mississippi. The wetland areas measure about 70,000 square kilometres, although the present nine political divisions that make up the region (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states) cover a land area of about 1,121,110 square kilometres (NDDC 2004: 2). It is through the Niger Delta's network of creeks that the water systems of the Niger and Benue rivers flow into the Atlantic Ocean.

Shell struck oil in the Niger Delta town of Oloibiri in June 1956. Nigeria formally commenced petroleum production in 1957 and a year later made its first crude oil exports. Ironically, Oloibiri is one of the communities where to this day deep grassroots discontent exists over petroleum exploitation, especially over issues of land expropriation and compensation (Akpan 2004). This point is elaborated later.

Shell enjoyed almost a complete monopoly of the upstream petroleum sector prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960 and still possesses the 'best' oilfields in the country. It controls most of Nigeria's crude oil reserves and production (SPDC 2001:6). Its dominant (mainly onshore) position has, however, not always been a positive achievement. In fact, in recent years the onshore dominance has proved rather ominous, as local youths constantly threaten to expel (and in some places have succeeded in expelling) the company from their territory. The main reason for this conflict is the company's alleged anti-community and exploitative operational ethos. The Niger Delta region as a whole is a study in social and environmental degradation, much of it directly or indirectly attributable to petroleum operations.

Some competition began to emerge in the Nigerian petroleum industry from 1960, when more foreign companies (mainly from the USA) began to acquire oil exploration concessions, and by the late 1960s the Niger Delta region had become a crowded theatre of upstream petroleum business. The sector is currently dominated by Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Agip, Total and Phillips. Proven crude oil reserves stood at 32,255 billion barrels in 2003 (OPEC 2004) – about three percent of the world's total. Ranked among the world's top thirteen oil producing (and top eight oil exporting countries), Nigeria produced about 2.3 million barrels per day in 2005, representing about three percent of global daily output.

Just to give an idea of the amount of real estate that is directly or indirectly under the control of the petroleum industry, at least 5,284 oil wells have been drilled in over 1,500 Niger Delta communities (NDDC 2004:22) since the mid-1950s. About 120 oilfields were active in 2003, out of a possible total of 280 (UK Trade and Investment 2003; NBR Services 2003). According to one estimate, the length of oil and gas pipelines in the Niger Delta is over 7,000 kilometres – and traverses a land area of about 31,000 square kilometres (NDDC 2004:22). Shell reportedly held about 400 square kilometres of land for its operations as of 2001, most of it reserved for future use. This excluded land acquired for 'short-term' purposes (such as for seismic projects and temporary staff) (SPDC 2001:11) and land not acquired for petroleum development but nonetheless rendered useless as part of ecological collateral damage arising from oil operations. Chevron's operations reportedly spanned 'over 5000 kilometres offshore and 2,600 kilometres onshore' as of 1998 (Ajayi et al 1998). However, as shown later, petroleum-related land use contestations in the Niger Delta go beyond the physical space directly or indirectly impacted by oil operations: existing laws, policies and practices raise important sociological and ethnographic concerns for local communities.

Ownership and Control

About 95 percent of Nigeria's oil and gas production takes place under a contractual fiscal regime known as joint ventures. The rest is covered by production sharing contracts. These two regimes replaced the colonial-era sole concession system whereby companies obtained exploration rights to a given territory, became private owners of the petroleum in the designated concessions, and assumed full financial responsibility for its exploitation. The colonial government benefited mainly through the royalties and taxes paid by the companies (Mulder et al 2004).

Decree No. 51 of 1969 repealed the colonial Mineral Oils Ordinance of 1914, ended the sole concessionaire era, and laid the basis for the contractual system of joint ventures between the Nigerian government and transnational oil companies. Under a joint venture, the federal government-owned Nigerian

National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC – established in 1977) bears 55-60 percent of the cost of upstream petroleum operations while the joint venture partners (transnational oil companies) contribute the rest. The Nigerian government, through NNPC, also takes the greater portion of the revenues accruing from the operations (SPDC 2003:4). The foreign joint venture partners are designated 'operators' and are responsible for the day-to-day business of searching for oil, developing oilfields, laying and maintaining pipelines, managing the crude oil export terminals, acting as custodians of the crude oil tanks as well as managing the operating budgets. This 'external' control of so many sensitive aspects of petroleum, Nigeria's most important economic commodity, partly explains why ordinary Niger Delta residents sometimes refer to Nigeria as a colony of Shell.

In production sharing contracts the financial costs of operations fall wholly on the contractor, the (foreign or local) oil company. The contractor recovers its costs, posts profits, and pays taxes and royalties to the government through stipulated fractions of the total quantity of oil produced, while the Nigerian government (through NNPC) shares the 'profit oil' with the contractor. Thus a major distinguishing attribute of production sharing contracts (as against joint ventures) is that specific quantities of crude oil (rather than money) change hands between NNPC and the contractors.

Since the major point of conflict between the oil communities and the Nigerian state on the one hand, and between the communities and the oil companies on the other, is rooted in the issue of petroleum ownership and control, it is appropriate to examine closely the laws that define these relationships, and how the relationships play out in a given oil community with regard to land expropriation and compensation. These issues are taken up in detail after the following brief anatomy of the communities in which the original study was conducted.

The Study Communities

As mentioned earlier, this article is based on data obtained in the Niger Delta in 2003. The study communities were Oloibiri, Ebubu and Iko (in Bayelsa, Rivers and Akwa Ibom states respectively). Although purposively chosen, the three communities are fairly representative of the upland and riverine human ecologies of oil and gas production in Nigeria. As shown presently, they occupy significant positions within the context of Nigeria's oil production history, are located in three of the country's leading oil producing states, and have strategic relevance to the major transnational oil companies, such as Shell Petroleum.

Commercial oil production began in Oloibiri and Ebubu in 1956, and in Iko around 1974. Oloibiri is a relatively popular name in Nigeria, the reason being that it is where the first commercial oil deposit was struck in June 1956. Major production continued in the town into the mid-1970s. The oil flow station in Iko

was still in service in 2003, while in Ebubu (an Ogoni community), production had been halted due to community protests against the activities of oil companies. In terms of socio-economic development, the three communities were indistinguishable from most other rural towns in Nigeria: they lacked most modern social amenities like good roads, decent housing, good schools, health centres, potable water, sanitation and electricity (only Ebubu was connected to the national grid). Given their status as oil-producing communities, they are classic examples of what Georges Bataille meant when he quipped that 'energy finally can only be wasted' (quoted in Apter 2005: 200).

The social and environmental hazards of petroleum operations were evident in the three communities. These included polluted creeks, which served as a major source of drinking water in Iko and Oloibiri, and charred iron roofs of residential buildings, which residents (in Iko especially) attributed to acid rain resulting from incessant gas flaring. In Ebubu, a large portion of forest wasted through oil spills in the early 1970s had not been restored as at the time of the study. The author has documented elsewhere the political attributes of the three communities, such as structures of community governance (Akpan 2006).

It was indicated earlier that land-related conflict between local communities and oil companies is a major feature of social relations in the Niger Delta. The nature of these conflicts, especially as the author encountered them in the study communities, will now be examined. Special attention will be paid to the ways in which land-related contestations at the grassroots intersect with the laws defining land use and compensation, and with the ways in which the natural environment frames the social experiences of ordinary people.

State, Petroleum and Land Use in Nigeria – Eminent Domain Abuse?

The Nigerian petroleum industry is governed by a plethora of laws. The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) identifies on its website more than 35 of these under what it calls 'principal' and 'subsidiary' pieces of legislation. These include the Oil Pipelines Act of 1956, Petroleum Control Act of July 13, 1967, Petroleum Act No. 51 of November 27, 1969, Offshore Oil Revenue (Registration of Grants Act) of April 1, 1971, Exclusive Economic Zone Act of October 2, 1978, and the National Inland Waterways Decree of 1997. As encountered during the fieldwork, a number of these laws came across to ordinary people as a form of eminent domain abuse. The principal legislation governing ownership and control of petroleum resources, and the associated contestations, are examined below.

The Petroleum Act

The most important petroleum ownership and control legislation in Nigeria is the 1969 Petroleum Act (originally Decree 51), which explicitly states that all petroleum resources in Nigeria belong to the federal government. This Act

repealed the 1914 Mineral Oils Ordinance (the first oil-related legislation since Nigeria formally became a British colony), which had forbidden the participation of non-British citizens or companies in oil prospecting and exploitation. It also repealed, among other colonial laws, the Minerals Act of 1945, which had vested petroleum ownership and control in the British Crown (Ebeku 2001).

Although petroleum ownership rights are enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, it is the 1969 Petroleum Act that provides the enabling details. The Act not only set the stage for the participation of Nigerian companies and Nigerian citizens in upstream oil business, but also gave the state the legal basis to promote an operating, policy and fiscal environment that would best serve the development needs of the Nigerian society. However, reality is not always a true reflection of stated intentions, as evidenced in the deepening social instability in the oil-producing areas.

One logical consequence of the Nigerian government's ownership and control of petroleum resources within the country's territorial boundaries is that private land can be condemned to make way for any aspect of petroleum development. In other words, while individuals' land surface improvements (in the form of buildings, crops, tombstones, shrines and ancestral cemeteries) remain private, minerals, mineral oils and natural gas are viewed by the state as public goods. Government's intervention in their exploitation becomes simply a case of public use.

As shown in the earlier discussion on eminent domain, such a right is not new, nor is Nigeria the only country where mineral rights vest in the state while individual landowners have only surface rights. Even so, in many mineral-producing countries, mineral rights take pre-eminence over surface rights. In Nigeria, it would seem that existing laws spawn discontent in the oil-producing areas mainly because they stipulate no clear benchmarks as to what should be paid as compensation. Section 77 of the Petroleum Act expects an oil operator to pay to the landowner:

> such sums as may be a fair and reasonable compensation for any disturbance of the surface rights of such owner or occupier and for any damage done to the surface of the land upon which his prospecting or mining is being or has been carried on and shall in addition pay to the owner of any crops, economic trees, buildings or works damaged, removed or destroyed by him or by any agent or servant of his compensation for such damage, removal or destruction.

While laws such as this would probably not be expected to be explicit on actual minimum or maximum amounts payable, the researcher found during his fieldwork a general lack of awareness by local residents about what anyone affected by any aspects of oil exploitation might legitimately be paid. Despite the protracted conflict associated with petroleum production in Nigeria, the researcher found no evidence of a clear government or NNPC outreach programmes directed towards the enlightenment of communities on matters of

entitlements, mineral rights, surface rights and compensation (cf. Alberta Department of Energy 2004, Alberta Department of Agriculture 2004). The Petroleum Act's silence on compensation benchmarks, and the absence of outreach programmes, leaves a penumbra, a grey area, over which affected groups either amicably negotiate with petroleum operators or are plunged into invidious squabbles. It would seem that by nationalising mineral rights, the state considered that it had saved itself the inherent complications of private claims. This possibly explains why, according to a study by Frynas (2000: 225), compensation-related court cases between oil-producing communities and transnational oil companies (who are joint venture partners with the state-owned NNPC) were almost always decided in favour of the oil companies. Indeed, Frynas's study found what seemed like constant collusion between the oil companies and the Nigerian government against the oil communities.

A key informant at Shell Nigeria disclosed to this author that in the face of so much vagueness about what was legally 'fair' or 'just', especially with regard to payments for land acquired for petroleum operations, the companies simply co-opted the statutory compensation calculations adopted by the state, although with slight 'improvements'. The companies, he said, went beyond mere compensation for infringements on surface rights (as with the state): they also paid for the 'loss of land value'. The respondent emphasised that the extra compensation was entirely voluntary, as payment for loss of land value was not required in the relevant laws. (The subsection entitled 'Whose Land' examines why the law attaches little importance to the loss of land value, and the associated contestations.) As the respondent put it, the oil companies incurred these additional costs because 'it is extremely risky to adopt a legalistic attitude when it comes to dealing with the communities'.

As a rule, the amounts paid by the oil companies are guided by what they regard as the 'current market value of the land'. However, because most petroleum exploration and production activities in Nigeria take place in very remote, rural communities the market value for land is often very meagre – where such 'market' value exists at all. Annual rentals for land acquired for petroleum drilling or related activities vary between $3.85 and $7.69 per hectare (OPTS 1997). These figures pertain to 'swamp' or 'sand beaches', and 'dry land' respectively. Land acquisitions are covered by decennial leases. In the event of permanent damage to land, the existing compensation regime requires the companies to 'capitalise' the applicable rental amount 'for a one-time payment... for a term of 20 years at a rate of 5%' (OPTS 1997). Thus, a ten-hectare parcel of 'dry land' currently worth $76.9 in yearly rental would, in the event of 'permanent damage', bring its owner a once-off payment of $209.04, being five percent of the annual rental compounded for a period of 20 years!

Concerning the payment for crops damaged, the companies also rely on the Oil Producers' Trade Section's (OPTS) recommendations. OPTS is the petroleum producers' section of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI). OPTS's recommendations are in turn guided, as indicated earlier, by government rates – the rates the state uses when its 'public interest' projects encroach on private 'surface rights'. OPTS's rates are slightly higher than those used by any of the nine Niger Delta state governments. To make the rates 'realistic', the oil companies (or the state, for that matter) typically distinguish between crops of 'economic' or 'cash' value (mainly tree crops), and those of 'consumption' or 'food' value (mainly shrubby or tuberous plants and vegetables). The former attract higher rates. Seedlings are considered less valuable than mature crops.

The reader may now recall the point made earlier, that in the rural Niger Delta, forests are not simply a collection of trees. The author learnt that in distinguishing between 'economic' and 'food' crops, little attention was often paid to the fact that some crops that might not have high 'economic' value had important cultural significance for local people. In local marriage, funeral and initiation ceremonies, for example, only in very rare cases would cash be accepted in lieu of certain required items. Many such items were often part of the local ecology. Examples are *pami* and *kaikai* (local wines sourced from raffia palm). The 'finest' imported wines, brandies, whiskies and beers would normally not be regarded as substitutes for pami and kaikai. Also, a grove of wild oil palm trees (*dura*) often served as an income source for a family for generations; in many cases, it defined a family's status in the community. Economistic compensation criteria would normally not take into cognisance the intergenerational economic and cultural importance of certain local 'economic' trees or crops.

Table 1 below has been constructed using the OPTS compensation rates just referred to. It gives a sense of how much, in monetary terms, an affected community, family or individual could have earned in 2003, and shows how farmers could be affected should they stick to indigenous 'food crops' rather than plant strictly for cash. The data offer a useful basis for understanding the anger among ordinary people in the oil-producing communities and further gives an insight into the controversies surrounding compensation and petroleum-related land use Nigeria. Only 'cash' and 'food' crops commonly found in rural Niger Delta appear in the table.

A second source of controversy and discontent relates to environmental protection. The Petroleum Act requires operators to 'adopt all practicable precautions' to prevent land and water pollution, and should this fail, 'take prompt steps' to contain the effects of pollution. These problems must be tackled in a 'proper and workmanlike manner in accordance with the regulations and practices accepted as "good oilfield practice"' (Gao 2003). The Act contains no threat of serious sanctions against polluters, leading to contro-

versial situations where oil companies sometimes preside over the processes of determining how much is payable to individuals and communities adversely affected by, say, an oil spill (Susu 1998).

Table 1: Oil industry compensation rates (for selected crops)

Crop	Maximum Amount Per Hectare of Crop (US$)	Alternative Criterion (Maximum Amount Per Crop/Stand – US$
Maize	58.84	–
Beans	82	0.02
Yam	369.23	0.31
Cocoyam	123.08	–
Cassava	136	–
Pepper	76	–
Sweet Potato	50	0.02
Pumpkins		0.08
Okro		0.04
Bitter Leaf		0.10
Tomatoes	100	0.10
Melon	90	0.06
Pineapple	–	0.15
Waterleaf	–	0.004
Mango (hybrid variety)	–	7.69
Coconut	–	4.62
Guava	–	1.54
Pawpaw	–	1.54
Banana	–	2.36
Plantain	–	2.46
Orange	–	4.62
Raffia palm	–	2.46
Rubber	–	3.08
African Pear		2.46
Cocoa	–	7.69
Oil Palm (hybrid)	–	4.62
Oil Palm (indigenous)	–	7.69

Source: Oil Products Trade Section (OPTS), Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1997).

The companies benefit from lax regulation in other ways: they can more fully mobilise their biases about what does or does not constitute an adverse impact on communities. Writing on behalf Chevron, a local community relations manager once stated that an oil spill was the equivalent of a fire disaster, over which no company should be threatened with sanctions or pestered for compensation:

> Let us imagine that one of your organizations suffered a fire incident in which some offices were totally burnt and equipment worth millions of Naira [Nigerian currency] destroyed. I believe it would be your fair expectation that some sympathizers will call on you offering their commiseration and praying that such incidents never happen again (Haastrup 1996).

None of the above should give the impression that there are no environmental laws in Nigeria to deal with the adverse consequences of petroleum exploitation and other human activities, or that the country has no environmental policy: there are several pieces of legislation aimed at protecting the environment. There are, for example, laws targeting oil pollution in navigable waters, harmful waste disposal, and damage to sea fisheries, among several others. A Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Decree was enacted on 30 December, 1988 as the legislation on which a new environmental policy was to be based. An Environmental Impact Assessment Decree came into existence in 1992, and in June 1996 a Federal Ministry of Environment was created. There are also laws directly aimed at promoting development interventions in the oil region such as those that set up the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The main emphasis of this discussion is that these laws tend to operate from the basic premise that because the Nigerian state 'owns' the country's petroleum resources and the land under which it is found, it goes about compensation and other community issues as if the community did not matter.

The fieldwork also revealed that local discontent was not simply about the amount of compensation, but more fundamentally about the way land was defined in the relevant statutes. For instance, the Petroleum Act limits people's claims to crops, shrines, tombstones and other physical improvements, rather than also to the minerals under the land. A respondent at Shell acknowledged this issue:

> The fundamental problem is the definition of 'land'. Except this is addressed, nothing significant will happen in favour of the [oil] communities. I believe the agitation in the communities is fundamentally about changing the definition of land, which in terms of existing laws, is quite disgusting. Land should mean everything on and underneath the surface, and not just 'surface rights' as stipulated in existing laws. The government cannot issue licenses for petroleum exploitation without the consent of the land owner. However, my company tries to do what the Nigerian law says, not what I or any other officer here thinks.

Uchendu (1979) has documented some of the local beliefs concerning land. It would seem that by limiting the definition of land to the visible surface, the Petroleum Act was always bound to spawn conflict between the oil communities and the Nigerian state (and its joint venture partners). As Ebeku (2001) puts it:

> The exclusive use and enjoyment of the land [in the Niger Delta] usually carried with it full rights to minerals, subject of course to the requirements of the prevailing custom and the relation of the particular occupier to the land; land usually included minerals.

Uchendu (1979:64) also points out that land in rural Southern Nigeria – especially those with limited experiences of conquests and displacements – is not a mere 'piece of earth', but a piece of earth that produced a sense of pride and 'mystical' attachment that was out of all proportion to the mere two hectares a family might hold: land 'embodies the spirit of the Earth deity, a revered mother who blesses...' The author confirmed through interactions with ordinary people in the study communities what Uchendu calls the local 'folk image' of land, and that this image had implications for people's day-to-day dispositions towards laws that made economics the defining criterion for land-related compensations. But even at the level of economics, the author deduced from conversations with local residents and from direct observations that on account of the laws that gave Nigerians only 'surface rights' to land, a person would remain poor even if vast petroleum reserves were struck under his or her bedroom.

Dichotomising the Source? – 'Onshore' and 'Offshore' Petroleum

'Would the Nigerian government lay claim to "offshore" petroleum if the Niger Delta region was not part of Nigeria?' This rhetorical question, which the author encountered repeatedly in the study communities, lies at the heart of the agitation that has trailed the Offshore Oil Revenue (Registration of Grants) Act, enacted by the General Yakubu Gowon regime as Decree 9 on 1 April, 1971. The Decree's intention was to set apart an economic petro-zone for the federal government – a zone to whose petroleum resources the littoral states of the Delta (at present Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Delta and Ondo) could legitimately make no claims. Two states (Akwa Ibom and Ondo) whose oil reserves are mainly offshore feel the impact of an onshore/offshore dichotomy more directly. The Act put offshore resources entirely in federal territory, thus amending the section of the 1963 constitution that had defined the continental shelf of a littoral state as part of that state. In terms of this Act, any revenue derivation claims by affected littoral states could only be legitimately made on the value of petroleum sourced on land and in shallow waters.

The first notable response to years of overt and covert resistance to the law occurred in 1994 when a decree enacted two years previously to abolish the dichotomy came into effect. The debate re-emerged after the return to civil rule

in 1999. Although the 1999 Constitution allowed for derivation funds of 'not less than 13 per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources', the new (civilian) government based such revenues only on offshore natural resources, with serious financial consequences for states like Akwa Ibom and Ondo.

Following widespread protests, the federal government instituted a case against the 36 states of the federation, asking the Supreme Court to interpret what constituted the seaward boundary of a littoral state in Nigeria. In April 2002, the court gave a ruling that effectively resuscitated the controversial 1971 Decree! The ruling was that 'the seaward boundary of the country's... littoral terminated at their low-water mark'. This restored the federal government's control over offshore oil and gas resources. Any state that had before the ruling received derivation revenues on oil and gas resources beyond 'their low-water mark' thus faced the risk of refunding the federal government! According to Itse Sagay, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), the ruling not only negated the rules of international law but also constituted a 'blatant' abuse of the resource rights of the littoral states (Africa Action 2002). Not surprisingly, it ignited a new spate of protests in the Niger Delta.

Eventually, to avert a wave of protests and resistance that could damage the country's new democracy, the federal government struck what it called a 'political settlement' with the oil states by enacting an Onshore/Offshore Dichotomy Abrogation Act of 20 February, 2004, which made it possible for the littoral states to receive derivation revenues on petroleum resources lying within a water depth of 200 metres. President Olusegun Obasanjo explained at the time that 200-metre depth made sense since the federal government was in a better position (than any state government in Nigeria) to handle any international disputes that might arise in relation to sea boundaries. There are, however, reservations among some analysts that this was the kind of 'political settlement' needed to stem the tide of petroleum-related land use contestations in the Niger Delta (*Vanguard* 2005).

'Whose Land?' – Encountering Nigeria's Land Use Act

The last piece of legislation to be discussed in some detail vis-à-vis the eminent domain discourse, especially as encountered in the study communities, is the Land Use Act, enacted as a military decree in 1978. Although not often listed among 'oil-related legislation' in Nigeria, the fieldwork brought up issues that indicate that analyses of petroleum-related conflict in Nigeria should take its provisions seriously. Generally, many Nigerians (especially in the south) view this law as having 'radically' redefined the relations between communities and the bio-geophysical environment in Nigeria, which is why it is regarded as a 'controversial' piece of legislation (Uchendu 1979:69, Taiwo 1992:326). The author found that the Petroleum Act and the onshore/offshore petroleum laws

as they operate in contemporary Nigeria draw some strength from the Land Use Act. Indeed, it is in looking at these various laws as a totality that one gains a better insight into the allegations of eminent domain abuse and entitlement deprivation in the oil-producing region.

Petroleum operations in the Niger Delta involve the leasing of land from communities and families. As elaborated to the author at Shell, this process begins when the company receives an 'area advice' from its relevant field team. An 'area advice' is a detailed map showing coordinates (longitudes and latitudes) of the proposed operational area. Once an area is confirmed as a possible site of operations, community liaison officers commence the process of ascertaining the land tenure system in place, verifying ownership and negotiating compensation issues with land owners' councils. In the company's experience, communities and families typically own land in the rural Niger Delta – an assertion corroborated by ethnographic research (Uchendu 1979, Ebeku 2001). A Shell officer who will be called Dandee in this article pointed out that swamp land was almost always communally owned, although 'reclaimed land' could change status from communal to family land. This 'tenure shift', he said, was itself an issue in the tension in the communities, although the researcher found that such tensions could equally result from or be exacerbated by the underlying corporate policies guiding compensation. According to Dandee:

> much of what we acquired in the 1960s as 'community land' is now being claimed by families and many of the disputes we have now are as a result of this kind of tenure shift. In the Niger Delta there is hardly a place you acquire land that you won't encounter trouble... trouble between community and family, and between leaders and the community as a whole.

Subsequent to tenure verification, Dandee continued, was a valuation of the 'surface rights' (to determine the 'market value' of man-made structures, crops, fishing ponds). Compensation would thereafter be paid for these items and the land leased. An idea has already been given in this article about the monetary worth of these transactions. From a royal archive at Oloibiri the researcher found documents indicating that rents were paid for the sites of the early oil wells between 1962 and 1972. A particular family whose land was acquired received one British Pound for the period 1954-1956. Other documents showed that people received only one British Pound between 1962 and 1972.

How does the Land Use Act intersect with these processes?

In Oloibiri and Ebubu, residents pointed out that rent payment to landlords stopped following the enactment of the Land Use Act. Respondents seemed fairly aware that the Act technically made land the property of the Nigerian government. The reader may recall that land expropriation was implicit in the 1969 Petroleum Act, which vests mineral rights in the Nigerian government.

However, it was difficult to confirm at first whether the stoppage of rent payments derived from the Land Use Act or from the Petroleum Act. What could be fairly clearly established from conversations in the community was that local residents themselves did not know what financial implications the Petroleum Act had for their status as 'landlords'. One interviewee in Oloibiri maintained that there was no way of knowing, since the leases were decennial: further discussions on matters of rent would not occur until after ten years. Residents began to be aware of the implications when the leases were up for renewal in the 1970s but were not renewed, and yet petroleum activities continued on the land. Comments from interviewees revealed a strong disdain for the Land Use Act and in some sense confirmed an observation made by Human Rights Watch (HRW1997: 77), that the Land Use Act, Petroleum Act, and onshore/offshore laws made it easy for the Nigerian state to 'confiscate' land from ordinary people and hand over such land to petroleum operators without 'effective due process'.

Such 'collusion', however, does not mean that the Nigerian state and the oil companies are always in agreement about how to 'exploit' ordinary people. In fact, in some cases there could be strong disagreement, as Dandee disclosed concerning the alleged stoppage of rent payment referred to earlier:

> we are at this moment at loggerheads with NAPIMS [National Petroleum Investment Management Services-a subsidiary of NNPC] over the issue of reacquisition of expired leases. They feel there is no need for 'reacquisition of expired leases'. According to them why do you have to 'reacquire' what already is government's property. But we know that it is extremely risky to adopt such legalistic attitude when it comes to dealing with the community. We are the operators, we are right there in the field, we wear the shoes and do know where they pinch.

It was not so obvious whether the Nigerian government's power to stop the company from reacquiring expired leases derived from the Petroleum Act or the Land Use Act, but it seemed quite likely that it derived from both laws and more.

Shedding some light on how the Land Use Act could contribute to the conflicting perspectives illustrated above, and in particular how the law could justify and sustain the stoppage of rent payment, Uchendu (1979:69-70) had argued a year after the enactment of the law that the Act makes the Nigerian land user nothing more than 'a tenant at will on state land', whose 'proprietary interests in his land... are restricted to improvement he made on land'.

Some Conclusions

It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that one of the oil produc-tion-related processes by which, to use Ikein's (1990: 164) phrase, 'poor condi-tions' in Nigeria's oil province are 'exacerbated' is land use. However, to appreciate such impacts, one must go beyond the counting of hectares. This point is particularly important because as a way of downplaying the implica-

tions of oil industry landholding on traditional agricultural practices and occupational systems, transnational oil companies in Nigeria are keen to emphasise the fact that they maintain a policy of minimal landholding in the Niger Delta (SPDC 2001: 11). The focus of analysis must be both on the character of petroleum industry landholding and on the sociological and ethnographic problems occasioned at the grassroots by the laws, policies and practices pertaining to land use.

Clearly, some of the laws that govern petroleum production in Nigeria, especially the ones defining petroleum ownership, control and compensation, as well as land, reflect negatively at the grassroots. From the narratives encountered in the field, it is obvious that the contestations around petroleum-related community entitlement, compensation for land use, and environmental protection are at bottom controversies around the 'justness' of the legal and institutional framework governing petroleum operations. Assuming that the Nigerian state is not abusing its power of eminent domain with particular regard to petroleum operations, the exercise of such power leaves ordinary people in the study communities with the strong impression that it is. A crucial deduction from this is that the legal and institutional framework for petroleum operations in Nigeria (and the actual ways in which such operations occur on a day-to-day basis in the oil-producing communities) does not harmonise with local socio-cultural and ecologic sensibilities, and therefore, might be said to be fundamentally counter-developmental.

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Concerns about Child Subject Research in Botswana: A Call for Establishing Structures and Guidelines that Protect Children

Introduction

Over the years, African societies often have been criticised for the belief and practice that 'children should be seen but not heard', which, among other things, has contributed to little research being conducted on issues affecting children. This trend has changed dramatically in recent years. The number of studies that involve children is increasing at a dramatic rate, and this increase is associated with a set of complex factors.

Since the escalation of child-centred research is not something that has been anticipated in Botswana, there has not been adequate planning for monitoring such endeavours. This is reflected in a number of ways, but the problems associated with the situation in Botswana are amplified by the lack of delineated structures and guidelines for addressing research that involves children. Attempts to address such problems are still at an early stage, if not non-existent. Available guidelines relate to research in general; the current structure assumes a focus on adults and does not specify any special protocol for research that focuses on the child subject. On a related note, many academic research projects conducted by undergraduate and graduate students in Botswana's institutions of higher learning do not operate under research advisory groups of any type. A great deal of work still needs to be done in this area, particularly taking into account that the involvement of children in research sometimes causes more harm than good.

Research with children can focus on a wide range of issues, including environmental, educational, economic, cultural, psycho-social, and moral. Issues that need attention vary according to the type of research. This manuscript focuses primarily on issues that need attention in researching the psycho-social concerns of children, that is, non-medical or non-body-invasive research, as the authors' backgrounds are in counselling and social work.

Background factors associated with child subject research are identified and delineated in this manuscript, and arguments are advanced that favour the articulation of explicit guidelines and detailed protocols for research conducted with anyone under the age of emancipation. A brief history of the ethics of human subject research is offered, followed by a discussion of the reality of contemporary research with children in Botswana. This reality, and hence the discussion describing it, is imbued with a number of tensions – seeming contra-

dictions that are more paradoxical than contradictory, but nonetheless are in need of explication. The actual practices of research are examined against the backdrop of international ethical standards. The manuscript concludes with recommendations for policy making and implementation aimed at protecting the interests of children in Botswana, and perhaps by extension, in other African countries.

Background to the Problem

Upon examining the formal research landscape in Botswana, a number of concerns about research conducted with children emerge and need careful scrutiny. These concerns are associated with several complex factors and are elaborated in this section.

The Voices of Children

First, at a global level, researchers have realised that adults cannot adequately represent the views and experiences of children whom they observe with detachment. Others have asserted that the worlds of adults and children are different (Damon, 1977) and that the age and authority of the adult means that the child can never be a complete participant (Corsaro, 1985; Fine, 1987). As such, an increasing number of stakeholders conscientiously assert the notion that children are social actors in their own right (Wartofsky, 1981; Maundeni, 2000), have the abilities to understand and explain their world, and are not a homogenous group with one homogenous voice or culture. Yet most governments around the world have legally encoded emancipation age limits. Dr Richard E. Behrman, the executive chair of a paediatric committee that prepared a prestigious Institute of Medicine report on research involving children, stated that ... unlike most adults, children usually lack the legal right and the intellectual and emotional maturity to consent to research participation on their own behalf' (quoted in *USA Today*, 2004). Kodish (2004, p. 1) states the following: 'There is a long-standing moral and legal tradition that supports parents as the primary decision-makers for their minor children, including the right to make proxy decisions for children about participation in research'. Who speaks for the child is obviously a multi-faceted tension in research conducted with children.

International Agreements

Second, at a more localised level, Botswana has signed several international and regional treaties that focus on children's rights. These include the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (United Nations, 1989) and the African Charter on the Rights and Responsibilities of Children (ACRRC). The UN's CRC, Article 12, states that children not only have a right to articulate their opinions with regard to issues that affect them, but they also

have a right to have these opinions heard. This convention expresses the message that children's 'voices' should be listened to by adults who make decisions concerning children's lives. Yet huge gaps continue to exist between national policies and the services actually delivered to children (National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, 2000). Research is one mechanism for enabling children to voice their issues and concerns and for potentially bridging this gap. However, although research that involves children gives children an opportunity to voice issues of concern to them, the reality is that most research agendas are determined by researchers rather than by the children themselves.

Socio-economic Issues

Third, Botswana's well-documented economic success, combined with a high incidence of HIV/AIDS, has also contributed to an increase in the number of researchers from outside Botswana who conduct research on children. The country has drawn many development projects and extensive donor funding aimed at fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic; therefore, for a variety of reasons, many foreign researchers are constantly moving into and out of Botswana. There have been so many, in fact, that it ostensibly has taxed the capacity of the nation's research review structure, which recently has decentralised out to the various Ministries.

Psycho-social Issues

Fourth, the numerous psycho-social problems that children experience in contemporary Botswana, as well as in some other African countries, has led to an increase in child subject research projects. These problems include HIV/AIDS, child abuse, parental divorce, orphan-hood and the status of other vulnerable children, incest, rape, war, and forced migration, just to name a few. And because countries throughout southern Africa, including Botswana, have been hard hit by HIV/AIDS, children face a plethora of psycho-social problems as a result of the pandemic. All the above issues are especially sensitive, as many researchers who focus on these child-centred issues tend to use qualitative methods. Although qualitative research can empower the children subjects and can make them active participants in the research process, it also can place children at a disadvantage.

The Need for Explicit Guidelines

Research with children raises a number of legal and ethical issues (Glantz, 1998; 2002). Based upon the above set of concerns and drawing from international policy concerning research with human subjects, the need arises for explicit structures and guidelines for conducting research with children in Botswana. These structures and guidelines need to be grounded in the

principles of child welfare and organised around sensibilities that advocate the best interests of the child.

A Brief History of the Ethic of Human Subject Research

Although laws vary from country to country, the ethical treatment of human subject research has a relatively short international history. This section outlines some of the significant events that have had an impact upon international policies relating to human subject research. A synopsis of important dates is offered.

The Nuremberg Code

The Nuremberg Code was established in 1948 and provides the foundation for protecting the rights of human subjects of research. The Code is an outcome of the criminal proceedings against Nazi doctors who conducted medical experiments on concentration camp prisoners without their consent. These experiments were a part of the Holocaust atrocities committed during the Second World War, and resulted in death or permanently disabling conditions for most of the subjects of these experiments. As a consequence, the Nuremberg Code makes clear that 'the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential', and that the benefits of research must outweigh any potential risks. These precepts remain basic to all ensuing policy concerning human subject research.

The Kefauver-Harris Bill

The Kefauver-Harris Bill was passed in the USA in 1962 to ensure greater safety in prescription drugs. This legislation came into effect as a result of the thousands of babies born throughout Europe and in the US with birth defects caused by thalidomide taken by their mothers. Drug manufacturers, for the first time, were required to prove the efficacy and safety of their products for human consumption to the Federal Drug Administration (FSA).

The Declaration of Helsinki

The World Medical Association met in 1964 in Helsinki, Finland. It was during this meeting that recommendations were established to guide medical doctors in their biomedical research involving human subjects. The resulting Declaration governs international research ethics and puts into effect a platform upon which 'good clinical practices' are promoted. In addition to the precepts of informed consent and benefits outweighing risks, as established by the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration added the following: research conducted with humans should be based upon laboratory and animal experiment results, research protocols should be reviewed by an independent committee before being initiated, and research should only be conducted by scientifically qualified professionals.

The Tuskegee Syphilis Study

It was during the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, which took place in Tuskegee, Alabama (US) between 1932 and 1972 that a series of research abuses occurred. The project was conducted by the US Public Health Service and involved over 600 poor and under-educated African American males. Of these, 400 of the men had syphilis; they were not informed of the condition, and were then denied treatment, even after a cure was available by the 1950s. These abuses were not revealed publicly until 1972, and the experiment was stopped in 1973 by the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, but only under pressure and after the incident had become a political embarrassment. The ensuing impact became one of such public outrage that President Bill Clinton made an apology to the subjects and their families in 1997.

The National Research Act (USA)

The National Research Act was passed by the US Congress in 1974, primarily as an aftermath to the negative publicity from the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. This Act created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The purpose of the Commission was to identify basic ethical principles aimed at protecting human subjects of research. Through this Act, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) were established at the local level; the Act required IRB review and approval of all federally sponsored research involving human subjects.

The Belmont Report

The Belmont Report was drafted by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Commission's report was named for the Smithsonian's Belmont Conference Center, where the Commission met between 1974 and 1978. In 1981, the regulations became encoded by their addition to the Code of Federal Regulations, and these were revised in 1991. Universities and other research institutions in the US must follow these federal regulations and supply written assurances to the Office for Human Research Protections, Department of Health and Human Services.

Research with Children

There has been a recent impetus for conducting research with children. In some cases, the research is well considered and undertaken with a cautious eye toward ethical interactions with the child subject. Unfortunately, in other cases, the interests of the research project are placed ahead of the interests of the children involved. It is easier for this to occur in a developing context than in developed countries, but no less exploitative. Some cultural aspects associated with childhood are potentially different in a developing versus developed

context; this and other mitigating psycho-social and socio-economic issues needing special attention are discussed in this section.

Defining Childhood

It is necessary to define what is meant by childhood so that this important discussion starts on a common ground. It is worth mentioning that in an African context, childhood is not conceptualised in terms of age, but in terms of inter-generational obligations of support and reciprocity (Ncube, 1998). In other words, an African child is always a child in relation to his or her parents, who expect, and are traditionally entitled to, all forms of support in times of need and old age (Rwezaura, 1989).

There is no standard legal definition of a child in Botswana. Various policies, acts and statutes define children differently. For example, the Children's Act defines a child as any person under the age of fourteen; the Adoption Act defines a child as someone below the age of nineteen; the Matrimonial Causes Act defines a child as a person below the age of twenty-one; and the Affiliation Proceedings Act defines a child as someone below the age of sixteen. Moving beyond the statutes of Botswana, the African Charter on the Rights of the Child defines a child as anyone below the age of eighteen. For the purpose of this paper, a child is regarded as any person below the age of eighteen.

Issues that need attention

Since the drastic rise in the number of research projects involving children has not been adequately planned for, there are numerous issues that need to be attended to in order to avoid hurting children as a result of their participation in research. This section focuses on these issues. These include the following: (i) how to avoid exposing children to the stress that results from interviewing the same children about their traumatic experiences more than once; (ii) how to ensure that children's rights are protected in the whole research process; and, (iii) how to ensure that scientifically qualified researchers are also adequately trained and qualified in relevant aspects of child development and related child concerns. The above three issues are politically loaded and emotionally charged. Implicit in them are other issues such as the absence of a body or bodies that monitor(s) child-related research, as well as the absence of guidelines that focus on research involving children in Botswana.

One of the primary questions that needs attention is 'How do researchers avoid involving the same children in research more than once?' There are many answers to this question. These include literature review, talking to people (both formally and informally), and attending presentations. Although these avenues are available, they are not adequately used by all researchers, and not all research projects are deposited in libraries. When applying for a research permit in Botswana, the researcher acknowledges an obligation to deposit a

copy of all reports associated with the request at the relevant national archives. Yet many holders of research permits fail to comply, and many researchers do not bother to obtain the requisite research permit. Incidentally, there is a legally sanctioned penalty in Botswana for conducting research without the proper permit; however the fine is only Pula 300 ($60).

Exposing the same children to multiple research events is an important issue, because duplication of topics and methodologies prevail in Botswana. This is partly so because of a variety of reasons. First, there is a poor dissemination of research findings. For example, not all University of Botswana students' research projects are kept in the library. Departments such as social work and sociology deposit only those dissertations that are 'good' in the library. In addition, not all researchers have access to such projects. Similarly, research projects conducted by students in other institutions of higher learning locally and regionally are not accessible to all potential researchers.

Second, the chances that the same children could be interviewed more than once are exacerbated by circumstances that arise from some researchers' failure to disclose to others information about the research they are doing or have done. This reluctance stems primarily from fears about competition, demonstrating how some researchers put their own interests before the welfare and best interests of the children. The authors have interacted with several social science investigators who were unable to gain access to relevant information about completed research projects as a result of other researchers' refusals to disclose information about their projects.

Third, certain locations in Botswana are becoming over-saturated in relation to child subject research, for instance, Gaborone and the surrounding metropolitan area. This is so because quite often researchers conduct projects under financial and time constraints. As the capital city of the country and as the urban area with the highest-density population, Gaborone is also a place where numerous psycho-social problems exist.

Another thorny question that needs immediate attention is 'How do researchers ensure that children's rights are protected in the whole research process?' This question is crucial when taking into account the following trends.

First, although Botswana has signed several international treaties on children's rights, a majority of children in the country are not aware of their rights. This phenomenon has been highlighted in numerous seminars, workshops, and conferences that the authors have attended. It is also well documented in existing literature (cf. Ministry of Local Government, 2001; Maundeni, forthcoming). It has been associated with, among other things, the scarcity of pressure groups and a weak civil society to lobby for children's rights. Childline is the leading vocal NGO in Botswana that focuses on children's rights. Other NGOs and church-based organisations such as Botshabelo Rape Rehabilitation Centre, BOCAIP, Save Our Souls (SOS) and

Tirisanyo Catholic Commission also lobby and advocate for children's rights, but not to such an extent as Childline. The latter largely concentrates on service provision. Although Childline is doing a good job in relation to advocacy and lobbying on behalf of children's rights, its efforts are limited by the fact that it is based in Gaborone with a centralised service structure. Therefore, many people in the country are unable to access or to benefit from its services. It is also worth mentioning that some women-centred NGOs also pursue advocacy around children's rights in Botswana; however, these NGOs largely focus on women's rights. In addition, their ability to educate children about their rights is hampered by a shortage of resources.

Second, many parents in Botswana do not believe that children have rights. They still believe that children are their property. In recent radio shows where child welfare workers were called to Radio Botswana to educate the public about children's rights, numerous callers repeatedly pointed out that children do not have rights. Some expressed their sentiments in very explicit terms, for example: 'My children are my property'. 'Our government has signed documents without understanding their implications.' 'I brought my children into this world and no one is going to tell me how to raise them or tell me that they have rights.' 'The reason why our children are uncontrollable is that they are told that they have rights.'

Third, the fact that many adults in Botswana resist the idea of children's rights indicates that some parents may deny their children opportunities to participate in research (Maundeni, Forthcoming). How then do researchers ensure that children are not over-protected against their right to participate in research? This is a valid issue because an over-protective stance towards children may reduce their ability to participate in research. The prevention of some children from taking part in research by adults is not peculiar to Botswana; it is documented in the existing professional literature (cf. Thomas and O' Kane, 1998). The critical question is: Should we collude with adults and silence children?

Fourth, there is no rigorous legislative body that coordinates research with children in Botswana. In the past, the Office of the President was responsible for assessing applications of people who intended to conduct research in Botswana. The committee that assessed the applications did not only assess child-centred research, but all types of research. As such, members were not experts on children's issues. The permission process used to take a long time; one of the authors had to wait for over eight months to obtain a research permit for a one-year project. The process recently has been decentralised, with responsibilities assigned to the various Ministries. Since this is a recent move, it remains to be seen how child-related research applications will be handled under the new system.

Fifth, there are no guidelines for researchers doing research with children in Botswana. In the absence of these structures, some researchers may abuse

children's rights. Frequently, children do not realise that they have rights because they are vulnerable due to their social status. In addition, this may arise from the fact that they are sometimes desperate to talk about traumatic experiences because they previously may never have talked about them with anyone. For example, most children who participated in interviews for a study on children's experiences of divorce in Botswana (Maundeni, 2000), revealed that they had never talked about their experiences of parental violence with any adult. The children had the impression that family violence was a secret and should not be discussed with people outside the home. Another type of example is a study conducted in Namibia (Levers, 2002). When the researcher discovered how fragile the children were on her first scheduled day of the investigation, she scrapped her original research plan and shifted to interviewing teachers about the children rather than the children themselves.

The chances that children may be revealing or sharing their experiences of traumatic situations for the first time are increased by the fact that programmes that address the psychological well-being of children in Botswana are very scarce. For instance, there are no counselling services for children attending pre-schools. Some primary schools do not have guidance and counselling teachers, and although most secondary schools have such teachers, to date most of them are not trained sufficiently. The fact that children may be desperate to talk about experiences of traumatic events may lead them to accept whatever the researchers say or does without question. Conversely, children who are not ready to talk about their traumatic experiences may feel forced to do so out of respect for an adult.

In fact, it is highly possible that children's rights may be abused during the research process, because of the extent to which children in Botswana are socialised to respect adults. This socialisation process is referred to in Setswana as *Botho*; and when a Motswana child has conducted himself or herself in a less-than-respectful way, the child is chastised with the phrase 'Ga ona botho' (bad manners), a very serious admonishment. While it is acknowledged that socialisation of children varies among families, there are several key aspects that characterise the socialisation of children in Botswana, as well as in other African countries. One of these features is the emphasis on children's obedience and respect for adults in general, not only their parents (Brown, 1977; Matovu et al., 1998; Maundeni, 2002). As a result some children may participate in research not because they voluntarily want to, but because they believe that their refusal would be seen as a sign of disrespect.

It should be noted, however, that various areas within Botswana (especially urban ones) are undergoing socio-cultural changes, as evidenced by the increase in nuclear families and the weakening of the extended family system, an increase in the number of people living in urban areas, people's adoption of new ideas and values, and increased contact with foreigners and urbanisation, which are all associated with modernisation (Brown, 1977). As the process

continues, some of the cherished values about the socialisation of children may be weakened. Because of the socio-cultural changes that are taking place in different parts of Botswana, the country comprises a mix of modern and traditional communities and ideologies of family relationships and childhood.

Finally, children's rights potentially may be abused by researchers, because many children in rural and remote areas experience the research situation as a new one, so they are unclear about what is expected of them and what they should expect from the researcher. For these reasons, it is the researcher's responsibility to protect children's rights and teach them about their rights. Researchers should not take the rights of children for granted. They should educate children about their rights and responsibilities in the research process. They should, for example, ensure that children give their informed consent to participating in research; not assume that a guardian or caretaker's decision to allow children to participate in research automatically mean that children have agreed to participate. Researchers should inform children that they have the right to withdraw their participation in the research, and also that they do not have to answer all questions and that they do not have to agree to tape recording.

There is of course a need to ensure that scientifically qualified researchers also are adequately trained and qualified in relevant aspects of child development and related child concerns. Researchers who are not sufficiently trained in doing research with children may harm children through the research process. At the University of Botswana, for example, some undergraduate and graduate students conduct research in fulfilment of their degrees. Unfortunately, some are not exposed to adequate training in the area of research with children. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the semesterisation programme has limited the amount of time allocated to courses as well as the time that students spend collecting data. Research with children is a very sensitive area, and as such we should not do 'quick research' with them.

The lack of training on research with children is also evidenced by the fact that by and large the research techniques that are used in such research are somewhat limited and narrow. Most student researchers use face-to-face interviews with children. They rarely use other communication strategies that may meet the needs and preferences of various children. Since there is no one research tool best suited to gaining children's opinions, there is need for researchers to conduct research with children using various strategies. This line of thinking has been emphasised by scholars (Davis, 1998; James, 1995) who have pointed out that child researchers should employ a number of tools, because children are not familiar with the social scientific tradition of face-to-face interview techniques. Others suggest that interviews are best carried out within the context of or alongside everyday activity or by using pictures or photographs as prompts (Curray and Russ, 1985; Backett and Alexander, 1991). Still others argue that paintings and stories, rather than interviews, should be used when doing research with children, because children are

threatened by formal occasions (Cavet, 1996). Additional techniques that enable children to be active participants in the research process include focus groups, role-plays, requesting children to write about hypothetical or real situations, as well as to use toys in telling or ending a story. The need to use various techniques to collect information from children has been clearly outlined by Mauthner (1997), who pointed out that children possess greater or lesser expertise in the verbal setting, the drawing technique, or the writing approach, and that this relates to aspects of their respective cultures.

All of the above suggested strategies can go a long way in improving the quality of information collected from children, enabling children to be active participants in the research process, and helping children to relax during the data collection process. However, the authors' perusal of numerous students' research projects showed that research strategies other than interviews are rarely used in research involving children.

International Ethical Standards

International ethical standards suggest that the very nature of conducting research with children require that protocols maintain the best interests of the child. For example, the Society for Research in Child Development has recommended sixteen principles for research with children:

(i)   The researcher should only use non-harmful procedures.
(ii)   The researcher should fully inform the child about all aspects of the research.
(iii)   The informed consent of parents or guardians of children should be obtained.
(iv)   The additional informed consent should be obtained from any persons whose interaction with the child is a part of the research focus.
(v)   Incentives to participate should be fair and not excessive to what is normal for the child.
(vi)   When deception or withholding information is essential to a study, it is the responsibility of the researcher to satisfy peer reviewers that the deception is necessary.
(vii)   Anonymity of information derived from records must be preserved.
(viii) The mutual responsibilities of all parties – researcher, parent or guardian, and child – should be clearly articulated at the onset of the investigation.
(ix)   The researcher has a responsibility to bring any information that may jeopardise a child and that comes to light as a result of the investigation to the attention of the parent or guardian.
(x)   The researcher should take measures to correct any unforeseen consequences of the study.
(xi)   Confidentiality must be preserved.

(xii)   After data are collected, the researcher has a responsibility to inform participants of findings and to clear up any misconceptions.

(xiii) Reporting results should be done as non-judgmentally as possible.

(xiv)   Researchers should be mindful of the implications of reporting results.

(xv)   Researchers should avoid any intentional scientific misconduct.

(xvi)   Researchers should avoid any intentional personal misconduct.

Challenges, Policy, and Recommendations for a Way Forward

The paper has argued that the drastic rise in the number of research projects involving children in Botswana has not been adequately planned for. Therefore, there are numerous politically loaded and emotionally charged issues that need to be attended to in order to ensure that the best interests of children are protected or to avoid hurting children as a result of their participation in research. Three of such issues that are discussed in this paper are: how to avoid exposing children to the stress that results from interviewing the same children about their traumatic experiences more than once; how to ensure that children's rights are protected in the whole research process; and how to ensure that scientifically qualified researchers also are adequately trained and qualified in relevant aspects of child development and related child concerns. Taking into account the above issues, the following recommendations are made.

First, there is a need for a unit or department that will take charge of children's research issues. Some of the crucial questions that need to be ironed out are: who will be members of the body that handles children's research issues? And where will the body be based – under which ministry? Currently, issues affecting children's welfare are handled by the ministry of local government's social welfare department. However, psycho-social issues of children cut across various sectors and disciplines. Therefore membership of the board that focuses on children's research issues should be multi-disciplinary in nature.

Second, there is a need to train researchers doing research with children on ethical issues and child development as well as child welfare issues. Such training should also include, inter alia, how to avoid hurting children during the research process. It should also emphasise the need for researchers to question both their research methods and the academic and personal assumptions that they carry with them into the field.

Third, there is the need for an increase in outreach workers to help children with psycho-social problems such as orphan-hood, divorce and abuse. This is particularly important taking into account that the process of social change has among other things weakened the extended family as well as its role of meeting children's psycho-social needs. The availability of such professionals can go a long way in reducing situations whereby children talk about traumatic experi-

ences for the first time during the research interviews. The increase in human service professionals who can help children with psycho-social problems should be accompanied by a similar expansion of education and prevention programmes that reach remote areas and villages. Most programmes and services, particularly those run by non-governmental organisations, are found in cities and towns.

Fourth, there is a need to think about whether it is important for undergraduates in various institutions of higher learning to do human subjects research. Do they have adequate training and resources such as the time, knowledge, skills and funds? Our argument is that most do not have adequate resources and as such they end up doing quick research with human subjects. Quick research can harm respondents irrespective of whether they are children or adults. The situation can be more pronounced if respondents are children. The long period that elapses before a researcher is granted permission to do the research also contributes to some researchers conducting 'quick research'.

Lastly, it is important that programmes that focus on children's rights are expanded. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the current situation whereby most children are not aware of their rights can result in abuse.

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Southern Africa: As Seen Through Sexuality, Mobility and Citizenship

Introduction

This paper develops a framework with which to identify and explain sexual citizenship in Southern Africa, paying particular (and historical) attention to the theme of mobility.[1] The paper goes beyond the juridical in investigating a cultural dimension of citizenship that consists of sexual practices. Additionally, by taking the territory that is usually understood as Southern Africa rather than South Africa as a significant framing context for sexual citizenship, the paper attempts to move beyond a narrowly legal or juridical conception of citizenship as necessarily linked to a singular nation-state.[2]

In investigating these two socio-legal dimensions of citizenship, the paper draws on the work of Achille Mbembe regarding the imagined character of the territory of Southern Africa. Writing within the broad school of African post-colonial studies, Mbembe has argued for the significance of attention to both the natural and the historical nature of territories and boundaries in Africa (2000). Drawing on de Certeau, Mbembe defines a territory in distinction to a place: 'In fact, a place is the order according to which elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence. A place, as de Certeau points out, is an instantaneous configuration of positions. It implies a stability. *As for a territory, it is fundamentally an intersection of moving bodies. It is defined essentially by the set of movements that take place within it.* Seen in this way, it is a set of possibilities that historically situated actors constantly resist or realize'. This definition of a territory importantly is both a people-based one and one that posits movements by those people.

To investigate sexual citizenship in Southern Africa, one can begin with theory from the school of citizenship studies. In that school, a relatively well-developed body of work has emerged around the topic of citizenship and nationality laws.[3] Citizenship studies as a school is comparative and increasingly global in both subject matter and research methods.[4] Its focus on nationality laws gives a point of definition and provides a necessary link to the governmental practice of citizenship. Citizenship studies ultimately depends on more historical explorations of citizenship, in particular the work of Margaret Somers, arguing that various concepts of citizenship are historically contingent products of pre-1600s English legal history.[5]

Within citizenship studies, Linda Bosniak's four-part typology of citizenship is particularly useful (2000). Bosniak argues that citizenship may be

understood variously as a legal status, as rights, as political activity, and as a form of identity and solidarity. The concept of sexual citizenship used in this paper is composed of a combination of the legal and the identity elements of Bosniak's typology. Citizenship as a legal status refers to formal or nominal membership in an organised political community. Citizenship as an affective status examines the psychological as opposed to legal, rights-based or political sides of citizenship.[6]

The paper examines developments over the past ten years in Southern Africa in a historical context. This paper does not attempt a thorough historical analysis, but rather attends to some of the contemporary ways in which gender issues interact with understandings of citizenship. Nonetheless, the development of citizenship is closely related to theories of state formation. Some historians have investigated state formation before the period of this study and have explored similar themes. For instance, in her study of registration practices of African customary marriages from 1910 to 1970, Debbie Posel has called for greater attention to gender dimensions in historical understanding of South African state formation (1995, see also Cheater 1998). In proposing sexual citizenship as a significant driver of Southern Africa, this paper identifies a different agent from some of those of other accounts.[7]

In its first part, the paper will present an overview of some recent legal developments in Southern Africa relevant to sex and citizenship. This overview is not intended to be comprehensive but is intended to indicate the significant contemporary currents affecting sexual citizenship in Southern Africa. This overview is not concerned to identify categories of rights that attach to persons of sexual identities but rather to identify doctrinal legal developments with significant effects upon Southern African sexual citizenship. Without arguing that this list is exhaustive, this part argues that there are two significant currents to explore. First, within the past several years, the South African Constitutional Court has decided a significant line of cases around sexual orientation, a line of cases that finds resonance in legislative developments as well. Second, a number of other Southern African court cases have drawn on less innovative administrative law or constitutional law doctrinal points to also push the boundaries of national immigration and citizenship laws.

In its second part, the paper places these legal developments within the current regional understanding of a changing dimension of citizenship that allows for diverse sexual self-understandings if practised within permanent partnerships. Here, the concept of a regional citizenship will be further specified by drawing on an understanding of regions as spaces imagined from within civil society rather than from within state bureaucracies. This part of the paper recognises two assumptions upon which its argument is based: first that mobility drives the development of citizenship and second that Southern Africa is itself an integrated labour market. Finally, the degree to which sexual relationships may underpin this regional citizenship is explored.

The paper concludes that further research into Southern African sexual citizenship should be conducted using this theoretical framework. In particular, it concludes that the exceptional practices of amnesties (migration regularisation or legalisation programmes) and asylum should be investigated. This research should include attention to the use of kin ties in the practice of amnesties as well as ethnographic research into contemporary practices of Southern African movement among gay and lesbians to Johannesburg.

Part One: Legal Developments regarding Southern African Sexual Citizenship

This part surveys two significant legal developments relevant to Southern African sexual citizenship: the equality jurisprudence with respect to sexual orientation and the pro-family line of immigration decisions.[8] There are of course other potentially significant developments – in particular the recent legal history of AIDS and migration is also arguably significant for sexual citizenship in Southern Africa.[9]

Within the past several years, the South African Constitutional Court has decided an impressive line of cases around sexual orientation. Although the Constitutional Court examined other rights and found some of them additionally violated by some of the governmental practices at issue, these cases can be said to have primarily used the sexual orientation ground in the equality clause of the Bill of Rights to strike down provisions in the South African statute books as well as some common law rules.[10] One case struck down the criminalisation of sodomy.[11] Another allowed for adoption of children by homosexual couples.[12] A third case extended permanent resident benefits to persons in permanent same-sex life partnerships.[13] A fourth case extended certain civil service pension benefits to persons in same-sex life partnerships.[14] The final case is the judgment recognising in principle marriage between persons of the same sex.[15] Demonstrating the depth of the constitutional commitment, the post-apartheid South African Parliament has chosen to provide statutory protection against discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in the Equality Act.

Additionally, Parliament included sexual orientation as an explicit ground for asylum in the post-apartheid Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (Pantazis 2002). This refugee protection statute places South Africa in a category on its own.[16] Other countries such as Australia and Canada have allowed asylum claims based on sexual orientation since 1994 and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has since 1995 (Millbank 2002). In 2001, Amnesty International (citing the International Gay and Lesbian Association) reported that eighteen countries had provided asylum to persons on the basis of gay or lesbian status (2001). However, the explicit protection afforded by the defini-

tional provision of the South African statute is greater than the implicit protection given elsewhere.

Nonetheless, the law on the books is not always the law in action. There appear as yet to be few asylum applications decided favourably in South Africa on the basis of sexual orientation as a protected ground. In 1994, a man from Uganda was reported to have been granted asylum on the basis that gays were persecuted in Ghana (ILGA 2003). In 1999, as the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 was nearing implementation, a doctor from Uganda and two other men from Pakistan were reported to be readying their application for asylum status on similar grounds. However, a distinction may be made between the grant of asylum to a gay or lesbian and the grant of asylum on the grounds of persecution by reason of inclusion in the particular social group of gays and lesbians. Based on the experiences of a public interest lawyer in Durban, only three instances of the latter category of asylum were granted in South Africa nearly four years after the coming into effect of the explicitly protective Refugees Act (Magardie 2003).[17]

The driving doctrinal force in these South African cases and legislation is the right to equality. These cases of courses were all decided with respect to a specific protected ground of non-discrimination, sexual orientation. But the force behind them is the more general one of equality. As understood popularly in the post-apartheid context, this vision of equality has been taken to mean support for women's rights and for rights of gays/lesbians. This development may lead to unintended consequences to this development. For instance, Reid and Dirsuweit have reported a recent rise in homophobic violence (2002, see also Human Rights Watch 2003).

Certainly, the Constitutional Court decisions and the series of legislative provisions identified above expand the rights and the power of gays and lesbians in South Africa. But read as containing a vision of sexual citizenship, what is the outline of the vision contained? There appear to be two important elements to this official substantive vision: a personal practice of stability and a social practice of limited diversity. First, the vision of sexual citizenship is of persons involved in stable long-term relationship. This personal practice of stability is not necessarily one characterised by legal ties but it is one of permanence. At the least, it operates within a reference framework of legal marriage in its background.[18] This vision would clearly have some continuity with past state visions of 'reputable Africans' of the pre-Constitutional era (Posel 1995, Bonner 1990). Second, this vision recognises significant diversity of sexual practice. As stated, this vision is self-understanding as neutral as between men and women and heterosexuals and gays/lesbians. While it does at least discuss the role of sexual desire and transient relationships, this constitutional vision is limited and does not embrace a transient or pleasure-seeking version of sexual citizenship (de Vos 2003). This is perhaps especially the case where children

are involved. It may also particular be the case where such sexuality is publicly displayed (Epprecht 2003).

A second significant legal development does not depend on the right to equality. A number of Southern African court cases (including some from South Africa) draw on administrative law or constitutional law doctrine to push the boundaries of national immigration and citizenship laws. Much of this boundary pushing has taken place in the sphere of sexual relations. While some of these cases turn on sexual orientation, others turn on heterosexual relations. For instance, there is a line of married persons' cases in Zimbabwe such as Kohlhaas v Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe.[19] These cases use the status of marriage to develop immigration rights. This development has textual support in a growing number of international instruments that recognise trans-border family rights (Jastram 2003) but does not appear to be driven by international norms. The South African case law and legislation has seen greater attention to administrative law to expand the rights of persons in families. For instance, in the Constitutional Court case of Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,[20] excessive executive discretion as well as the right of married persons to live together in the same place was part of the justification for striking down a Home Affairs prohibition on applications for permanent residence by married persons within the territory of South Africa. There is a legislative as well as a judicial component to this development. The development of trafficking legislation within the SADC region may also fit into this boundary-pushing category, since that legislation aims to protect women and children in particular from transnational exploitation. This line of cases and other legal developments has its own gender and mobility dynamics apart from the South African equality jurisprudence on sexual orientation.

This geographical boundary-pushing line of cases is itself internally contested. For instance, the Zimbabwean line of cases that emphasises the rights of family members as family members has been considered and not followed in South Africa.[21] Likewise, Dodson (2001) has examined the development of South African migration policy (including the early phases of the development of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002) from a gender perspective. She argues that this South African policy in substance continues to discriminate against the concerns of women within Southern Africa, even if by default. The application of neutral rules to persons (such as women) in a position of social disempowerment further disadvantages those persons. Furthermore, Dodson argues that the lack of participatory process in the formation of post-apartheid South African migration policy both reflects and exacerbates this gender discriminatory aspect.

The difference in doctrinal sources of these developments provides food for thought. As noted above and explored further below, these South African and Zimbabwean legal developments (and the others) may be viewed not only from a citizenship perspective that focuses on rights or political activity, but also

from a citizenship perspective that uses collective solidarity or identity. In this perspective, these two apparently separate developments have greater unity and reflect an underlying sexual citizenship of the Southern African region.

In adopting a regional citizenship approach, this paper differs from recent arguments examining similar developments. Charles Ngwena (2002) identifies a category of sexuality rights that has recently come onto the human rights agenda. He views these rights as claims of a variety of social movements but fundamentally as stemming from the diffusion of existing international human rights precepts. Examining the areas of gay and lesbian sexuality, teenage sexuality, and HIV/AIDS, Ngwena concludes that the concept of sexuality rights has yet to take firm root in Southern Africa although it has mustered some support in policy and practice. He argues in favour of further entrenchment of legal sexuality rights. The Human Rights Watch report on homophobia in Southern Africa (2003) applies a method similar to that of Ngwena.

Part Two: Sexual Citizenship, Mobility and Secrecy in Southern Africa

It remains to go one level deeper and to place the significant legal developments identified and elaborated upon in the first part within the current regional understanding of a rapidly changing dimension of citizenship that allows for diverse sexual self-understandings within a frame of permanence. In so doing, sexual citizenship is conceived of as both imaginary and disruptive but nonetheless rooted in an actual social practice, that of access to mobility.

Often regions, such as the SADC region, are conceived of solely in terms of state bureaucracies.[22] An alternative concept of regional citizenship can be specified by drawing on an understanding of regions as spaces imagined from within civil society as well as from within state bureaucracies. Rebecca Karl has observed that it is now 'commonplace' to see regions as 'imagined constructs that they possess historical specificity and are imagined differently by different people at various times' (1998: 1096). Karl's exploration of the construction of the Asian region provides some pointers for the present study of regional sexual citizenship in Southern Africa. Karl is keen to point out that these regional imaginaries are contested and in particular that dominant state-centred narratives may be challenged at specific moments by others. Karl identified a dominant vision of 'Asia' as a region that is anti-imperialist yet state-based, as in Sun Zhongshan's imagination of the region. However, Karl also identified an alternative regional discourse 'rooted in non-state centred practices and in non-national-chauvinist culturalism' (1998: 197). Karl explored the action of a group of 'Chinese intellectuals along with Japanese socialists and exiled Indian, Filipino, and Vietnamese activists', the Asian Solidarity Society organized in 1907, that was engaged in purposeful radical political activity attempting to subvert the emerging state-centred orders. Karl concluded that although this group achieved little of lasting significance, their

importance lies in their demonstration of the ability to contest the imaginary vision of a region against a dominant state-centred discourse.[23]

This exploration of a regional dimension to citizenship also necessarily disrupts the easy identification of citizenship with a nation-state. To do so is consistent with recent trends in comparative constitutional scholarship. For instance, Alex Aleinikoff has recently explored constitutional arguments that loosen what he terms 'the Strict Congruency Thesis'. This thesis holds that a constitution (in Aleinikoff's writing, the US Constitution) protects its nationals and only protects its nationals. In contrast, Aleinikoff explores ways in which the United States Constitution has and should protect a broader group of persons, the inter-generational project of those with enduring attachments and contact with America (2002). It is noteworthy that the South African Bill of Rights is explicit in offering its protection to 'everyone' rather than to 'citizens' in nearly all instances (Klaaren 1996).

Nonetheless, this exploration of sexual citizenship cannot be too imagined or too disruptive. Any identification of a regional citizenship must be rooted in actual social practices to have lasting significance. This part suggests that the historic differential access of women to mobility in the Southern Africa region may have given rise to the specifically Southern African form of citizenship. While this paper is not the place to present a comprehensive view of the historical understandings of Southern Africa, it is important to recognise that the concept of regional citizenship as developed here thus has two assumptions.[24] The first assumption is that control over mobility drives the development of citizenship. Migration regulation is a significant cause in the development and elaboration of citizenship. The second assumption is that since the late 1800s, the Southern African region has been an integrated labour market.

To demonstrate the plausibility of these assumptions, we can explore the social practice of women's differential access to mobility in the region. Theresa Barnes's study of the pass laws in urban colonial Zimbabwe from 1930 to 1980 demonstrates the ways control over mobility drives the development of citizenship, including sexual citizenship (1997). Barnes notes it was only in Southern Africa that state bureaucracies attempted to impose mobility controls on women. State authorities had imposed controls over the mobility of African men with relative (and increasing) success from the late 1880s. Those authorities attempted to extend that control over women as well. However, these attempts were famously resisted (Wells, Barnes). Barnes thus argues that African women enjoyed relative freedom of mobility in Zimbabwe until the late 1970s. Likewise, significant controls over the mobility of African women in South Africa were imposed only from the 1960s.

This history is arguably reflected in the present. A. P. Cheater's exploration of contemporary citizenship practices in Zimbabwe reveals evidence of a single (albeit contested) regional sexual citizenship (1998). In her view, the current construction of nationhood in Zimbabwe is under the domination of the

black male elite. Their vision of citizenship has the character of being exclu-sivist.[25] Nonetheless a significant (and mostly female) segment of the Zimbabwean population is engaged in resisting the ascendant exclusivist vision of citizenship. This segment is composed of the 'hundreds of thousands of individual members of internationalised networks, who, from different parts of the country and speaking different home languages, regularly cross Zimbabwe's borders legally in what is called going out of the country' (1998: 192). Cheater focuses on these regional travellers although she also notes the existence of a significant population of more specifically local cross-border shoppers, also majority women (those who 'jump').[26] Cheater paints a picture of these women using a deeply rooted and pre-existing version of citizenship to contest and resist the citizenship being pushed by the ascendant black male elite. 'The behaviour of the cross-border traders reflects popular views of what Zimbabwean citizens ought to be able to do with their lives, in contrast to the state's narrowing definition of citizenship' (1998: 193). This pre-existent citizenship dates to the 1950s or before and is a cosmopolitan one extending to links with all the states that border on Zimbabwe. These states include Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique as well as South Africa.

The studies of Barnes and Cheater support the assumptions of this theoretical framework. Through the processes that Barnes and others have described, Southern Africa became a region with a history of differential levels of control over mobility according to gender.[27] From a state point of view women were more mobile than men. This differential regulation has created opportunities for exploitation and indirectly influenced the gendered under-standing of regional citizenship in Southern Africa. As Cheater puts it, there may well be a more cosmopolitan sense of regional citizenship that inheres in particular in economically active women. Today's regional sexual citizenship is in part a legacy of the largely failed attempts to control women's mobility. The attempt – through bringing women into some degree of regulated contact with the state bureaucracies – may be as significant as the failure in the gener-ation of this regional sexual citizenship.

Finally, the perspective of secrecy (perhaps particularly in the historical context of apartheid) may be used theoretically to link sexual practices to governmental practices of legalisation. To do this we can look at secrecy both in immigration and in refugee law contexts. One recent exploration of the theme of clandestinity in relation to practices of legalisation is Susan Coutin's work on legalisation of Salvadorans in the United States (2000). Coutin considers the relationship between immigration and law as a series of governmental practices by which the law produces both citizens and illegal immigrants. Referring to the status of illegality as a 'space of nonexistence',[28] Coutin details several practices by which this space is constructed and maintained (2000: 29-34). One practice is 'limiting reality to that which can be documented'. Without documents, one is in a space of non-existence. Another practice is 'the

temporalization of presence'. This links presence to the ticking of a clock, and until the clock has finished ticking, there is no (official) presence. Another practice is the definition of wage labour as a privilege that states can either grant or deny to certain categories of people and another is how kin ties are made 'legally inert for immigration purposes' in this space of non-existence. Coutin also notes that 'many of [undocumented immigrants'] daily practices must be clandestine'. Finally, the space of non-existence is also constructed by practices that limit the mobility of undocumented immigrants.

Among the Salvadorans she interviewed, Coutin does not claim to have identified any sense of transnationalism. But she does claim that there are commonalities of language when speaking of citizenship. Salvadorans, whether transnational, Salvadoran, or legalised American, spoke of birth on the soil of a nation and also of relationships to family members. They used these facts to as stories to express their feelings of citizenship. Coutin does not celebrate this fluidity but recognises that Salvadorans are both able to manipulate existing models of citizenship and to produce alternative modes such as dual citizenship and citizenship located outside of a state structure (2000: 158-161). Without celebrating the resistance element of clandestinity, Coutin shows how that status may be negotiated at times and used at times within the immigration context in ways that both fit with and change the traditional understandings of legal and illegal.

Another exploration of the theme of clandestinity is contained within Audrey Macklin's account of the bureaucratic context of persecution stories told by asylum applicants (1999). In this essay, Macklin's prime concern was with the credibility of stories. In order to present a convincing case to a Canadian refugee tribunal adjudicator, applicants claiming to be fearful of persecution on various grounds needed to negotiate a fine line between a demonstration of genuinely engaging in protected activity and a demonstration of fleeing from persecution. At the same time, the applicant must be presenting a stable identity consistent with the belief or activity underlying the ground of persecution. As Macklin suggested, these negotiations and presentations can be complex. As part of this exploration, Macklin briefly noted how, like other applicants, gay and lesbian applicants face the question of how much to reveal in telling these official stories. The adjudicator would also then be in an official position to question the credibility of the identity as well as that of the broader persecution story.

A theoretical framework can put these two studies together. The gay or lesbian refugee applicant may well be linked by the phenomenon of sex and secrecy to the applicant for legalisation. Just as a gay or lesbian person may need to negotiate their disclosure of identity within a refugee context, in a legalisation context, many migrants often need to decide whether to keep certain things secret from immigration officials, including the existence of family relationships across borders.[29] Both negotiations have important immigration

and family dimensions and consequences. In this sense, both legalisation amnesties and asylum practices for gays and lesbian experience a similar phenomenon of sex and secrecy.

In sum, an examination of the stories of birth, family relationships, and sexual identity may reveal much about the character of sexual citizenship in Southern Africa imagined as a place of common membership. On the one hand, such stories may constitute a mere common language for discussing issues of citizenship. On the other hand, such stories may reveal an understanding of sexual citizenship in Southern Africa that crosses the existing juridical borders. Within this examination, the zone of secrecy often negotiated with respect to sexual practices and family relationships may be usefully compared to the zone of secrecy inherent in the legalisation context.[30]

Conclusion

A specific line of empirical research into Southern African sexual citizenship with two particular threads is suggested by the terms of the theoretical framework elaborated here. The exceptional practices of asylum and amnesties in contemporary South Africa should be investigated. This research should include both further investigation into the gender nature of recent state practices of legalisation[31] as well as ethnographic research into contemporary practices of Southern African movement among gay and lesbians. Research into these exceptional practices of amnesties and asylum could also provide a useful exploration of the substance and trajectories of contemporary Southern African citizenship beyond the element of sexual citizenship singled out here. In particular, the character of Johannesburg as a gateway city into a broader global world may be specified.

Finally, there are independent arguments for investigation of these exceptional sites. First, within the policy-oriented sectors of migration and citizenship scholarship, it is the regular exception that becomes the rule. For instance, the 'exceptional' practices of amnesties often take shape as a normalised migration policy tool. Amnesties were a regular and significant policy mechanism used by the apartheid state and such a use of amnesties may well characterize contemporary South Africa.[32] Likewise, asylum can be put into such a policy understanding, both globally and within Southern Africa. One understanding of the function of asylum law, crudely put, sees it as a safety valve for the operation of immigration policies. Here, following James Hathaway rather than Micheal Walzer, asylum is important as policy rather than as a direct expression of political values of particular national societies – for example of giving membership and community to those (refugees) who are by definition those without such goods.

The second argument for examination of the exceptional sites derives more directly from post-colonial studies than from the citizenship studies argument

advanced above. Here, it is the extreme exception that proves the rule. For instance, Lars Buur has recently examined the informal justice practices in townships which incorporate physical violence in opposition to the supposed values of tolerance and the rule of law of the post-apartheid constitutional order. He argues that by the very virtue of their exclusion they are included and constitute part of the new legal order (Buur 2003). Buur, Mbembe, and others have recently explored and drawn on the work of Giorgio Agamben to examine the exceptions in order to see the rules (Agamben 1998, Mbembe et al. 2003).

Notes

1. Versions of this paper have been delivered at the Pittsburgh USA annual meeting of the Law and Society Association (June 2003), at the Sex and Secrecy Conference organized by WISER in Johannesburg and held at the University of the Witwatersrand in June 2003, and at the Law in a Transforming Society conference held at the University of South Africa in January 2006. Thanks are due to all comments and criticisms as well as to research funding from the University of the Witwatersrand.

2. This paper primarily treats developments in South Africa and Zimbabwe, both countries of the political SADC grouping. However, the Southern African region or even 'South Africa' may be described as extending as far as from Cape Town to Katanga (Mbembe 2000).

3. This school of citizenship studies itself derives in part from a re-examination of immigration in America. See Yans-McLaughlin (1990) (discerning a network-exchange theory replacing assimilation and human capital theory as the dominant paradigm in immigration scholarship). Aleinikoff prefers the term 'sovereignty studies' (2002: 4).

4. See Bosniak 2000, 2002; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001 (studying the citizenship laws of 25 countries).

5. See M Somers, 'Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 58, 587-620, 1993, (citizenship practices emerge from the articulation of national organizations and universal rules with the particularisms and varying political cultures of local environments (types of civil society)); M Somers, 'Rights, Relationality, and Membership: Rethinking the Making and Meaning of Citizenship', *Law and Social Inquiry*, vol. 19, 63-112 (1994) (modern citizenship rights are not the outcome of the emergence of markets but rather a continent outcome of medieval English legal revolutions). Somers' themes – the articulation of the national with the local and the dissociation of citizenship from the triumph of capitalism – link to the post-colonial school of Mbembe and others. See for example, B von Lieres, 'New Perspectives on Citizenship in Africa', in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 25, 1999, 139-148 (arguing that 'contemporary African politics... rather than hegemony and resistance... is about adaptation, accommodation, and collaboration'). For a recent special issue on contemporary developments, see 'Sexual Movements and Gendered Boundaries:

Legal Negotiations of the Global and the Local', 14 *Social & Legal Studies*, vol. 14, No. 1, 2005.

6. Bosniak points out that most explorations of the affective side of citizenship have assumed national 'community' such as explorations of patriotism. She argues that the 'community' engendered by trans-migrants within social formations across borders may also serve as an affective link between personal and collective identity (2000: 486-487).

7. For instance, D. Miller 'South African multinational corporations, NEPAD and competing regional claims on Post-Apartheid Southern Africa', *African Sociological Review*, vol. 8, 176-202, 2004, (identifying multinational corporations as drivers of regional integration).

8. Other legal developments do not seem so significant. In one example, the Hague Conventions are a series of standard international agreements covering issues both of legal process (for example, evidence, service etc.) and sexual citizenship (adoption, child abduction etc.). Neither type of Hague Conventions are signed or ratified to any great extent among the member states of the Southern African Development Community as of the end of 2002 (The Hague Conventions, 2002). However, these conventions and linked developments may have significance in other regions (Jastram 2003).

9. This topic is broader than what can be covered in this article. At present, Malawi and Zimbabwe regard homosexuality as a ground for prohibited immigrant status (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2003).

10. The statutory provisions were contained in laws enacted before the constitutional transition of 1994. For a survey of the historical development of such laws see the appendix of HRW 2003.

11. See for example, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), De Vos 2000. This South African case can be compared with the result of the S v Banana 2000 (3) SA 885 (Zimbabwe), (deciding that the Zimbabwe Constitution did not decriminalise sodomy), Ngwena 2002: 8-10.

12. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development CCT, 40/01, (10 September 2002).

13. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). Compare the opposite result in the Namibian case of Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v Frank and Khaxas (Case No. SA 8/99), Ngwena 2002: 9.

14. Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa CCT, 45/01, (25 July 2002).

15. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another CCT 60/04, (1 December 2005). One interesting thing regarding this recent case is its remedy, which effectively gives Parliament a year to consider and enact either a same-sex marriage law or another version, along the lines of civil union statutes.

16. This was done through the definition of the term 'social group'. Section 3 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 states, in part, that a person qualifies for refugee status if that person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his particular

social group. Section 1(xxi) states that 'social group' includes, among others, a group of persons of particular gender, sexual orientation, disability, class or caste.

17. Communication to author from Sheldon Magardie.

18. Based on the cases to date, some have argued that same-sex marriage should be constitutional in South Africa (Byrn 2002).

19. 1998 (3) SA 1142 (ZS).

20. 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC).

21. See the lower court decision in 'Dawood'.

22. The Southern African Development Community is an organisation of fourteen states (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). It has passed two Declarations on gender issues: the 1997 SADC Gender and Development Declaration and the 1998 Addendum to the Declaration on Violence Against Women. See Banda 2002, Ngwena 2002.

23. The conception of competing visions of citizenships can of course be more broadly applied. For a view of the American military and higher education institutions as locked in such a conflict over gay and lesbian citizenship see Kapczynski 2002.

24. One can note the early 1900s practice of naming the entire region not as Southern Africa but – in a term that should be distinguished from the term Union of South Africa – 'South Africa'. See for instance Martin Chanock's aptly named *Unconsummated Union* (1977)

25. Indeed, Zimbabwe has over the past twenty years moved further and further towards an increasingly intolerant view towards dual nationality (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2003). As Cheater notes, an intolerant view towards dual nationality will impact particularly harshly on women who are married exogamously in a patrilineal society.

26. Cheater describes a conversation with one of these women who opened the conversation as follows: 'Good morning madam. We are the ladies who travel to Botswana. Is there anything you would like to order? Shoes? Clothes? Microwave? Steam iron? Computer? Video? Discs? Fax?' (1998: 202).

27. Women were of course subject to other restraints (including legal restraints) on their mobility, such as their status of legal minority. What is of significance is how their differential access to physical mobility structured their mobility in other senses.

28. Coutin thus links the character of fleeing persecution usually seen as part of refugee law with the character of an undocumented status, usually seen as part of immigration law (2000: 27-47). Nonetheless, she concludes that physical presence and social participation have proved more powerful than the need to escape physical destruction in the legalisation of the Salvadorans (2000: 42).

29. This may be relevant both for revealing kin ties across borders as well as the existence of more than one family.

30. The project proposed here is of course related to but distinct from a doctrinal history of the conflicts of law 'in the Southern African region, a worthy topic of study in its own right. The field is of course dominated by the scholarship of C. Forsyth at present: C. Forsyth, *Private International Law* (4th ed.). However, other scholars are also working with different voices. See E Schoeman, 'Choice of Law and Legitimacy: Back to 1917?' (1999) 116 *SALJ* 288-298. For comparative purposes, see C. Forsyth, 'The Domicile of the Illegal Resident' (2005), *Journal of Private International Law*, vol. 1.

31. Crush and Williams have analysed the recent South African set of three post-apartheid amnesties but did not investigate the concept of sexual citizenship (1999).

32. More broadly, one could claim that the discriminatory practice of illegality was a structure of the apartheid state (Klaaren and Ramji 2001).

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RESEARCH REPORT

Small-scale Irrigation Development for Sustainable Rural Development: A Case Study of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme

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Introduction

It is especially in the rural areas of South Africa that people live in a vicious cycle of poverty that perpetuates underdevelopment. The country's President, Thabo Mbeki, has observed in this connection that 'the rural areas of our country represent the worst concentrations of poverty. No progress can be made towards a life of human dignity for our people as a whole unless we ensure the development of these areas' (Pycroft, 2002: 15). Clearly, there is a need to fast track the development of the rural areas. The government faces a massive backlog in promoting and stimulating sustainable rural livelihoods created first by apartheid and second by the lack of a clear rural development policy.[1] This is further compounded by the conspicuous absence of a rural voice.

With approximately sixty percent of the total population of the Eastern Cape Province living in the rural areas of the former Transkei and Ciskei, improving agricultural productivity, especially small-scale farming, is a crucial but not a sufficient condition for the eradication of poverty. There is however widespread scepticism regarding the potential of small-scale farming to generate sustainable rural livelihoods. Currently, the small-scale farming sector continues to battle with the seemingly insurmountable task of moving from its subsistence status to market-oriented production. It is well-known that the agricultural sector in the former 'homelands' performed dismally compared with the white commercial agricultural sector. Whether agricultural productivity can be improved remains controversial.

This study was conducted against the background of current attempts to rehabilitate and revive the defunct Tyhefu irrigation scheme, based on irrigation management transfer policy (IMT).[2] The Tyhefu irrigation scheme was one of several irrigation schemes established in the former Ciskei, (now Eastern Cape) between 1976 and 1985. The main question this paper seeks to examine is the extent to which a rehabilitated and revived Tyhefu irrigation

scheme can generate sustainable rural livelihoods. Based on research over two years, (2000-2001), the main constraints and challenges facing the farmers were examined.

The findings of this study suggest that irrigation management transfer is a complex and delicate process. In this new set of arrangements, beneficiaries face formidable challenges in terms of capacity (human and financial) if small-scale irrigation farming is to become a viable sector. No doubt, the viability and sustainability of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme demands a comprehensive package of interventions that address various issues of markets and marketing, capital investment and access to finance, technology, education and training, support and extension services. This raises concern about the possibility for independent agricultural production as well as sustainable rural livelihoods.

Agriculture under Apartheid

A major feature of the agricultural sector in South Africa has been its dual structure. This dualism, with significant differences in costs, infrastructure and level of production, is well documented (Vink and Kirsten, 2000; Lipton, 1977; Niewoudt and Groenewald, 2003; Schrire, 1992; World Bank, 1994). The dual structure is starkly reflected in the fact that approximately 60,000 commercial farmers occupy almost eighty-seven percent of the total agricultural land and produce more than ninety-five percent of marketed output, whereas small-scale farmers[3] in the former homelands occupy thirteen percent of agricultural land and contribute only five percent to output (Niewoudt and Groenewald, 2003:3). The consequences of discriminatory rural development policies and the legislative construction of a dualistic agricultural system in South Africa have been to concentrate poverty within the rural areas, particularly the former homelands (Pycroft, 2003:106).

Historically, agricultural development has been viewed in terms of the efficient, capital intensive, largely white-owned, technologically advanced, large-scale commercial sector. Consequently, the government prioritised this kind of agriculture as a key sector that would stimulate economic development. Conversely, small-scale agriculture has been characterised as a traditional, backward, unproductive and inefficient subsistence sector and generally associated with the homelands. Kassier and Groenewald (1992:347) describe the commercial farming sector as reminiscent of the farming sectors in the developed world, producing surpluses and using considerable amounts of purchased inputs. In contrast, the subsistence sector has many of the characteristics of subsistence farming as experienced elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

Extension and support services have always emphasised the dichotomy between commercial and subsistence agriculture. As a result, major service institutions were biased in favour of white commercial agriculture. This bias

was made possible by a long history of direct state intervention in South African agriculture. Effectively, it meant the systematic dispossession of the crucial means of production that would offer some hope for the emergence of a black propertied class (Kimemia, 2000:33). The consequence has been the creation of several distortions, which not only ensured a highly skewed distribution of land ownership but also a differential access to resources. Where support services existed for the small-scale farmers the quality has always been inferior. The cumulative effect of these measures is a small-scale farming sector that has been restricted to low input levels. Consequently, small-scale farming has been unable to meet the needs of the rural population, who became net food importers from the white agricultural sector (World Bank, 1994:22). Vaughan (1992:421) argues that 'the historical undermining of smallholder production, which so substantially reduced the significance of the peasantry as a social and economic category, contributed to the widespread assumption that a smallholder class no longer exists as a significant locus of production in South Africa agriculture'.

Small-scale farming has a long history in South Africa and has been promoted in various guises since the Tomlinson Commission's report in 1955. The Tomlinson Commission promoted the concept of small-scale farming as a means of alleviating poverty and promoting economic development. The Commission believed that small-scale farming in 'traditional black areas' had the potential to produce a surplus of agricultural commodities (1955:117). The concept of 'economic unit' farm size was central. Tomlinson envisioned the emergence of a middle class farmer group with the capacity to produce a liveable income through full-time farming. The viability of this strategy required the provision of supporting infrastructure in terms of farm inputs, transport and agricultural extension, in addition to the planning of the farm areas into economic units. The government rejected these recommendations, with the result that viable small-scale farming never became a reality.

Generally, the results of small-farmer development programmes have been disappointing. Van Rooyen and Nene (1996:329) sum up small-scale farmer development as follows: 'experience with small farmer strategies highlights several problems, of which insufficient participation, lack of ownership, ad hoc participant selection, lack of property rights to farm land and deficient support services play a significant role in failing to establish a small farmer category in the country'. The shortcomings in the promotion of small-scale farming suggest that 'the concept was never introduced under fully supportive conditions' similar to existing for large-scale farming (van Rooyen and Nene, 1996: 327).

The current climate is hostile to the development of small-scale farmers, despite various legislative and policy changes since 1994. The prospects for revitalising agriculture in the former homelands and establishing a new class of emerging farmers are bleak. The dual nature of agriculture remains very much

intact. Even if widespread agrarian reform were to be achieved, the impact of such reforms would be limited by the lack of access to critical inputs such as credit, training, and extension services. Until such time as a supportive environment is provided, the potential of small-scale farming cannot properly be judged.

Irrigation Development in the Homelands

A review of the literature on irrigation development on the African continent provided useful insights for this study. The lessons from irrigation development in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that the continent is littered with examples of derelict and costly failures. The broader African experience is not unique, but shares many similarities with the South African situation. For example, many irrigation projects have suffered from a combination of technical, institutional and organisational constraints. Generally, irrigation scheme management and consultants were primarily oriented to dealing with the technical or agronomic, and not the human, challenges associated with irrigation development. Farmers in all cases were situated at the bottom of the production chain. Farmers worked in a tightly controlled environment which emphasised compliance with all the irrigation management directives. In an environment in which the centralisation of all functions was so salient, farmers were restricted in the extent to which they could affect and influence irrigation scheme management. Clearly, farmers worked in an organisational context not suited to their needs. The reductionist approach adopted by the planners meant that sound working relationships between the farmers and irrigation scheme management could not be realised. Almost without exception the case studies reviewed indicate that the industrious type of farmer was never developed as was envisioned in the planning documents. Nor were rural livelihoods improved in a sustainable manner. It is not surprising, therefore, that the top-down or centrally planned approach in the implementation of many irrigation schemes proved unsustainable.

Irrigation development (including betterment planning and farmer support programmes) is one of at least three approaches to agricultural development in the homelands. Generally, none of these approaches brought any lasting benefit to the local population. Instead the reserves continued to slide into ever-increasing poverty and widespread environmental degradation. The irrigation schemes were seen as government's response to low agricultural productivity and 'the absence of commercial agriculture in the homelands to what was attributed to the perceived lack of entrepreneurial and managerial ability among black farmers'. Such schemes seemingly offered 'a deceptively simple solution to the problem' (Brand et al, 1992: 356; Cloete, 1987: 546-547). This notion, combined with the philosophy of optimal resource use, was taken to dictate that outside management should be introduced to develop

agriculture (Brand et al, 1992:356). Consequently, large-scale centrally managed estate or project farming in both irrigated or dryland production became the main focus in the former homelands.

Irrigation and Agricultural Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa

The poor track record of many irrigation schemes, despite huge investments, in the former homelands prompted the government to reconsider its active and direct role in small-scale irrigation farming. This resulted in the closure of many irrigation schemes including the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. Prior to 1994, government in the former homelands was responsible for the operation, maintenance and finance of irrigation schemes. In addition to rampant corruption, irrigation scheme managers found that their entire budgets were consumed in running and maintaining the economically non-viable irrigation schemes.

The new policy framework, known as the irrigation management transfer (IMT), is premised on the transfer of ownership, authority and responsibility with regard to small-scale irrigation schemes from government to the farmers. In other words, the intention was that the irrigation schemes were to be totally owned, managed and maintained by participant farmers, in the form of Water User Associations (WUAs).[4] The primary purpose of WUAs is to provide for the effective representation of small-scale irrigation farmers on the irrigation schemes at a local level as well as managing water on behalf of their members. Furthermore, IMT requires that costs be recovered from the beneficiaries of the schemes.

The process was envisioned as fully participatory. As such, irrigation management transfer required the maximum involvement of all stakeholders in every aspect of project development. The key role players are the farmers, their committees, extension officers, consultants, relevant government departments, local government, and non-governmental organisations. This approach differs radically from the way in which the irrigation schemes were planned and operated in the past.

The introduction of IMT is no small undertaking for the beneficiaries considering the top-down nature of development in South Africa during apartheid. The latter resulted in many communities lacking the necessary skills and resources with which to meet the new demands. Access to markets as well as the generally poor infrastructure in rural areas, add to some of the critical challenges facing the small-scale irrigators. These challenges hinge on the question of the viability and sustainability of the irrigation schemes.

IMT is justified on several grounds. First, there is the issue of disparities in the degree of support provided to state and private irrigation schemes. Second, the government found the financial burden of maintaining and operating unproductive irrigation schemes, through the provision of annual subsidies, impos-

sible to justify and sustain. Consequently, following budgetary re-prioritisation after 1994, financial support for the management, operation and maintenance of many irrigation schemes in the former homelands was withdrawn, resulting in the collapse of many of them. Last and most important, external pressures on the government have dictated the path which the government should take with regard to service delivery. Specifically, the South African government's macro-economic strategy, GEAR, in line with the World Trade Organisation rules, calls for deregulation and reduction of support (in terms of providing subsidies) for the agricultural sector. Internationally, there is a pervasive policy consensus in favour of reducing state control and management of irrigation schemes based on the argument that state managed enterprises are costly, over-subsidised, inefficient, and tend to deepen state financial crises. Transferring state responsibility to farmers, according to proponents, relieves the state of financially burdensome obligations, while at the same time enhancing farmer involvement. As such, irrigated agriculture is deemed to be a lower order user of scarce resources and therefore must be seen to be moving towards self-sustainability (Maritz, n.d.: 3).

To facilitate the process, the government has undertaken to upgrade the infrastructure of existing irrigation schemes at public expense as a once-off subsidy before the transfer of ownership to the farmers, or to their institutional entity. There is no intention to develop new irrigation schemes. Also, the requirement is that each irrigation scheme be examined individually to determine its financial and economic viability. This requirement is based on the fact that commercial banks and other lending institutions will only finance profitable projects.

Irrigation management transfer in South Africa is still in its infancy. As such it is not possible to give a comprehensive evaluation of the process. As a growing area of research, there is still a paucity of data on many aspects of IMT. While there is a growing body of literature on operational and financial performance, 'less evidence is available on effects of management transfer on maintenance and economic performance of irrigated agriculture' (Vermillion, 1997: v). At the same time comparative country studies are few, while comparisons between IMT and non-IMT cases are rare. Considering that governments initiated IMT to reduce the costs of operation and maintenance, it is surprising that a limited number of studies have been done on the impact of IMT on government. Equally, the absence of a standardised analytical paradigm to date makes it difficult to arrive at general conclusions or policy implications.

Even though research studies internationally present a mixed picture, overall, the results of the impact of IMT are generally positive. The focus of many studies is on short-term and immediate results. A general concern is whether these gains can be sustained over the long-term. Reported positive results include reduction of costs for both farmers and government; enhanced financial self-reliance; expansion of service areas; reduction in the amount of

water delivered per hectare; and increases in cropping intensity and yields (Vermillion, 1997:29). For example, a study of IMT at the Dawheya Irrigation scheme in Ghana (Sam-Amoah and Gowing, 2001) has shown relatively high yields sustained despite the fact that both cropping intensity and cultivated area decreased. A decrease in production and running costs and an increase in average net income and high financial self-sufficiency ratios have been reported. This has led to the conclusion that IMT has resulted in better performance. On the negative side studies have focussed on increased costs for farmers, poor financial viability and deterioration of irrigation infrastructure.

The Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme

Project History

The Tyhefu irrigation scheme can be found on the eastern bank of the lower Fish River approximately 30 km west of Peddie in the Eastern Cape. It consists of five settlements – Ndlambe (160 hectares, Pikoli (120 hectares), Ndwayana (55 hectares), Kalikeni (151 hectares), and Glenmore (93 hectares) along a stretch of approximately 25 km of the river. Of these five settlements Ndlambe is the focus of the study. Approximately 1000 hectares of potentially irrigable land is undeveloped. This area will be extended once the scheme becomes functional. At the time of the closure of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme the total irrigated area was 694 hectares.

The Tyhefu area has historically been described as 'one of the most eroded and impoverished areas of the Ciskei. Some of the drier parts are virtually beyond rehabilitation. The area is densely populated and is so drought-prone that the people are unable to subsist from the land: a truly depressed area' (Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry Annual Report, 1984/85) Furthermore, Loxton, Venn and Associates[5] (1977) identified problems of advanced erosion, veld degradation and limited agricultural potential. They found the area moderately suited to extensive and semi-intensive livestock production rather than cultivation. Where farming was taking place, the land was not utilised to its optimal capacity. Despite the fact that in some areas of the Eastern Cape there is overcrowding, much of the land remains unutilised. Agricultural productivity in the Tyhefu area is further limited by the agro-ecology of the region. This includes poor soils, low and irregular rainfall, water quality problem, high evaporation rates, seasonal extremes of temperature and a poor resource base. Other constraints to successful farming for the majority of the rural population include limited access to credit and finance, poor (or non-existent) support and extension services, and poor infrastructure.

Preliminary investigations into the feasibility of irrigation development in the Tyhefu area date back to the 1930s. The abandonment of the idea at the time was attributed to water quality problems. Only in 1977 was implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme undertaken as a pilot project. The scheme was a

state-driven, top-down initiative. This study argues that the justifications for the Tyhefu irrigation scheme were conflated, with the result that the ambition to sustain political control of the Tyhefu area far outweighed considerations regarding the financial viability and sustainability of the proposed project. Given the repressive political climate of the time in South Africa, the planners' proposals were a mechanism for the realisation of the socio-political and economic agendas of the apartheid state and of the Ciskei government. The planning and implementation of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme were thus affected by broader Ciskeian political interests. Various competing and conflicting interests sought a stake in the proposed irrigation development, thereby dividing and alienating the rural population. On the one hand, there was the need on the part of the apartheid authorities and the subordinate Ciskei government to assert authority in the Tyhefu area through the installation of chiefly authority. At the village level, a complex web of relationships and interactions existed: the role of the village elite, the Tribal Authority, the Tyhefu irrigation scheme management and the farmers.

Given the above, strict centralised managerial control and decision-making over the activities of the farmers, capital intensive and sophisticated agricultural techniques, and the production of high value crops, were the main requirements for success at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. This approach did not allow for farmer participation in the initial planning process, design and implementation phases. Farmer participation would have run counter to the principles of exclusion and the narrowing of political space on which the South African state was firmly grounded. According to Van Averbeke et al. (1998: 4-5) during the late 1980s the growing awareness among the irrigation scheme workers of their rights, and the demand for higher wages, led to a general decline of most of the irrigation schemes in the Eastern Cape as well as the erosion of the authority of irrigation scheme management.

Management style was autocratic and top-down. The effect of this approach was the non-accountability of management, feelings of incompetence among the farmers, and inadequate training and development of local institutions (Bembridge, 2000). According to Backenberg et al. (1996: 61) on most schemes the relationship between farmers and project management was that of customer and supplier. Farmers had no sense of ownership. This was not conducive for effective interaction and cooperation with irrigation scheme management. Thus, the farmers were limited in the degree to which they could affect and influence management. As a commercial enterprise, the Tyhefu irrigation scheme managers interpreted their role as one of ensuring efficient production through the provision of various inputs and marketing of the crop.

The economic viability of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme was in doubt from the start. As a result, it was running at a large operational loss (circa R1 million) prior to management withdrawal in 1995 (Bembridge, 2000: 37). Whilst the Tyhefu scheme was able to maintain sustained production through the annual

subsidies received from the state, it was a financial failure. The study by Hill (1984) on the 'Economic Viability Studies on Three Irrigation Schemes in Ciskei' provided a detailed analysis of the economic performance of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. Hill (1984: 2) concluded that all the existing schemes were sunken costs. He made several observations regarding the Tyhefu scheme. He (Hill, 1984:1) noted that already by 1984 the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme had not produced a positive cash flow, even in the operational sense. The poor economic performance of the scheme can be attributed to a number of factors: corruption, lack of participation by farmers, poor management, centralised control and decision making, water quality, labour intensity, the use of electricity as a source of power, and fixed market prices for crops.

Besides the perceived short-term benefits of improved food security and access to employment, all respondents are unanimous that the scheme's impact on the village and region as a whole has been limited. The respondents point to the lack of development of the area. Available evidence on many irrigation schemes suggests that 'the distribution of benefits was limited in relation to total need and to aggregate resources available for development. Although higher levels of resource use, production and wage employment were achieved through modern farming enterprises... little was done to promote a class of self-employed farmers or to improve farming conditions for small holders outside these schemes... The projects... often incurred losses, and rarely involved spill-overs or linkages with the surrounding communities' (Vink and Kirsten, 2000: 20). Bromberger and Antonie (1993: 23) referred to the irrigation schemes as 'islands of prosperity amidst an ocean of poverty'. At the same time many of the farmers incurred a heavy debt burden.

At the time of the closure of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme, none of the management functions had been transferred to the farmers. This proved counter-productive since the ultimate aim of reviving the irrigation schemes is the transfer of all responsibilities to the farmers. With no managerial and other skills critical for the viability and sustainability of the irrigation schemes, capacity-building is essential. At present the Tyhefu scheme is technically insolvent or defunct. The land has been lying fallow since 1997.

Attempts at Reviving and Rehabilitating the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme

In 1998 the community of Ndlambe wrote a letter to the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry requesting the urgent revival of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The Minister's (1998) response is contained in the following statement: 'It is clear from the information supplied to me... that a number of issues regarding irrigation need to be addressed, apart from the question of adequate water supply. These include the restoration of effective management, the development of the further irrigation potential originally planned... I have accordingly requested that the whole question of development, adequate water

supply, water tariffs, sustainability and management of irrigation be investigated...' Basically, this statement sums up the major challenges facing the farmers of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme.

The Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs (DALA) and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) have subsequently taken the decision jointly to rehabilitate and transfer the irrigation schemes to the farmers, the beneficiaries. The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry appointed a Task Team in 1997 to advise DWAF and DALA on all water-related aspects of the schemes. With regard to the Tyhefu scheme this step involved the proposed extension of the water pipeline. In addition the Task Team was to make recommendations about which government departments or structures were to be responsible for what functions. The report, entitled 'Report on Investigations into ways of Rehabilitating the Water Supply Aspects of Certain Irrigation Schemes in the Former Transkei and Ciskei', was presented in August 1997. DWAF was assigned the task of taking over all the bulk water supply management responsibilities, the rehabilitation of bulk water infrastructure where necessary, and the creation and capacity-building of Water User Associations (WUA). The responsibilities of the Provincial Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs (PDALA) related to on-farm activities. In the Report it was indicated that rehabilitation of TIS would be implemented in three phases at an estimated cost of R75 million. It was envisaged that the process would start in September 1997 and be completed in March 1999. Since then the proposed schedule and costs have had to be revised. The main obstacle has been cited as the availability of funds.

The Departments of Water Affairs and Forestry and Agriculture and Land Affairs commissioned LawGibb (technical consultants) in June 1999 to conduct feasibility studies. The main objective was to determine whether the construction of a bulk pipeline from the Lower Fish River Government Water Scheme, with all associated works, to supply irrigation water to the rest of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme would be viable (LawGibb, 1999). Furthermore, the Minister of DWAF requested that the restoration of the pump systems be looked at as a matter of priority, so that farmers could resume farming. Subsequently, in August 1999, Argus Gibb undertook visual inspections to assess the condition of the entire infrastructure. They found that since the closure of the irrigation scheme in September 1997, the infrastructure had deteriorated considerably. This deterioration included pump installations which required major refurbishment due to a combination of theft, vandalism and poor maintenance. Physical rehabilitation for Phase One started in 2002, with the whole operation expected to be completed in 2004.

A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was formed at the beginning of the rehabilitation process. The PSC was intended to be a temporary structure which would be disbanded once the Tyhefu irrigation scheme became operational. Its main task was to oversee the whole rehabilitation process as well as work

hand-in-hand with all the stakeholders. The Water Users' Association (WUA)[6] was established in terms of the Water Act No. 36 of 1998.

The main critical issues not yet resolved relate to the crops that will be planted, issues of marketing, user charges, and access to finance. Several crops have been suggested including sugar beet, jojoba beans, citrus, wheat and various vegetables. At the moment, all the stakeholders are reviewing a proposal from a Johannesburg-based Israeli company interested in contract farming for high value crops.

There are many details and agreements to be entered into by the community. In many ways these activities seem to be beyond the comprehension and scope of the community and their elected representatives. The institutional structures need to be fully conversant with the conditions and terms of the contracts into which they might enter. Considering that the potential business partners are sophisticated (and will protect their own interests at all costs with competencies not immediately available to the community), there is a need to capacitate the PDALA, NGOs as well as other people working in the area so that they can render effective professional advice to the community. If need be outside expertise should be sought. The eagerness on the part of the community to see the project running, as well as poor institutional support for the elected structures and insufficient training, are areas that need to be addressed urgently.

The process of rehabilitating and reviving the Tyhefu irrigation scheme has proven lengthy, delicate and uncertain. This is a source of concern for the community. Their argument revolves around widespread poverty, unemployment in the area and an appeal for government assistance.

Methodology

Fieldwork was conducted intermittently over a period of two years (2000 and 2001). A critical part of the orientation and planning phase was a review of the literature and consulting with officials or experts on various aspects of the research. The literature review entailed the perusal of a wide range of documents (commissions, research and consultants' reports, South African government policies and legislation, and journal articles and books. Locating primary documents pertaining to the planning and operation of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme has been difficult. The same goes for accessing reliable statistical information. Literature on Third World irrigation schemes, particularly those in Africa, proved an important source of information.

A reconnaissance survey was carried out in June 2000. This involved consultation with local leadership structures and some community members where the scope and objectives of the research were outlined and discussed. The researcher attended various community and committee meetings when invited, playing, in most instances, the role of an observer rather than a direct participant, except where an opinion or direct advice was solicited. These

meetings provided the opportunity for informal discussions with the various stakeholders during the initial stages and throughout the research period. Most importantly, these meetings led to a better understanding of the complexities involved in the upgrading and rehabilitation of the Tyhefu Irrigation scheme, enabled the accumulation of additional data and provided the basis for the drafting of the questionnaire.

The target population for the study was all the former farmers at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. Also, all six members of the Board of Directors, Project Steering Committee and Water Users' Association of the Ndlambe section of the irrigation scheme formed part of the target population. No sampling frame existed for this study, since no reliable list of former farmers existed. Using estimates of between 300 and 350 farmers in the Ndlambe section, it was decided to interview ten percent of the target population.

The survey research approach was adopted in order to obtain the required information. Two types of semi-structured questionnaires were compiled based on the literature review and preliminary informal interviews with various stakeholders, namely (a) for the ex-farmers of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme (b) a questionnaire for members of the Board of Directors,[7] Project Steering Committee[8] and Water Users' Association[9] of the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme, hereafter referred to as institutional structures. The questionnaire for the former farmers consists of two sections. Section A dealt with demographic as well as socio-economic factors (age, educational level, sources of income and labour, income derived from farming, farming experience, contribution of Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme to rural livelihoods and scheme impact). Section B focussed on farmers' perception of constraints, challenges and the process of reviving the irrigation scheme. The questionnaire for the institutional structures focussed on the constraints, challenges and the rehabilitation process.

A Socio-Economic Profile of the Farmers at the Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme

The age distribution of the majority of the respondents (62 percent) ranges between 31 and 50 years. A study by Kepe (1992:61) on the various irrigation schemes in the Ciskei (Tyhefu, Zanyokwe, Shiloh and Keiskammahoek) found that people with interest in continuing farming were farmers between the ages of 46 and 55 years. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents were in the category of what can be regarded as older farmers. According to respondents the youth have not shown any real interest in farming. Reasons given for such interest vary, and include statements that they are interested in other activities such as wage employment and sport. As one respondent argued: 'Our children have not seen any real benefits from farming, hence the lack of interest. They've seen us struggling with the management of the scheme before and thus prefer either working in the urban areas or starting their own businesses. The majority of the

youth are job seekers in the urban areas. Perhaps with poor job prospects everywhere, the rehabilitation of the scheme might prove a major incentive for the youth. A majority of them have registered as potential farmers. It's a wait and see approach if they will actually get involved'. Catling and Saaiman (1996: 174) suggest that 'many young people associate working on the land with the negative experiences of the past and a stigma is attached to agriculture. In order to improve agriculture and to encourage new livelihoods in the rural areas, more must be done to promote agriculture amongst the youth'.

Overall, the standard of education is very low. More than half of the respondents have not reached standard five. According to educationalists, people with less than four years education are unlikely to have attained any degree of functional literacy (Koshy in Bembridge, 2000: 51). This observation holds true for the respondents of this study who expressed concern about their lack of essential skills such as management, marketing, financial management, record keeping, and the application of new agricultural techniques. Their perception is that illiteracy is a major hindrance to successful commercial farming. Various studies have reported similar low levels of formal education in the former homelands (Steyn, 1988; Williams and Rose, 1989; Kepe, 1992 and Bembridge, 2000). Illiteracy and the age of the farmers has been linked to the reluctance or lack of response of farmers in adopting new technologies, innovations, and they have a negative effect on agricultural productivity and the provision of extension services (Van Averbeke et al., 1998; Bembridge, 1985).

The findings indicate that the majority of respondents are not dependent on one source of income but on a combination of various means. State transfers in the form of pensions and disability grants constitute the main source of gross cash income for sixty three percent of the respondents' households. Other studies have confirmed the importance and value of state transfers to household income (Monde-Gweleta et al., 1997; Ainslie and Ntshona, 1997; Van Averbeke et al., 1998).

It is quite evident the respondents are struggling to make ends meet with the meagre financial resources at their disposal and the limited employment opportunities available. The effects of deprivation and poverty are cushioned, albeit on a limited basis, by kinship and reciprocity.

Since the closure of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme there had been no income derived from farming. During fieldwork it became clear that the amount of income derived from farming varied considerably between the commercial farmers and small plot-holders. According to the respondents, income ranged from as little as R300 per season for the small plot-holders to R10,000 for the commercial farmers. No records were provided to confirm these figures. Dissatisfaction among the farmers is quite evident, especially the ex-commercial farmers, about the income to be derived from farming.

It is clear from the research findings that agriculture contributed to the livelihoods of the farmers in a modest way. This is particularly so if one considers the

unpredictable nature of the income derived from farming by all the farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. This supports the conclusion of the research by Monde-Gweleta et al., (1997) that in both dryland and irrigated environments in the Peddie district, agriculture does contribute to the income of many households, but rarely constitutes a livelihood in its own right.

Research Findings

This section examines the perceptions of constraints, challenges and the process of reviving the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. Respondents were asked about the factors that affected the degree to which they could farm successfully, based on their experiences as former farmers at the now defunct irrigation scheme. Eighteen items were used to measure the perceived main constraints and challenges. These can broadly be divided into the following categories:

– Quality and nature of support and extension services;
– Skills and training needs: agricultural training, information and research;
– Input and product markets; and
– Physical factors influencing irrigated crop production: climatic conditions, soil and water quality and availability, pests and diseases, tenure security and farm size.

Primary constraints and challenges identified by the respondents for the future in a rehabilitated Tyhefu irrigation scheme are finance and credit, markets and marketing, institutional support, training, and support and extension services. Respondents were unanimous that these have the potential to undermine the viability and sustainability of the scheme.

Support and Extension Services

The quality and nature of support and extension services was described by eighty percent of the respondents as very good during the early years of the irrigation scheme. However, all respondents were quick to point out that the service deteriorated considerably during the 1980s until the scheme's closure in 1997. Respondents are critical of the type and nature of the service rendered. The service is described as having been top-down and authoritarian. In spite of the presence of extension staff on the irrigation scheme premises, farmers indicated a limited rate of contact. Extension officers were described as working more in their offices and rarely doing any on-site visits. As one respondent noted, 'This made it difficult for us as farmers to get advice and establish good working relationships with the extension officers. In most cases the type of service was irrelevant to the real needs of the farmers'. Overall the respondents in the study rated the quality of service as poor, ineffective and misdirected. The result was that farmers relied more on their colleagues for advice and assistance.

Respondents had reservations regarding the knowledge and skills of extension officers. It is evident from the findings that the competence of extension officers is questioned. Hence, it is believed this limited their ability to provide sound advice to farmers on key production and irrigation practices. Well-trained competent extension officers resident on the irrigation scheme particularly during the first few years are critical to the success of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. Specialised training of new and serving extension officers should receive priority. There is a strong argument for the overhaul and re-orientation of the extension service to address the needs of small-scale irrigation farmers. Working partnerships between farmers, institutional structures and extension officers need to be forged. This relationship should differ markedly from the one that existed before the collapse of the scheme, which was top-down, technocratic and authoritarian. Extension service needs to strive through training towards encouraging greater farmer independence and collaboration rather than the subordination of farmers.

Related to the above is the need to upgrade and reorient research to focus on the needs and problems of small-scale and emerging farmers. It is for this reason that all the respondents in this study regard agricultural training, information and research as prerequisites for successful small-scale irrigation farming. A major anomaly identified by the respondents is the inability of the farmers to access timely agricultural information and services. This includes information on new crop cultivars with high yield potential and market value, soils analysis, advice on fertilizers and pesticides, effective weed, pest and disease control, and farm management methods and techniques. Research evidence suggests that previous research effort has been devoted largely to commercial farming and that such research output is marginally relevant to the needs of small-scale farmers (Catling, 1996).

Skills and training needs

This study found that the poor educational level of the farmers is positively related to their level of functional literacy. Feelings of incompetence among the respondents are widespread. All the respondents realise that they need to acquire various skills through training for greater independence. Critical skills considered lacking are the drawing-up of business plans, formulation and reading of contracts, financial control and management, record keeping, computer literacy, adopting latest technology, project planning, management and evaluation, keeping minutes, communication, conflict resolution, marketing and management, operation and maintenance, and quality control. Research evidence (Cousins, Cousins and Theron, 1996: 185) on small-scale commercial farmers in the Western Cape suggests that business management skills, which include keeping proper farm accounts and records, are often limited. According to Rogerson (2000: 210) the lack of management or business skills serves to worsen all the other problems of rural producers, since

entrepreneurs lack the capacity to analyse situations and chart ways to minimise the adverse impact of constraints on their business. Thus, a high level of financial management will no doubt be one of the critical areas that need to be addressed.

None of the farmers have any formal agricultural training. Even though the majority of the farmers are confident about their agricultural knowledge and farming skills (as a result of their previous involvement in irrigation and subsistence farming, sometimes as farm labourers in the commercial farm sector), they need training in new production, irrigation techniques and practices. This is particularly important given the fact that the rehabilitation and revival of the Tyhefu irrigation scheme is premised on market-oriented farming. The skills they possess can largely be regarded as general farming skills such as weeding, fencing, and driving. Specialised farming skills cannot be said to exist on a wide scale. Innovative practical training suited to the needs of the farmers is critical.

Markets and Marketing

Marketing of produce for the majority of the farmers, particularly the food plot-holders, was a serious problem. It is clear from the findings that marketing was generally not well-organised, and was poorly developed based on the availability of buyers. There was stiff competition among the farmers whilst at the same time they restricted their activities to narrow localised markets. In most cases this problem resulted in reduced profit levels. For the commercial farmers, low monetary returns when using the scheme's marketing services were a source of tension between them and irrigation scheme management.

In the past, the level of rural infrastructure and the fact that Tyhefu irrigation scheme is located far away from main markets made it difficult, if not impossible, to exploit favourable market opportunities. Backeberg et al. (1996: 52) observe that 'an unfavourable economic location renders the profitable production of many products impossible. It also reduces the ability to produce many fruits profitably'. Overall, farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme require both improved access and improvements in marketing of their produce. Also, one of the challenges is the development of a marketing system that will serve as a mechanism through which farmers can channel their produce. Similarly, an improvement in marketing information system is vital. Other areas of concern relate to the availability of storage facilities, the ability to adhere to high production and quality control standards, and meeting contract obligations. The suggestion by van Averbeke et al. (1998: 203) that there is a general need for the identification of suitable crops that can be grown profitably, without being sensitive to market conditions and distance, is valid. Even though sugar beet has been identified as a preferred candidate crop, no final decision has yet been reached as to the suitable crops. There is agreement, however, that emphasis should be on high value cash crops.

The success of any business venture hinges on the efficient functioning of the marketing system of which a proper transportation network is part. The village and rural infrastructure (roads and telecommunications), although not regarded by 77 percent of the respondents to be an impediment, needs to be upgraded. Poorly maintained secondary roads serve the study area. In the past, together with a poorly functioning telecommunication system, this drawback has made it difficult, if not impossible, to exploit favourable market opportunities. The absence of tarred roads means that vehicle owners are likely to charge a lot of money for transportation of goods (van Averbeke et al., 1998: 56). Consequently, the expense of delivering produce to the market can even exceed the cost of production, making the produce very expensive to the consumer (Van Averbeke et al., 1998: 21). Backeberg et al. (1996:52) further argue that 'irrigation, even with the existence of sufficient water resources, will remain an undeveloped farming activity in some former homelands until good transport and other communications have been established'.

Finance and Credit

Respondents are apprehensive about their ability to access finance. They need credit for various short-, medium- and long-term purposes. More importantly, the fact that credit is offered at market-related interest rates highlights the difficulties the farmers are likely to have in servicing their loans. This is regarded as a negative incentive for small-scale farmers, who are likely to find it impossible to invest in agriculture. Farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme are also constrained by low levels of liquidity, high transaction costs, and inadequate collateral. In other words, even though the institutional restructuring of agricultural services has been undertaken to meet the financial needs of small-scale farmers, there are many requirements needed in order to qualify for financial assistance. In many cases the farmers do not comply. The possibility of providing start-up finance on favourable terms requires further investigation. Equally crucial is whether the Tyhefu irrigation scheme will be able to generate a positive cash flow in the long-term, rather than relying on credit to sustain itself.

User charges

A number of cost recovery issues at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme still need to be finalised. The introduction of user charges and cost recovery is one of the thorny areas in South Africa. Generally, the record of cost-recovery is disappointing, resulting in the termination or discontinuation of a particular service. The fact that forty three percent of the respondents were non-committal in terms of paying for services is a cause for concern. Affordability featured prominently in all the responses. When taking into account the socio-economic status of the respondents, it seems unrealistic to expect them to carry the full cost of operation and maintenance.

Conclusion

The Ndlambe community is eagerly awaiting the eventual resumption of farming at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. They are pinning all their hopes for poverty alleviation, employment creation, income generation and the general improvement of the standard of living and rural livelihoods on this one project. There is potential for this positive development, albeit on a limited basis in the short term. Whether the Tyhefu irrigation scheme can generate sustainable rural livelihoods is questionable and subject to debate, especially in view of the constraints and challenges that lie ahead.

It is clear from the research findings that agriculture contributed to the livelihoods of the farmers in a modest way. Effectively, irrigated farming generated income that can be said to supplement overall household income. This is particularly so if one considers the unpredictable nature of the income derived from farming by all the farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. In most cases income has been low and many families lived in poverty. It needs to be realised that the Tyhefu irrigation scheme is not and will not be a panacea for the socio-economic ills facing the community. Since agricultural development is just one aspect of the rural economy, for the rest of the community other income-generating activities need to be considered. Rural development experience suggests that a complementary blend of interventions offers an integrated way of dealing with the various development problems communities face.

Diversification is widely regarded as an important risk management strategy for small-scale farmers. Since small-scale, capital-intensive commercial farming is a particularly risk-laden activity, farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme, rather than concentrating on a single high value crop, need to spread their risks.

Current policy thinking on Irrigation Management Transfer is a major departure from the previously top-down, supply-driven approach. Whilst this approach represents a notable innovation, participatory development alone is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for the success of small-scale irrigation schemes. This shift exposes farmers to new challenges and creates new demands organisationally and in terms of production practices. The real test for irrigation management transfer is the extent to which it is accompanied by a comprehensive package of support and extension services and farmer empowerment so that the viability and sustainability of the irrigation schemes is assured.

While the need for the transformation of small-scale irrigation schemes is undisputed, the hurried implementation of irrigation management transfer raises questions about the long-term viability of irrigation schemes in general. This study suggests that improving the situation of small-scale resource-poor irrigation farmers, such as the ones at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme appears to

be the secondary aim of this reform. In essence, fiscal capacity pressures (and international trends) have been the determining factor for the adoption of irrigation management transfer rather than the potential far-reaching effects of this reform on the livelihoods of the farmers and concrete evidence about enhanced performance and cost-efficiency and effectiveness in the South African situation. Farmers at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme need special support. Radical policy changes are vital before any significant improvements can be achieved in income, livelihoods, general standard of living and agricultural productivity. Without this change the possibility for independent agricultural production, let alone sustainable rural development, is minimal.

Notes

1. In 1995 the national Rural Development Strategy was unveiled. The main criticisms of it included its failure to address the potential of the rural economy and issues of local governance. The revised Rural Development Framework in 1997 in addressing these concerns placed increased emphasis on rural municipalities in creating sustainable rural livelihoods and poverty alleviation. It has since become apparent that this is too overwhelming a mandate for most rural municipalities. Capacity constraints have made it impossible for them to fulfil their developmental role.

2. The lessons of previous development projects including irrigation schemes necessitate a move away from top-down, dictatorial and paternalistic approaches to participatory ones. This is the primary emphasis of irrigation management transfer worldwide.

3. The concept of small-scale farmer is highly contested and value-laden. Whilst small-scale farming is viewed as an important policy objective by the government and an important sector of agricultural development, the concept remains ill-defined and controversial. Not only are several terms used to define small-scale farmers, there is also an increasing realisation that this group is not homogenous. The terms used include small holder, resource-poor farmers, subsistence farmers, peasant farmers, food-deficit farmers, household food security farmers, land reform beneficiaries and emerging farmers (Machete and Mollel, 1999: 3). In addition several criteria are used to classify them in terms farm size, purpose of production, income level and racial group. In this study small-scale farming refers to black farmers who are found largely in the former homelands, whose primary objective is market-oriented farming. Implied is the assumption that these farmers are constrained in terms of their capacity (human and financial) and complementary resources such as research, support and extension services, access to markets, marketing and key production inputs.

4. The establishment of WUAs provides small-scale irrigators with greater scope for self-management. Maritz (n.d.: 6) states 'although WUAs are water management institutions their primary purpose is not water management. They operate on a restricted local level, and are in fact cooperative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit'. The

ability of the WUAs to assume their responsibilities is a formidable challenge. International experience has shown that developing the capacity of WUAs is a long-term process, and that it takes several years before they can be able to assume full responsibility. No doubt the Departments of Water Affairs and Agriculture need to play a crucial role in capacitating WUAs.

5. Loxton Venn and Associates are consultants who planned the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. The Tyhefu irrigation scheme was first administered by management agents Interscience (Pty) Ltd., a subsidiary of Loxton, Venn and Associates, on behalf of the Ciskei government until 1984. They remained as advisors to the Ciskei government. Interscience (Pty) Ltd was in charge of planning and implementing cropping programmes, budgeting and financial control and evaluating performance (Bembridge (1986: 605). From 1985 to 1997, Ulimocor, Ciskei Agricultural Corporation, managed the Tyhefu irrigation scheme. This takeover did not mean the end of the influence of old management, since they became advisors to Ulimocor. In the meantime, Loxton, Venn and Associates management staff were re-employed by Ulimocor. In effect, therefore, changes in management did little to change the structural principles on which the scheme was based. Essentially decision making was still vested with the old management.

6. At the initial meeting of DALA/DWAF Task team in 1997 one of the main problems identified was the selection of a suitable legal entity to replace the water-related functions of the parastatals (DALA/DWAF, 1997: 5). After some deliberation the WUA concept was explored. The Task team, subsequently, recommended that a WUA be created at each irrigation scheme. Each WUA is required to have its own constitution to suit its particular needs and circumstances – it can therefore decide on what functions, duties and powers it wishes to have (DALA/DWAF, 1997: 12/13). The constitution of each prospective WUA must be approved by the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry before its formation.

7. This is a structure that will take over the irrigation scheme assets once they have been handed over by the government. The understanding at the moment is that the government will repair all assets in bad condition.

8. The PSC is one of the institutional structures established at the Tyhefu irrigation scheme at the beginning of the rehabilitation process. It acts as an important link between the community and other stakeholders. It is a temporary structure which will be disbanded once the Tyhefu irrigation scheme becomes operational. Its main task is to oversee the whole rehabilitation process and to work hand-in-hand with all the stakeholders.

9. The Water Users' Association (WUA) was established in terms of the Water Act No. 36 of 1998. The primary purpose of WUAs is to provide for the effective representation of small-scale irrigation farmers on the irrigation schemes at a local level as well as managing water on behalf of their members. Specifically, responsibilities will include levying an equitable and affordable tariff on water users, and the use of all funds for the benefit of the scheme. Bembridge et al. (2000: 63-64) elaborate: 'the WUA should be able to take over scheme assets, take over collective loans, operate accounts and institute by-laws enforceable by its members... It would be responsible for arranging input supplies, draught power, and marketing'.

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REVIEW ESSAYS

Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (eds.), *Reclaiming The Land – The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Zed Books, London, 2005.

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Introduction[1]

In the early 1990s, Rehman Sobhan (1993) argued that after two decades in which agrarian reform was a global non-event, '[v]otaries of agrarian reform' had been reduced to 'a fringe group of romantic throwbacks left over from the 1950s and 1960s' (1993: p.3) He offered a broad overview of post-Second World War experiences in Asia, Latin America and Africa, and distinguished between radical and non-egalitarian reforms in terms of their effect on eliminating class differentiation and modes of domination in the countryside. He concluded by arguing that '[t]he political mobilization needed to realize radical reforms in the contemporary developing world remains *elusive*' (1993: p.133, my emphasis). Nearly ten years later, Deborah Bryceson (2000), after discussing the post-Second World War academic literature on the peasantry, suggested that '[p]easant theory is on the retreat' (2000: p.29); that it was critical to bring peasants 'back into theoretical and policy debates' (2000: p.30); and that the ongoing reproduction of the peasantry in Latin America, Asia and Africa through contradictory processes of formation and dissolution seemed to give them an 'enduring presence' (2000: p.6). She concluded also by referring to an elusiveness, speaking about the multifaceted survival strategies of the peasantry under conditions of global neo-liberalism that make the peasantry – conceptually – 'more *elusive* than before' (2000: p.30, my emphasis). These brief comments on the status of the peasantry and agrarian reform provide an important historical and theoretical backdrop to the volume under review.

Reclaiming The Land is a collection of topical essays that seeks to address and capture this elusiveness, but also to transcend it in the sense of demonstrating the significance of the peasantry in the modern world, particularly their critical role in bringing about progressive social change. In this regard, it is noteworthy that a world-systems theorist such as Wallerstein (2002), in a recent analysis of potential anti-systemic movements internationally, failed to make any reference to the (seemingly still illusionary for many) peasantry. The volume under review argues convincingly that the agrarian question remains unresolved in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and it explores the contemporary forms of agrarian change. The editors emphasise, first of all, global

socio-economic changes that have resulted in the re-configuration and differ-entiation of rural popular classes and that involve them in diverse livelihood strategies; and, secondly, rural politics especially in the form of militant social movements – rooted in the semi-proletarianised peasantry and landless prole-tariat – that are, contrary to the views of other social analysts, 'the leading forces of opposition to neoliberalism and the neocolonial state' (Moyo and Yeros 2005: p.9). They are particularly interested in the politics of the agrarian question, rather than more 'economistic' concerns about accumulation and production. Moyo and Yeros are most widely known for their work on Zimbabwe, with the former being generally recognised as the foremost specialist on land and agrarian issues in that country. Recent events in Zimbabwe, entailing 'the first radical shift in agrarian property rights in the post-Cold War world' (Moyo and Yeros 2005: p.3), provided the direct stimulus for the intellectual production of this collection, yet the editors downplay the exceptional status of Zimbabwe in relation to broader interna-tional trends.

This review essay assesses the contribution of this book to furthering our understanding specifically of agrarian and land processes in present-day Zimbabwe. This overall aim is pursued through three lines of inquiry. First of all, I provide a review of the volume (excluding the Zimbabwean chapter). In the process I raise some important methodological and theoretical points, as well as illustrate how this comparative work gives us important leads in deepening our understanding of agrarian change in Zimbabwe. Secondly, I focus on the chapter on Zimbabwe (by Moyo and Yeros) and examine whether it has furthered our grasp of the complexities of national and rural dynamics in Zimbabwe in the light of other recent works on the same or similar subject. Thirdly, I briefly conclude by considering how the theoretical and empirical work of Moyo and Yeros relates to key sociological concerns, and how a more sociological perspective might enrich our understanding of agrarian issues. In focussing on Zimbabwe, I engage with an acrimonious but important debate amongst Zimbabwean Left scholars about state formation and political change (Moyo 2001; Yeros 2002b; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004; Moore 2004; Raftopoulos 2005).

Besides the stimulating introduction provided by Moyo and Yeros, the volume is divided into three main sections: on Africa, Asia and Latin America. Each section is introduced by a continental overview written by a respected agrarian specialist, namely, Bernstein, Aguilar and Veltmeyer, respectively. The African section (140 pages) is the longest and has chapters on Ghana, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe; the Asian section (75 pages) is consid-erably shorter with only two country chapters, on India and the Philippines; and the Latin American section (125 pages) has two chapters on Brazil, and one each on Columbia and Mexico. The continental overviews, to varying degrees, are overly selective in their national foci (as recognised by Aguilar in the case

of Asia) and thus do not necessarily provide us with a full picture of diverse national trajectories. It is also unclear whether the country chapters are sufficiently representative of continental agrarian processes and conflicts. For instance, in the case of Latin America, nations with well-known militant rural struggles form the basis of the chapters. Hence, some critics may dispute the overall claim by the editors about 'the resurgence of rural movements' in the South and East as a valid empirical generalisation. It is also debatable whether each chapter makes a contribution of significance in enlightening us about agrarian dynamics within its respective national context and, beyond the Zimbabwean chapter, assessing this is best left up to other reviewers. Indeed, the real significance of all the chapters may lie elsewhere, in illustrating – rather than proving – in a socially contingent (rather than uniformly flat) manner the global trajectories of agrarian processes that the editors stress in their introduction. In this regard, in his chapter Bernstein speaks of 'general themes from which specific histories create complex variations' (2005: p.82), leading thus to particular paths depending on the socio-historical-national context but embodying more universal processes. These specific national trajectories are outlined, in a very uneven and often only partial manner, in the various country chapters.

'The Peasant Movement Has Been Resurrected From The Dead'

In their introduction to the book (Chapter 1), Moyo and Yeros provide the theoretical and world-historical context for the chapters that follow. They do so by linking conceptually the agrarian and national questions, what Neocosmos has called the 'two fundamental *democratic* questions in Africa today' (1993: p.9 my emphasis). Interestingly, many of the arguments by Moyo and Yeros about the peasantry and agrarian reform are similar to Neocosmos's earlier thoughts, yet in their work on Zimbabwe they have been criticised (see below) for largely ignoring 'democratic questions'. It is also notable that the editors are currently based in countries (Moyo in Zimbabwe and Yeros in Brazil) that are presently experiencing significant forms of rural struggle and agrarian change. This is not to suggest an (improper) analytical bias on their part; rather, it helps us to understand their particular sensitivity to the main concerns addressed in the book. Further, in their analytical formulations of rural politics and change, they have been clearly influenced by James Petras (and Veltmeyer) and his work on Latin America. In recent years, Petras has consistently and exuberantly spoken about 'the rising influence of peasant movements' (1998: p.1) with a national socio-political agenda struggling against neo-liberal regimes in Latin America, and he suggests that these peasant-led movements are 'challenging the traditional belief that the urban working class leaders are the designated vanguard of historical change' (1998: p.8). Simultaneously, Petras is particularly dismissive of NGOs (and urban civics generally), labelling them as 'instruments of neoliberalism' (1997: p.7) that undermine the anti-system

struggles of radical rural movements. He rejects the anti-statism of civil society formations and highlights 'the conflict between classes over state power at the national level' (1997: p.15). Petras's position, including a state-centred theory of social change, is manifested in the theoretical perspective of Moyo and Yeros. In general, this approach entails the strident defence of a modernist (class-based) historical materialism. This perspective, I suggest, is both the strength and weakness of the editors' conceptualisation of agrarian change.

Moyo and Yeros argue that land and agrarian questions are often 'treated synonymously' with respect to regions such as Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa where large-scale farming and landlordism exist, but that there is an important conceptual distinction. Thus, 'the resolution of the agrarian question is tied up with industrial transformation', whereas the land question is 'directed more immediately to the issue of land redistribution and the related issues of land tenure and land use' (2005: p.24). Simultaneously, agrarian reform without land reform is highly improbable even in parts of Africa where general dispossession of the peasantry did not take place under colonialism. The editors do not intentionally seek to update or modify the classic agrarian question but their analysis implies that it needs to be reconsidered if not refor-mulated. The classic question was concerned with the transition to capitalism, and Bernstein (2003) elsewhere labels this as the 'agrarian question of capital'. He claims that this transition has occurred globally and that the agrarian question has been resolved at this level, but that stalled capitalist industrialis-ation in the peripheries has left the classic question unresolved in these regions but now largely redundant given the existence of capitalism as an all-pervasive world-system. Bernstein speaks about an 'agrarian question of labour' in the context of the subordinated integration of the South and East in international commodity chains and markets under neo-liberalism. This revised question concerns the 'fragmentation (or fracturing) of labour' (2003: p.211) in the peripheries, with 'ever more disparate combinations of wage- and self-employment (agricultural and non-agricultural petty commodity production)' (2003: p.217) as reproduction strategies. This crisis of rural liveli-hoods, which involves increasing proletarianisation, may (or may not) lead to struggles specifically over land such as those discussed in the volume under review. In a similar vein, Moyo and Yeros argue that the transition to capitalism in the South and East (what they refer to as the 'periphery') has been marked by the incompleteness of primitive accumulation and industrial development arising from a disarticulated and extroverted pattern of accumulation; and by the 'truncated nature' (2005: p.8) of proletarianisation deriving from ongoing conditions sustaining semi-proletarianisation.

Moyo and Yeros constantly stress that this failed transition, despite decades of post-colonialism, has been characterised by unfulfilled national sovereignty and self-determination entailing the incompleteness of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) rather than – I would tentatively propose as an

alternative viewpoint – the persistent failings of an actually-existing (and hence 'completed') NDR. Full-scale NDRs, according to the editors, have not occurred in the peripheries because of their subservient position in relation to the imperialist centre, as shown by the pronounced inability of their nation-states to fulfil 'even the minimum of modern social demands, namely the guarantee of the costs of social reproduction' (2005: p.38) and by their ongoing economic crises, political instabilities and repressive tendencies. It would appear that, for Moyo and Yeros, full national self-determination (and ultimately the NDR), along with the resolution of the agrarian and national questions, are by definition ruled out in the South and East by the very existence of capitalist imperialism, based on some version of a one-stage theory of (prolonged) social revolution. Implicit in their analysis is a somewhat a-historical and idealised (and possibly romanticised) notion of a fulfilled NDR (a term they never adequately conceptualise) as a necessary and eventual end product of social struggle, instead of an understanding of 'actually existing' NDRs embodied in historically-variable social formations. This teleological depiction of history, entailing forward movement that will ultimately progress along a particular pre-determined trajectory, is epitomised by the sub-title to the chapter on Zimbabwe, 'towards the National Democratic Revolution'. This condition of negativity (a revolution yet to be fulfilled) is privileged method-ologically in explaining the social crises currently besetting the periphery, such that their historical understanding of the Zimbabwean crisis (in Chapter 6) becomes almost subservient to this teleological explanation or is at least signif-icantly structured by it. Running throughout the course of the argument by Moyo and Yeros is the flawed methodological assumption that at some future date the agrarian and national questions will be resolved and the NDR fulfilled.

In the ongoing debate about globalisation, the editors quite correctly side with the argument that globalisation is not homogenising the world and making the nation-state redundant, because it has 'highly uneven and polarizing tendencies' (2005: p.10) that involve – for Moyo and Yeros it would seem – processes (primarily) of state re-functioning rather than state re-structuring. As a result of this unevenness, 'capitalism has subordinated agriculture to its logic worldwide, but without creating, by necessity, home markets capable of sustaining industrialization' (2005: p.14) in the South and East, thus forestalling capitalist development and the resolution of the classic agrarian question. A corollary is the subservient integration of the periphery into the globalised but 'centrally-based corporate agro-industrial complex' (2005: p.17) in terms of both production and marketing systems, and the subsequent international division of labour in agriculture with peripheral states battling for markets for traditional exports and also involved in non-traditional goods and land uses such as horticulture and eco-tourism run by corporate capital. In the process, market forces have been unleashed and state support for peasants 'in the sphere of both production and reproduction' (2005: p.18) has been

removed, thus reproducing semi-proletarianisation and poverty in ways largely functional to global capital. The current market-led agrarian reform agenda involves accumulation from above and, as with earlier state-led models under Cold War conditions it is a manifestation of geo-political and localised class conflicts. Indeed, the editors see class struggle as the 'engine' powering history and society.

In highlighting the ongoing significance of the nation-state in the periphery, Moyo and Yeros properly conceptualise the reconfigured state as a dialectical rendezvous point for the contradiction between global and national (class) struggles and between national classes. In doing so, they give significant causal weight to neo-imperialism and to the centre-periphery relation in explaining the unfulfilled NDR and corresponding social crises, and thereby (possibly) over-privileging external determinants. Yet, as will be noted in their analysis of Zimbabwe, they fail to give sufficient theoretical emphasis to the form of the nation-state and focus more on its potential functions (and functionality) in advancing the NDR in the face of global neo-liberalism. Moyo and Yeros (see below) at times recognise contradictions and struggles within the state, yet overall they seem dangerously close to an instrumentalist notion of the nation-state, in which any particular (form of) state can – at least potentially – at different times significantly advance the struggle of different classes. It is likely for this reason that their Zimbabwean critics claim that they analytically misrepresent the Zimbabwean state by failing to sufficiently consider its 'authoritarian anti-imperialism' (Raftopoulos 2005: p. 14).

Moyo and Yeros argue that the peasantry, referring to small-scale agriculturalists operating in the system of commodity production embedded within capitalism, 'does not constitute a class ... but inherent in it are the antagonistic tendencies of proletarian and proprietor' (2005: p. 25). The peasantry is differentiated between rich, middle and poor with only the middle peasantry embodying pure petty commodity production as neither hirers nor sellers of labour power. The reproduction of the peasantry through accumulation strategies is uneven and unstable, involving (simultaneously) contradictory processes of proletarianisation, semi-proletarianisation and even re-peasantisation. Semi-proletarians, involving the functional dualism of the peasant-worker grouping, engage in a mixture of farm-based petty commodity production and (urban or rural) wage labour, and this is not a transitional state but continues to be a pervasive socio-economic condition in the periphery (see also Neocosmos 1993). For instance, structural adjustment intensified landlessness (and thus proletarianisation) but also increased the demand for land and land-based natural resources because of the diminished prospects for off-farm sources of income, and rural inhabitants are often inclined to 'reproduce functional dualism on their own' (Moyo and Yeros 2005: p.32) as a survival option. The negative notion of the peasantry as 'not a class' is not particularly helpful when it comes to (static) analyses of class structure, yet it

seems that the editors are more concerned – and aptly so – with (ambivalent) processes of class formation and the reconstitution of the peasantry under neo-liberalism.

In this context, Moyo and Yeros examine the current politics of the peasantry and argue that its heightened significance cannot be derived from an unmediated reading of the (relatively undeveloped) productive forces in the periphery. Detailing the complex processes that mediate the relation between socio-economic conditions and political action, and that would involve 'thick descriptions' of peasant experience is clearly beyond the mandate of this volume, although Fernandes's chapter on Brazil offers intriguing insights. A richer analysis of land occupations and rural movements requires this, yet to their detriment the editors seem to be somewhat dismissive of post-modernist localised peasant studies. In fact, their modernist meta-theoretical approach seems to subordinate experiential reality to the demands of a theory which prioritises a political-ideological struggle (the NDR) that may be more in the (romanticising) minds of the editors than in the (embittered) hearts of the subjects of their study. At the same time, Moyo and Yeros rightly claim that the dominant (and even radical) conception of civil society and the 'urbanization of democratic theory' (2005: p.37) found within the social sciences have downplayed the importance of rural struggles and their significance in democratising the nation-state in the South and East (see also Moyo 2001).

The editors assert that the politics of peasant-workers is diverse and multi-faceted, often involving both rural (farm) and urban (workplace) experiences and grievances, thus adding considerable complexity to matters of political consciousness that a range of organisational formations – like 'progressive' trade unions and political parties – have failed to grasp and articulate (and, as mentioned above, the editors also do not explore). Even membership-based farmer associations have 'generally fallen hostage to bourgeois elements within them, which have eschewed advocacy of land issues and development policies aimed at smallholder accumulation' (2005: p 42). Hence, there has been a political vacuum in the countryside that peasants and rural proletarians have sought to fill either on a spontaneous or more organised basis. This has sometimes meant an avowed rejection of either working with the state or more dramatically of capturing state power, together with more of an emphasis on autonomous and democratic self-mobilisation within civil society as epitomised by the Zapatista uprising in Mexico. Moyo and Yeros claim that this anti-politics position is problematic for various reasons: civil society is generally co-opted as a 'tool of neoliberalism' (2005: p.43); the nation-state continues to be a critical nexus of power in processes of social transformation; and the internal contradictions of the state have been productively exploited by rural movements, for instance in the Philippines. The editors provide a useful overview of these present-day rural movements, highlighting their social base, leadership, tactics, strategy and ideology.

The emphasis throughout the volume is on the land occupation strategy, and they note that under neo-liberalism there has been a 'shrinking of civilized political space' (2005: p.39) as defined by global capital: civil politics embodies not just property-friendly politics but now also market-friendly politics, and the rural movements fall squarely within the 'uncivil', notably in terms of the earlier notion of the civil. This is a significant point that Yeros (2002a) develops extensively in his doctoral thesis, where he examines historically the globalisation of civil society, or what he calls 'civilization', and he argues that uncivil rural politics has led to social revolutions and extensive agrarian reform since the Second World War. Thus, it has been the 'uncivil' agency of 'the landless and land-short' that 'has been the basic source of agrarian reform historically' (Moyo and Yeros 2005: p.53), and popular-led agrarian reform has driven state-led and market-led agrarian reforms globally. This is a stance that is repeatedly substantiated by an edited volume (Ghimire 2003) that looks at civil society and agrarian reform in the South and East. More generally speaking, Yeros and Moyo argue that rural semi-proletarians and proletarians are the most significant force for change in the contemporary globalised world, though 'not by virtue of being exploited by capital, but by being expelled from it' (2005: p.55). This is a fascinating theoretical point that regrettably is left undeveloped. For example, are semi-proletarians in any form ever 'outside' (or expelled from) capital, understood as a set of contradictory social relations? (see Holloway 2003). Nevertheless, Moyo and Yeros claim that the national and agrarian questions in the peripheries are intimately intertwined and that the rural movements, including the land occupation strategy, are contributing to their simultaneous resolution. Thereby they are advancing the NDR within the limits imposed by global imperialism. Yet, as noted earlier, the underlying notion that the national and agrarian questions will be finally laid to rest (at the end-of-history?) is a form of historical determinism.

It is unclear whether any of the contributors to the volume (perhaps except Veltmeyer) would necessarily agree in a significant way with the perspective provided by Moyo and Yeros and thus with the theoretical context in which their specific work appears, although Bernstein takes issue with some of their more specific comments on Zimbabwe. For his part, Bernstein (Chapter 2) offers a broad periodisation of the historical path of agrarian changes in sub-Saharan Africa in order to understand their current specificities. He also notes particular macro-regions within the sub-continent, such as settler colonial capitalism (including Zimbabwe), yet in all regions indirect rule institutionalised the 'customary' and thereby inhibited the commoditisation of land and class formation within the countryside. Interestingly, Moyo (2004) has noted increasing land concentration and centralisation outside settler capitalism in the post-independence period, and this has led to a marked land question in these other regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Bernstein shows that state-led agricultural policy in late colonialism and early post-colonialism

sought to 'modernise' the peasantry and to create a class of petty capitalist farmers, but land tenure remained 'largely unchanged' (2005: p.78). Mafeje (2003) offers an alternative version of events, claiming that in these non-settler regions there is no land question but only an agrarian question. In so arguing, he would likely question Bernstein's (and Moyo's) understanding of ('unchanged') land tenure under customary arrangements, by asserting that customary tenure based on 'the African mode of social organization' (2003: 19) provides usufruct rights that continue to ensure widespread access to land for petty commodity producers.

During the neo-liberal era, Bernstein continues, the crisis of livelihoods has intensified in the rural areas with social reproduction dependent on dwindling contributions from both agriculture and off-farm employment/ self-employment. Yet the systemic crisis in African agriculture has been experienced unevenly, and it has involved deepening differentiation within the worker-peasant class, further land concentration and alienation, and the greater involvement of petty bourgeois elements in expanded agricultural accumulation. These class dynamics are not overtly expressed but are manifested in generational, gender, regional and ethnic conflicts. Bernstein argues that 'there is little experience in modern African history of popular rural political *organization* on a broader scale centred on agrarian and land issues' (2005: p.88, his emphasis) compared to Latin America and Asia, yet this general observation is left largely unexplained. This is a point that Moyo also highlights in relation to Africa in an article written just prior to the land movement emerging in Zimbabwe in early 2000 (Moyo 2000). According to Bernstein, the most vivid confrontations are localised defensive actions against land dispossession arising from, for example, infra-structural or development projects but without any clear ideology and political programme, with the recent case of Zimbabwe being an exception.

In general, Bernstein is 'more cautious' than Moyo and Yeros 'about a global tidal wave of land struggles' (2003: p.217). He also claims that, by independence in Africa, generalised commodity production was established throughout the sub-Saharan region in the sense that the 'basic social relations and compulsions of capitalism were internalized in peasant production' (2005: p.75). This takes us back to the argument by Moyo and Yeros about the expulsion of the semi-proletariat and the social reach of capitalism. For example, Seth (2003) like Bernstein argues that capitalism has encompassed the globe such that any opposition to capital exists in the 'interstices of capital' (Seth 2003: p.48), and thus is not external to capitalism but is subsumed into it. What this means for Bernstein's particular argument is that Africa's (including Zimbabwe's) current agricultural crisis and unresolved agrarian question – even if understood in a global context – cannot be 'attributed exclusively to a (malign) exterior' (2005: p.87). By implication, a sensitive understanding of agrarian processes in Africa cannot be reduced to either external (for example,

neo-liberalism) or more internal (for example, nationalism) determinants or a combination thereof based on a positivist notion of 'external' relations and interaction, because the global and the local are 'internally' fused and embedded within the same dialectical processes.

Regrettably, the four African case studies do not capture the full diversity of regions outlined by Bernstein but they certainly illustrate and elaborate on some of his key points. Amanor (Chapter 3) argues that land in Ghana is effectively owned not by the state but by chiefly authorities that, as 'customary custodians' (2005: p.105), officially represent the rights of peasantry in land, and this inhibits the formation of independent peasant associations. The peasantry is 'weakly organized' (2005: p.116) and formal efforts to legally defend their land interests are repulsed by the state. Thus, peasant struggles to enhance their livelihood options are often more spontaneous and uncivil. The establishment of forest reserves and modern agribusinesses for export-orientated activities has increasingly commoditised land and led to land expropriation and, as their 'moral right' (2005: p.114), peasants have sought to repossess or access this land for agricultural and natural resource usages. This has included the destruction of timber saplings and informal timber marketing activities, the cutting of plantation seedlings and illegal harvesting of fruits at night, as well as 'squatting' or occupations on portions of expropriated land. Amanor argues that peasants have found themselves pitted against a broad alliance of chiefs, the state and corporate interests.

The chapter by Kanyongolo (Chapter 4) on Malawi focuses more specifically on (largely unorganised and uncoordinated) land occupations. Customary land tenure systems have been constantly devalued as a productive form of land investment, and land reform has favoured large-scale commercial farming based on freehold title that has further entrenched dominant class interests. An un-cohesive and demobilised civil society, notably urban-based NGOs that espouse liberal rhetoric and trade unions with weak rural structures, has failed to offer progressive support (as in Zimbabwe) for rural 'counter-systemic actions' (2005: p.126) that have been often censored by the state. Employing notions emanating from critical legal theory, and consistent with the Moyo and Yeros argument, Kanyongolo shows how occupations go contrary to market-driven land reforms and are effectively de-legitimised by the legal and judiciary regimes, rather than being considered as a 'legitimate democratic strategy for redressing injustice' (2005: p.118). The spatial distribution and social composition of land occupations in Malawi shows considerable diversity, such that 'land occupiers have not always been poor peasants' (2005: p.129) but at times have included traditional power elites as participants or supporters. The land movement in its internal organisation also tends to reproduce the patriarchal structures of rural society (a point that needs considerable research in Zimbabwe) and occupations adjacent to the industrial centres raise the prospect of alliances with the urban proletariat.

Sihlongonyane's work on South Africa (Chapter 5) looks at the land occupation tactic in the context of the neo-liberal policies of the ANC that stress production rather than equity and that seem 'antithetical to the alteration of agrarian power relations' (2005: p.148) or even to more limited land redistribution. This tactic, along with a range of informal market activities, is in many ways a survival strategy employed by the landless and unemployed in both peri-urban and rural areas, and is particularly beneficial to women as it enhances their access to land and natural resources. Civil society since 1994 has been in large part demobilised and has subsequently failed to significantly push for land reform from below. Yet a loosely organised but fragmented constellation of community-based organisations and progressive NGOs is emerging and this includes the increasingly militant Landless People's Movement. This struggle though is 'largely defensive in nature' and 'is not underwritten by a coherent political programme for social change' (2005: p.157). Sihlongonyane argues that land seizures as a form of grassroots pressure for agrarian change should not be conceptualised as a 'blanket strategy' (2005: p.159) but should be employed selectively alongside other tactics including negotiation.

Aguilar's overview of Asia (Chapter 7) looks at the diversity of land struggles and direct peasant action in the form of a classificatory grid distinguishing between levels of organisation, forms of engagement with the state (or disengagement) and the nature of oppositional forces. In general, this action is characterised 'by the goal of acquiring a piece of cultivable land and, where it has been denied, the right to control production and the disposal of the output' (2005: p.210). The extensive occupation of state land in the Southeast Asian highlands (such as in Thailand) is a defence against grinding poverty by landless peasants by preserving petty commodity production and thereby warding off de-agrarianisation and proletarianisation, although also seeking off-farm income to sustain their livelihoods. This action occurs independently of the state and is thus said by Aguilar to be 'a form of challenge to state power' (2005: p.210), and at times the state has been forced to officially regularise these land seizures. He says that, in doing so, the state has effectively (if inadvertently) extended its authority in the countryside, an interesting twist of events that is worth exploring in the case of the fast track resettlement scheme in Zimbabwe. Land occupations have also been pursued 'within the reformist space of the state' (2005: p.222) as peasant groups 'exploited cracks and obstructions in the implementation of agrarian reform to claim possession of land' (2005: pp.217-18). This has sometimes led to conflicts between non-hegemonic classes, such as between the agrarian proletariat and petty commodity producers in the case of the occupation of large estates.

Unsanctioned and illegal land usages also contributed to the demise of collective agriculture in China and Vietnam as households sought to acquire and cultivate private plots, and hence establish petty commodity production. This undoing of collectivisation in China coincided with the government's

post-Mao move towards a market economy, and it has resulted in the formation
of an absentee landowner class. This is an intriguing point that provides an
angle into understanding the dynamics that led to the land occupations in
Zimbabwe. It suggests that simultaneous (class) action 'from above' and 'from
below' may interact in a symbiotic and dialectical fashion, advancing the land
reform process. Conspiratorial claims about 'top down' manipulation, which is
a common argument by the critics of Moyo and Yeros, become more
problematic in this light. In Vietnam, indebtedness in the face of a 'simple
reproduction squeeze' (Aguilar 2005: p.224) has compelled many peasants to
sell their land-use rights and this has resulted in rural proletarianisation. The
market commoditisation of peasant land is rapidly advancing in both
post-collectivised and never-collectivised nations of Asia. Aguilar (similar to
Bernstein) argues that the classic agrarian question, understood in national
terms, is largely redundant because of the globalisation of class relations, yet
'specific contexts require their own appropriate solutions and responses'
(2005: p.231).

   In this context, Pimple and Sethi (Chapter 8) look at land occupations in
India where the land question 'remains far from resolved' (2005: p.237). A
standing alliance between the landed elite and the state has meant that
state-implemented land redistribution in the past has been limited, and now
landlessness and poverty is on the increase under conditions of neo-liberalism
and privatisation of the land tenure regime. Small farmers are losing more land
to forests and are being denied access to the natural resource base within state
forests as these lands are leased to industrialists for timber felling and tourism
ventures. Further, village commons or common property resources on which
the landless and agricultural labourers often depend are becoming scarcer
because of land commoditisation. Land occupations however are sporadic and
unorganised, in part reflecting a 'lack of adequate country-wide political
mobilization among the landless' (2005: p.246). This is the case despite the
existence of significant nationwide peoples' and workers' movements in India
and in some areas local 'grassroots forest protection movements''(2005:
p.243) that adopt tracts of land for their own usage. Most of the more militant
examples of land occupations discussed by the authors are of more historical
interest than of contemporary relevance, and thus to speak of a recent 'resur-
gence' is problematic. Pimple and Sethi conclude by arguing that there is 'an
urgent need to build the social legitimacy of the right to land' and that this
requires 'the transformation of institutional structures of subordination' (2005:
p. 253) that maintain rural poverty.

   Likewise Feranil, in his chapter on the Philippines (Chapter 9), argues that
'the persistence of agrarian conflicts reveals the continuing need to address the
land question' (2005: p.257) particularly as the state-led (supply-driven)
re-distributive model of land reform has been replaced by a market-led
(demand-driven) agrarian strategy under neo-liberalism. During the Aquino

regime with its market-friendly land policies, peasant organisations openly engaged with the (non-monolithic) state and worked with pro-reform state legislators and bureaucrats in policy formation, and this implied reform from above. Yet, 'policy alone does not determine outcomes' (2005: p.263) and thus this engagement had 'variegated tendencies' (2005: p.258) and outcomes in the face of anti-reform initiatives by the traditional agrarian oligarchy and modernising landlord-entrepreneurs. In fact, radical initiatives in the form of land occupations (reform from below) were repressed and this consolidated the position of the landowning classes. Thus, these land seizures did not amount to 'an alternative land reform programme implemented outside the state' (2005: p.268). Feranil notes the array of strategies pursued by differing parts of the peasant movement and civil society post-Aquino, including working with the state and outside the state in an environment now more favourable to the ruling classes. The state has sought to harness and co-opt autonomous peasant groups in agrarian programme implementation. And, simultaneously, these groups seek to use the narrowed space available to expand the programme, including employing the legal system against recalcitrant landowners. Peasant groups, with a rights-based approach or 'rightful resistance' (2005: p.271), continue to challenge landlord power in local authoritarian enclaves, including occupations, demonstrations and rallies. According to Feranil, these measures are not simply weapons of the weak nor do they entail seizing state power. Rather, they lie somewhere between the two extremes, in trying to push the state to radicalise the agrarian programme. The dynamics between the state and the peasantry in the Philippines, at least superficially, resemble events in Zimbabwe. A comparative study of land reform processes in these two nations would likely provide important analytical insights into the relationship between state and society as well as internal contradictions and fissures within the nation-state.

In his overview of Latin America (Chapter 10), Veltmeyer (along the lines of Moyo and Yeros) conceptualises land occupations as 'a tactic of class struggle' (2005: pp.285-6) and as a strategy for gaining permanent access to land. He discusses the debated notion of the disappearance of the peasantry as a socio-economic category (as does Bryceson) and as a political force in the world today, and concludes that the peasantry 'constitutes the most dynamic force for anti-systemic change' in Latin America (2005: p.294). Landlessness in the region continues to prevail. For instance, he provides the stunning statistic that, in 1998, 90 percent of arable land was concentrated in large land holdings and the smallest 50 percent of farm units occupied only two percent of the land. Ongoing processes of land concentration and centralisation entailing 'primitive accumulation' have led to massive urbanisation and the transference of rural land struggles 'to the periphery of the new urban metropoles' (2005: p. 291) including 'squatting' on unused urban land areas.

Veltmeyer details the history of agrarian reform in the region and speaks about three paths, as do other agrarian theorists. First of all, state-led reform (as studied by Sobhan) dominated the scene from 1950s onwards as states sought to thwart social revolution. This entailed expropriation of land without compensation, land redistribution and rural development initiatives. Subsequently, some land reform programmes have been preserved if not consolidated but others reversed, including in Chile and Nicaragua, depending in large part on the balance of forces between the peasantry and the state. This point highlights the contradictory tensions inherent in all agrarian processes, and raises doubts about an inevitable march toward the NDR. Once started, governments in Latin America often sought to prevent the radicalisation of their own reform initiatives, and peasant movements tended to split with some fragments becoming 'a transmission belt for state policy' (2005: p.297). Further, redistribution led to considerable internal differentiation within the peasantry, including the emergence of rich peasants-cum-rural capitalists, self-sufficient peasant farmers and a rural landless proletariat. Market-assisted reform involving the promotion of land markets and land titling dominated state policies throughout the region during the 1990s, and it entailed a model of agrarian development that emphasised social capital rather than natural capital embedded in land. This focus on social capital reduced pressure on the state to expropriate and redistribute land, and emphasised agricultural productivity and modernisation. It also spoke of the social empowerment of the peasantry and thereby masked and displaced notions of class struggle. These reforms have severely restricted the market situation of small producers and have devastated peasant economies, and thus are unlikely to diminish the political significance of land occupations.

Latin America is currently witnessing significant forms of autonomous peasant-led grassroots movements that have overtaken in significance the 'new' social movements of urban poor and issue-orientated social organisations that arose during the 1980s in the context of global civil society initiatives. However, since the mid-1990s, strategic alliances have been formed between urban civil society and rural movements. As Moyo and Yeros show, this trend differs significantly from the case of Zimbabwe, yet they argue that forming such alliances, at a time when the ruling party is trying to inhibit them, is critical to advancing the NDR.

In the face of massive concentration of land ownership in Brazil over the past decades and the non-implementation of agrarian reform, the land occupation movement has become particularly militant, as peasants have been excluded from the space of agrarian policy making. Fernandes (Chapter 11) argues that through land seizures, expropriated peasants 're-socialize themselves, struggling against capital as well as subordinating themselves to it' because through occupations they 'reinsert themselves into the capitalist production of non-capitalist relations of production' (2005: p.318). This conceptualisation

returns us to the point by Seth about the reach of capital and to the Moyo and Yeros claim about the expelled condition of the peasantry in their struggle to re-access land. Regrettably, considering this theoretical point is beyond the scope of the review essay. Fernandes nonetheless argues that land occupations are a socio-spatial struggle against proletarianisation and a manifestation of class conflict. Established peasant settlers in frontier areas that have been expropriated by encroaching large landowners have undertaken these occupations, along with the landless that seize portions of land owned by the agrarian bourgeoisie and *latifundios*.

These occupations may entail, as in the history of Zimbabwe, broad and organised territorialised movements or more spontaneous isolated movements that are not part of a wider political project. Fernandes offers intriguing insights into the formation, organisation and tactics of this form of popular struggle, viewing seizures and encampments on land as a 'space of political socialization' (2005: p.321). Saving the occupation against threat of eviction is part of the 'logic of resistance' and sustaining the encampment is a 'form of pressure to demand the settlement' (2005: p.333). Detailed case-study analyses of specific land occupations in present-day Zimbabwe are yet to be done, but the analysis by Fernandes provides informative conceptual leads. In recent years in Brazil, most official land resettlements have simply involved formal recognition by the state of seized lands, yet the state has also sought to criminalise this form of resistance. The neo-liberal agenda in contemporary Brazil further expresses how 'the government attempts to resolve the agrarian question exactly on the terrain of the enemy: the territory of capital' (2005: p.338). Mattei's chapter (Chapter 12) looks specifically at agrarian reform in Brazil under neo-liberalism, and finds it seriously wanting in tackling rural poverty and squalor. He argues that any real reform involves restructuring rural modes of domination by 'destroying the power of the traditional agrarian oligarchies, as well as reordering the production model controlled by the large agro-industrial corporate network' (2005: p.346). And this requires the convergence of progressive rural and urban social forces.

Ampuero and Brittain (Chapter 13) claim that the global neo-liberal model of development has reinforced the power of the national oligarchy in Columbia and that this class continues to dominate the state to the exclusion of rural workers and small landholders in national development processes. Historically, land reform has been used by the state to (ineffectively) disarm the opposition in the countryside, including the guerrilla movement. This 'peasant-led armed struggle' (2005: p.368) defends rural settlements from paramilitary forces, including those involved in the cultivation of coca alongside more traditional crops, and it seeks to establish alternative agricultural models in 'liberated' areas. The authors detail various policy documents of the guerrilla army (the FARC-EP) concerning agrarian transformation and the dismantling of the neo-liberal agrarian strategy. Mexico has also witnessed significant

uncivil claims to land, notably amongst Indian peasants as discussed by Bartra and Otero (Chapter 14). These struggles for land and autonomy, which the chapter details in considerable historical depth, involve an 'inseparable' mixture of 'material (land) and identity (culture) demands' (2005: p.383). This raises complex questions about the relation between a strictly indigenous (ethnic) movement and broader alliances with the rest of the Mexican peasantry and, in this light, the authors try to develop a theory of political-class formation that involves both economic and cultural dimensions. The recent Chiapas uprising involving Zapatista Indians, and subsequent ongoing events, demonstrates that the Mexican Indian peasantry has been politically constituted as a class. Bartra and Otero conclude by arguing that 'for each Indian peasant there are two mestizos, almost always as poor. Therefore the rural struggle of Indian peoples is interwoven with that of the peasantry as a class. It has always been so... [T]he peasant movement has been resurrected from the dead' (2005: pp. 406-7).

This collection of essays is an essential contribution to the burgeoning academic literature on agrarian and land questions. The sketches drawn on the global canvas by the editors (and authors) clearly reveal common agrarian processes and trajectories throughout the East and South. Moyo and Yeros have successfully captured analytically these global processes, yet in a contingent and historically specific manner. Clearly, the expansion of global capital demands that historical materialists continue to understand capitalism as a world-historical system and, necessarily, this involves venturing into the methodological realm of mega-theory with all its snares and pitfalls. Thus, despite my specific criticisms of their modernist perspective, Moyo and Yeros should be commended for their defence of high-order theory and for seeking to develop it with reference to agrarian processes. As well, the comparative approach of the volume deepens our understanding of national agrarian dynamics, as I illustrated at points with regard to Zimbabwe. The overriding emphasis on the politics of the agrarian question, including class reconstitution and struggle, is an excellent countermeasure to more 'economistic' renditions, although accumulation/production ('economics') and struggle ('politics') are embedded in the same social processes. However, a more focussed attention on specific modes of domination in the countryside would have enriched the analyses contained in the volume, including the chapter on Zimbabwe. Neocosmos for instance stresses the repressive power of the state in rural areas, and argues in the case of apartheid South Africa that a 'transformation of the social relations ... in the interests of the majority of the oppressed is not just a question of ...land redistribution. It is a question of democratising the social relations under which land is held and exploited. It involves of necessity a democratic restructuring of the land tenure system(s) and a democratisation/abolition of the chieftaincy' (1993: p.65). Oppressive modes of rural

domination, in a multitude of forms, continue to exist throughout the South and East, and should be central to our analyses of agrarian processes and reform.

More importantly, after studying all the chapters, the reader is still left with the perplexing feeling that perhaps the resurgence of rural movements is not as considerable as the editors assert, or at least it is marked by considerable unevenness including absence. In this regard, it may be the notion of 'movement' that is particularly problematic rather than the notion of 'resurgence'. The predominant understanding of 'movement' privileges programmatic organisational action, yet many of the chapters in the volume explicitly downplay this and speak of rural resistance and opposition – including land occupations – that are largely spontaneous and unorganised. In other words, across the global periphery, there may be lots of 'motion' but much less in the form of 'movement'. A final point concerns the very notion of 'periphery' that is often used, notably by the editors themselves. This term is regularly associated with world-systems theory that over-privileges the imperialist metropolis and gives it primary explanatory value while the 'periphery' has a more residual analytical status (Mamdani 1996). Considering that the volume seeks to (presumably) counteract this form of (Euro-centric) analysis by emphasising the (un-peripheral/un-residual) role of popular-led agrarian reform in shaping world history, a more neutral term than 'periphery' would have been conceptually advisable.

Zimbabwe – 'Towards the National Democratic Revolution'?

This brings us to the most controversial chapter in the book (Chapter 6), on the land occupations in Zimbabwe. Moyo and Yeros argue that the land occupation movement in Zimbabwe is 'the most notable of rural movements in the world today', that it has obtained 'the first major land reform since the end of the Cold War', that it has been 'the most important challenge to the neocolonial state in Africa' under neo-liberalism (2005: p.165), and – perhaps most controversially – that it has a 'fundamentally progressive nature' (2005: p.188). Their more strident critics would claim that such statements entail – almost perverse – value judgments made by 'patriotic agrarianists' (Moore 2004: p.409) or 'left-nationalists' (Bond and Manyanya 2003: p.78) who fail to conceptualise analytically or even highlight empirically the increasingly repressive character of state nationalism in contemporary Zimbabwe, designated as an 'exclusionary' nationalism (Hammar et al., 2003) or an 'exhausted' nationalism (Bond and Manyanya 2003). In an article that touches on the Zimbabwean chapter of *Reclaiming The Land*, Raftopoulos and Phimister argue that this authoritarianism involves an 'internal reconfiguration of Zimbabwean state politics' (2005: p.377) and now amounts to 'domestic tyranny' (2005: p.356), and they speak about a 'number of African intellectuals on the Left' (including Moyo and Yeros, but also Ibbo Mandaza) who have 'leapt to the defence of ZANU-PF' (2005: p.376) and its re-distributive

economic policies. For their part, Moyo and Yeros claim that their critics (who they call neo-liberal apologists for imperialism or 'civic/post-nationalists') demote the significance of national self-determination and the agrarian question in Zimbabwe, and end up moralising (as I guess liberals are fond of doing) about the recent land movement by focussing on its excessive violence and eventual co-option by the ruling party and state. They therefore argue that it is essential to conceptualise the land occupations in the context of a re-radicalised (and revitalised) state nationalism and the ongoing movement of the NDR.

This debate amongst the Left, which has been the explicit subject of a number of recent papers, has pronounced political overtones, and is indeed linked at times by the protagonists to the current tensions (almost chasms) within the national politics of Zimbabwe that involve 'competing narratives of Zimbabwe's national liberation history' (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003: p.17) as well as fundamentally different conceptions of the current crisis. On the one hand, there is a nationalist discourse that speaks of a land crisis and that stresses national sovereignty and re-distributive policies, and on the other, there is a more liberal discourse that refers to a governance crisis and that emphasises human rights and political democratisation (Hammar et al., 2003; Sachikonye 2002). The first discourse focuses on the external (imperialist) determinants of the crisis and the latter on its internal (nation-state) determinants (Freeman 2005). Yet both discourses have roots in the notion of the NDR, with the former prioritising the 'national' and the latter the 'democratic' (Moore 2004: p.41). For example, Mandaza[2] (who has links with the ruling party) says that during the late 1990s post-nationalist forces in alliance with foreign elements were engaged in a subterranean 'social crisis strategy'[3] that sought to make Zimbabwe ungovernable, and that the (supposedly radical) intellectual representatives of these forces sought to prioritise issues of governance and democracy 'at the expense of addressing the National Question'.[4] Thus, the civic nationalism of these theorists (such as Raftopoulos) is portrayed as civil society warring against the state, and as seeking to undermine economic (re-distributive) nationalism rightly propagated by a beleaguered nation-state in the periphery.

Labelling each other as either left-nationalists or neo-liberals amounts at one level to intellectual misrepresentation and character assassination. Yet it is also suggestive of important theoretical differences within the Left. For example, Raftopoulos has been influenced by a Leftist tradition including the works of Stuart Hall and E. P. Thompson,[5] and he might consider himself a radical democrat, whereas the joint work by Moyo and Yeros is more inclined towards a modernist class perspective. This debate, in which I will not get embroiled directly, brings to the fore the many tensions, contradictions and ambivalences embodied in the socio-political processes characterising present-day Zimbabwe, and raises fundamental questions for sociologists about how to

conceptualise the 'social totality'. Although not defending Raftopoulos and others, whose work I have critically reviewed elsewhere (Helliker 2004) for its failure to offer rigorous class analyses, I argue that Moyo and Yeros – in studying Zimbabwe – have an overly structured conception of the totality, deriving in large part from their modernist perspective.

A considerable part of the argument by Moyo and Yeros entails a (fairly innocuous) political-economic history of pre-1980 Zimbabwe as a white-settler capitalist nation in order to show why independence failed to consummate the NDR, as well as an analysis of key political and social developments between 1980 and 2000 (again largely standard interpretations). It is doubtful whether any of their critics would find major fault with their historical analyses; in fact, Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004), in analysing the development of the Zimbabwean crisis, conclude (as do Moyo and Yeros) that the current accumulation process – including subsequent to 2000 – is particularly beneficial to the emerging black bourgeoisie. Moyo and Yeros, in their historical narration, speak about the petty-bourgeois character of the liberation movement; about how the black petty-bourgeoisie, having been 'shut out of the white private sector', began after independence to 'redirect its accumulation strategies through the state' (2005: p.172) and also touted economic indigenisation within the financial and agricultural sectors; about the devastating effect of neo-liberal structural adjustment on petty commodity farmers in the communal lands; about how (predominantly white) agrarian capital branched into non-traditional high-earning export crops like horticulture plus wildlife eco-tourism as part of extroverted economic liberalisation; and about the de-mobilisation by the ruling party of its social base soon after independence and how by the mid-1990s both urban and rural organisations 'had been well civilized to the requirements of neocolonial capitalism' (2005: p.181; see also Yeros 2002a).

Yet, by the late 1990s, there had emerged a macro-economic crisis (with the IMF withholding any further balance of payments support) and a broad-based political opposition in the urban areas (trade unions, civics, the NCA and the MDC) questioning the legitimacy of the ruling ZANU-PF party. This crisis reverberated within the ruling party and state, spurred on by the openly political demands for compensation by the ruling party aligned (but largely marginalised) war veterans. By the year 2000, in the face of imperialist aggression or at least disengagement, the 'balance of class forces within the ruling party was tipped in favour of radical nationalist solutions' (Moyo and Yeros 2005: p. 188) to agrarian and land questions. Although state nationalism had been re-radicalised, the emphasis by the authors is on the 'continuity in the nationalism' (Yeros 2002a: p. 243) throughout the post-independence period rather than a significantly reconfigured (and narrower) nationalism in recent years as proposed by their critics.

Moyo and Yeros trace the land reform process during the first twenty years of independence, claiming that 'the land cause had never been abandoned' by the semi-proletariat (2005: p.182) and that the land-short constantly pressurised the state for reform through, amongst other tactics, 'uncivil' land occupations. The history of land reform and land occupations in Zimbabwe provided by the authors draws extensively on Moyo's influential earlier work. Occupations occurred in some form or other during all periods of land reform. From 1980-1992, when the market method predominated under the Lancaster House Agreement, there were initially low profile but high intensity occupations that received substantial support from the leaders of the liberation struggle. But as this period progressed, and as the initial thrust of land distribution tapered off because of the increasing embourgeoisement of the ruling party and the fiscal crisis of the state, a rift began to grow between ZANU-PF and its rural (peasant) base. Low intensity occupations continued, but the state's response was to treat the occupants as squatters and to have them removed. The following period from 1993 to 1999 marked the beginning of the challenge to the market method with legislative amendments facilitating the compulsory acquisition of commercial land (with compensation) along with threats to do so on a significant scale (notably in 1997). However, land redistribution progressed slowly and agrarian policy focussed more on modernising master farmers or facilitating small-scale capitalist farming, while the party elite also became extensively involved in commercial farming through leasehold arrangements. Occupations proceeded apace during the time (of structural adjustment) and reached a climax in 1998 with high-profile community-led occupations during the International Donors Conference. The land occupations from 1980 to 1999 involved loosely organised and fragmented forms of un-civility, and differed significantly from the recent 'fast track' or Third Chimurenga occupations in this regard.

Like other agrarian specialists on Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2002, 2003; Marongwe 2003), Moyo and Yeros note various differences in character between the latest round of land occupations and earlier ones, including the active involvement of the state in driving the 'fast track' land movement. In the end, though, they claim that the 'essence' of the occupations has 'remained the same' (Moyo 2001: p.321). They also weave together a story of unbroken rural action by the semi-proletariat that portrays the current land occupations as a 'climax' of constant and consistent struggles over land (Moyo 2001: p.314) and as dramatically addressing the national question and advancing the NDR. This claim seems very close to romanticising the peasantry (the Subject of history?) and insinuating that, against all adversity and despite negligence on the part of other social classes, the land-short forever sought to advance the NDR, that they 'never abandoned the revolution'. This is what Moore refers to as the 'peasants have taken charge of history' narrative (2001: p.257). Similar to a remark I made in the previous section, this seems consistent with the 'old left

trap of turning some group amongst the marginalised or exploited into the fetishised vessel of … [the analyst's]... personal hopes by projecting some sort of dehumanising ontological purity… on to the chosen group' (Pithouse 2003: p. 127). Without wanting to romanticise the land movement in Zimbabwe, Bernstein (2003: p.220) claims that it represented an 'objectively progressive' expression of the new agrarian question of labour, because land occupations as a reproductive strategy addressed the unfinished business of the NDR.

Yet critics such as Jocelyn Alexander (2003) would argue that this entails a restricted notion of the NDR, such that 'to focus narrowly on the occupations alone misses the point that what they marked was not just an unprecedented assault on the unequal distribution of land [Bernstein's progressive content] but also an extraordinary transformation of the state and political sphere' (2003: p.104) in an undemocratic direction. Moyo and Yeros downplay the re-structuring of the state in an authoritarian direction (see also Hammar 2003 and Chaumba et al., 2003), and what is emphasised throughout is the function-ality of the state in legitimising and strengthening the land movement in the direction of the NDR. Despite their recognition of nation building as a process in the early independence period of reconstruction, they fail to adequately make problematic the notion of the nation in the current context of crisis but treat it (and the national question) rather a-historically, or more of a product than a process. As a result, they fail to look critically at the Zimbabwean state's 'discursive authority' and practices to understand how national discourses fix the meanings of (an otherwise ambiguous and uncertain) nation (see Doty 1996). Simultaneously, they are outright dismissive of alternative renditions of the nation (for example, a civic nationalism) because of the supposed imperi-alist character of these renditions. At times, for Moyo and Yeros it appears that simply labelling a specific social group or practice as 'imperialist' (or 'neo-liberal') has some sort of magical explanatory value that limits the need for further investigation. Interestingly, prior to the 'wave' of democratisation throughout Africa during the 1990s, Shivji (1989) theorised about the NDR and human rights, and argued (unlike Moyo and Yeros today) that the furtherance of the NDR necessitated a distinctive anti-authoritarian (and thus democratic) thrust that privileged the right of the popular classes to organise independent of the repressive nation-state. In this respect, Neocosmos (1993) repeatedly emphasises the critical link between 'democratisation from below' (1993: p.8) and both land and agrarian reform, and he argues that democratic struggles are 'the primary issue' (1993: p.15) in ensuring progressive reform. This lacuna in the work of Moyo and Yeros is particularly surprising given that in the past Moyo has shown a marked sensitivity to the fact that 'basic democratic principles have not underlain land policy formulation' (1999: p.21) in Zimbabwe since independence.

As noted earlier, Moyo and Yeros argue that the occupations in Zimbabwe had a fundamentally progressive character. The overriding social base of the

movement was the rural-based semi-proletariat but it expanded to include the urban proletariat and petty bourgeois elements, and this involved bridging the urban-rural divide in a 'tense but resolute cross-class nationalist alliance on land' (2005: p.189). Initially, the movement had a working class thrust, in opposition to the (relatively retrogressive) post-national alliance of civil society – a mixed political bag including urban-based trade unions and white commercial farmers – that made no significant demands for redistribution of resources and had no agrarian reform programme. War veterans, with links in both the semi-proletariat and state bureaucracy, were able to effectively organise, mobilise and lead the movement. Yet they never sought to establish democratic peasant-worker organisational structures during the course of the occupations, nor did they challenge the institution of chieftaincy as a modern form of indirect rule. As a result, state bureaucrats, aspiring black capitalists and ruling party leaders were able to develop hegemony over the movement, and they claimed ownership over the land revolution based on their liberation and indigenisation credentials. In this regard, 'the black elite employed the state apparatus to retain its power and prepare the ground for its reassertion in national politics', and this entailed undermining 'any source of working-class organization outside elite ruling-party control, in both town and country' (2005: p.192, 193). The balance of class forces within the nationalist land alliance shifted dramatically against the semi-proletariat as the black elite dominated the policy making process and steered land reform in a direction that favoured its bourgeois interests, an outcome which is very common in historical reform processes globally (see Sobhan 1993). Thus, while re-peasantisation has been a dominant aspect of the land redistribution process through new petty commodity producer establishments under the A1 reset-tlement scheme, middle and large black capitalists are 'in political alliance under the banner of indigenization, seeking to appropriate the remaining land and also to tailor the agricultural policy framework to their needs' (2005: p199). The (initial) anti-imperialist potential of the land occupations has thus been subverted, and there is the danger of a 'full reversal' (2005: p.194) of the agrarian reform process because of the comprador aspirations of the black bourgeoisie.

Moyo and Yeros assert that the strategy of state-led land reform 'did not go far enough *within* the ruling party and the state to safeguard the peasant-worker character of the movement or to prepare the semi-proletariat organizationally against the reassertion of the black bourgeoisie' (2005: p.193, their emphasis). This claim is very provocative (and worth exploring) in terms of theorising about the nation-state and political change, yet regrettably it is not clearly formulated let alone substantiated, if only because Moyo and Yeros – according to Moore – have 'no theory of the state' (2004: p.415). It might in fact be argued that the opposite is the case, and that the agrarian change strategy went too far within the state and was thereby captured by what Raftopoulos

labels as the state 'commandism' of ZANU-PF (Raftopoulos 2005: p.5). The argument by Moyo and Yeros though is part of their more general state-centred theory of change, and is explicitly a reaction to society-centred theories that romantically depict independent civil society expressions (anti-politics or independence from political society) as the critical nexus for social transformation. Baker (2002) has critically discussed this position with reference to both Eastern Europe and Latin America, but it is a position that Holloway has strongly adopted. Holloway (2003) argues that focussing popular struggles on and against the state (or capturing state power) is tantamount to subordinating opposition to the logic of capitalism, and that progressive forces should not take state power but dissolve it. This anti-politics or anti-power involves thus a non-instrumentalist conception of social revolution. Holloway claims that to struggle through the state involves continuity rather than rupture, and that the fetishised forms of social relations under capitalism depict falsely the state as the 'centre point of social power' (2003: p.57).

For Moyo and Yeros, however, this 'breaking with the state' is not 'a sufficient condition for autonomous self-expression' as both state and society are expected to be civil to the needs of capital. Hence, they argue that 'breaking with the civility of *capital*' – including subverting entrenched property rights in land – is the 'requirement' (2005: p.179 their emphasis) for independent progressive movements. On this basis, they thus stress that the land movement involved a challenge to the specifically neo-colonial (and comprador) character of the Zimbabwean nation-state. Regrettably, in de-emphasising (or in refusing to acknowledge) how this same movement reinforced (and reconfigured) the authoritarian form of the state, the dialectical moments in this movement are not properly captured by the authors. According to Moyo and Yeros, it was during this last period of popular land reform, from the year 2000 onwards, that un-civility 'obtained radical land reform *through the state and against imperialism*' (2005: p.179 their emphasis). They seem though to have a rather undifferentiated notion of imperialism and fail to consider more regional forms of imperialism, notably the pan-African sub-imperialism of South African capitalism (Neville Alexander 2003). They also appear at times to conflate imperialism and capitalism, and thereby assume that 'against imperialism' is necessarily 'against capitalism'.

Moyo and Yeros clearly celebrate the specific form of uncivil action embodied in the land movement, involving what Mandaza approvingly calls the 'abrogation of that principle that governs capitalism per se: the inviolability of the right of private property'.[6] This position is consistent with well-argued claims made by theorists based in the South and East about alternative roads to modernity and 'indigenous traditions of civility' (Kaviraj 2001: p.322). Indeed, Chatterjee argues that the 'squalor, ugliness and violence of popular life' cannot be imprisoned 'within the sanitized fortress of civil society' and that there might be some 'strategic use of illegality and violence' (2002: pp.70, 71).

Thus, Yeros in his thesis raises serious doubts about the prospects of 'civil solutions to neo-colonialism' (2002a: p.161). He argues for example that the main trade union federation in Zimbabwe (the ZCTU) and the peasant farmers association (the ZFU) capitulated to civilisation or became civilised, such that the 'rural grievances of the semi-proletariat ... remained in uncivil terrain' (2002a: p.213). Further, the 'civil domain, by definition, cannot be broadened by civil society. The onus lies on progressive uncivil politics in the periphery' (2002a: p.249).

Thus, although the land movement has now been largely hijacked and reinserted into the political project of the black agrarian bourgeoisie, it has (or had) a progressive content in relation to the NDR. For example, the new agrarian structure has (or had) the potential to broaden the home market as a basis for a more articulated pattern of accumulation involving an introverted agro-industrial production system, thus contributing to the resolution of the agrarian and national questions (see Bernstein 2005: p.91 here). The potential benefits of land redistribution in resolving the accumulation and production aspects of the agrarian question have also been emphasised by Moyo (2000) elsewhere. But, in examining the current period, most analysts claim that the fast track programme has not had a significant impact (economically) on the land question (considering ongoing landlessness and land congestion in the communal areas) and that the 'broader agrarian question still needs to be defined and addressed' (Sachikonye 2003: p. 238; see also Mbaya 2001 and Freeman 2005). Indeed, Moore (2003) has disputed the nature and extent of the link between land and economic production and accumulation. He argues that, despite what the ruling party claims, the current economic crisis is not necessarily rooted in the land question and that fast track has not stimulated the (still stalled) primitive accumulation process in Zimbabwe. He further claims that 'the imperative for speedy resettlement [since 2000] did not come from an aroused peasantry, but in the politics of a regime facing economic crisis, [and] the loss of allies within almost all sectors of civil society' (Moore 2001: p.262).

In fact, it is the politically progressive aspect of the land movement that is most contentious. Moyo and Yeros note that land redistribution over the past few years has undone racial property rights in rural areas and has redressed historical injustices by giving significant number of peasants land. In so doing, it has undermined the racial manifestation of the class struggle in Zimbabwe, thus laying the basis for the next – and presumably more class-based – phase of the NDR. Mandaza argues in a similar vein: on the one hand, the emergent African bourgeoisie is bound to benefit most from the land reform process, yet this will simultaneously open up the struggle 'tomorrow between the black bourgeoisie and the underclass of society'.[7] As noted earlier, this is largely a teleological depiction of Zimbabwean society and history.

But what the critics of Moyo and Yeros roundly denounce is their underestimation (or underplaying) of state violence. Thus, Moyo (2001: pp.325-330)

argues that the short-term pain of authoritarian and violent practices during the occupations must be weighed against the longer-term benefits for democratisation in advancing the NDR. Mandaza likewise argues that it is a 'politically reactionary position... to deny the principle of land redistribution simply because the methods being employed are said to be bad'.[8] For Raftopoulos and Phimister (1995: p. 376), this means that 'democratic questions will be dealt with at a later stage, once the economic kingdom has been conquered' (see also Moore 2003). This age-old question about means and ends in political struggle, and its implications for agrarian change in contemporary Zimbabwe, is deserving of ongoing study.

Moyo and Yeros claim that the NDR in Zimbabwe is now at a critical juncture, and that its further progress requires bridging the yawning political gap between the urban and rural semi-proletariat and proletariat under conditions of reinstated civil and political liberties. They call for a 'new class-based nationalism against the racialized, bourgeois nationalism of the indigenization lobby, and against neoliberal democracy politics' (2005: p. 201). This argument that the next phase of the NDR is clearly at hand (or at least is somewhere around the corner) and thus is in the process of unfurling due its inherent make-up, and that it demands (almost by necessity) a particular programmatic alliance amongst progressive forces, seems to be their answer to the classic Leninist question of 'what is to be done', and it is consistent with their deterministic notion of the social totality. It clearly goes contrary to what they would likely consider to be 'post-modernist' renditions of the dilemmas currently facing the Left internationally. For instance, Hardt and Negri (2001) identify a nebulous multitude as the agency of emancipation in the contemporary world, and they speak of a global authority (Empire) and simultaneously downplay the nation-state as a centralised authority. As a result, they are bitterly criticised because 'strategic guidance' (like that offered by Moyo and Yeros for Zimbabwe) is not forthcoming (Callinicos 2003: p. 136). Likewise, Holloway fails – in fact refuses – to chart the strategic way forward. He claims that 'the knowing of the revolutionaries of the last century has been defeated' (2003: p.89), and that the old certainties of the Left are no longer tenable. In other words, changing the world without taking power is an open-ended and indeterminate process. In that sense, the Leninist question may be the wrong question altogether.

Sociology and Agrarian Reform

Callari and Ruccio (1996), in noting the challenges of post-modernism to historical materialism, speak of different tendencies and divergent conceptions of the 'social totality' within Marxism historically. On the one hand, they refer to a 'modernist systematicity' (1996: p.23) that over-privileges ontological order and determinism and that enacts closure on what are open-ended and incomplete social spaces. On the other hand, they identify a more anti-systemic

(meaning less-structured) trend within Marxism that stresses openness, formation and disorder or a contingent (and even un-sutured) social totality. This tension within historical materialism highlights the ambivalence of the human condition and of social relations, but Callari and Ruccio claim that, throughout most of its history, Marxism has unfortunately embraced a 'modernist systematicity'. In other words, the contingencies and contradictions (or the dialectics) of the human condition (the concrete totality) have been theoretically represented as an overly structured (and deterministic) abstract totality. It is this dominant representation by historical materialism that has been (quite rightly) the object of criticism by post-Marxists. Yet the argument by Callari and Ruccio implies that the seeds of post-Marxism/post-modernism are inherent within the history – and theory – of Marxism, in the second totality based on contingency.

In this context, it is abundantly clear that Moyo and Yeros in many ways are sensitive to the dialectical processes of 'the social'. For instance, they highlight the conflicting economic-political processes that seem to be pulling the peasantry in opposing directions, involving both re-peasantisation (through land occupations) and proletarianisation (through land concentration). They also note the contradictory tendencies within the land movement in Zimbabwe, speaking about both its retrogressive and progressive moments. A key point they emphasise is that the land movement had the real potential (at least initially) to democratise the countryside, a point that their critics fail to appreciate in their overriding (and one-sided, un-dialectical?) emphasis on authoritarian nationalism. Yet, these contradictory processes – in the work of Moyo and Yeros – are largely sacrificed on the altar of an overly structured totality. The openness and contingency of these processes, including the class agency that they rightly bring to the fore, are subsumed under the notion of the National Democratic Revolution and the trajectory of this social process. In this regard, Bernstein (2003) makes a very telling point, in speaking about a 'dialectical (rather than romantic) view of history' (2003: p.220). Moyo and Yeros of course are not agrarian romantics but are serious scholars seeking to make sense of highly complex agrarian processes globally and locally. Regrettably, they enact methodological closure on the social dialectics embodied in their (otherwise) insightful analyses. In theorising about social change in the modern world, Holloway makes the absolutely critical point that, as historical materialists, 'we must reject the notion of a dialectic which reconciles everything in the end' (2002: p.159).

There is a clear tension in the work of Moyo and Yeros, but unfortunately they tend to edge ever so close to a modernist systematicity. In this context, their critics claim that Moyo and Yeros simply reproduce the (un-dialectical) nationalist teleological depiction of Zimbabwean society and history propagated by the ruling party. But such an argument crudely conflates particular points of consistency in representation/argumentation with universal

agreement. Besides an overly structured totality, Moyo and Yeros also have an overly-realist conception of 'the social' rather than a more 'constructionist' conception as often found within sociology. The relationship between structure and agency seems unmediated, as if the latter can simply be read from the former, and thus claims about reductionism have been made about their form of analysis (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). In this respect, what Bartra and Otero label in their chapter on Mexico as a theory of political class formation, along the lines it seems of E. P. Thompson, would involve looking deeply into the realms of the experiences of the worker-peasant. Moyo and Yeros would likely agree with the importance of this, but they tend to posit certain forms of consciousness to the peasantry that are consistent with the trajectory of the National Democratic Revolution. The general conclusion that seems to arise from this review essay is that the insightful analyses contained in *Reclaiming The Land* would have been further enriched if the 'elusive' notion of the National Democratic Revolution were 'expelled' from the volume.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Brian Raftopoulos for his comments on an earlier version of this review essay.

2. Regrettably, Ibbo Mandaza has failed to publish any academic literature in recent years. However, it is widely known that Mandaza writes the weekly column 'The Scrutator' in *The Zimbabwe Mirror*. All quotations from Mandaza in this review essay are from this column.

3. *The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 25 June to 1 July 1999.

4. *The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 28 April to 4 May 2000.

5. Personal communication with Raftopoulos, 20 September 2005.

6. *The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 12 January to 18 January 2003.

7. *The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 14 July to 20 July 2002.

8. *The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 27 October to 2 November 2000.

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Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in Southern Africa: Understanding the Opportunities Lost

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Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma, (eds.), *Demilitarisation and Peace-building in Southern Africa. Vol. II, National and Regional Experiences*. Aldershot: Ashgate (The International Political Economy of the New Regionalism Series), 2004.

Peter Batchelor, Kees Kingma and Guy Lamb, (eds.), *Demilitarisation and Peace-building in Southern Africa. Vol. 111. The Role of the Military in State Formation and National Building*. Aldershot: Ashgate (The International Political Economy of the New Regionalism Series), 2004.

Benign: how else might one described the two words, 'Demilitarisation' and 'Peace-building', which anchor this set of three books published on behalf of the Cape Town-based Centre for Conflict Resolution? Benign, yes; and yet, the unfolding tragedy in Iraq shows how quickly these (and other) key-words can be corroded. In the exercise of state power, words are often stripped of meaning to suit narrow political ends. Often, however, this process is corroborated by the set routines of academic discourse. Here, the accusing finger points, not at faceless decision-makers, but to the routines of organised knowledge.

While the contributors to these three books are not beholden to the power of power politics, to use a phrase from the American theorist, John Vasquez,[1] suggest that the routines of orthodox International Relations, especially its ontological focus on states, have corroded the good intentions of those who participated in the project from which these books were hatched.

Orthodox International Relations (IR) is fixated on what it calls 'Realism'. Underlying this theoretical construct are five assumptions: international politics is about states; states seek (military) power because nothing else can guarantee their security; relations between states are guided by national interests; it is possible – no imperative – to distinguish between the political and the economic; and because the world is driven by calculations of power, states must prepare for war.[2]

Generalised statements like these are of course the staple diet of disciplinary routines where parsimony always weighs heavily on choice.[3] As a result efforts to organise are invariably over-stretched, distorted, and twisted to fit into formal explanatory frames. This is an over-riding feature of Realist IR and accounts for its wholly simple-minded formulations of the social world.

Take the Realist belief that southern African states operate within a regional 'state system'. This idea was introduced into the region's political discourse in the late 1960s by the American political scientist Larry Bowman.[4] Four years later the idea was imprinted in academic lore by the success of a book[5] which first described the region within the conceptual framing of Realism. As it did so, both history and sociology were ignored: what mattered more was the necessity to force the region into policy frames that could be of use to practitioners.

The facts on the ground were somewhat different, however. At the time, all the states in the region were – as they remain, incidentally – wholly unformed. This explains why overlapping sovereignties, not to mention robust cross-border communities, flourish throughout southern Africa.

The essays in the three books under review are positioned within the broad framing of 'Peace Studies'. In its heyday, 'Peace Research' – as it was also known – was seen to be an antidote to Cold War Realism. Strongly normative in its calling, Peace Studies favoured social engineering over empirical and historical inquiry.

Understanding this teleology explains why these essays fail to ask deep-seated, first-order questions about the theoretical construction of southern Africa and its 'state system'. It also explains why these writers are not concerned with rescuing the key-words – even those which they champion – from their corrosion by the unbridled forms of Realist IR.

Peace Research has never made a deep impression in southern Africa. Institutionally, its only real home – in South Africa, certainly – has been the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) which has been within the institutional fold of the University of Cape Town for forty years. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the CCR was associated with the work of H. W. van der Merwe, the Afrikaner sociologist and Quaker Peace-Activist; from 1992 to 2003, it was directed by Laurie Nathan, one-time student leader, anti-conscription activist, who has degrees in Business, Law and Peace Studies.

The overall aim of these books, as Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma suggest in their introduction to Volume One, 'is to support and facilitate the achievement of sustainable peace and human development in southern Africa, by analysing demilitarization and peace-building processes in the region and identifying policy options for peace-building. The central focus of the research is the extent to which demilitarization following the termination of wars has contributed to broad processes of peace-building in the affected region. Has the military in southern Africa downsized and refocused towards new roles? Has

there been a "peace-dividend", allowing more investment in economic and human development, thereby dealing with some of the root causes of conflict? The research findings reported here have addressed these questions from several different angles, at several levels, and in a number of specific country settings'.

In the main, the goals they have set themselves have been achieved. In the first volume this is certainly so, but – and this is great disappointment of the entire set – these goals fail to describe the region in ways that are different from those offered by Realist IR. For this reviewer, this is the fundamental flaw in Peace Research. Interests, as I have argued elsewhere, will always trump ideas.[6]

Andre du Pisani's chapter is the only one (of five) to be positioned, disciplinary-speaking, within the mainstream of International Relations (IR). His chapter on 'concepts and discourse' succeeds in tracking an unfolding series of ideas both within the region in the aftermath of the Cold War. He opens with Barry Buzan's pioneering work towards the 'widening and deepening' of the idea of security:[7] away from the state towards more rounded understandings of ways to understand the myriad of processes which surround 'demilitarisation and peace-keeping'.

This said, du Pisani's chronology often decomposes, and his emphases are difficult to understand. He also misses, in my view, important moments in the development of the critical literature which challenged Realist IR. (Ken Booth's brief but seminal paper[8] which turned thinking about security in southern Africa on its head, for example, is not mentioned at all!) Does this explain, one must wonder, why the idea of Human Security – which has recently made such of powerful impact in both theory and practise of IR – gets only one, and very passing, mention?

Laurie Nathan's idea around the 'structural causes of crisis and violence' borrows from an early generation of peace researchers especially the pioneering ideas of Johan Galtung. Although often invoked, these concepts have not enjoyed a wide understanding in southern Africa. But the guise in which they appear here is not strongly sociologically located, as was Galtung's work. Instead, Nathan locates them in democratic theory and suggests ten ways to manage 'structural violence' in Africa.

Gavin Cawthra's ideas are located within state theory – Charles Tilly and Benedict Anderson, for instance – but he draws the argument about the provision of security continually back towards the limits of 'state capacity'. Both History and Sociology might have helped him to suggest why this lack of capacity can be explained by the imported nature of the state in the region.

The defence economist Peter Bachelor sets out a strong 'opportunity-cost' argument for demilitarisation through the use of quantitative indicators. It is a convincing argument but, alas, one poorly understood by mainstream economists who look beyond militaries to markets to deliver peace to southern Africa. Bachelor does not address this issue. This is a pity because the alliance

between market economics and state-centred political power sustains most Realist IR thinking in the region.

Using a 'sociological lens', Jackie Cock's interests are with identities, institutions and ideologies. She ends, however, somewhere else – with violence, gender and the environment but only after picking from a rich theoretical base: Noam Chomsky, Jaques Derrida, Richard Falk, Anthony Giddens, Clifford Geertz, Eric Hobsbawm, Michael Igantieff, Fredrick Jameson, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Edward Said and Anthony Smith.

These thinkers offer interesting alternative perspectives on the southern African region but, curiously, Cock ignores the insights offered by history in the construction of the region and its political discourses. Nonetheless, this is the only piece in the entire series that is seriously interested in theoretical ideas and in sociology.

Kees Kingma's contribution is distant from the region. He mainly reports second-hand from workshops; he is more interested on what happens when Peace Studies meets management and implementation. Five quite flimsy, case-studies, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, anchor a plea for appreciating more deeply the plight of ex-combatants, and for assisting in their integration in society.

If Volume One of this Series hangs together, albeit by using different disciplinary points of entry, Volume Two is little more than a pastiche. What were the editors aiming at by drawing such diverse themes together?

Certainty there are, as the sub-title suggests, 'national and regional experiences' of demilitarisation and peace-building in the region, but each of these themes could have produced a volume in, and of, itself. Parenthetically, this is where a chapter looking at the force, power and material basis of policy think-tanks would have made a welcome contribution to consolidating 'demilitarisation and peace-keeping' in southern Africa.

After apartheid ended, energetic writings and policy interventions from these groups helped to turn words into directions other than they were intended. Max Weber helped us understand how this happens during transitions: ideas that aim for '... change … are worn down by historical process, codified and routinized by interpreters, gradually brought into line with the status quo'.[9]

Located in (foreign-funded) think-tanks, these interpreters have devoted themselves to the perfection of the management of the region through the ontology offered by states. They fought – and they won – a battle for the soul of the region by strategically positioning benign words at problem-laden conceptual intersections. In these places, progressive ideas were constructed as threats to rational ordering and any benign meanings that words may have enjoyed were stripped away in power politics.

As this happened, any hopes for another form for southern Africa was lost and the idea of 'peace and prosperity' was turned into an armed chain of Realism that links demilitarisation and peace-building to the imperative for

economic growth. South Africa's 1998 invasion of Lesotho stands as testimony to efforts to impose Realist order on the region by twisting words and their meanings; unfortunately, this event gets barely a mention in these three books.

If the second volume in the series was an opportunity lost, the final in the series is well directed: the role of the military in state-formation in Southern Africa. This is a return of the modernisation theme that militaries make nations.

Following an introductory chapter by Andre du Pisani and Guy Lamb which traces, but does not really critique, this modernisation trajectory, there are country chapters – Botswana (Bonolo Simon Ditiraw), Mozambique (João Paulo Borges Coelho and Paulino Macaringue), Namibia (Andre du Pisani), South Africa (Annette Seegers), and Zimbabwe (Walter Tapfumaneyi). These are interesting, albeit uneven, case studies: each points the way towards the need for further work. Again, what seems necessary is a regional perspective: this could, conceivably, again have been delivered by History and Sociology.

If all these criticisms sound a trifle hard: let me mute them somewhat. Any work that counters the deepening corrosion of social life that has been so powerfully driven by net-worked Realist think-tanks must be welcomed – no, must be roundly applauded. In important ways, and this follows from what has been argued, the absence of muscular IR is a singular strength of this volume; indeed, the entire project.

The contributors to these three books hope that neo-institutionalism will deliver to southern Africa's people all that has been denied them. But, Iraq suggests that neo-institutionalism, if stripped of its benign intent, can deliver great harm. The problem may lie elsewhere. It is a pity that the idea of states – their history, and their sociology – was subjected to too few searching questions by the twenty-five authors who fill these pages.

Notes

1. John A. Vasquez, (1983), *The Power of Power Politics*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

2. These ideas have been distilled from Kim Richard Nossal, (1998), *The Patterns of World Politics*, London: Prentice- Hall, p. 15.

3. This comes from Donald J. Pachula, (2002), 'Introduction, Visions of International Relations: Project and Procedure', in Donald J. Pachula, (eds.), *Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field*, University of South Carolina Press, p. xv.

4. Larry W. Bowman, (1968), 'The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa', *International Studies Quarterly*, 12, 3, 231-261.

5. Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale, (eds.), (1972), *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in RegionalPolitics*, New York: The Free Press.

6. Peter Vale, (2004), *Whatever happened to the post-apartheid moment? Past hopes and possible futures for southern Africa*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR Comment Series), 37p.

7.   Barry Buzan, (1991), *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Second Edition), Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.

8.   Ken Booth, (1994), 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations', Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies (Working Paper Series No. 30).

9.   Cited in John Abromeit, (2004), 'Remembering Adorno', *Radical Philosophy*, 124, p. 27.

BOOK REVIEWS

Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar, *Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. 2001.

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Ellis and Ter Haar waste no time in alerting their readers to their claims: to understand the dynamics of African politics first seek to understand the religious ideas and experience of the people of Africa, and: look to the inter-action between religious ideas and politics in Africa for a better understanding of changes taking place in the wider world. Politics and religion have never been separate issues in Africa (nor often, elsewhere) simply because African life has never lived separate from spiritual matters. With at times captivating enthusiasm Ellis and Ter Haar ('the authors') have produced a well-researched account of the fusion of the spiritual and the social, and especially spiritual and political, that shapes Africa and her peoples. But more than this, they have recognised that to understand religion in Africa it is not enough to subject the religious practice of the people of Africa to the Western sociological gaze: as panoptic as such as gaze may be, it fails to hear the voices of Africa.

Truth is partial in that no one individual or group possesses it entirely. Knowledge comes from facts and experiences, but since our facts and experiences are inevitably limited, our truths are never total. No one of us is ever objective enough because no one of us can ever see, hear, taste, smell, or touch enough. If we wish to secure a truth greater than our own, we must converse with people whose experiences are different than our own. The truth, says Donna Haraway, emerges through 'shared conversations in epistemology' (1991, p. 101). The time Descartes spent meditating would have been better spent conversing with the largest number and widest cross-section of people possible. No one can attain the truth herself or himself. To achieve objective knowledge, we need each other (Tong 1997: p.157 - 158).

One of the key contributions of this text to the sociological study of religion lies in the authors' epistemological approach to the study through the ideas of the people, rather than the typical sociological approach focussed on structures and systems. One intriguing source for their study has been recognition of the oral traditions of Africa through the use of rumour to facilitate their epistemological access to African ways of faith, for it is often in the discourse of

rumour that peoples ways of knowing come to the fore. The novel perspectives the authors bring are well rooted in established anthropological and socio-logical theory of Weber, the Comaroffs, Foucault, Geertz, Giddens, and from African philiosophy and religion, Mbiti.

From their definition of religion ('a belief in the existence of an invisible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, that is the home to spiritual beings with effective powers over the material world' – 2001, p.14), the authors place their study firmly in Africa. Traditional Western understandings of religion simply cannot accommodate African perspectives; they colonise and confine the ideas of Africa into the paradigms of the West (2001:181). To understand religion in Africa requires that we look to African ideas of religion and not simply to the institutions of religion. In ways echoed by the ontological perspective of social realism in the West (Archer 2000) many Africans view reality as stratified. The African perspective acknowledges that beneath the empirical world lies the spiritual world, with the former emergent from the latter. This relationship between the visible and invisible world is what connects religion and politics in Africa, for influence over the spiritual world (and control over communication with that world) 'can become a matter of the greatest political importance' (Ellis & Te Haar 2001:15). The authors remind us that we need to recognise that 'politics' extends beyond the social institu-tions into the underlying social structure emerging out of the relations between human agents: '…politics is seen as the debates and activities relating to the distribution of resources in society in the largest sense' (Ellis & Te Haar 2001:20). It is in using such broader understandings the authors succeed in giving their readers access to the 'shared conversations in epistemology' of religion, life and everything heard in the streets and through radio trottoir (literally, 'radio shopping mall'). Through these shared conversations both religion and politics in real-world late modern Africa appear in an evocative manner.

One of the insights that emerges, related directly to the role of radio trottoir (and the electronic original) concerns the complex relationship between politics and religion that is revealed – tragically – in the way HIV/AIDS is understood and responded to in Africa. In an oral society, dependant upon radio (in both its literal and social form), the rather obvious assertion that foreign aid, and foreign AIDS, sound the same becomes a matter of causality with very real implications (Ellis & Te Haar 2001:46). Added to African understandings of causality rooted in spiritual concerns which ask the question 'why' rather than the Western 'how', and against the background of centuries of colonial exploi-tation, and HIV/AIDS becomes a direct consequence – malicious or accidental – of relationships with the West. In African understanding HIV/AIDS, as it was briefly in the West (and still is in many religious contexts) is a moral issue in its origins, and thus must be treated with religious technologies.

Religion, argue the authors, has been the generally preferred 'technique' for managing change in Africa (2001:163) through the use of spiritual resources. They acknowledge that religion has not been, and is not perfect in managing these resources. Religion in Africa has in some cases been used to support regimes of evil (Maboto Sese Seko) as much as it for social good. They argue that where 'a bloody colonial history has left particularly acute traumas' (for example the Democratic Republic of the Congo) religion is no longer able to perform one of its important African functions – the exorcising of the 'spirits of the dead' – and this failure leaves people ill-equipped to create theories of change (2001:185). In many cases traditional religion has been left so decimated, or so corrupted, that it has lost its influence, and concern has grown for a lack of moral centre and a loss of connection between the spirit world and the material world. As a result new forms of religion ('entrepreneurs') have begun to emerge that lack the social roots of those they replace (2001:190). Once again, the emergence of religion in these spaces of moral uncertainty is not always viewed as good by people outside a specific context (the conflict around shari'a in northern Nigeria for example).

Despite these failures and weaknesses of religion in Africa, the authors argue that religious revival is present in Africa, emergent from the loss of moral centre. Like it or not, believe in it or not, religion and politics are securely inter-twined in Africa, and as Africans continue to spread in a new African Diaspora, so the connections between the spiritual and material worlds will become real in other parts of the world.

This work makes a valuable contribution to understanding what we make of religion as a social practice in Africa. It also has salience for those who seek to understand African politics, from village to national levels. Although at times focusing strongly on the central regions of African, the authors have managed to include rich examples from Egypt to South Africa, and have done so in a way which is refreshing, accessible and frequently surprising.

Archer, M. (2000). Being Human. The Problem of Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tong, R. (1997), 'Feminist Perspectives on Empathy as an Epistemic Skill and Caring as a Moral Virtue', *Journal of Medical Humanities*, 18 (3), 153-168.

Toby Shelley, *Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet*, London, Zed Books. 2005.

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Readers of Toby Shelley's *Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet* will be easily reminded of Anthony Sampson's *The Seven Sisters*. Like Sampson, Shelley brings into his work a strong journalistic background marked by years of observing and analysing the socio-economic and political dimensions of petroleum exploitation. Shelley's urbane prose demystifies the ensemble of geology, mining machines, economics and accounting – the petroleum industry's classic view of itself – making the inner workings of petro-capitalism intelligible to the lay reader.

The major difference with Sampson's *Seven Sisters* (and this is not to belittle the unparalleled investigative depth for which Sampson's works are known) is that Shelley does not dwell on the history of the oil industry and the ruthless tactics with which the oil oligopoly (Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Total and the like) influence politics and policies in Third World oil-producing countries. Shelley's main focus is on the role of oil in the deepening of social impoverishment across the world and on the spread of wars, cross-border socio-political tensions, economic wastefulness and brigandage. He places at the centre of much contemporary global conflict the politics associated with petroleum exploitation. He sees, for instance, the 'politico-military storm' in the Middle East and Central Asia as inseparable from the two regions' vast oil and gas reserves. Even more provocatively, he suggests that '[r]ight-wing lobbyists would not be championing an assertion of US hegemony in West Africa were it not for the uncovering of that region's deep-water oil and natural gas since the 1990s', (p.2).

The book touches on just about everything oil has done to the world and its sensibilities. Chapter Two – the most comprehensive of the book's five chapters (excluding the Conclusion) – details, among other things, the 'bitter harvests' that oil-dependent economies like Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar, have reaped from 'sowing the oil'. These range from the inability to 'convert oil revenues into sustainable economic growth', and declines in per capita incomes since the mid-1970s, to overall economic contraction (especially in major oil exporting countries like Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate). Economic declines in these countries, the book notes, have occurred across periods of oil price booms and slumps, persisted in a world where oil demands continue to grow, and tended to worsen despite promises by national politicians that oil revenues would stimulate

economic diversification. Many of these countries, like Nigeria, have grown used to being referred to as rich lands full of impoverished people.

Among the many explanations the book proffers for the persistence of 'bitter harvests', 'wasted windfalls' and poverty in oil-dependent Third World economies is that the governments of these countries fail to take account of the fact that 'oil and natural gas extraction is capital- rather than labour-intensive'. Even so, petroleum export 'requires little in the way of linkage into the rest of the local economy'. In reality, rather than automatically stimulating diversification, petroleum production 'tends to create enclave industries'. Shelley points out that these attributes of petroleum underscore the need to use petroleum revenues in the wisest ways possible: diversifying the local economy must be a deliberate endeavour if oil-rich Third World countries want to 'break down the walls of the enclave and loosen their excessive 'ties to the oil companies of the industrialised world' (p.43).

Many readers will find Shelley's accounts of the geographies of petroleum-related civil conflict quite revealing. The coincidence of petroleum exploitation and civil conflict is found in places as far apart as Aceh (a special district in Sumatra, in Northern Indonesia) and the Niger Delta (in southern Nigeria), in Angola and Colombia, and in Sudan and Mynmar. A substantial part of Chapter Two is devoted to case analyses of civil conflicts in Aceh (Indonesia), Niger Delta (Nigeria), Angola, Sudan and Colombia. In the various cases, a point is made of how petroleum intersects with factors such as ethnic, linguistic and religious differences and the colonial experience in entrenching civil conflict.

Cross-border conflict seems also to be a major by-product of petro-capitalism and petro-politics. The book details how in the late 1990s the scramble for control of offshore petroleum resources in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa 'resulted in more than thirty territorial disputes' (p.79). Nigeria and Cameroon were brought to the brink of a war when the International Court of Justice ruled that the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula was no longer to belong to Nigeria, but must be ceded to Cameroon – a verdict the Nigerian government rejected. Cross-border tension currently mars the relations between the two neighbours. Western Sahara is still struggling for full independence from Morocco, the multi-billion barrel petroleum reserves in the Spratly Islands are still being contested by at least six countries (China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Malaysia and Brunei), and given the Chinese economy's rapacious thirst for oil, it is unlikely that China will voluntarily relinquish its claim to the islands. Much of the tension between Iran and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia is linked to cross-territorial claims on the oil riches of the Caspian Sea. The now hidden, now open disputes between United Arab Emirates and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Qatar and Bahrain, and Kuwait and Iraq, all have direct links to oil and natural gas reserves in specific territories.

The discourse on 'Dutch disease' and 'oil curse' has traditionally portrayed economic declines, conflict and the prevalence of corruption in (especially Third World) oil-producing countries as seemingly resulting from the mere fact of petroleum endowment. Shelley adopts a different approach. Although frequently using the term 'commodity curse', he lays the blame for the development predicaments of Third World oil-producing countries on institutional failures. He maintains that the spell of conflict and corruption associated with petroleum production can only be undone 'through the construction of social institutions that impose transparency on the collection and distribution of hydrocarbon wealth' (p.80). He advocates 'the widest popular participation in decision-making', which for some countries would mean confronting ethnic and class divisions and for others regional issues and 'traditions of rule by families or military cliques' (p.81).

Another illuminating feature of the book is that an entire chapter is devoted to the role of Western powers in destabilising oil-endowed developing countries, a situation exacerbated by the fact that Western industrial economies are overly dependent on imported energy. For these countries 'oil and gas are too important to be left to their owners to manage' (p.81). The book details the connections between American neo-conservative Republicanism with the conflict in Iraq. It shows how it has been the United States' desire, since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, to have 'a partner or stooge regime in Iraq' just in case Saudi Arabia could no longer be trusted to play its pro-US role of curbing, from within OPEC's oil price hikes. Indeed, Shelley argues, the United States has used the rhetoric called 'global war on terror' to run a ring around some of the world's major oil reserves. 'War on terror' has served as a pretext for garrisoning the Middle East, 'building air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan', and seeking 'control over Caspian reserves' (p.107).

If Shelley's book makes an important statement on the current state of conflict and insecurity in the world, it is that the lust for oil (within and outside producing states) is central to both.

This is a bold, lively and readable book. It is another vocal example of the longing among analysts and activists across the world for a new energy future.

G. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2005.

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This book offers an analytic commentary on the living contradiction inherent in the notion of colonial humanism developed as a variant of French colonial policy in the inter-war years as well as on one of its intellectual responses, that of Negritude. Both, it is shown, eventually fed on each other and enabling a relationship of a special type – a variant of neo-colonialism – to develop and operate up to the mid-1990s. Its policy resonances however, seen in the current nature of Western development projects in Francophone Africa for instance, continue up to the present.

From a vantage point that is post-Marxian/structuralist/modern, Wilder's analysis is guided by 'the conviction that it is possible to identify structural features of colonial formations and their corresponding socioeconomic, political, and cultural logics while also attending to their contradictory and historically specific features' (p.79). He wants us to believe that contrary to those post-colonial scholars engrossed in post-national geopolitics that look for explanations and categories beyond the nation-state, post-modern explanations can (still) be sought for at the level of discourses found at the level of the state. 'Greater France as a spatially dispersed and multicultural political formation (and) Negritude's multiple commitments to republicanism, panafricanism and cosmopolitanism', to him can be explained at the level of the specific discourses and resultant policies in and around the nation-state. This is in order to explain something that is not altogether new (say, for students of Francophone African foreign policy), that colonial policy and Negritude did produce its own symbiosis (p.204), something that carried over into the Franco-African relations in the first decades after independence.

First and foremost though, the book sets out to challenge conventional interpretations of France's colonial role. Wilder wants to overcome the tension evident in conventional writing between the ideals of French republicanism and the grubby oppressiveness of imperial-colonialist exploitation, a tension most analysts, he finds, are unable to overcome. But he also intends something else. Using Marx as reference, a bottom-up view in explaining French history and sense of self is taken. Explaining the contours of the contradictory and unfinished nature of the French imperial-nation state is best done by starting from the colonies. This, with the intention of exposing the 'doubleness' and ambiguity of the history of French capitalist modernity. The intention is to

expose the crises and transformations, the ebbs and flows of political rationality (p.14) and the disjointed relationships engendered in and around the French imperial venture.

To Wilder the disjointedness and contradictoriness of the modernist project in the French colonies – a project which contains elements of liberalism, neo-liberalism and welfarism – helps us transcend the conventionally talked about 'tension' of a French republicanism, seemingly at odds with French imperialism. Instead, he takes a holistic view, explaining French behaviour in terms of the contradictions within the nation-state itself. The aim is to bring about an integrated treatment of universality and particularity as 'interrelated dimensions of republican, national and colonial policies' that have 'seen universalising practice have particularising effects' (p.15).

As such, the book gives the reader a sense of the intellectual discourse(s) in and around the state which informed colonial policy in the inter-war years. This discourse combined republican images of solidarity with integral nationalist images of organic community intended to build an imperial mentality in the metropole (p.32). All this, however, left the delicate problem of how to justify the exclusion of the colonial subjects and the denial of citizenship (p.33).

This was done by disassociating nationalism from citizenship. It was justified in terms of a patriarchal family model: the solidarity which existed within such a family and notions of 'tender' benevolent paternalism. All this, the author points out, excluded republican notions of fraternity (p.33). The debate was both imaginary and real – heterotopic or effectively enacted – in that it constructed a mental artifice amidst the reality of colonial networks of imperial circulation which bonded the empire that made possible the notion of an African France and raised the possibility of the colony becoming a province of France (p.34). With reference to Marx and Lefebvre and their explanations on the role of ideology that is not meant to unmask ideas or mediate lived reality, the open contradiction lived on: Colonies were included in an expanded national vision of imperial nationalism that included racialised colonial subjects who were also deemed irreconcilably different and excluded from the republican polity (pp.38, 39).

National-imperial tensions were palpably evident in the colonies. Colonial welfarist political rationality begins to be practised against the background of an overarching welfarism which emerged as a series of social and economic projects in a post-liberal age before and after World War One (p.49). With reference to Foucault's treatment of political rationality, the abandonment of liberalism for welfarism and the shift from colonialism as a 'civilising mission concerned with economic exploitation and individual behaviour to a colonial humanism oriented towards economic development, native welfare, and the management of indigenous populations' (p.50), are presented as evidence for 'the contradictory rationality of colonial rule' (p.43). It shows the state had

begun to concede that racial superiority and the idea of a civilising mission were no longer adequate grounds for colonial subjugation (p.51).

In Chapter 3 Wilder talks of the ideological architects of a derivative of colonial welfarism, colonial humanism in both the pre- and post-war periods. He traces the media outlets and institutions such as the Ecole Coloniale and associated institutions that existed to elaborate on the outlines of colonial humanism and which mediated between science and government. As such, the intimate relationship between colonial ethnology, governing strategy and political authority (pp.52-75) is exposed. As a result, the author is able to conclude that 'colonial ethnology was at once an important relay in the circuit of political rationality and one of its most distilled products' that helped create a network of disparate elements including various institutions and a decentralised public to re-conceptualise the imperial order (p.75).

In the fourth chapter, colonial humanism which amounted to more than an ideology and was a strategy and method of rule, an instrument racialising native populations (p. 76, p. 78), is circumscribed. At this point in time the attempt was made to 'understand' custom and codify customary law without, however, creating general or fixed legal codes for natives (pp.105-107). The modernisation strategies and the developmentalism of the inter-war years in French West Africa intended to have an interventionist state fund a coherent economic policy that would rationalise and specialise colonial production. However, these attempts to expand production were bedevilled by conjunctural crises at a time of the Depression. More importantly, structural contradictions intervened. Here there were dual imperatives working against each other. There were those of the social conservation of the traditional collective, support for chiefs and what was anticipated to go with it, political stability versus those to do with promoting social evolution and the promotion of bourgeois family practices, property laws, formal education and individualism. These cross currents at work in colonial administration amounted to a form of government compelled to use both at the same time. As a result, preservation and transformation happened simultaneously and colonial reform was unevenly realised (p.117). All in all, the effect of 'development' was to exacerbate 'native' impoverishment and erode French authority at a time when socio-economic change bred resistance and agitation (pp. 92-5).

The subsequent chapter looks at nationality and citizenship against the background of the contradictoriness of colonial policy to both modernise and primitivise Africans, promote social evolution and prohibit civil society (p.119). Colonial education policy demonstrated the contradictory tendencies from the application of colonial humanism. Where schools on the one hand were to produce 'traditional' Africans, higher education on the other was meant to create "new natives" who were to act as "interpreters with regard to the masses…the educators of backward races"' (p.120-1). In the wake of nationalist opposition from newly educated elites, opposition was initially dismissed

as a manifestation of isolated malcontents or blamed on outside agitators (p.123). But the stereotyping of Africans as big children marked another phase in this process of racialisation, fixing differences by an insistence on customary civil status and allowing for arguments to deny Africans citizenship (p.126-7). At the same time, the periodic expansion and contraction of rights for the 'originaires' of Senegal who enjoyed nominal citizenship rights, indicated that citizenship was not so much shaped by law but by politics (p.129). Colonial citizenship as an issue therefore brings out the imperial nation-state's underlying tensions.

The colonial state's preoccupation with controlling an incipient civil society in order to demonstrate that an inclusive 'political immaturity' was now a permanent condition of African colonial existence (rather than the exclusive 'biological inferiority' as before) meant that two contradictory things were intended – to include Africans in the French nation on the one hand but at the same time to exclude them from the French polity (p.143). Paraded as proto-individuals, semi-nationals and subject citizens, Africans found themselves in an ambiguous and impossible situation of socio-political disorganisation in which they could not retreat into a pre-colonial past of cultural wholeness nor advance to fully fledged citizenship. This created openings for political dissent.

Following on from this, the sixth chapter looks at the possibilities for anti-racism in the metropole during the inter-war years. It pursues the question of how Africans could hope to take recourse in egalitarian republican values or to 'nativism' to overcome their state of limbo when republicanism politically excluded them and indigenous authenticity itself was a product of colonial valorisation (p.150) Here Negritude, as a cultural movement which rejects assimilation and engages with the issues raised by colonial humanism about the relationship between race, culture, nationality and citizenship is looked at. The social and educational backgrounds of some of its progenitors, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Leon-Gontran Damas and Aimé Cesaire and their 'palavers about Negritude' as colonial students at university in France (markedly influenced by Leo Frobenius' *History of African Civilisation*) that produced a self-conscious African community – including members of the African diaspora – is considered. Group discussions in and around citizenship, black patriotism, republicanism and humanism emanate both from the African community's participation in French metropolitan civil society and its marginalisation within it (p.158).

Discovering cultural specificity did, however, not mean precluding black people from participating in modern politics, nor did its formulation lead to a one-sided nativist primordial retreat that rejected the West. The focus on culture was an attempt to promote a new cultural politics (organised around journals and cultural salons involving translations of African-American writing, poetry readings and novel writing) for colonial elites of African

descent intended to create an alternative public sphere that was also to raise the levels of a transnational, pan-African consciousness (p.173-4) in order to transcend racial self-hatred and class divisions and push the project of identity politics within the black community to the point where race becomes a political not an ontological claim (p.187; p.191).

The Negritude movement functioned in two ways, as an alternative public engaged in a discourse on national-imperial politics and as a 'counterpublic that insisted on political equality as culturally distinct Negro-Africans' (p.197). During the inter-war years however, there also emerged a Pan-Africanist and black internationalist movement – centred around the Ligue de Defense de la Negre (LDRN) and later the Union des Travailleurs Negres (UTN) – struggling to organise colonial workers, overturn colonialism and support world communist revolution through entertaining relations with the Comintern and the Parti Communiste Francaise (PCF) (pp.180-1). Members of the Negritude movement and colonial students organisations were, however, unwilling to engage in any political activity with the black militant Left as this might also threaten their government scholarships (p.183).On the other hand, as the PCF put its anti-colonial stamp on anti-colonial black metropolitan politics, it in turn, was unwilling to recognise black nationalism as an autonomous radical movement and to collaborate with black radicals and race conscious black reformers (p.184). The relationship remained a tense one. However, all colonial groups fed into a broad anti-fascist, anti-colonial and Pan African movement which in pragmatic and strategic ways sought to make colonial grievances known to the metropole, and, backed by the Popular Front, advocated a new imperial federalism which linked black cultural nationalism with social democratic humanism (p.194).

With reference to Senghor and Damas's writing, Chapter 7 engages with cultural politics and cultural nationalism in its engagement with colonial humanism. The author finds that Negritude is not to be seen as radical and in some ways complicit with the colonial order it contested (p.202). 'Negritude writers became implicated in the elaboration of colonial humanism even as they formulated an alternative black humanism' (p.203). But he finds, contrary to post-colonial scholars engrossed in post-national geopolitics that look for explanations and categories beyond the nation-state, when looked at on the scale of 'Greater France as a spatially dispersed and multicultural political formation, Negritude's multiple commitments to republicanism, Panafricanism and cosmopolitanism' can be explained at the level of the specifics of the nation-state and can be seen not to have been contradictory (p.204).

Therefore, when it comes to this form of cultural nationalism, Damas's critique of Republican colonialism traces a cultural-political vision that avoids the alternatives of humanist universalism and nativist particularism (p.229). Senghor in turn is shown to imagine an alternative Greater French nation where

Africans, without being culturally assimilated, are politically fully integrated. Senghor wished for a Greater France, an imperial federation, that was to be cognisant of a novel cultural formation that was 'Afro-French' and 'international' and an outcome of colonialism (p.236) but also an example of black culture with its universally important contribution to aesthetics that gives space to a hybrid African humanism. This humanism is one where the person (rather than an individual) is empowered by being in unison with the universe and has his/her roots in a (mythical) black society that is inherently democratic and socialist (p.247).

The last substantive chapter looks at the critical and poetic writings that confront colonial rationality and engages with the rationalist impasse faced by Negritude when confronted by racial logic and unreason. In its writings and poetry, Negritude can be seen to link a liberal discourse with a post-liberal discourse grounded in racial alterity and irrationality positing a site of engagement of the self-critical, real, utopian, romantic, dreaming, rational and irrational African intellectual. As such, examples of Cesaire and Damas' poetry and writings and their imagery and responses to them by commentators such as Sartre are analysed in some detail, since all are an attempt to 'transform the imperial-space time in which they were nevertheless rooted' (p.293).

The author who expresses a number of intentions at the beginning of the text does not fully pursue these to the end of the book. His most constant theme, that of exposing the living contradiction that is French colonial rationality, its mythology as opposed to French colonial practice and control, however, remains the most constant, developed and useful. The book exposes much of the official and unofficial socio-political-literary discourses within and next to the French colonial-imperial state, unravelling much in the sociology of the imperial project that was France before and after the formative inter-war years. As such, sociologists, social theorists and historians of colonialism interested in the political-philosophical underpinnings of its French variant in Africa, as well as students of International Studies interested in explaining the mental, mutual and often complementary nature of the special relationship between France and Francophone Africa up to the mid-1990s (after which it begins to rupture) or those interested in explaining the discourse in and around citizenship and identity, will all find their pickings in this publication. At the present time, when the world finds itself in a post-Westphalian phase and grapples with the need for a dialogue between Western universalising precepts and the South's (or Africa's) need for recognition of its social values and voice, the book provides a illuminating insight into the earlier complex (rather than the later) writings of Negritude engaged in a cultural/political project in another time and place of expanding the boundaries of the French imperial state. However, the exercise of 'linking republicanism and Pan Africanism, humanism and culturalism, cosmopolitanism and nativism, vanguardism and populism, political engagement and cultural production' (p.253), its expansive

creativity and utopianism also provides a starting point for looking at the notion of a inter-civilisational dialogue on how African culture can inform an alternative universalism, an emergent world polity or world citizenship.