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CONTENTS/SOMMAIRE

Debate

Book Reviews

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> It is interesting to note that ... the word for 'tribe' does not exist in indigenous languages of South Africa (Mafeje 1971:p.254).

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Paul Tiyambe Zeleza

The Challenges of Studying the African Diasporas[1]

The field of African diaspora studies has grown rapidly in recent years. What accounts for this? What are the current preoccupations of African diaspora studies and their limits? Who dominates the field and how can African scholars help reshape it? These are of course broad and difficult questions which cannot be adequately dealt with in a paper of this size. Suffice it to say answers lie as much in the shifting dynamics of knowledge production as in the changing contours of material production, in transformations that are simultaneously epistemic as they are economic, that are confined to and connect the academy and society, that are often as much national as they are transnational. In short, the rise of African diaspora studies can be attributed to, on the one hand intellectual and ideological imperatives, and on the other to developments in regional and global political economies.[2]

Intellectually, the growth of diaspora studies was facilitated from the 1980s by the rise of globalization and transnational studies as well as cultural studies and especially the 'posts' – poststructuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism. Also critical was the growth of interest in world history following multiculturalist assaults on the western civilization curriculum. This was accompanied by an explosion of conferences, centres, courses, and publications on diaspora studies. Particularly crucial in the Anglo-American academy was the publication of Paul Gilroy's (1993) influential, but deeply flawed text, *The Black Atlantic.* Ideologically, the field of African diaspora studies has benefited from the resurgence of Pan-Africanism and black internationalism, the age-old imperative for collective liberation for African peoples at home and abroad, fostered in part by the collapse of the schisms of the Cold War, the demise of apartheid, and the renewed search for an African renaissance.

Intellectual and ideological developments of course do not occur in a vacuum. The socioeconomic dynamics underpinning the growth of diaspora studies are varied indeed, but principally include transnational migrations and movements, globalization processes and the reconfiguration of nation states, and the awakened interest by African institutions and national governments in diasporas as a developmental asset – a remittance pipeline – and as the continent's potential global guardian. Contemporary African mass migrations within the continent and to other world regions including those containing diaspora communities have reconfigured the identities of African peoples as existing national, racial and ethnic identities are reconsidered, renegotiated and recalibrated. These processes are mediated by the intensified flow of ideologies, images, and identities facilitated by the new information and communication technologies.

The growth of African diaspora studies as an academic field has been uneven. It is stronger outside than within the continent itself, and there are of course important variations in each of these locations. This can be attributed to the very demands of the

diaspora condition, that diasporas are more likely to reflect on their diasporic identities than non-diasporized populations. Also, institutions of higher learning are stronger and far better resourced in the African diaspora hostlands of the global North than in most African countries. Within the diaspora itself, there are notable differences between the Atlantic and non-Atlantic worlds, between North and South America, between the Anglophone, Francophone and Hispanophone scholarly worlds, and within each of these worlds as is the case between the American and British academies.

As many commentators have noted especially those working in the bourgeoning field of African diasporas in Asia, the field of African diaspora studies is largely framed by the Atlantic model in which the patterns of dispersal are reduced to the slave trade and the processes of diasporization to racialization (Zeleza 2005; Keita 2005; Campbell 2006; Larson 2007). As for the Americas, outside of the Caribbean and Brazil, race and blackness have not featured as highly in Latin American historiography as they have in US historiography (Vinson 2006). And in the Anglophone world, not only is the field more developed in the United States than in Britain, in the American academy there is the division between ethnic studies and area studies in which African American/Africana/Black studies and African studies are often lodged, respectively, while in the British academy the division is between those in cultural studies and in development studies (Hanchard 2004; Zack-Williams 1995; Zack-Williams and Giles Mohan 2002; Adi 2002).

African scholars are clearly late comers to the field of African diaspora studies, and among them migrant academics relocated to the academies of the global North especially the United States, Britain, and France probably predominate. One could argue that besides their exposure to the closer seductions of diaspora studies, many are driven by the diasporic imperative to defend Africa which is routinely defamed in the global North and by autobiographical impulses to make sense of their own transnational experiences and diasporic offspring (Zeleza 2008). I know attempts to understand better my Canadian-born daughter and African-American wife were a major inspiration for me. They and their colleagues and compatriots on the continent are also increasingly attuned to efforts by policy makers to engage African diasporas more productively – the AU has declared the diaspora Africa's sixth region.

As I have argued elsewhere, greater engagement by African scholars in diaspora studies might be critical in shifting the terms of debate in terms of their analytical, linguistic, geographical, and racial referents. Analytically, a continental perspective incorporating North Africa and South Africa helps decentre the 'Black Atlantic' perspective, both in its spatial and racial preoccupations with the Atlantic world and 'blackness' in so far as African scholars from northern Africa and among those of Asian and European descent in South Africa may not be preoccupied with 'blackness', thereby freeing studies and discourses of African diasporas from their racialized trope and trap.

Linguistically, the fact that African scholars are, collectively, multi-lingual in terms of the European languages thanks to the fiat of colonialism, can and should help in the reading and production of diaspora studies and discourses beyond English to include Portuguese, French, and Spanish, among the key languages of the Atlantic diasporas. Africa is also home to Arabic and several European and Asian languages that are part of the languages of the African diasporas in the regions that use those languages.

Geographically, involvement by scholars in different regions of the continent would help expand the spatial horizons of African diaspora studies. For historical and cultural reasons, historians from western Africa are more likely to focus on the Atlantic diasporas, those from northern Africa on the Mediterranean and Red Sea diasporas, and those from Eastern Africa on the Indian Ocean diasporas.

African diaspora studies have already enriched and will continue to enrich the field of diaspora studies in general. The field throws into sharp relief some basic questions: the meanings of the terms diaspora, Africa, and their combination African diaspora. How do the histories of African diasporas affect the way we think about diasporas, theorize diaspora? In the rest of the paper I explore some of these questions, obviously not in any detail given the constraints of space, but rather to share the analytical frameworks I have developed for my own project on African diasporas. My project seeks to examine the migrations of African peoples across the globe over the last few centuries, the formation of African diaspora communities in different world regions, and the various linkages between these communities and Africa. In short, it seeks to map out the patterns of African dispersals, processes of diasporization, and practices of engagement between Africa and its diasporas.

The paper is divided into four parts. I begin with brief definitional notes as a prelude to suggesting the simple, but critical point that African diasporas are global and multilayered, composed of multiple communities, different waves of migration and diasporization. The second and third parts outline very broadly the historic and contemporary dispersals and diasporas, and how we might examine their inter-relationships. The fourth part offers a possible analytical framework that might be useful in untangling the complex histories and dynamics of engagements between Africa and its diasporas, and attempts to sketch, again very broadly, the nature and dynamics of these engagements and linkages.

Defining Diaspora and Africa

As George Shepperson (1993) has reminded us, the term African diaspora did not emerge in the Anglophone world until the 1950s and 1960s, although of course African diasporas as such existed long before then, and so did ideas and movements of African and black internationalism, which were captured by the concept and ideology of Pan-Africanism. Interventions by Shepperson (1968) himself and Joseph Harris (1968, 1982, 1993) did much to popularize diaspora studies in the Anglophone academy, especially in the United States where the civil rights and the black studies movements were assaulting the barricades of Eurocentric scholarship and white institutional exclusion. In the meantime, in Britain the term diaspora entered through the attempts of cultural studies scholars such as Stuart Hall (1980) and Paul Gilroy (1987) to theorize and explain postwar black British culture. An archaeological excavation of other linguistic and intellectual traditions, from French to Spanish to Arabic and Afrikaans, would surely yield different genealogies. Today, the term African diaspora enjoys pride of place in the increasingly crowded pantheon of diaspora studies.

In many cases, the term diaspora is used in a fuzzy and uncritical manner in which all manner of movements and migrations between countries and even within countries are encapsulated in its generous conceptual bosom, and no adequate attention is paid to the historical conditions and experiences that produce diasporic communities and

consciousness, or lack thereof. I say lack thereof because not all dispersals result in the formation of diasporas. In other words, dispersal does not automatically create a diaspora and once formed a diaspora does not live in perpetuity. Some diasporas disappear, some dispersals turn into diasporas long after the original dispersals.

Diaspora, I would suggest, simultaneously refers to a process, a condition, a space, and a discourse; the continuous processes by which a diaspora is made, unmade and remade, the changing conditions in which it lives and expresses itself, the places where it is moulded and imagined, and the contentious ways in which it is studied and discussed. It entails a culture and a consciousness, sometimes diffuse and sometime concentrated of a 'here' separate from a 'there', a 'here' that is often characterized by a regime of marginalization and a 'there' that is invoked as a rhetoric of self-affirmation, of belonging to 'here' differently. The emotional and experiential investment in 'here' and 'there' and the points in between, indeed in the very configurations and imaginings of 'here' and 'there' and their complex intersections obviously change in response to the shifting materialities, mentalities, and moralities of social existence.

Diaspora is simultaneously a state of being and a process of becoming, a kind of voyage that encompasses the possibility of never arriving or returning, a navigation of multiple belongings, of networks of affiliation. It is a mode of naming, remembering, living and feeling group identity moulded out of experiences, positionings, struggles, and imaginings of the past and the present, and at times the unfolding, unpredictable future, which are shared or seen to be shared across the boundaries of time and space that frame 'indigenous' identities in the contested and constructed locations of 'there' and 'here' and the passages and points in between.

In a broad sense, a diasporic identity implies a form of group consciousness constituted historically through expressive culture, politics, thought and tradition, in which experiential and representational resources are mobilized, in varied measures, from the imaginaries of both the old and the new worlds. Diasporas are complex social and cultural communities created out of real and imagined genealogies and geographies (cultural, racial, ethnic, national, continental, transnational) of belonging, displacement, and recreation, constructed and conceived at multiple temporal and spatial scales, at different moments and distances from the putative homeland. A diaspora is fashioned as much in the fluid and messy contexts of social experience, differentiation and struggle, and through the transnational circuits of exchange of diasporic resources and repertoires of power, as in the discourses of the intellectuals and political elites.

This leads us to the question of what is Africa and who are Africans that constitute, when dispersed and reconstituted, African diasporas. The idea of 'Africa' is an exceedingly complex one with multiple genealogies and meanings, which make any extrapolations of 'African' culture and identity, in the singular or plural, any explorations for African 'authenticity', quite slippery as these notions tend to swing unsteadily between the poles of essentialism and contingency. Elsewhere I have argued that Africa is as much a reality as it is a construct whose boundaries, geographical, historical, and cultural, have shifted according to the prevailing conceptions and configurations of global racial identities and power, and African nationalism, including Pan-Africanism.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the maps and meanings of 'Africa' and 'Africanness' are being reconfigured by both the processes of contemporary globalization and the project of African integration. I work from the assumption that Africa is a material and imagined place, a historical geography, the constellation of the places and peoples embedded in its cartographic and conceptual bosom. It is an invention as much as 'Asia' or 'Europe' or the 'West' and all such civilizational spaces, but it has a physical, political, paradigmatic and psychic reality for the peoples who live within or who are from its cartographic and cultural boundaries, themselves subject to shifts.

As we all know the name 'Africa' is not African; it originally referred to the Roman province in present-day Tunisia, and only later was it extended to the whole continent, and much later still did the various peoples of the continent come to be referred to, or to refer to themselves as Africans; some still don't. Thus, exclusive claims to Africa based on the sands of the Sahara or doses of melanin represent the spatialization and racialization of African identity that are historically spurious. My Africa is the Africa of the African Union. How legitimate is it to project this Africa backwards? My answer is that almost invariably history is filtered through the lenses of the present and the Africa of the Pan-Africanist founders of the OAU, the predecessor of the AU, is no less handy than, indeed preferable to, the racist epistemic cartography of Africa invented by European imperialism that divided Africa into two, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa: Hegel's 'Africa proper'.

This means, quite simply, that African diasporas include all those peoples dispersed from the continent in historic and contemporary times, who have constituted themselves or been constituted into diasporas. The key words are 'historic times' and 'constituted'. At a technical workshop convened by the African Union (2004) in Trinidad in 2004, in which I participated, the following definition of diaspora was adopted after several days of heated debate:

> The AU has committed itself to providing representation to the African Diaspora in its policy process. For this purpose, we recommend that the definition of African Diaspora refer to the geographic dispersal of peoples whose ancestors, within historical memory, originally came from Africa, but who are currently domiciled, or claim residence or citizenship, outside the continent of Africa.

This merely points to the complexities of the African diasporas and underscores Kim Butler's (2000: 127) point that 'conceptualizations of diaspora must be able to accommodate the reality of multiple identities and phases of diasporization over time'. She offers a simple but useful schema for diasporan study divided into five dimensions: '(1) reasons for, and conditions of, the dispersal; (2) relationship with homeland; (3) relationship with hostlands; (4) interrelationships within diasporan groups; (5) comparative study of different diaspora'. For Darlene Clark Hine (2001), black diaspora studies, as she calls the field, need to have three features: a transatlantic framework, an interdisciplinary methodology, and a comparative perspective. I would agree with the last two and revise the first that African diaspora studies need to have a global framework.

The Historic Dispersals and Diasporas

There are numerous dispersals associated with African peoples over time. Colin Palmer (2000) has identified at least six: three in prehistoric and ancient times (beginning with the great exodus that began about 100,000 years ago from the continent to other continents) and three in modern times, including those associated with the Indian Ocean trade to Asia, the Atlantic slave trade to the Americas, and the contemporary movement of Africans and peoples of African descent to various parts of the globe. While such a broad historical conception of diaspora might be a useful reminder of our common origins and humanity, it stretches the notion of diaspora too far beyond analytical recognition to be terribly useful. So most scholars tend to focus on the historical streams of the global African diasporas.

Trying to categorize African diasporas is by no means an easy task. In terms of dispersal of populations we can identify four broad movements: intra-African, trans-Indian Ocean, trans-Mediterranean, and trans-Atlantic. In my view only the last three qualify to be regarded as potentially constitutive of *African* diasporas. The first are at best seen as ethnic or national diasporas (there is historical literature on trading diasporas, slave diasporas, conquest diasporas, refugee diasporas, pastoral diasporas). In terms of periodization, distinctions are often drawn between historic/old and new/contemporary diasporas. It is of course possible to talk of three broad periods, pre-fifteenth century, fifteenth-nineteenth centuries, and since the twentieth century. Needless to say, the periodizations vary for the different regions, and it is important to pay attention to transformations in local, regional, and global political economies and their intersections.

Studies of African diasporas largely focus on the Atlantic world, but the literature is growing on the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean diasporas, which antedate the trans-Atlantic dispersals and diasporas. One unfortunate result of the Atlantic model is the tendency to reduce all historic African diasporas to the dispersals of slavery and to blacks. To use Robin Cohen's (1997) typology, African diasporas are often seen as victim diasporas (in Cohen's schema the others are labour, trade, and cultural diasporas). This tends to freeze African diaspora history, homogenize African diasporas, and racialize them exclusively as black.

The eastern African region from Egypt to Mozambique was integrated into the Indian Ocean world many centuries before the rise of the Atlantic world. Recent studies clearly demonstrate that the African diaspora has very old roots in Asia – from Western Asia, the so-called Middle East, to south Asia including India and Sri Lanka, to which Africans traveled as traders, sailors, soldiers, bureaucrats, clerics, bodyguards, concubines, servants, and slaves. Thus, unlike the historic Atlantic diasporas, the Indian Ocean diasporas were comprised of both forced and free migrants.

Exploration of the African diasporas in the Mediterranean worlds of western Asia and southern Europe has been fraught with considerable difficulties not least the fact that until modern times this was the most intensive zone of cultural traffic and communication, in which communities straddled multiple spaces in complex networks of affiliation. The case of the Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula who swept through northern Africa following the rise of Islam in the seventh century is a case in point. They traversed northern Africa and western Asia, the so-called Middle East, although

with the rise of the modern nation-state and national identities, notwithstanding the enduring dreams of the Arab nation, it is possible to talk of, say, the Egyptian diaspora in the Gulf.

In Europe the first major zone of African settlement was in the southern flanks of the Mediterranean from ancient Rome to Andalusian Spain. The African presence in ancient Rome is now well documented in the works of several classicists, including African and diasporan writers. It is of course well known that northwestern Africans – the so-called Moors – occupied and ruled parts of the Iberian Penisnula between 711 and 1492, but they are rarely discussed in diasporic terms, as an *African diaspora.* Anouar Majid (2000: 77), the renowned Moroccan scholar, insists that Andalusian Spain was an 'African kingdom in Europe'. In the Iberian Peninsula, the trans-Mediterranean and trans-Atlantic dispersals and diasporas met, in so far as some of the earliest Africans to settle in the Americas came from Spain and Portugal. Thus not all the African-descended arrivals in the Americas originated in Western Africa and the Atlantic islands. The historiography on the development of an Afro-Iberian population and their role in the Spanish occupation and settlement of the Americas is still poorly developed but is improving.

Beyond the Mediterranean littoral in Europe, there are ancient African communities from Russia to Britain. Some argue that the scattered African communities on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus mountains were brought there between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries as slaves for the Turkish and Abkhazian rulers, while others trace their origins many centuries earlier as remnants of an Egyptian army that invaded the region in antiquity. Allison Blakely (1986, 1994) who has also written on early African settlements in the Dutch world, believes the two explanations may not necessarily be contradictory, in that there were probably different waves of African dispersals in Russia. The history of Africans in Britain can be traced back two thousand years, but the African presence became more evident following the rise of the Atlantic slave trade. Many of the Africans worked as domestic servants, tradesmen, soldiers, and sailors. A growing stream of Africans coming for education, a tradition that began in the eighteenth century and accelerated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, later joined them.

The extent to which the various dispersed Africans became constituted into diasporas is extraordinarily complicated. In some cases, they disappeared, that is they were eventually absorbed into the host populations. In others, they have survived to the present as a distinct community as is the case with the Sidis of India. In yet other cases, new African diasporas are emerging from cultural memories rekindled by recent African migrations and the current circuits of global racial ideologies and solidarities. The transition from dispersal to diaspora depends, in part, on the regimes of integration, representation, and repression in the host society as well as gestures and impulses of connectivity from the homeland. In this context, there is a lot of debate, for example, on the integrative mechanisms of Islam in western Asia and Islamic Africa. Hunwick and Powell have argued that in the Mediterranean lands of Islam religious precepts prevented the emergence of the racialized voice of 'black consciousness' even among enslaved Africans.

The shift from dispersal to diaspora is far less problematic in the Americas largely because these dispersals are historically far more recent and the imperatives of

racialized slavery and later segregation ensured the differentiation and distancing essential to the formation and reproduction of diasporic identities. Nevertheless, the patterns of diasporization vary across the Americas because of national and regional diversity in the political economy of race, the demographic and cultural weight of the African presence, and the cultural ecologies of belonging and alterity. Altogether, according to Joseph Inikori, whose estimates are, in my view, the most reliable, 15.4 million Africans landed in the Americas during the four long, horrific centuries of the Atlantic Slave Trade.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century more Africans had come to the Americas than Europeans, which has led Sheila Walker (2001) to contest the conceptualization of America as a European construct, as some kind of Eurogenic creation, and to restore the African and African diasporic contributions to their rightful place. 'For more than three hundred years of the five-hundred year modern history of the Americas', she writes, 'Africans and their descendants were the Americas' largest population. Therefore, the demographic foundation of the Americas was African, not European ... In the necessary process of re-creating themselves in their new milieu, these Diasporan Africans invented and participated in the inventing of new cultural forms such as languages, religions, foods, aesthetic expressions, and political and social organizations' (Walker 2001: 2-3).

African diasporas of various sizes were formed across the Americas from Canada to Argentina (yes Canada and Argentina had slavery too and have had long standing black communities notwithstanding their whitening campaigns). African diasporas emerged in North America's southern cone, Mexico and Central America, as they did in South America's southern cone, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The largest diasporan communities developed in the United States and Brazil, the leading political and economic powers of the two continents, each with its own brand of racial ideology, the racial separatism of the US and the mythical 'racial democracy' of Brazil, both of which engendered and sustained the exclusions that reproduced the complex and contradictory processes of diasporization. It was only in the Caribbean that the African diasporas retained their demographic superiority. Perched in the Atlantic in the middle of the Middle Passage, as it were, the Afro-Caribbean diaspora embodied all the complex connections, crisscrossings, and cultural compositions of the African diasporas of the Atlantic. Not surprisingly, Caribbean activists and intellectuals played a crucial role in all the transatlantic Pan-African ideologies and movements.

On the whole, studies of African diasporas in the Americas continue to be heavily focused on national histories. Even transnational histories often betray narrow analytical or linguistic concerns. For example, Paul Gilroy's influential text, *The Black Atlantic,* is essentially a celebration of the supposedly new and distinctive Anglophone diasporic cultural modernity in which not only Africa is an irrelevant reality, but much of Latin America is ignored. In most Atlantic diaspora studies, the diaspora in the United States often stands on the pedestal, the one against which to judge the identities of the other diasporas. The fact that Brazil has the largest African diaspora in the Americas, indeed in the world, is often forgotten.

Contemporary Dispersals and Diasporas

In the twentieth century there were several new dispersals from Africa, a continent now divided into colonial territories and later into independent nation-states. Unlike their predecessors, whose communities of identity, either as imagined by themselves or as imposed by others, were either ethnic or racial (not to mention sometimes religious), the new African diasporas had to contend with the added imperative of the modern nation-state, which often framed the political and cultural itineraries of their travel and transnational networks. The 'new' or 'contemporary' African diasporas, as they are sometimes called, can be divided into three main waves: the diasporas of colonization, of decolonization, and of structural adjustment that emerged out of, respectively, the disruptions of colonial conquest, the struggles for independence, and structural adjustment programmes imposed on African countries by the international financial institutions from the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The diasporas of colonization would include the students who went to study abroad and stayed, seamen who became settlers, and many other others who could migrate and become citizens according to the prevailing immigration regimes in the host country. The diasporas of decolonization include besides the so-called 'indigenous' Africans, European and Asian settlers, who relocated overseas during the struggles for independence and immediately after. The diasporas of structural adjustment have been formed since the 1980s out of the migrations engendered by economic, political, and social crises and the destabilizations of SAPs. They include professional elites, traders, refugees, and students.

African migrations are of course part of a much larger story of complex global migrations. The late twentieth century has in fact been characterized as 'the age of migration'. However, the available evidence indicates that while the volume of international migrants has indeed grown significantly in absolute numbers since the 1960s and there have been significant changes in the character and direction of international migration, the percentage of people who have left and remained outside their countries of origin has remained remarkably steady and small: while the number of foreign-born persons, including migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, worldwide increased from 75.5 million in 1960 to 190.6 million in 2005, the change in the proportion of migrants in the world population changed only slightly, from 2.5 percent in 1960 to 3 percent in 2005. This compares to 2 percent in 1910 and 2.1 percent in 1930. As elsewhere Africa's migrant population increased, nearly doubling from 9.1 million to 17.1 million, but like the other regions in global South – Asia, Latin American and the Caribbean and Oceania – Africa's share of the world's migrant stock declined from 12.1 percent in 1960 to 9 percent in 2005. There was also a decline in the share of migrants in the African population, from 3.2 percent to 1.9 percent.

Particularly rapid in the closing decades of the twentieth century was African migration to Europe, which was characterized by increasing diversification in the number of countries both sending and receiving the immigrants. Dispersals from the continent and the diaspora itself grew in Britain and France, the old colonial superpowers. Quite remarkable was the emergence as immigration countries of southern European countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, themselves emigration countries, a development that was as much a product of the improving economic fortunes in these countries and their integration into the prosperity and political sphere

of western Europe as it was of mounting immigration pressures on their borders to the east and the south. New African immigrant communities also formed in central and eastern Europe, especially following the end of the Cold War.

Equally rapid was the growth of African migration to North America, especially the United States. By 2005 there were approximately 1.5 million African-born residents in the United States, up from 700,000 in 2000, 363,819 in 1990, 199,723 in 1980, 35,355 in 1960, 18,326 in 1930, 2,538 in 1900, and 551 in 1850. The growth in African migration in recent decades is particularly remarkable, although Africans still accounted for a small proportion of immigrants to the United States, 3 percent of the nearly 33 million foreign born residents in 2005, up from 0.4 percent in 1960 and 1.9 percent in 1990. The relatively low rates and levels of voluntary immigration from Africa to the US until the 1960s can be attributed both to restrictive US policies against non-European immigration and the reluctance and inability of colonized African populations to migrate in any significant numbers outside the continent.

Changes in both Africa and the destination countries and regions are obviously important, so are the transformations in the receiving countries. In the case of the US the role of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s is of paramount importance. Quite literally, the postcolonial migrants from Africa to the US owe their fortunes to the doors opened by African American struggles. In the theoretical literature on the causes, courses, and consequences of international migration there are several theories, each employing radically different concepts, assumptions, and frames of reference, that seek to explain the factors that first, initiate, and second, perpetuate international migration, and third, that attempt to assess the effects of international migration on both the sending and receiving countries. Some emphasize economic factors and motivations; others offer political or sociological perspectives and propositions.

The economic theories include the neoclassical economic model, the 'new economics of migration' theory, dual labour market theory, and world systems theory. These theories need not be mutually exclusive. A process as complex as international migration is obviously the result of equally complex forces operating at various levels in space and time: the migration flows are determined by conditions in both the sending and receiving countries, including the state of the economy, political stability and freedoms, and immigration law, all of which are affected by broader forces in the global political economy. Whatever might initiate immigration, the factors and forces that perpetuate it can be quite different. Several theories have been developed to account for the rise of new conditions that emerge in the course of international migration that sustain it and function as independent causes for further migration. They include network theory, institutional theory, and cumulative causation theory. Once again, there is little that is intrinsically incompatible among the three theories. It stands to reason that migration involves both social networks and enabling institutions and is a cumulative process. The interplay between these factors obviously varies in specific contexts.

As might be expected, there is no agreement on the consequences of migration for the migrants themselves as well as for their countries of origin and their countries of immigration. A variety of models seek to explain the performance of migrants. One is human capital theory, according to which education and training are important determinants of income and occupation. Another is the split labour market thesis that

postulates the market is divided along racial, gender and other hierarchicized lines along which rewards are unequally distributed. Immigrants are positioned accordingly. The succession model predicts that a group that arrives last occupies the bottom position in economic rankings as previous groups progressively move up the occupational hierarchy. From these perspectives, African migrants can be expected to suffer triple subordination: as immigrants, as people who arrived recently, and as people many of whom are black.

Since the mid-nineteenth century various groups from the successive waves of African migrations have turned into new diasporas, while some have retained their status as temporary migrants or transnational professionals. A critical question raised by the literature on African immigrants and diasporas is the connection between the two – immigration and diasporization. In other words, when do new immigrants become part of the diaspora? I would suggest that not every migrant turns into a diasporan. Many Africans who have come to the United States, for example, since the end of the Second World War, have done so for temporary periods, as workers, expatriate professionals, business people, students, and tourists and often go back after the realization of their objectives. It does not seem to make much sense to regard such *temporary* migrants as members of the new diaspora. But temporary migrants can, and many do, become permanent migrants even if they maintain connections with home through periodic visits. A precondition for the transition from a migrant into a diasporan is *prolonged* settlement, followed by *permanent* resettlement in a new host country. Neither condition need be planned of course; indeed, many African migrants abroad do not always anticipate staying long or settling permanently, but often end up doing so.

At issue, then, is not *intention,* but the *duration* of stay, the separation of the there of the home country and the here of the host country. It is the offspring of such migrants who complete the transition from migration to diasporization for their families and communities. Thus the diasporization process is a cumulative one beginning with migration, followed by resettlement, and is reproduced through the offspring of the migrants. Using this schema, I would distinguish between African migrants, diasporized Africans, and African diasporas. In this context, long-term African-born residents of the diaspora hostlands would be considered diasporized Africans, while their offspring turn into African diasporas, more fully socialized into the experiences and identities of the historic diaspora. It can be argued, then, temporality defines diasporization as much as spatiality. In other words, the process of diasporization has spatial and temporal dimensions: African diasporas refer to Africans and their offspring resettled outside the continent. The historic diasporas are those whose resettlement occurred in the past, while the new diasporas are those formed from the waves of more recent migrants. The past is of course a moving location. It might be useful to distinguish the two in generational terms, to confine the new diasporas, broadly, to the diasporized Africans and their first generation offspring; subsequent generations often become absorbed into and indistinguishable from the historic diaspora formed out of much earlier waves of migration.

Like the historic diasporas, the contemporary diasporas are differentiated and their internal and external relations are mediated by the inscriptions of gender, generation, class, political ideology, and religion. But unlike the former, the latter have to negotiate

relations with the historic diasporas themselves and also not just with 'Africa' but with their particular countries of origin and the countries of transmigration. The revolution in telecommunications and travel, which has compressed the spatial and temporal distances between home and abroad, offers the contemporary diasporas, unlike the historic diasporas from the earlier dispersals, unprecedented opportunities to be transnational and transcultural, to be people of multiple worlds and localities. They are able to retain ties to Africa in ways that were not possible to earlier generations of the African diasporas.

Clearly, there are diasporas within the diaspora. In a sense, then, the entire diaspora world is constituted by what Earl Lewis (1997) terms with reference to the United States 'overlapping diasporas'. In the US there are at least four groups that can claim an African diasporic identity: first, the historic communities of African Americans, themselves formed out of complex internal and external migrations over several hundred years; second, migrant communities from other diasporic locations, such as the Caribbean that have maintained or invoke, when necessary or convenient, hyphenated national identities; third, the recent immigrants from the indigenous communities of Africa some of whom share racialized affinity with the two groups; and finally, African migrants who are themselves diasporas from Asia or Europe, such as the Ugandan Asians or South African whites. Each of these diasporas has its own connections and commitments to Africa, its own memories and imaginations of Africa, and its own conceptions of the diasporic condition and identity. The third group is sometimes divided by the racialized codifications of whiteness and blackness, sanctified in the colonial cartographies of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and by US immigration law under which North Africans are classified as white.

Given the complexity and diversity of the African diasporas, it stands to reason that relations between the various groups are exceedingly difficult to map out. What I would like to suggest is a possible analytical schema, containing three elements that structure these relations: first, the contexts of engagement, the social arenas in which the different diasporas interact; second, the constructs of engagement, the dynamics that mediate their interactions; and third, the character of the engagements, the content and processes of interactions.

The contexts in which the various diasporas interact with each other are both private and public and the varied intersections between them. The private or privatized spheres include family and inter-personal relations. In the case of families we can think of inter-diasporan marriages and partnerships as well as intra-family generations of diasporization between parents from the same African country and their American-born children. The public contexts of inter-diasporan engagements are obviously even more multidimensional. I have identified seven in terms of their social weight and explanatory possibilities. They are: (1) educational institutions; (2) labour market; (3) religious institutions; (4) leisure activities; (5) business enterprises; (6) political process; and (7) community life. There can be little doubt that the encounters within each and across the various social domains are complex, contradictory, and always changing.

The connections and disconnections among the different diasporas are conditioned by four sets of factors. First, different sectors and organizations have specific institutional cultures that set the broad parameters of inter-diasporan interactions as do,

second, the push and pull of ideological affiliations which affect the tenor and possibilities of cooperation, accommodation, or conflict within specific or between different diaspora groups. The nature and formation of, third, collective identity and fourth, individual subjectivity, which are constructed through the prevailing practices of socialization, spatialization and representation also help structure these dynamics. In so far as all communities have multiple identities, inter-group relations among Africa's diasporas are partly affected by the intersections of some of these identities and interests.

As for the relations between the old and new diasporas, they are characterized by antagonism, ambivalence, acceptance, adaptation, and assimilation, which often denote cumulative phases of acculturation, mediated by the length of stay in the new hostlands, the spatial and social locations of the different diasporas, their respective connections to Africa and the hostlands and the attitudes of the historic diasporas. Antagonism is often engendered by stereotypes and poor communication on both sides. Historically, each successive wave of arrivals has been integrated, over time, for example, into the African American community, in the process transforming not only the new diaspora itself but also what it means to be African American. Barack Obama, the US Democratic Party's presidential contender, the son of a Kenyan father and white American mother, is a typical example.

Linkages Between Africa and Its Diasporas

One critical measure of the diaspora condition as a self-conscious identity lies in remembering, imagining and engaging the original homeland, whose own identity is, in part, constituted by and, in turn, helps constitute the diaspora. This dialectic in the inscriptions and representations of the homeland in the diaspora and of the diaspora in the homeland is the thread that weaves the histories of the diaspora and the homeland together. Two critical questions can be raised. First, how do the different African diasporas remember, imagine, and engage Africa, and which Africa – in temporal and spatial terms? Second, how does Africa, or rather the different Africas – in their temporal and spatial framings – remember, imagine, and engage their diasporas? Given the complex ebbs and flows of history, for Africa itself and the various regional hostlands of the African diasporas, it stands to reason that the engagements between Africa and its diasporas have been built and shaped by continuities, changes, and ruptures.

Created out of movement, dispersal from a homeland, the diaspora is affirmed through another movement, engagement with the homeland. Movement, it could be argued then, in its literal and metaphorical senses, is at the heart of the diasporic condition, beginning with the dispersal itself and culminating with reunification, which is often perpetually postponed. The spaces in between are marked by multiple forms of engagement between the diaspora and the homeland, of movement, of travel between a 'here' and a 'there' both in terms of time and space. The fluidity of these engagements is best captured by the notion of flow, that flows of several kinds and levels of intensity characterize the linkages between the homeland and the diaspora. The diaspora or the homeland can serve as a signifier for the other subject to strategic manipulation. The flows include people, cultural practices, productive resources, organizations and movements, ideologies and ideas, images and representations. In

short, we can isolate six major flows: demographic flows, cultural flows, economic flows, political flows, ideological flows, and iconographic flows.

Much of the scholarly attention has gone towards the political flows, as manifested, for example, in the role that the trans-Atlantic Pan-Africanist movement played in engendering territorial nationalisms across Africa and how continental nationalism and the civil rights movement in the United States reinforced each other, and how in postcolonial times the various diasporas have engaged political processes and projects from conflict to democratization. In studies of the historic diasporas there has been an analytical tendency to privilege the political connections represented by the Pan-Africanist movement, while in studies of the contemporary diasporas focus concentrates on the economic impact: flows of remittances and investment. Economics is of course at the heart of the diaspora condition for both the historic and contemporary diasporas in so far as both were engendered by labour imperatives, one involving the demand for forced slave labour and the other the supply of free wage labour.

Ideological flows refer to the flows of ideas and ideologies that can be embodied in social and cultural movements and discursive paradigms, ranging from visionary philosophies and projects to transnational feminisms to literary movements in the African and black worlds. For example, there has been what Abiola Irele calls the 'cycle of reciprocities' between the literary movements of Africa and the Atlantic diaspora, most significantly the Harlem Renaissance and the Negritude movement whose echoes found resonances in the Black Arts and the Black Aesthetic movements in the US and the cultural nationalist and the nativist critical movement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.

Iconographic flows refer to images and visual representations of Africa, Africanness and blackness that are created, circulated, and consumed through art works and the media. As Nkiru Nzegwu (2000) has demonstrated, transatlantic artistic dialogue has been continuous and intensified over the last half century, sustained and reproduced by the travels of artists, a shared visual language, and invocations of cultural memories and artistic motifs. 'Because the socio-economic conditions under which these artists create activates psychic vortices', she writes, 'art-making becomes a ritual in which cultural genealogy is revitalized, new realities are constructed, and new identities are announced'. African American iconographic constructions of diasporan identity and black modernity have been particularly influential, thanks in part to the global tentacles of the American state and capital, on whose corporate media and imperial wings they have been exported to the rest of the world. Examples include appropriations of African American cultural identity by British blacks during the Second World War, and of political blackness by the oppressed peoples of South Africa in the late 1960s. For their part the new African diasporas have been simultaneously recycling old and reinventing new iconographies of Africa and Africaness. Examples include the Senegalese traders selling the monolithic Africa of Afrocentricity, and the imports of Nollywood films by new African diasporas hungry for modernist self-representation.

The demographic flows are self-evident. Almost from the beginning to the present, the traffic of people from Africa to the Americas has never been one way; some have returned from the diaspora to the continent, whether permanently or temporarily, and

through them contacts and memories between the diasporas and the continent have been kept alive, and vibrant cultural exchanges maintained. Thus, Africa and the Americas have been permanently connected since the sixteenth century by the continuous flows of people in both directions. It is well to remember that the slave trade was not a one-time event, but a continuous process that lasted four centuries from the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. We all know about the resettlement schemes in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Up to the end of the nineteenth century, the quintessential sojourners of these transoceanic voyages were sailors, and to a lesser extent, soldiers, but there were also traders, students and scholars, political leaders and rebels, religious seers and proselytizers, and ordinary men and women seeking personal and collective salvation from the depredations of their times and circumstances.

Over the centuries cultures – from music to religion, foods to fashion – in both continental Africa and diaspora Africa changed and influenced each other, to varying degrees across time and space. This was a dynamic and dialogic exchange, not simply a derivative one between a primordial, static Africa and a modern, vibrant diaspora. This is to suggest the need for an analytical methodology that is historically grounded, one that recognizes the enduring connections between Africa and its diasporas, that the cultures of Africa and the diaspora have all been subject to change, innovation, borrowing, and reconstruction, that they are all 'hybrid', and that the cultural encounters between them have been and will continue to be multiple and multidimensional. We need to transcend the question of African cultural retentions and survivals in the diaspora, to examine not only the traffic of cultural practices from the diasporas to various parts of Africa, but also the complex patterns and processes of current cultural exchanges through the media of contemporary globalization from television and cinema to video and the Internet.

This is not always acknowledged in studies that examine the development of expressive cultures among the diaspora communities and the cultural traffic between the diasporas and Africa. Gerhard Kubik (1998) provides a useful typology that divides the interpretive schemes of diaspora cultures into six categories; what he calls, first, biological reductionism, second, socio-psychological determinism, third, pseudo-historical reductionism, fourth, historical particularism, fifth, cultural materialism, and sixth cultural diffusionism. It stands to reason that all these elements, the imagined ontologies of blackness, constructions of racial hierarchies, selective appropriations of African memories and alterity, material imperatives of cultural change, and the diffusionist trails of cultural transfer, have played a role in the development of diaspora cultures as distinctive cultures marked by similarities, differences, parallels, connections and exchanges with the numerous cultures of continental Africa. The communication and circulation of cultural practices and paradigms between Africa and its diasporas have encompassed religion, education, literature, art, and music, to mention a few. These flows have constituted, I would argue, an essential part of Africa's modernities, globalization, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism.

Religion and music have been among the most important elements of cultural exchange. The traffic in religious ideas, institutions, and iconography, encompassing the African derived religions, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, has been particularly intense and an important aspect of the African diasporic experience, identity, struggle,

agency, and linkages with Africa. Africans dispersed from the continent brought religious beliefs, rituals, and values into their new lands of settlement and resettlement, just as diasporan Africans who subsequently returned or established connections with the continent came with reinvented religious practices or were sometimes proselytizers of the world religions. Music has been a powerful medium of communication between Africa and its diasporas through which cultural influences, ideas, images, instruments, institutions and identities have continuously circulated in the process creating new modes of cultural expression both within Africa and in the diaspora. Facilitating the traffic in music are persistent demographic flows and ever-changing communication technologies and has involved exchanges, simultaneously transcontinental, transnational, and translational, of artistic products, aesthetic codes, and conceptual matrixes.

Another cultural sphere in which linkages between Africa and its diasporas have been important is education. Records show diasporan Africans coming to the continent for formal and informal education although our knowledge of the patterns and magnitude of this trend remains poor. When Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone and Liberia College in Liberia, opened in 1827 and 1862, respectively, they served as Pan-Africanist institutions that attracted students and faculty from across West Africa especially, many of who were themselves of diasporan origin, such as the great nineteenth century Pan-Africanist intellectual Edward Blyden.

More common were flows from Africa to the diaspora, especially the United States, where the black colleges and universities (HBCUs) that mushroomed in the late nineteenth century served both as a Mecca for African students and a model for higher education in Africa itself. Until desegregation in the 1950s and 1960s, the HBCUs remained the main centres of African higher education in the United States where African elites and independence leaders were educated from Kwame Nkrumah to Nnandi Azikiwe and Hastings Banda, the founding presidents of Ghana, Nigeria, and Malawi, respectively. It was there that the serious and systematic study of Africa was pioneered, courses on African peoples established, and monographs and journals published long before the historically white universities, in pursuit of national security, disciplinary excitement or belated multiculturalism, discovered African studies. Continental and diasporan Africans also met in the imperial metropoles of Europe as well as in the educational and political institutions established by the new revolutionary states from the Soviet Union to China. Bennetta Jules-Rossette's (2000) *Black Paris* offers a remarkable portrait of some of these interactions in France that did so much to promote the scholarly, literary, and artistic solidarities of Pan-Africanism.

Clearly, engagements between Africa and its diasporas have been deeper and more diverse than is often realized, characterized by flows and counterflows of various magnitude. Taken together, these flows and complex linkages have produced contrasting impacts on social groups, communities and nation-states both in the diaspora and on the continent. They have shaped identities, representations of Africa and Africans, as well as self-perceptions by continental Africans and diasporan Africans. So dense are some of the flows and counter-flows that in some domains, continental and diasporic issues are often difficult to disentangle.

This is the challenge I have set for myself, to map out the dispersals of African peoples globally, decipher the complex processes of their diasporization, and examine

the changing patterns of engagement between them and Africa. Such a synthesis, I believe, provides a means of taking stock of the knowledge we have accumulated thus far in African diaspora studies and deepening our theoretical understanding of this infinitely fascinating and exceedingly complex phenomenon.

Notes

1. A revised version of an essay specially written for presentation at the Teach-In, 'Rethinking the African Diaspora – Rethinking Africa', Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, May 15, 2008.
2. Tracing the rise of any intellectual field or formation is quite challenging. For African diaspora studies, the following authors provide useful snapshots: Patterson and Kelly (2000), Edwards (2001), and Zeleza (2005).

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Social sciences internationally: The problem of marginalisation and its consequences for the discipline of sociology

Introduction

The development of sociology in Africa and Latin America has remained largely under-researched until now. Ongoing debates on the globalisation of economy and society, as well as the increasingly cross-national activities of the scholarly community, have been enhancing reflections on the internationalisation or globalisation of the discipline, a topic on the agenda of each of the more recent World Congresses of Sociology. Diverging perceptions of these processes within sociology have been articulated, opposing those who argue for the internationalisation or globalisation of the discipline without explicitly insisting on present North-South divides (Albrow/King 1990; Archer 1991; Genov 1991) on the one hand, and those who insist on the disadvantaged position of, for instance, African (Adésínà 2002) or Indian (Oommen 1991) sociologies, on the other hand. The debate around the globalisation of sociology, political and often polemical at first sight, illustrates the increasingly difficult articulation between the universalistic claims of the discipline as such and its particular developments locally or nationally (Berthelot 1998; Keim 2006), and is thus of epistemological importance as well.

Strongly theoretical and often highly politicised, however, this debate more often than not lacks an adequate empirical basis. The main objective here is to take up systematically the several dimensions and factors of the centre-periphery-divide that have been mentioned in the literature so far.[1] Subsequently, a variety of factors relating more specifically to the problem of marginalisation will be tested empirically. The paper will thus provide a systematisation of dispersed elements mentioned in the fields of science studies, including the history of science and knowledge, on the one hand; the sociological debate around the globalisation of the discipline, on the other hand. It will be argued that the underlying structure that links dispersed results in these two fields can be captured through an analytical centre-periphery-model. The relevance of the results for current science policy as well as for the epistemological foundations of sociology will be shortly reflected upon in the conclusion.

Centre-Periphery Models in history and sociology of science literature

The starting point of this paper is the hypothesis that a centre-periphery-model seems to be a valid tool for the description and comprehension of processes of social scientific knowledge production, diffusion, reception and scholarly communication at an international level. From a global perspective, sociologies in Western Europe and the United States appear to constitute the centre of our discipline, whereas those from the global South, despite claims for the internationalisation and globalisation of the discipline, occupy today a rather peripheral position. There are a number of reasons for

and multiple manifestations of the hierarchical relationship between scholarly communities, their institutions and their research output.

One important reason is that, historically, sociology as a specific scholarly discipline, as opposed to social thinking, which is probably as old as humankind and present all over the globe, emerged and was institutionalised in Europe first – Ibn Khaldun's (1967-68) early attempt to found a 'science of civilisation' had full potential but found few followers.[2] A series of studies in history of the sciences points out how the modern scientific system expanded through colonialism and imperialism, using a centre-periphery-model for science history (Baber 2003, Mignolo 2004, Petitjean/Jami/Moulin 1992, Polanco 1992, Rashed 1992, MacLeod 1982; for specific case studies, see Saldaña 1992, Krishna 1992, Todd 1993). Similarly, sociology in the southern continents as well emerged as a subordinated, dependent sociology.

After decolonisation, the structures of scientific dependency more often than not remained intact. Many scholars from southern countries still study and get their Ph.D.s in European metropolises, while the United States as the new centre of the international scientific system has also had considerable impact on the development of sociologies particularly in Africa, Latin America and India, partly because of their encouragement of US-style social sciences as an ideological weapon in times of the Cold War (Gareau 1985, Chekki 1987).

Several authors address these current issues in terms of centre-periphery. Hountondji links the present situation of the sciences in the global South to historical subordination. Drawing on dependency and world systems theory, he understands underdevelopment in the South as a consequence of their historical annexation to the world market and transposes this explanatory scheme to the domain of scientific development (Hountondji 1990b: 7. See also: Hountondji 1994: 2).

Although this paper will follow his invitation to draw analogies between the functioning of the economic and the academic domains, it appears that this can not account for all problems the centre-periphery-divide represents for the social sciences. Gareau's article 'The multinational version of social science with emphasis upon the discipline of sociology' (Gareau 1985) is one of the few attempts to study the international relations within sociology applying science study methodology. In his own centre-periphery model, Gareau distinguishes three social scientific 'blocs': Western social science in the US and Western Europe, Soviet Marxism-Leninism, and the peripheral social sciences of the South. He bases his assumption that the three blocs communicate in hierarchical relationships on empirical evidence. He thus states the ethnocentric perspective of Western social science and the intellectual dependency and subordination of the South, as well as the unilateral communication in hierarchical relationships.

Gareau denominates the different scholarly communities, according to their paradigmatic orientation and national location, as 'sects'. The vocabulary indicates his critical and relativistic attitude towards what he calls 'multinational social science'. Thus, he assumes a purely external determination of the observed intellectual hegemony: US-American social science is not that widely spread and recognized because of its 'intrinsic values', but because of the political, economic and cultural domination of the US. According to Gareau, social scientific power corresponds to and relies on economic and political power, because the social sciences are part of the

'knowledge industry'. Sociology, the discipline he focuses on, is thus apprehended as being totally determined by external interests.

As Gareau's article proposes a macro-sociological approach to the international relations within the discipline, it will be one of the starting points for the model presented below. However, the limitations of his proposition should also be pointed out. First of all, his article bears the marks of the Cold War period and therefore calls for some revisions today. What is more problematic, however, is his unilateral economic and geopolitical determinism. This perspective neglects the fact that institutional and material factors within academia cannot be exclusively reduced to the broader economic situation. For instance, if the US-American social sciences are characterized as the most ethnocentric ones and as forming a practically closed and self-referent communication system, largely ignoring the rest of the world, the geopolitical position of the US alone does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation in itself. Rather, it has also to be taken into account that the US-American social sciences are among the most developed of the world and their scholarly community is probably the largest. This means there is a sufficient critical mass within the country that ensures scholarly discussion and the subsequent development of the discipline. External communication is thus not of the same, vital importance as in smaller communities.

Other factors that Gareau certainly underestimates are the power position of the US in the publications sector and in the domain of international bibliographic databases, as well as the effects of the disciplinary division of the social sciences, topics that will be examined below. If these factors do not necessarily contradict Gareau's assumption at a more abstract level, they need to be dealt with in more detail in order for us to understand the specific functioning of the social sciences internationally.

Several other authors provide ideas and empirical evidence referring to single aspects of the centre-periphery divide, for instance S. F. Alatas (2001, 2003) and S. H. Alatas (1974, 2006a, 2006b) who have focussed more particularly on sociology. Others have provided empirical indicators on the peripheral situation of the sciences in the continents of the South (Arvanitis/Gaillard 1992, Waast 1996, 2001, Waast/Gaillard 1996 and Weingart 2004), but neglected the domain of the social sciences and have not emphasised the conceptualisation of an analytical centre-periphery model. These contributions will be integrated into the model presented below, which has the advantage of systematizing the relevant literature, much of which remains actually dispersed geographically, disciplinarily and paradigmatically, into a broader comprehensive picture. Furthermore, the proposed model has the potential to be operationalised for empirical testing.

For an analytical centre-periphery model in the study of the social sciences internationally

One of the innovative aspects of the centre-periphery approach at the point of time of its emergence was its conceptualisation of the relationships between and the reciprocal conditioning of the global centre and periphery. The three-dimensional model that has been developed within dependency theory for the global expansion of capitalism (Cardoso/Faletto 1969) can be transposed to the domain of the social sciences, in only partial analogy, for sure, as we are dealing here not with material goods but with ideas, knowledge and discourses.[3] Three dimensions have thus to be distinguished for the

sake of analytical clarity, as represented in the following schematisation:

Centre	I. Infrastructure and Internal Organisation	Periphery
Development		Underdevelopment
	II. Conditions of Existence and Reproduction	
Autonomy		Dependency
	III. International Position and Recognition	
Centrality		Marginality

First of all, scientific development requires an appropriate material, institutional and personal basis. Lack of the necessary material infrastructure (Waast 2001, Bako 1994, 2002), but also suppression of academic freedom (Diouf/Mamdani 1994) in parts of the global South – especially in a number of African countries – seem to be major causes for the peripheral status of their sociologies. An ideal-typical developed sociology shows a high degree of institutionalisation, with specialised centres for research and teaching, journals and associations. Institutional development requires sufficient funding and adequate income opportunities for researchers, as well as a broader academic institutional framework and further infrastructures such as editing houses, a book market, information and communication technologies, well equipped libraries etc. Furthermore, a developed sociology is characterised by its internal division of labour that covers and continuously develops all domains of sociological activity from empirical data collection and the realisation of case studies at a low level of abstraction to conceptualisation, methodology and theory building. It therefore requires a functioning scholarly community that constantly communicates, cooperates and critically discusses results, in a thematic as well as cognitive division of labour. Furthermore, the scholarly community determines and maintains the requirements for accession and exclusion from the profession – curriculum development, teaching contents, examination and certification. A developed sociology can thus be defined as a system of autonomous production, diffusion and accumulation of knowledge and discourses. Consequently, an underdeveloped sociology lacks one or several of the above mentioned characteristics. This first dimension, social-scientific development, is mainly determined by external factors such as availability of funding, scientific and higher education infrastructures.

But the historically evolved hierarchies and inequalities in the production, diffusion, and especially reception of social scientific knowledge remain intact even in countries with comparably strong local social sciences (for example, the case of Japan: Koyano 1976, Lie 1996). A second dimension of the centre-periphery problem, often but certainly not always related to the state of development and to be analytically distinguished from it, is that referring to the conditions of existence of given sociologies, namely the dimension of autonomy or dependency.

An autonomous sociology has the capacity of self-reproduction and autonomous development at the level of its staff, institutions and knowledge. Research results are communicated internally and can be diffused into other communities. On the opposite side, dependent sociology requires a steady import of theories and concepts, teaching material and research devices as well as of academic degrees from the universities of the centre. It relies on a methodological-theoretical as well as personal basis which it hardly contributes to produce. Autonomy is not to be confused with autarchy, in the sense that scholarly activity is in itself always internationally constituted. The difference lies in the fact that autonomous sociology benefits from international exchange and communication, whereas these are an essential requirement for dependent sociology.

While the impact of financial dependency on overseas resources is not always easy to determine, it seems obvious that problems related to editorial dependency (Altbach 1991) as well as over-reliance on overseas certification, especially at the PhD level (Szanton/Manyika 2002), and most of all to intellectual dependency, i.e. receiving and applying concepts, theories and methodologies developed in the centre, are today inhibiting the emergence of autonomous sociological approaches and traditions. They have been aptly described by S. H. Alatas (1974, 2006a, 2006b), S. F. Alatas (2001, 2003) and Hountondji (1990a, 1990b, 1994). Unfortunately, due to methodological constraints, the dimension of autonomy/dependency can hardly be evaluated on a macro-level; it would necessitate in-depth content analyses of sociological output with regard to the reception of theoretical framework, methodology, the origin of key concepts and the literature considered (for examples of in-depth text analysis of South African sociological literature with regard to degrees of dependency, for example in citation schemes, see Keim forthcoming b: 391-459). Relevant information to evaluate the degree of dependency – such as the origin of degrees obtained by the teaching staff and researchers, the origin of books in their libraries and on course outlines, the central references in sociological texts – is not systematically available on a large-scale basis. This second dimension – autonomy or dependency – refers to intra-scientific factors in the first place.

This article focuses on the third dimension of the problem: the question of centrality and marginality, an intra-scientific problem referring to the position and function of given sociologies within the international community. The terms centrality and marginality are used here to describe the relationship between existing communities, their institutions and scholarly production.

Centrality refers to internationally visible sociologies that enjoy prestige in the international community and that are recognised as the core of the discipline. This applies to their institutions and scholarly authorities, teaching programmes and degrees, prestigious journals and editing houses. Their particular position confers on them the power of setting the dominant topics of research and teaching, methodological and theoretical approaches, as well as meta-discourses. In other words, they establish what could be referred to as schools, paradigms, ideologies, etc. Referring to a phenomenon of mutual recognition, definitions of marginal and central science are always somewhat tautological. Central science is often defined as the mainstream in the sense of the international bibliographic databases (Gaillard 1987: 9; Arunachalam 1996). But these databases are the mainstream and they set the

mainstream at the same time (see below). Alatas, referring to Gizyncki, defined the centre as 'a place from which influence radiates', which is no less tautological but a logical problem inherent to the concept (S. F. Alatas 2003: 603).

The hypothesis of the chosen centre-periphery model is that today African and Latin American sociologies, like these continents' intellectual production in general, occupy a marginal position within the international scholarly community. They lack international recognition, and not only are they largely ignored in the rest of the world, but that ignorance is not even considered to be a problem. They rely on the institutions and scholarly production of the centre, either because they have no local alternative – in this case marginality combines with underdevelopment and dependency – or because they remain oriented, despite local alternatives, to locations in the international field that are regarded as more prestigious.

The following will take up systematically a series of factors and manifestations of marginalisation that are mentioned, often in rather polemical ways, in the literature: lack of visibility in international databases, forms and dimensions of the unequal division of social scientific labour, problems of extraversion, locality and exoticism, the effects of the disciplinary divisions within the social sciences, as well as of the evolutionism inherent in social thinking. Finally, central social sciences study the societies of the periphery, whereas marginal ones do not deal with the societies of the centre as an object of study.

It should be stressed that marginality and centrality as conceptualised here have analytical value in the first place and are not meant as a value judgement. Furthermore, the macro-sociological focus, characterising the relationship between national and even continental scholarly communities, does not mean that dynamics of marginalisation on a more meso- or micro-sociological level – within regional, national and local scientific communities as well as within single institutions – should be underestimated. These phenomena are not the subject of this article.

The paper thus pulls together and exposes in a systematic way arguments and evidence on the topic, providing genuine empirical data where necessary, and will thus give a more complete picture of the complexity and extent of the problem of marginalization within sociology.

It should be emphasised that the proposed model renounces the category of 'semi-peripheries'. Instead, the analytical distinction of three dimensions of centre and periphery allows for a more detailed description of particular cases. For instance, to cite two cases dealt with in the literature, Japan could be characterized as hosting a highly developed, yet strongly dependent and rather marginal sociology, whereas in Palestinian sociology, the underdevelopment factor appears to be the main reason for its peripheral position internationally (Cf. for these examples Koyano 1976, Lie 1996, Tamari 1994, Romani 2008). We could even think of cases where original thinkers develop theoretical approaches that earn international recognition despite academic underdevelopment, often outside academia. The theoretical debates surrounding the African liberation struggles (Fanon 1961, 1968, Cabral 1973, 1983, Magubane 1983 etc.) can be mentioned here as an example that challenges the established view of the necessity of solid academic institutions as a basis for theoretical developments.

International bibliometric databases – indicators of marginality and instruments of marginalisation

A common method for measuring the contribution of individual scholars or of given scientific communities to the advancement of their disciplines is scientometry, especially bibliometry. Pouris (1995), for instance, applies this methodology to the study of social sciences internationally, stating that 90 percent of the articles contained in the 'Social Science Citation Index' originate in 10 percent of the world's countries. He erroneously interprets this result as representing the percentage of the international social scientific production. However, this conventional usage of bibliometric databases to determine scholarly production is highly questionable, especially with regard to the countries of the global South (Cf. Frame 1985; Arvanitis/Gaillard 1992). In fact, they cover by definition those products of scholarly labour that have already had considerable 'international impact', i.e. the most frequently cited ones, thus creating a vicious circle where only those that are already recognised have the chance to gain even higher visibility (Barré/Papon 1993: 328). Analyses of these databases with regard to the origin of articles show that the included scholarly production is highly concentrated geographically and thus can serve as an indicator for centrality-marginality. Keeping in mind the numerous sources for errors, which bibliometric analyses can hardly avoid, an evaluation of the visibility of national social science literature nevertheless produces crucial results.

The Social Sciences Citation Index covers literature from '1 700 of the world's most significant social science journals'.[4] The search field 'Author Address' provides the possibility to search for all the articles published by authors institutionally affiliated in a given country.

The realities of a highly stratified international community are more than obvious when the following are considered: the SSCI contains 366,828 articles by authors and co-authors affiliated in the United States, which is 58 percent of the total of the covered literature, followed by Great Britain (71,606) and Canada (40,573). North America thus represents 64 percent of all the entries whereas Western Europe, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, totals 25 percent. On the other hand, literature from the whole of the African continent amounts to less than one percent. Within Africa, South Africa is the most important country (2,762), followed by Nigeria (667). Out of the 49 African nations, only ten had more than 100 articles referenced in the SSCI. The whole of Latin America equals about one percent with Brazil (1,793) and Mexico (1,630) at the top, followed by Jamaica (721). Out of the 26 Latin American countries, eight appear more than 100 times as countries of author affiliation.

The database FRANCIS (1984-2005) could be considered as the French counterpart to the SSCI.[5] A search according to countries of authors' affiliation provided useful data.

FRANCIS proves to be slightly more balanced than the SSCI: 44 percent of all articles were published by authors affiliated to US-American institutions (310,734). Together with those from Canada (49,441), 51 percent of all covered publications originated in North America, 34 percent in Western Europe. In line with linguistic priorities, France occupies the second position worldwide (108,557), followed by

Great Britain (80,447) and Germany (44,505). Articles by authors from African institutions again only represent a small fraction of approximately 1.5 percent, and those from their Latin American counterparts approximately 2.3 percent.

The database 'Sociological Abstracts' (1995-2005) concentrates especially on sociological literature. Unfortunately, however, the global share of the US could not be determined for Sociological Abstracts, due to the fact that author addresses in the United States do not indicate the country. As a consequence, the relationships between all remaining countries also shift with the distribution and seem to be more egalitarian at first.

For the last decade, Great Britain occupied the first place (19,592), followed by Australia (5,456), Germany (5,304) and France (4,583). To account for the effect of the exclusion of the major power, however, it is noteworthy to differentiate some of the US-based articles by city or region of origin. For the last decade, the database covers 8,134 articles published by authors employed in California, which thus occupies the second position worldwide, 5,927 by authors affiliated in New York, and 3,774 by scholars from Washington, just to pick a few examples. African production makes up approximately 3.3 percent with a total number of 2,427 articles, approximately equalling that of Italy or Chicago. Latin American countries have 8.5 percent of the entries as 'author affiliation'. Consequently, this database is not more balanced than the other two.

Instead of erroneously taking these results as the reflection of scholarly production, they should be understood as indications of the degree of centrality or marginality of given national communities. This becomes very obvious in the case of China. According to UNESCO, China was the first country in the publication of social science books (55,380 titles) (UNESCO 1999b).[6] This productivity is not reflected in the considered databases at all. The producers of bibliometric databases, through their criteria of selection, determine which social sciences are central and constitute the mainstream, and which are supposedly of no interest to the international community. Insofar they have to be understood as an indicator of marginality and at the same time as an instrument of marginalisation, strengthening North Atlantic domination.

Nevertheless, the analysis so far does not exclude the possibility that low figures for the African and Latin American continents correspond to real underdevelopment in the scholarly publication sector and thus do correlate to de facto scholarly production. A response to that question must remain unsatisfactory, as one cannot rely on any alternative source for objective figures on publication output. However, UNESCO provides a small database, DARE, containing social sciences journals from all over the world (http://www.unesco.org/most/dare.htm, June 2003). DARE is neither complete, nor representative, and the person in charge at the office in Paris could not even explain on which grounds journals are included in DARE (personal communication, Sept. 2003). Compared with the entries in the so-called 'international databases', the titles in the UNESCO database can therefore be regarded as a kind of random sample of social sciences journals. For matters of convenience, only African journals, production and referencing are examined more closely here.

DARE contains 280 African journals, most of which have existed for several years or decades, their longevity indicating to some extent their degree of establishment within the regional and local social sciences and insuring that one is not confronted

with the 'Volume One, Number One' syndrome (cf. on development problems in African journal production: Adebowale 2001). Out of these 280, the SSCI (1992-1997) covers only two: the *South African Journal of Economics and African Studies* (also from South Africa). The marginalisation of African journal production in this database is blatant. FRANCIS (1984-2005) seems to be slightly more representative, covering 32 of the 280 journals – one Egyptian, one Malian, two Nigerian and Senegalese, three Algerian, Kenyan and Moroccan, four Congolese, five Tunisian and eight South African journals. Nevertheless, the large majority of the titles remain invisible in FRANCIS as well. Sociological Abstracts includes 23 of the African journals contained in DARE for the period 1960-2005: one from the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Tunisia, two from Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe, twelve from South Africa. Although slightly more balanced than the SSCI, it does not even cover 10 percent of the random sample.

Furthermore, this brief survey exposes a lack of consensus as to which African journals rank among 'the world's most significant' ones: only one title is included in all three considered databases (SSCI, FRANCIS, Sociological Abstracts), the South African *African Studies,* which also indicates the regionally specialised interest for African social sciences (see below). The fact that both SSCI and FRANCIS ignore two of the long standing and probably most prestigious journals of the continent, CODESRIA's *Africa Development* and the former *South African Sociological Review,* today *African Sociological Review,* edited by CODESRIA as well, should undermine their credibility at least in the African research community. On the other hand, popular but not peer-reviewed journals like the *South African Labour Bulletin* appear in one of the databases, which shows once more the common ignorance of the African publication sector in Philadelphia, Cambridge and Paris alike.

The bibliometric analysis thus confirms the hypothesis that African social sciences production is highly marginalised within the international mainstream. A similar but probably more complete cross-checking of the so-called international databases will soon be possible for Latin America, which is currently establishing its own alternative international data base, the LATINDEX.[7] The results could be complemented by considerations of the language factor or the composition of editorial committees, i.e. the positions of power within the international social sciences journals (Cf. Schubert/ Braun, 1996). This paper will not examine these possible extensions of bibliometric analysis but instead mentions a few other, maybe less obvious indicators and factors, of marginalisation.

The unequal global division of social scientific labour

Marginality also refers to the function that scholarly communities perform within global knowledge production. Hountondji points to an unequal global division of labour, which dates back to the colonial period and parallels economic and geopolitical centre-periphery structures (Hountondji 2001/02). S. F. Alatas differentiates three levels: '1. The division between theoretical and empirical intellectual labour. 2.) The division between other country studies and own country studies. 3.) The division between comparative and single case studies' (Alatas 2003: 607). According to the generally accepted hierarchies of knowledge (Cf. Gaillard/Schlemmer 1996: 128), the social sciences of the global South produce mainly knowledge at the lower levels, in

the sense that they deal with local problems at a low level of abstraction and generalisation, whereas the North holds almost a monopoly on prestigious comparative research and general theory building, i.e. the more universalising social sciences knowledge (Sitas 2006).[8]

This unequal division manifests itself at institutional and personal levels, for example regarding cooperation programmes. In his programme for a Mexican social sciences research policy, González Casanova emphasised the crucial question of international cooperation and summarised a few rules to be respected in such collaboration to enhance the local social sciences: the Mexican researchers should be integrated in all stages of research, from conceptualisation to the publication of the results, and should not remain limited to collecting data; the theoretical framework and the initial hypothesis should be published; the results should be analysed and published in Mexico first and only subsequently abroad; as partners in international comparative projects, the Mexican researchers should participate in the whole of the analysis and interpretation and should have access to all materials from all regions part of the comparison; no region should be excluded as an object of research; organisation and development of the research and the practical research experience obtained should be published together with the results (González Casanova 1968: 26). The author thus highlights several points that have proven to play their part in the unequal division of labour at the level of personal and institutional collaborations.

In his introduction to a compilation of articles on international scientific cooperation, Gaillard generalises the main problem in North-South-relations as the existing hierarchy between the participants: '(...) all the authors who have contributed to this volume agree that the main problems in the practice of North-South collaboration programmes are tied to the asymmetry in collaboration and to the domination that the partners from the North exert' (Gaillard 1996: 12. Translation W.K. For further details and case studies see: Gaillard 1999). The mentioned hierarchies refer to the fact that the Northern partners were more involved in the central tasks of conceptualisation, interpretation, theory building and publication, whereas the Southern colleagues often had to contend themselves with collecting and processing data. Empirical research on North-South-inequalities in scientific collaborations – not distinguishing between disciplines – showed that in 90 out of 100 cases, the head office of the cooperation projects was with an institution in the North. In 65 percent, the initiative for research also emanated from there (Gaillard/Schlemmer 1996: 124). In a series of interviews with African researchers, Waast observed that: '(...) the researchers who benefit from cooperation programs complain about being subjected to a narrow agenda and about an unequal division of labour. Many of them estimate that their role is limited to that of mere suppliers of data, or of developers of solutions devised out of context, following a standardised model' (Waast 2002: 43. See also Teferra 2002).

This problem is also well known among African social scientists (Hountondji 1990, 1994, 2001/02, Sitas 2006), and Mkandawire considers it to be of particular importance, also referring to the fact that it is mostly regional specialists who are interested in social scientific research in and on Africa (Mkandawire 1989: 2). This issue is examined in the next paragraph. The tendencies expressed in the cited literature were basically confirmed in a series of interviews undertaken by the author during an in-depth study on the development of South African labour studies, with

sociologists at the universities of KwaZulu-Natal, Witwatersrand and Cape Town (for citations of the interviews on this topic, see Keim 2006: 382-405). This once again shows that the dimensions of marginality and underdevelopment are two separate problems, as South Africa has a considerable degree of material and institutional development.

To conclude this part on unequal personal and institutional relationships and in order to dispel any possible doubt that the afore-mentioned voices emanated from radicalised individuals, it is interesting to note that the UNESCO Report on the Social Sciences, a rather well balanced, cautious and very diplomatic document, stresses the same problems for the African continent (UNESCO 1999a: 123).

Extraversion, locality and the pressure to define oneself as exotic – inequalities in the cognitive division of labour

'Place matters only to those for whom Great Truths are not an option. The local is local for those without the power not to make it matter' (McDaniel 20003: 596). This quotation appropriately exposes the argument put forward in this paragraph. The unequal division of labour, often combined with local scientific development problems (the lack of integration into scholarly communities, isolation as well as communication infrastructure), and the prestige of institutions in the centre, have a combined effect on the cognitive level of sociological knowledge production. These factors lead to what Hountondji called 'extraversion', referring to the fact that African scholarly production is oriented neither towards the local peers nor to one's own society, but towards the overseas public (cf. the works of Hountondji). Extraversion manifests itself in the choice of research topics and in the degree of generalisation that, according to Hountondji, are oriented towards the interests of the North Atlantic audience: 'This is one of the most pernicious forms of extraversion: theoretical, or socio-theoretical extraversion, the fact that we allow the content of our scientific production, the questions we pose, and the way we deal with them to be pre-oriented, pre-determined by the expectations of our potential readers' (Hountondji 1990 b: 11).

This already points to the related problem of the local focus and limited scope of peripheral sociological production. As Alatas observed, there is a global division of labour between those who work on their own countries and those who work on countries other than their own, do comparative research and arrive at considerably higher degrees of generalisation. In accordance with extraversion, the southern social sciences limit themselves in scope and perspective. The overseas, 'international' audience is interested in (case) studies on particular societies, that in turn feed into general theory formation in the North: '(Extraversion) has to be understood as the origin of a particularly bothersome limitation in the practice of the social sciences ... the enclosure into the particular, the idea that the local scholarly discourse is only interesting if it refers to local realities, the idea that the African historian, sociologist, anthropologist, linguist, philosopher ought to do African history, African sociology, anthropology on Africa, African linguistics, African philosophy. Limiting one's own horizon in this manner, the researcher of the Third World leaves to others the theorising and the interpretation and integration into bigger entities of this mass of data he delivers. The African researcher inhibits himself the access to the universal' (Hountondji, 2001/02: 5; Translation WK). The consequences of these problems highlighted by Hountondji are further discussed below.

The pressure to define oneself as exotic, which southern social sciences experience on an international scale, is a specific form of locality, and a particularly limiting one. As Sitas observes: '(...) there is a serious pressure to define ourselves as "different" in the world context of ideas. Trying to be more than peripheral exotica in the "global cultural bazaar" of social science, we are bumping up against the niche trading tents we have been offered. (...) Of course, we can be cynical and say that even here very few of us are considered good enough to be included, like Ali Farka Toure and Yousso N'Dour in the category called "world music", as decorative additions' (Sitas 2006: 20).

The difference between locality and generalising abstraction can be traced empirically in the titles of publications. Typically, publications produced at the periphery contain the geographical location in their title, thus signalling the provincial or regional status of their knowledge production, a feature that has no equal in North Atlantic production. According to Baber, the conclusion from this observation is that there is a topographic dimension to social scientific knowledge production, reception and validation: '(...) a specific geography of knowledge where spatial location of the researcher and site of research also play a significant role in the reception and valorisation of the work is in operation' (Baber 2003: 618). This corresponds exactly to the quotation that marked the beginning of this subsection.

The hypothesis on the related phenomena of extraversion and locality can also be empirically tested by examining the geographical specialisation of research institutions. UNESCO's DARE-database contains information about a rather arbitrary selection of about 4,800 social sciences research institutions worldwide. The descriptions contain contact details, regular activities, publications, some key words as well as an indication of the geographical area of research.[9] Similar to the data about social science journals, these can be used as a random sample. Out of the 89 African institutions contained in the database, eight made no indication of regional specialisation. Only six reached beyond the continent, whereas 33 mentioned their own country and 45 Africa or sub-regions within the continent as geographical areas. Out of the 149 Latin American social sciences institutions contained in DARE, two thirds (105) had a local or regional focus, whereas 23 focussed on other continents and 21 made no indication concerning the geographical scope of their research.

For matters of convenience, Germany and France have been selected as examples for European countries. Out of the 208 institutions (89 German and 119 French), 56 made no indication concerning their regional specialisation; 20 focussed exclusively on their own country and 41 on Europe; 50 on one or several other continents (often in addition to Europe), and 38 institutions indicated a global perspective. The hypothesis of the centrality of Western Europe, which in terms of knowledge dominates the rest of the world, and the marginality of Africa and Latin America, limited to local and regional research, as Hountondji criticised, is confirmed by this indicator.

However, these indicators do not show clearly to what extent the southern limitation to the local corresponds to the interests of the North Atlantic social sciences, as Hountondji purports with his concept of extraversion and Sitas with his critique of exoticism. To deal with that question, an evaluation of the activities of invited scholars at institutions in the centre might be informative. Unfortunately, systematic information on that matter is not available. However, over the course of two academic years the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), one of the most

prestigious French social sciences institutions in Paris, published on its website lists with the names of all invited scholars and specifying the topics they presented at the EHESS, thus providing a valuable source for the kind of analysis required here.[10] Due to the limited number of speakers and to the fact that they were representing a variety of social sciences disciplines, the following analysis should be considered as an approximate assessment of the topic. Between 2001 and 2003, 361 visiting scholars presented their social scientific work at the EHESS. About 33 percent of them came from Western Europe, 32.5 percent from North America, 11 percent from Latin America and 7.8 percent from Africa.

The titles of their presentations at Paris give an indication of the geographical scope and degree of generalisation of their work. To demonstrate this, the totality of presentations can be categorised in an order of increasing generalisation: first, those which refer explicitly to the native country; second, those which refer to the native continent, its history or contemporary social questions; third, those that explicitly deal with France to see whether a bias has been introduced into the analysis through the location of the host institution; fourth, those that deal with other regions or eras (Ancient Rome or Greece, the Aztec or Mayan cultures, etc.); and finally those that deal with general, abstract, theoretical, methodological or epistemological questions. The scholars in the last category can be considered to have been attributed the status of scientific authorities in their respective fields by their Parisian colleagues. Those who talk about their own home country or continent, on the other side, were invited to Paris rather as informants (the term 'informant' was used by Hountondji 1994). In several cases, one presentation had to be placed into more than one category due to the complexity of the issues evoked in the title. The distribution for African scholars is represented in Table 1.

Table 1: Presentations by African scholars invited to the EHESS, 2001-2003

Affiliation of scholar	Total	Topic of presentation relates to				
		Home country	Africa	France	Other regions/ times	General theory/ methodol.
Egypt	5	1	1	-	3	2
Morocco	4	3	-	-	-	1
Algeria	4	3	-	-	1	-
Ivory Coast	3	1	2	-	-	-
Tunisia	3	2	-	-	-	1
Mauritania	2	1	1	-	-	?
South Africa	2	2	-	-	-	-
Gabon	1	-	-	-	-	1
Cameroon	1	1	-	-	-	-
Mali	1	1	-	-	-	-
Niger	1	-	1	-	-	-
Senegal	1	1	1	-	-	-
Total	28	16	6	0	4	5
percent	28	57	21	0	14	18

Due to possible multiple categorisation, the sum adds up to more than 100 percent.
Source: Invited professors at the EHESS 2001/02 and 2003: http://www.ehess.fr/html/html/7.html (January 2004).

Table 1 clearly shows that the majority of African presentations concentrated on the home country of the lecturer (57 percent). Six of them related to the African continent as a whole, which means that 78.6 percent of the total would have to be considered as informants. Obviously, Africans were not invited to talk about France (0), four presentations were held on other regions than Africa, and five on general theoretical issues. It might be interesting to note that the four regional specialists were all concerned with Islam, and four out of the five presentations in the category for general theory or methodology also focussed on religion. This emphasis might be a result of the incidents on 9/11/2001 that pushed Islamic studies in the North Atlantic region. For the Latin American speakers, the distribution is illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2: Presentations by Latin American scholars invited to the EHESS, 2001-2003

Affiliation of scholar	Total	Topic of presentation relates to				
		Home country	Home continent	France	Other regions/ times	General theory/ methodol.
Argentina	16	7	4	3	3	5
Brazil	15	10	1	2	3	5
Mexico	6	6	1	-	-	1
Columbia	3	1	1	-	1	-
Peru	2	2	-	-	-	-
Chile	1	1	1	-	-	-
Venezuela	1	1	-	-	-	-
Total	44	27	8	5	7	11
Percent		61	18	11	16	25

Due to possible multiple categorisation, the sum adds up to more than 100 percent.
Source: Invited professors at the EHESS 2001/02 and 2003: http://www.ehess.fr/html/html/7.html (January 2004).

Here again, the majority of the papers presented at the EHESS had a local or regional focus. The interest for France was related to comparative research between France and the native Latin American country in most of the cases. It is noteworthy that 25 percent of the presentations could be categorised as 'General Theory and Methodology'. Nevertheless, on a global scale, these results confirm the hypothesis of the marginality of African and Latin American social science. These figures can now be compared to those for North America and Western Europe as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Presentations by North-American and Western European scholars invited to the EHESS, 2001-2003

Affiliation of scholar	Total	Topic of presentation relates to				
		Home country	Home continent	France	Other regions/ times	General theory/ methodol.
USA	75	11	5	7	29	34
Italy	33	7	3	2	8	17
Germany	24	3	9	1	2	11
Spain	14	9	1	1	1	4
Great Britain	10	1	1	1	5	4
Canada	10	-	-	-	-	10
Switzerland	9	1	2	1	1	3
Greece	8	4	1		1	2
Portugal	4	4	2	-	2	-
Netherlands	4	-	1-	-	1	2
Austria	3			1	1	1
Belgium	3	-	1-	-	1	1
Finland	2	-	1	-	1	1
Sweden	2	-	-	-	1	2
Denmark	1	-	-	-	1	-
Norway	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total	203	40	27	14	55	93
percent		20	13	7	27	46

Due to possible multiple categorisation, the sum adds up to more than 100 percent.
Source: Invited professors at the EHESS 2001/02 and 2003: http://www.ehess.fr/html/html/7.html (January 2004).

Almost half of all the presentations were concerned with general problems of the social sciences. Another 27 percent focussed on other regions and times, a mere 20 percent were on a topic limited to their author's home country, and another 13 percent on their home continent. To have their focus on general topics and overseas regional specialisation is particularly evident with North American guests: 45 percent of the US-American and all of the Canadian presentations concentrated on general questions. As for the Western European guests, except for the Iberian Peninsula and Greece – which according to that indicator can be characterised as the European periphery – very few speakers talked about their native countries. The share of presentations on other continents and times was also considerably high.

The unequal division of labour described here for one institution of the centre is also observable in the South itself. Andrade Carreño provides the counterpart to the above analysis, looking at articles in seven Mexican sociological journals with respect to the country of origin of authors and the geographical location of their object of research. He presents the results reproduced in Table 4.

Table 4: Institutional origin and geographical location of objects of articles in Mexican social sciences journals according to Andrade Carreño

Origin of article	Geographical location of object of research						
	Mexico	Lat. -Amer.	North. -Amer.	Europe	Asia & Africa	None	Total
Mexico	474 57 %	85 10 %	6 1 %	3 0 %	13 2 %	245 30 %	826 100 %
Lat.-Amer.	0 %	121 76 %	0 0 %	0 0 %	0 0 %	38 24 %	159 100 %
North-Amer.	32 29 %	25 23 %	7 6 %	1 1 %	0 0 %	44 40 %	109 99 %
Europe	22 21 %	25 24 %	0 0 %	6 6 %	0 0 %	52 50 %	105 101 %

The numbers were rounded, and consequently the percentages do not always equal exactly 100 percent.
Andrade Carreño includes the following journals, between 1980 and 1994, in his analysis: *Acta Sociológica, Estudios Sociológicos, Polis Annuario de Sociología, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Sociológica* and *Tiempo Sociológico.*
Source: Andrade Carreño 1998: 135

The unequal division of labour is clearly observable in these figures as well. The majority of Mexican and Latin American articles focussed on the local and regional level – 57 percent and 76 percent respectively – whereas large parts of North American and European contributions were not bound geographically (40 percent and 50 percent respectively), Andrade Carreño is certainly right in judging this abstraction from geographical location as an indicator for general theoretical works (Andrade Carreño 1998: 136). A majority also concentrated on Mexico or Latin America, reflecting the frequent communication between southern social sciences and regional specialisations in the centre. The phenomena of extraversion and the 'captive mind' (see below) are thus detectable within the local academic communities, as the Mexican example shows.

Effects of the disciplinary divisions within the social sciences

Not only does the above mentioned indicator on the unequal division of labour among invited scholars strongly confirm the marginality of African and Latin American social sciences. Looked at more closely, the practice of inviting scholars at the EHESS also hints to another factor of marginalisation of the southern social sciences: the disciplinary structure of the social sciences that channels discourses, but also personnel and finances, and thus keeps the southern voices away from the social sciences nomothetic core disciplines (economy, sociology and political sciences). Typically, ethnology/social anthropology and orientalism are the disciplines occupied

with societies outside of Europe, completed by 'area studies', established during the Cold War (for a slightly different focus on the disciplinary divisions as an instrument of 'internal colonisation' in the countries of the South, see Lander 2004).

An extension of the previous analysis, considering which departments of the EHESS invite speakers, reveals that an invited African social scientist most probably ends up in the Department of African Studies. In fact, out of the 38 invited Africans, 14 came to the Centre for African Studies, twelve to the Centre for Social History of Mediterranean Islam, eight to the Centre for Historical Research, one to the Centre for Turkish History, one to the unit of Sociology, History, Anthropology and Cultural dynamics, one to the Laboratory for Social Anthropology, and one to the Division of Area Studies. This means that in the majority, invited African scholars related to regional specialists, not to general social scientists. The same disciplinary channelling mechanisms that keep southern social scientific production from the core of the business impact, for example, on their publishing opportunities. Regionally specialised journals are more readily available to sociologists from the South than more prestigious general social sciences journals (see the interview passages cited in Keim forthcoming b on this subject). As a consequence, their contributions remain largely invisible for the northern and international community of peers in their own discipline.

Evolutionism in social thinking

Finally, marginality is also related to the inherent evolutionist thinking in the social sciences, which – despite post-modern deconstruction and disillusion – still prevails and creates hierarchies between objects of research as well as between locations of sociological production. The assumption that all regions and societies will go through the same stages of development, with the rich nations of the North actually representing the peak of human development and the rest of the world 'catching up', also affects the perception of social scientific production from the north Atlantic domain. In the South, it inhibits 'methodological non-alignment', i.e. alternative grounds for thinking and theorising about local social developments: '(...) it is expected that other parts of the world develop in the same manner as the modern Western world (...). It is a matter of time and stages. (...) The development of the non-Western world is considered as parallel to that of the West. The captive mind does not consider another possible alternative, that is, methodological non-alignment' (S. H. Alatas 1974: 695).

The core disciplines do not consider Africa or Latin America as places with their own social realities and with genuine theory building, but instead as a field, a case study or a laboratory, where 'universal theory' developed out of the North Atlantic experience can be tested and validated. This attitude is expressed strongly in the publication *Africa and the disciplines – the contributions of research in Africa to the social sciences and humanities* (Bates/Mudimbe/O'Barr 1993). Contrary to its title, that pretends to focus on the contribution of research in Africa to the development of the disciplines, the book contains a series of articles illustrating the importance of research on Africa, for example in the field of economy: 'Africa is a gold mine to economists, because its economic history has been so extreme. Booms, busts, famines, migrations. Because there are so many African countries, often following radically

different economic policies, Africa offers a diversity ideally suited to the comparative approach which is the economist's best substitute for the controlled experiment' (Collier 1993: 58). This passage clearly reveals to what extent Africa is thought of as a field of experimentation, as a region exporting raw data in order to complement universal theory done in the North – a gold mine. This perception is intimately connected to the evolutionist assumption that Africa trails far behind in its social development and thus cannot yield cutting edge research in the social sciences. Among sociologists in the South, this provokes the strong feeling that they could not contribute anything new and meaningful to international debates, because their own realities are too far behind the latest developments in the metropolises. This is expressed by Johann Marée in an interview passage about the lack of interest for South African sociologies abroad: '(...) it is because they are the vanguard of development, they don't have anything to learn from us here. We can't inform them on the questions they are dealing with now' (Johann Marée, Interview 3.3.2004). In this regard, recent debates about modernity in the South and the North seem to be of particular importance (Dussel 2003; Lander 1997, 2003, 2004; Mignolo 2004). These might contribute to a necessary paradigm shift to counter the detrimental impact of evolutionism.

The consequences of marginalisation – a critical conclusion

The results strongly confirm the persisting marginalisation within sociology and the social sciences internationally at a macro-sociological, world-scale level. They should thus be taken seriously in any debate about the internationalisation or globalisation of sociology. Any assumptions of an integrated, homogeneous, international or global community of equals seem to be premature and lacking reflection on the distortions within international sociology. The results obtained through the above empirical analyses should be taken seriously with regard to two more far-reaching issues: with regard to science policy in the South; and with regard to the debates generated by recently emerging theoretical attacks against North Atlantic domination and by claims for the possible globalisation of the discipline. The latter also points to recent challenges to the very epistemological foundations of sociology.

Considering the results presented above, it should be stressed that recent developments in science and research policy are not appropriate for overcoming the centre-periphery structures in the social sciences. Individual evaluation against so-called 'international standards' and, most of all, the pressure to 'publish internationally or perish', again push sociologists at the periphery to turn their back on their own local scholarly communities and on their own societies in general, obliging them to publish according to the rules and preferences of the so-called 'international' audience. Especially for the domain of the social sciences, the policy of 'catching up' with the international mainstream is not an option (a proponent of 'catching up' for peripheral scholarly communities is Gaillard: Gaillard 1987, 1994; Gaillard/Schlemmer 1996). The generation of sociological knowledge follows a different logic than, for instance, the natural sciences. In particular the lower level of abstraction from the specific context of emergence of social science knowledge requires different strategies in science policy to overcome intellectual dependency and to allow for the development of autonomous traditions. A more complete argument for counter-hegemonic currents cannot be fully expressed here.[11]

Concerning the current internal debates, in recent years several theoretical attacks have been launched against the North Atlantic domination over the social sciences that cannot be accounted for through macro-social, quantitative analysis at a global scale: criticism of Euro-centrism (Amin 1988, Fals-Borda/Mora-Osejo 2003), deconstruction of orientalism (Said 1978), attacks on anthropology and area studies (Mamdani 1997, Mafeje s.d.) and the attempt to 'provincialize Europe' (Chakrabarty 2000). S. F. Alatas (2001) has conceptualised to what extent imported approaches may be irrelevant for the analysis and understanding of local societies, and has proposed a set of criteria necessary to render southern sociologies more relevant to their own contexts. At the same time, the constructive approach of the indigenisation project attempts to develop sociological concepts from social knowledge contained in oral poetry (Akiwowo 1986, 1999, Makinde 1988, Lawuyi and Taiwo 1990, for a critical review see Adésínà 2002; Keim 2007).

These approaches have contributed to opening up spaces for a critical discussion of the established Northern dominated theories.[12] They have furthered a critical reception and diversified reaction to the globalisation debate within the discipline. The subsequent discussion shows that the results of this paper should not be taken as highlighting an exclusive development problem of sociologies in the global South. On the contrary, the centre-periphery structures affect the very epistemological foundations of the discipline as a whole (for a detailed version of the argument, see Connell 2006, Keim forthcoming a).

In particular, the dimension of marginality and centrality leads to topographical hierarchies in sociological knowledge production. This poses a fundamental problem to the constitution of a nomothetic discipline that aims at making universally valid assumptions on social realities. In the past as well as today, the dominant North Atlantic tradition has exerted hegemonic tendencies of Eurocentric inclusion and exclusion, leading to a distorted form of universalism. Ethnocentrically, it emanated from North Atlantic particular social conditions; logocentrically, it deduced common general assumptions, based on these particular conditions, and applied them to all social realities on the globe. Thus, a specific form of Eurocentrism has 'miraculously encountered the particular own in the general and the general in the particular own' (Waldenfels 1997: 49).

The majority of humankind, its social experience and social scientific reflection on that experience, are excluded from sociological theory formation through the observed marginalisation tendencies, but are included into the scope of general theories derived from the particular North Atlantic experience. The problem of centre and periphery is thus not only an obstacle to the autonomous development of sociologies in the global South, but an epistemological problem at the very core of the discipline. Up to date, few are those who have recognized the epistemological challenge to the discipline emanating from the South in recent years (Berthelot 1998, Connell 2006).

Many of the classical approaches (for a critical discussion, see Connell 1997), have thus formulated universalistic aspirations without reflecting their particular social location. Their universalism, however, is based on the meta-theoretical assumption of the unicity of humankind (Archer 1991:131). Some of the Southern critiques, on the contrary, deny or at least question this ontology: 'This is precisely the problem. The "unicity of humanity" that requires that we have "a single discipline" for "a single

world" is in the imagination of the conventional western sociologist' (Adésínà 2002: 93). Ontological and subsequently sociological universalism appears to be at the origin of recent calls for the internationalisation or globalisation of the discipline. These are interpreted by Adésínà and others as hiding new attempts of North Atlantic domination.

Their scepticism seems to be justified, for instance, by one of the publications that actually tries to further the internationalisation of the discipline. Albrow/King (1990), in their introduction to a collection of articles from *International Sociology,* propose a periodization in which the phase of indigenization is at least implicitly considered to be already overtaken by the last phase, globalisation of sociology. This shortcutting of the necessary debate around alternative sociologies originating at the periphery is seen by critical scholars as, for instance, Oommen, as a new version of classical universalism and thus as yet another 'camouflage' of North Atlantic domination: '(...) one can speak of internationalization of sociology as an ongoing process of modernization/ Westernization of sociology' (Oommen 1991: 71).

These debates are situated, in the end, at the level of meta-theory, ontology and philosophy. What can be concluded, however, from the above presented empirical data on the state of international sociology, is that the discussion can hardly be called a serious scholarly discussion, in the sense of a debate among equals where the better argument counts, as long as communication structures remain as heavily distorted as they are up to date.

Notes

1. This paper is based on results of my PhD thesis (Keim 2006). The book based on the thesis will appear later in 2008 (Keim forthcoming b).
2. For a critical assessment of the construction of 'classical theory' and of the 'founding fathers', see Connell 1997.
3. The analogy ends, at latest, when it comes to one of the fundamental assumptions of economic dependency theory, namely that the development in the centre causally determines underdevelopment in the periphery. This can in no way be assumed for the domain of the social sciences.
4. Social Science Citation Index, http://www-fr.redi-bw.de/session/SSCI-4667830f.html, (Jan. 2006). The online resources of Freiburg University provide access to the years 1992-1997.
5. FRANCIS, INIST-CNRS, 2001. http://www.bibliothek.uni-regensburg.de/dbinfo/einzeln.phtml?bib_id=alle&titel_id=656 (Jan. 2005).
6. According to the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999, Table IV.5 'Book production: number of titles by UDC classes'.
7. www.latindex.org (Auf. 2006). Unfortunately, this database was still in an early phase of establishment at the time of data collection for the analyses presented in this paper and could not be used.
8. This corresponds to the division of labour between senior and junior researchers that Shinn observes at the micro-level within scientific institutions. Cf. Shinn 1988.
9. The fact that 'geographic area' is a feature included in the form the contacted institutions were supposed to deliver to UNESCO poses a problem insofar as this suggests giving such an indication, whereas the questions of abstraction, empirical or theoretical research, were probably not included. No indication of geographical specialisation may thus mean either the omission of the question, a global scope or an abstract, theoretical orientation.

10. The EHESS published lists of invited speakers for the years 2001/02 and 203 on its website (http://www.ehess.fr/html/html/7.html, Jan. 2004). Data for the following years were not available any more.
11. I have argued that sociological innovations, what I termed 'counter hegemonic currents', might rather be expected to emerge out of locally grounded communities. Their socially relevant research practice, in the course of their development and maturation, leads to increasingly theoretically relevant research output. An in-depth case study on the historical and recent developments in South African labour studies adequately illustrates how, under specific social and political historical circumstances, a locally relevant domain of sociological research did emerge and favoured growing independence from North Atlantic domination (see Keim forthcoming b: 167-503). The concept of 'counter-hegemonic current' thus relates to the emergence of original, growingly autonomous sociologies at the periphery.
12. However, these reclamations from the global South have been of a rather limited impact on de facto relationships within the international community. I have pointed out elsewhere (Keim 2006) the three main reasons for this: first, restricting themselves to the scope of theories and texts, they have not aimed at the principal media of domination highlighted in the above analyses, i.e. institutions and funding. The second reason is related to the problem of marginalisation. In fact, North Atlantic domination over the field of social sciences relies on the shared acceptance of a common arena of competition (for the concept of 'arena' see Shinn 2000). Only if one accepts that the institutions and communication media of the dominant mainstream are the arena of competition in one's discipline, then the battle for international scholarly reputation can begin and marginalising tendencies be put into operation. Formulating their explicit assault on North Atlantic domination, the theoretical critiques in question stepped into the same arena of competition for international recognition, trusting that their voices would be heard and their arguments taken seriously by the dominant northern audience. Finally, their claims met ignorance in a general climate of theoretical and epistemological post-modern laissez-faire.

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Xenophobia and the place *of the refugee in the rainbow nation of human rights*

> *...the paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general – without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself* (Arendt, 1958, 297).

In the *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt provides us with the haunting image of those rendered 'stateless' in Europe as a consequence of the two world wars. In Arendt's words these 'citizens of nowhere in the world', are no longer 'recognised or treated as humans'. Stripped of fundamental protections the refugee exists in 'the abstract nakedness of being human', the link between the human and the citizen destroyed (1958, 299). What Arendt wants to demonstrate is that '(T)he refugee-precariously positioned at the end of the distinction between human and nonhuman-becomes human (or, as Nietzsche would have it, "all too human"), only when no longer human, he is no longer capable of having rights'(Balfour and Cadava, 281).

The images Arendt paints become all too real when one visits the River Road camp overlooking Alexandra. An all-male camp of about 220 people hounded out of various townships in Johannesburg, it is fenced in and overlaid with barbed wire. Guards keep an eye on the inmates with access closely monitored through a single gate. I got there some two months after the violence first erupted and witnessed the spectre of Agamben's *homo sacer*, people reduced to bare life without the protection of legal or civil rights (Agamben, 1998).

Sibonile Mabhena, a 23 years old Zimbabwean inmate of the camp left the country of his birth in 2004 because he was 'starving' and jobs had dried up. He was living in Alexandra when a crowd gathered outside his shack on 10 May 2008. He knew some of them as they were his neighbours. They asked him to 'vacate the shack immediately'. It was already late at night but he bundled what he could together and slept with his family in the open veld. The following day he sent his wife and three year old child to Vereeniging while he went to sleep at Skilful Panelbeaters, his place of work in 10th Road in Kew, owned by a fellow Zimbabwean. On 12 May 2008 Skilful Panelbeaters was attacked by people from Alexandra who were brought to his workplace by taxi. Compressors and other equipment were stolen while vehicles were stripped to the bare shell. The panelbeating shop now serves as a makeshift parking lot for taxis. This is how Sibonile arrived at the River Road camp – without documents, family, home, or work.

If people were reduced to bare life in the camps, it however did not turn them into Foucault's 'docile subjects' (Foucault, 1997). Many refused to sign onto documents that could potentially scupper their ability to gain the status of refugees. They were prepared in the process to turn themselves into spectacles, taking to setting up shelters on the side of busy roads. In some of the camps inmates set up schools and elected

committees to defend the camps against attacks, to distribute food and other donations made by private humanitarian organisations and to represent their interests to the authorities.

African immigrants had already learnt to live on the margins of the system, finding ways to get their children to school, finding jobs and shelters to live in. At the same time many had to learn to live at a distance from the repressive arm of the state. These everyday individual resistances (Scott, 1985) were now translated into a collective response with committees elected to ensure the feeding of people, organise security, represent their stories to the media and liaise with humanitarian organisations.

The May 2008 xenophobic attacks resulted in the death of over 50 African immigrants. According of official reports some 342 shops were looted, 213 gutted and 1,384 people arrested (Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula quoted in Crush, J., et. al., 2008, 11). The attacks were greeted with shock and horror across South Africa. How could this be happening in a country with an international reputation for reconciliation and whose people were dubbed the 'rainbow nation of God' in recognition of their seeming 'miraculous' ability to overcome three century old racial division and oppression? It is also a country that is widely acknowledged for its founding constitution and emphasis on human rights supported by a well funded Human Rights Commission. From the government side blame put on the 'Third Force', right wing elements and criminals.

Minister in the Presidency Essop Pahad alluded to the role of right wing forces: 'We need to understand that xenophobia has historically been used by right wing populist movements to mobilise particularly the lumpen-proletariat against minority groups in society.' When asked to clarify his comments Pahad replied: 'All I am saying is we need to be very careful ... it is easy to mobilise in this way with right wing agendas' (Independent Online, 21/5/2008). Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, fingered the 'Third Force' and criminals:

> Let us not overlook the disturbing fact that sinister forces appear to have a hand in the escalation and spread of repulsive behaviour, which has regrettably led to the loss of innocent lives, both foreigners and South Africans ... The only time that South Africa has experienced this form of violence was pre-1994, and we all know that this was politically-motivated violence ... we were aware that criminal elements had exploited concerns and fears of the people (Independent Online 21/5/2008).

The director-general of the National Intelligence Agency, Manala Manzini, was probably the most outlandish, linking the violence to people wanting to disrupt the 2009 elections:

> We believe that as South Africa prepares for another national election early next year, the so-called black-on-black violence that we witnessed prior to our first election in 1994 has deliberately been unleashed and orchestrated (M&G Online, 23/5/2008).

There was little acknowledgement that xenophobic violence has a longer history in post-apartheid South Africa. From the birth of the new democracy, the danger signals were there. As early as December 1994 and going into January 1995, African foreigners were attacked in Alexandra with many having their accommodation destroyed and others marched to the police station. The mobilisation was named 'Operation Buyelekhaya' (go back home) and involved

> Armed gangs of youth, claiming to be members of the local ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) ... carried out a concerted campaign of intimidation and terror to rid the township of illegal aliens ... They specifically targeted Shangaan speakers and Zimbabweans and other residents with 'dark complexions' by throwing them and their possessions out of their homes and flats. Some of those targeted had their homes burnt down and their possessions looted. Others were frog-marched to the local police station where it was demanded that they be removed immediately (Minnaar & Hough, 1996, 188-99).

This was followed by a series of brutal attacks:

> In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out while the other two, both Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed the roof trying to escape the crowd. This violence was visited by members of a crowd who were returning from a rally in the country's administrative capital, Pretoria, who had gathered to protest under the banner of an organisation called 'Unemployed Masses of South Africa' who proclaimed to represent 32 000 jobless people (*Pretoria News*, 4 September 1998).

These intermittent outbreaks of xenophobic violence

> culminated in December 2005 in the disgrace of Olievenhoutbosch, a community near Centurion in Gauteng Province, when groups of South Africans chased foreign Africans living in the Choba informal settlement from their shacks and businesses. Several were killed in the burning and looting ... Throughout 2006 and 2007, attacks on foreign nationals escalated in their brazenness and brutality. In a spate of attacks in 2007, over 100 Somalis were killed and Somali businesses and properties were looted and torched. Certainly there were plenty of danger signs. Government ministers should not have been surprised in May 2008 (Crush et al., 2008, 21).

The attacks on African foreigners in the last decade and a half were accompanied by a heightened language of hysteria and demeaning 'Othering' of African immigrants. This language was by no means confined to the townships but was rife in the press, in parliament and institutions of the state, particularly the SAPS and Home Affairs. The May 2008 attacks though were different. The previous violence was limited to one episode in one locale while the May attacks spread across the country, putting tens of thousands on the move, some 15000 Mozambicans leaving the country in a convoy of busses, scores dead and injured and thousands seeking sanctuary in camps and makeshift shelters.

This article considers the different sources that contributed to an increasing xenophobic environment and argues for a fundamental shift in approach to African immigration.

Walking 'like a Mozambican'

> …police in South Africa arrest more people for violating immigration laws each year than for any other reason. Of those apprehended, most are forcibly repatriated, and many suffer human rights abuses, including physical torture and denial of access to legal representation ... In dealing with what they perceive as the 'foreign menace' police on the ground have become simultaneously more corrupt, militarised, and brutal (Murray, 2003, 453).

A Human Rights Commission (HRC) study of police methods revealed that 'there was substantial failure of enforcing officers to comply with even minimal requirements' of

the law (HRC, 1999, p. xx). This was particularly the case with proof of identification. The legal requirement in South Africa is that people do not have to carry identification. The 'official policy adopted by the SAPS is that individuals should be accompanied by police to retrieve their identity document (ID) if an officer suspects that they are illegally in the country but they allege they have valid documents' (HRC, 1999, p. xxi). What the HRC found was that more often than not suspects were not afforded this opportunity and were immediately arrested. The HRC also found that in many instances when an ID was produced it was simply torn up (HRC, 1999, p. xxvi).

The harsh reality of the brutal and callous way in which law enforcement officers could treat immigrants was brought home to South Africans in November 2000. SABC television showed white police officers setting dogs on three defenceless black men. The men, it subsequently emerged, were Mozambicans and were shown to be repeatedly attacked and crying out for the police to stop. This was to no avail as the attack lasted nearly an hour (*The Star* 8 November 2000). The environment for treating immigrants with impunity was helped by the way senior police officers labelled the majority of African immigrants as criminals. Senior Superintendent Johan Steyn was of the view that '90 percent of criminals who break into homes, commit armed robbery and rape the women are Zimbabweans' (*The Star*, 27 March 1999). Captain Giacomo Bondesio of the South African Police Service's Aliens Investigation Unit was of the considered opinion that 'as many as 90 percent of the Nigerians who applied for Section 41 permits – which grant temporary residence to political asylum applicants – were drug dealers' (*The Sunday Independent*, 22 June 22 1997).

These comments are not isolated, but symptomatic of widespread sentiments and created the conditions for the police to act with impunity. This stereotyping and lack of concern for immigrants rights was exemplified by a police officer who arrested a South African citizen, who was quickly deported because 'he walked like a Mozambican' (M&G 21 July 1994). In response to this process of identification Everett points out that in a study of women migrants that some changed

> their traditional styles of dress after arriving in South Africa, both as a strategy for assimilation and to avoid attention, particularly from the police. One migrant explained that the police 'know how we walk and how we dress: South Africans put on trousers and Zimbabweans put on dresses'. Another added that she asked her brothers to teach her how to walk like South Africans before migrating in order to better assimilate. Finally, women simply attempted to go about their daily lives unnoticed wherever possible ... (Everett, 2007, 43-44).

These responses must be seen in the context of the particular methods used by the Internal Tracing units of SAPS to identify foreigners:

> In trying to establish whether a suspect is an illegal or not, members of the internal tracing units focus on a number of aspects. One of these is language: accent, the pronouncement of certain words (such as Zulu for 'elbow', or 'buttonhole' or the name of the meerkat) ... Appearance is another factor in trying to establish whether a suspect is illegal – hairstyle, type of clothing worn as well as physical appearance. In the case of Mozambicans a dead give-away is the vaccination mark on the lower left forearm ... (Minnaar & Hough, 1996, 166-67).

These methods are particularly relevant as it was precisely similar methods that were used by communities to single out foreigners in the May 2008 xenophobic attacks. The

examples cited above date back to a decade or more. They illustrate that the problem did not spring up suddenly but has a long genealogy. In the past, it was usually explained away as a hangover of apartheid, but recent attacks show that xenophobia against African immigrants is much more deeply embedded in communities.

Home Affairs

Some of the descriptive words and phrases used by South Africa's judges during litigation against immigration and asylum procedures of the Department of Home Affairs are very revealing. They include 'shameful', 'horrifying', 'dysfunctional', 'unconstitutional', 'unlawful', 'hypocritical nonsense', and they paint a graphic and debilitating picture of 'gross inhumanity' (Justine Gerardy, *The Star* July 26 2008).

High-ranking officials in the Department of Home Affairs have also been fingered for 'deliberately stalling reform of laws governing refugees and migration. Despite widespread knowledge of ill-treatment of foreigners, many state officials have dragged their feet, partly because of political sensitivity over the rights of foreigners' (Murray, 2003, 453). Some evidence of this foot-dragging is revealed in the long wait for people to hear of the result of their applications to be given the status of refugee. According to the UN, a refugee 'is a person fleeing from individual persecution, generalised human rights violations or armed conflict in their country of origin' (UNHCR, 1998, 2). In the period that the immigrant applies for refugee status they are given the status of asylum seekers. In 1999 there were 50,000 asylum seekers whose status was pending. In some cases asylum seekers had already waited six years for their applications to be appraised by Home Affairs (Harris, 2001, 14).

Home affairs spokespersons, also, in public pronouncements have contributed to and reinforced the idea of South Africa been overwhelmed by African immigrants and as the reason for South Africans not acquiring a better life. The then Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, told parliament in 1998 that if South Africans were 'going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme' (quoted in HRW, 1998, 20). Among the accusations made about 'illegal aliens' in the 1999 White Paper for example were:

– They compete for scarce resources with millions of South Africans living in poverty and below the breadline;
– They compete for scarce public services, such as schools and medical care, infrastructure and land, housing and informal trading opportunities;
– They compete with residents and citizens for our insufficient job opportunities, and offer their labour at conditions below those prescribed by law or the applicable bargaining agreements;
– A considerable percentage of illegal aliens have been involved in criminal activities; and
– They weaken the state and its institutions by corrupting officials, fraudulently acquiring documents and undeserved rights and tarnishing our image locally and abroad (quoted in Harris, 20, 2001).

The DHA in 1998-1999 in White Papers also introduced the idea of local communities getting involved in the 'detection, apprehension and removal of "illegal aliens"'. As

Williams was to prophetically reflect 'in the context of high levels of xenophobia and intolerance towards foreigners, it is likely that the actions of South Africans will not be limited to mere reporting. There is a danger of South Africans taking the law into their own hands, even considering it their patriotic duty to take action against "illegal aliens"' (1999, 2). Reflecting on the similarities of language used by the media and government agencies, Danso and McDonald held:

> One could argue that there is a self-reinforcing mechanism at play, with the Department of Home Affairs (as well as the police and defence forces) issuing anti-immigrant statements and statistics and the media uncritically reproducing them. This creates a feedback loop to bureaucrats and policymakers as to the legitimacy and 'correctness' of what they are saying. When combined with the highly xenophobic attitudes of the population at large this self-reinforcing mechanism serves to foreclose more progressive policy options and acts to stifle (and even shutdown) more informed public debates on the issues (Danso and McDonald, 2001, 132).

Peter Vale has argued how globally and also in post-apartheid South Africa the movement of people across borders has mutated 'from local issue, to international item and then, to security threat' (Vale, 2002, 10). The consequence of this, Vale points out, that in terms reminiscent of

> ... the old South Africa, control and surveillance became overriding policy consideration ... solutions initially offered to the 'problem' of cross-border movement of people were settled within the disciplining boundaries affirmed by the principle of state sovereignty, notwithstanding a rhetorical understanding (to use a striking phrase from Francis Wilson) that migration had made the region. South Africa's government, through the responsible minister, asserted that both refugees and migrants were considered to be a 'problem' (Vale, 2002, 12).

In similar fashion to Danso and McDonald, Vale argues that the fusion of migration and security has led towards 'policy closure' (Vale, 2002, 14).

The response from political leaders in response to allegations of growing xenophobia has often been denialism. Prior to the recent xenophobic violence that erupted in Alex on 11 May 2008, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that emanated in 2007 warned that 'xenophobia against other Africans is currently on the rise and must be nipped in the bud'. Yet South African President Thabo Mbeki 'denied that xenophobic tendencies existed in South Africa, pointing out that the country did not even have refugee camps' (Wilson Johwa, *Business Day* 11 July 2006). This denialism came despite the weight of evidence to indicate otherwise. His intelligence services claim they advised him about the issue, and attacks on African immigrants had been highlighted in the media.

Comprehensive surveys had also pointed to strong and growing xenophobic attitudes. The South African Migration Project (SAMP) surveys conducted in 1997 and 1998 on the attitudes of South Africans toward immigrants and immigration were particularly instructive given subsequent events. The surveys were startling in the numbers of South Africans who possessed strong anti-immigration feelings, both in wanting to strictly limit the number of foreigners allowed into the country and in having negative images of foreigners. These views were held across class and race lines. Some 53 percent in 1998 wanted a 'strict limit on the number of foreigners allowed in the country'. In the 1997 survey 'people living in neighbouring countries'

were seen by 48 percent as a criminal threat, 29 percent thought they bring diseases and 37 percent believed they were a threat to jobs.

By 2006 the SAMP survey showed a deepening of attitudes:

- Nearly 50 percent support the deportation of foreign nationals including those living legally in South Africa. Only 18 percent strongly oppose such a policy.
- Some 74 percent supporting deporting anyone who is not contributing economically to South Africa.
- Some 76 percent want the borders to be electrified, up 10 percent from 1999.
- Those supporting refugee protection stood at 47 percent, those opposed 30 percent.
- Close to 75 percent are against increasing the number of refugees.
- Some 50 percent would support refugees staying in border camps. Only 6 percent are opposed.
- Just 30 percent would favour refugees working.

Clearly there was a mounting groundswell of xenophobic attitudes and the state's response which ranged from shock, apology, blaming the attacks on criminal elements and the seemingly ubiquitous third force, and even denial, is difficult to countenance.

The media

The editor of a prominent South African weekly wrote in 2005 that the 'Media generally reflect social reality and relations within society. I would not blame the media for fanning xenophobia in any way' (Mondli Makanya quoted in McDonald and Jacobs, 2005, 306). Makanya, then editor of the *Mail and Guardian*, went onto bemoan how difficult it was 'to cover stories about Nigerians migrants as the fact is that a disproportionate number of people from that country, as opposed to migrants from elsewhere, say Congo or Senegal, are involved in crimes' (quoted in McDonald and Jacobs, 2005, 306). When pushed for evidence for his assertions Makanya could not provide any. Danso and McDonald conducted a rigorous study of the English language South African press coverage of cross-border migration between 1994 and 1998. They found three common stereotypes: 'migrants as job stealers, migrants as criminals and migrants as "illegals"'. (Danso and McDonald, 2001, 124) Criminality was almost exclusively linked to African immigrants while 'there is an almost complete lack of references to crime and illegality on the part of Western Europeans and North Americans in South Africa ... When African (and to a lesser extent Asian) migrants are associated with a criminal act the event becomes newsworthy, while the same crime committed by a white foreigner is ignored or given less publicity' (Danso and McDonald, 2001, 127).

They further found that the media also emphasised the impact of immigrants on state resources. So for example they point to the following newspaper articles: 'The government has to spend about R397, 000 on each illegal alien which translates into about R1,98 billion being spent on maintaining illegals last year'; and, 'This year alone it cost more than R210 million – a tenth of the entire programme budgeted for the (Reconstruction and Development Programme) – just to house, educate and police and give medical care to only sector of the problem: the illegal Mozambicans' (*The Star* 18 September 1995; *Financial Mail*, 9 September 1995). When using figures the media

were often simply repeating figures put out by official sources or simply projecting to the country as a whole from provincial estimates (Danso and McDonald, 2001, 125).

Danso and McDonald also found that the press used the word 'illegals' and 'aliens' to label African immigrants no matter what their particular status that in reality could run from permanent residents, work permit holders and refugees. Labelling is important for it often involves questions of power and allows 'authoritative state actors to serve the interests of some to the exclusion of others' (Moncrieffe and Eyben, 2007, 7).

In a study of the media conducted a couple of years into post-apartheid South Africa, Dolan and Reitzes found that the Department of Home Affairs and other government departments, such as the defence forces, were quoted 'more often than all other sources combined. Immigrants themselves receive only about 2 percent of the quotes, while specialists researching or analysing immigration are not quoted once. The clear implication is that immigrants are much talked about in the news columns, but do little talking themselves' (Dolan and Reitzes, 1996, 12). McDonald and Jacobs do concede that it is difficult to prove if a 'xenophobic press is merely a reflection of public sentiment or stems from xenophobia within the press itself ... What is clear (though) is that there is a cycle of negative (mis)representation of cross-border migration in the English-language print media in the country and it is likely that public opinion and journalistic opinion simply feed off each other' (McDonald and Jacobs, 2005, 306).

The oppressed has returned and its name is nationalism[1]

> Between resounding assertions of the unity of the continent and this xenophobic behaviour of the masses which has as its inspiration in their leaders, many different attitudes may be traced. We observe a permanent see-saw between African unity which fades quicker and quicker into the mists of oblivion, and the heart-breaking return to chauvinism in its most bitter and detestable form (Fanon, 1990, 126).

Gillian Hart warns against:

> celebratory claims often bolstered by invocations of Polanyi's 'double movement' of an inevitable, cumulative rising tide of progressive working class and popular opposition springing from below to challenge the devastation wrought by the top-down extension of neoliberal market forces into all forms of life and livelihood. One of the limits of this currently popular 'optimistic' reading of Polanyi is its neglect of the possibility if not likelihood that what he called 'enlightened reactionaries' may well become major forces in protective counter-movements (2008, 4).

One of the reasons for 'celebratory claims' was that from about 1997 there has been a marked increase in community based protests around the commodification of basic services and lack of service delivery. These upsurges have fanned out countrywide, emerging and disappearing only to re-emerge in another place. There has been a definable theme to much of the protest around the provisions of services and houses and the targets have generally been local councillors. In 2004-2005 there were 5813 protests (as defined under the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993) recorded by the SAPS and subsequently, an average of 10,000 per annum (Nqakula, C., 2007). While one cannot link all these protests to service delivery, it does indicate the incredible levels of social unrest.

One of the threads that runs through the various service delivery protests has been the language of betrayal (Wale, 2008). Alongside this has been rampant unemployment and growing inequality which meant the Gini coefficient soared from below 0.6 in 1994 to 0.72 by 2006 (Joffe, H., 2008, *Business Day*, 5 March). Hart's warning, given the xenophobic violence, has proven to be prescient. In similar vein the great historian of the French crowd in history, Rude, wrote of how 'the levelling instinct of the crowd might as readily be harnessed to an anti-radical as to a radical cause' (Rude, 1964, 225).

As if to illustrate the efficacy of this assertion *The Star* newspaper of 22 July 2008 on the same page highlighted the killing of Mozambican Francesco Nobunga in a xenophobic attack and a march in Pixley Ka Seme municipality in Mpumalanga. Four houses and a car belonging to local councillors in Vukuzahe township were burnt. Residents were responding to rates increases in which they claimed they were not consulted. The form that protests against worsening conditions takes often depends on the local context because the broader socioeconomic context is interpreted and shaped and acted upon by local circumstance.

The Human Sciences Research Council (2008, 5-7) found in its report on the May-June events a link between service delivery protests and xenophobic violent attacks:

> Settlements that have recently experienced the expression of 'xenophobic' violence have also been the site of violent and other forms of protest around other issues, most notably service delivery ... findings elsewhere in this report demonstrate that the nature of the resistance to foreign migrants stems mainly from local economic and public resource competition, it is perhaps not surprising that in other respects respondents emphasised the spatial manner in which foreign migrants have settled in South Africa, i.e. integrated within existing and largely depressed communities ... South African citizens literally feel 'besieged' by a range of socioeconomic challenges. This feeling is particularly acute for men of working age who are struggling to find employment or make a living and feel most directly threatened by the migration of large numbers of 'working men' from other parts of the continent.

Patrick Bond (2008) points out that there are various ways in which the structural inequalities that continue to widen in post-apartheid South Africa could potentially be translated into violence against immigrants:

- Lack of jobs, as formal sector employment dropped by a million after 1994, and declining wage levels as a result of immigrant willingness to work for low pay on a casualised basis;
- Immigrant tenacity in finding informal economic opportunities even when these are illegal, such as streetside trading of fruits, vegetables, cigarettes, toys and other small commodities;
- Housing pressures whereby immigrants drive up rentals of a multi-occupant dwelling unit beyond the ability of locals to afford;
- Surname identity theft (including fake marriages to South Africans who only learn much later); and
- Increases in local crime blamed on immigrants.

There are certainly broader socioeconomic conditions under which scapegoats can come under the cosh in more intense local environments. Sociology offers some clues

as to why African immigrants might be convenient scapegoats. These involve visibility, vulnerability and the way in which the 'outsider' can easily come to play the role of 'economic villain', because 'often for victims of adversity it is at least some comfort to explain their misfortune by attributing it to the evil machinations of villains rather than as a consequence of remote, complex and hardly comprehensible forces' (Rinder, 1958-59, 257).

This should be linked to the fact as pointed out throughout the article that during the first decade and half of democracy there has emanated from government, the police and the media a language that defined the African migrant as a problem. South Africans attitudes showed a marked antagonism to African foreigners of all types as a HRW report attested:

> In general, South Africa's public culture has become increasingly xenophobic and politicians often make unsubstantiated and inflammatory statements that the 'deluge' of migrants is responsible for the current crime wave, rising unemployment, or even the spread of diseases. As the unfounded perception that migrants are responsible for a variety of social ills grows, migrants have increasingly become the target of abuse at the hands of South African citizens, as well as members of the police, the army, and the Department of Home Affairs. Refugees and asylum-seekers with distinctive features from far-away countries are especially targeted for abuse (HRW, 1998, 4).

Mondli Makanya offered this opinion in 2004:

> I think that most black South Africans understand why black, working class South Africans, feel the way they do. It's about economics. It's also about people in transition, about a class of people arriving below them, undercutting them and competing with them in a context where they must scramble, of high unemployment, where the state is absent (quoted in McDonald and Jacobs, 2005, 310).

Foreigners in turn became increasingly insular as the threats increased. Alan Morris found in his study of Nigerian and Congolese immigrants in Hillbrow that they saw black South Africans as 'prejudiced', 'parochial' and the men as 'violent.' They tended 'to accentuate negative representations of black South Africans and to homogenise and essentialise this group' (Morris, 1998, 1127-28).

In general terms Peberdy's research showed that the state routinely stigmatised African immigrants:

> The State's attitudes to both immigrants and migrants is most evident ... in the way it argues non-South Africans threaten the nation by endangering its physical health, its ability to provide resources, employment and levels of crime. The language ... is replete with images of Africans as carriers of disease (Peberdy, 1999(a), 15).

By the time of the May 2008 attacks a powerful xenophobic culture had been created and state organs were geared to hounding African immigrants, the media to stigmatisation and stereotyping, while in many townships African immigrants lived under threat of scapegoating that carried within it the use of violence.

South Africa is not alone in having to confront the spectre of the refugee and the challenge this places for the idea of the nation-state in this period of globalised capitalism. As Comaroff and Comaroff point out, the migrant exposes:

> ... the contradictory logic of sovereign borders: the simultaneous necessity that they be open to various forms of flow – of finance, workers, commodities, consumers and

> infrastructure – and yet enclaved enough both to offer competitive advantage for global enterprise and to serve the material interests of a national citizenry; in other words, to husband the kind of difference, the kinds of distinction between the local and the nonlocal, from which transnational capital may profit (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2005, 145).

These contradictions are illustrated in the way the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has responded in post-apartheid South Africa. For example it has on the one hand, like at Volkswagen, signed away gains won during apartheid on the shopfloor on the altar of international competitiveness and exports. When striking workers tried to build an alternative fighting internationalism it was smashed by a combination of NUMSA and IG Metall, the German trade union (Bolsmann, 2006). Alongside this COSATU has bought into a 'Proudly South African' campaign that mobilises against imports and calls on South Africans to buy only locally produced products. So COSATU wants the world to buy products made in South Africa but wants South Africans to only buy local.

In the next section we focus on how some leading theorists are attempting to grapple with these issues of refugees, sovereignty and globalisation.

Globalisation, citizenship and the nation-state

> If the refugee represents such a disquieting element in the order of the nation-state, this is so primarily because, by breaking the identity between human and the citizen and that between nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis. Single exceptions to such principle, of course, have always existed. What is new in our time is that growing sections of humankind are no longer representable inside the nation-state – this novelty threatens the very foundations of the latter. Inasmuch as the refugee, an apparently marginal figure, unhinges the old trinity of state-nation-territory, it deserves instead to be regarded as the central figure of our political history … The refugee should be considered for what it is, namely, nothing less than a limit-concept that at once brings a radical crisis to the principles of the nation-state and clears the way for a renewal of categories that can no longer be delayed (Agamben, 2000, 20-22).

Eric Hobsbawm, in reflecting on the future of nations and nationalism in the twenty-first century, points to three trends. The first is that 'large regions of the globe remain both internationally and internally unstable', reflected in part by 'a global relapse into the first major epidemic of massacre, genocide and "ethnic cleansing" since the immediate years after the Second World War' (2007, 84-85). This has increased the number of refugees with estimates varying between 20 and 40 million.

The second trend is the massive scale of people moving across national borders. The figures are staggering. Between 1998 and 2001 the United States, Canada and Australia had an influx of 3.6 million immigrants and fifteen states of the European Union between 1999 and 2001 had an inflow of approximately 4.5 million immigrants. The effect of these cross border movements according to Hobsbawm has meant that in 'original home of nationalism', Europe, 'the transformations of the world economy are making short work of what the wars of the twentieth century, with their genocides and mass population transfers, appeared to produce, namely a mosaic of ethnically homogenous nation-states' (2007, 87).

Many migrants, Hobsbawm points out, do not permanently cut themselves off from their original homelands. Many send remittances to their home countries and in North

Africa and the Philippines for example provide 10 percent of the GDP. Between 1994 and 2004 the number of countries allowing dual nationality increased twofold to ninety-three states. South Africa is one of these countries. For Hobsbawm these developments beg questions of citizenship 'rights and obligations in states where a substantial percentage of the inhabitants are absent from the national territory at any one time, and a substantial proportion of permanent residents have inferior rights to indigenous citizens' (2007, 88). In the South African case, it is the latter that is pertinent.

The third trend related to this massive movement of people is the resurgence of xenophobia which Hobsbawm concedes has been underestimated in his own writings on modern nationalism. For Hobsbawm the strength and 'rise of xenophobia reflects the social cataclysms and moral disintegration of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries as well as mass international population movements. This combination is naturally explosive ...' (2007, 89). In Hobsbawm's reading, the increase and spread of xenophobia reflects the disintegrating of 'larger nation-state identities into self-regarding group identities ... And this in turn reflects, not least, the diminishing legitimacy of the nation-state for those who inhabit its territory, and the diminishing demands it can make on its citizens' (2007, 93).

Hobsbawm is not sure what, if anything will replace (the nation state) as a general model in the twenty-first century (2007, 94). Hobsbawm, in many senses returns to his earlier pronouncement in the final pages of *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, where, anticipating events at the end of the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries he wrote: 'The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism' (1990: 182-183).

Hobsbawm's views on the eroding power of the nation-state were taken much further by Hardt and Negri in *Empire* where they pointed to a world beyond national sovereignty, which has many echoes to the cosmopolitan worldview. There is 'no centre of imperial power' and the eroding of national sovereignty is seen as paving the way to increased chances of global democratic governance and this anticipates the need to 'develop a political theory without sovereignty' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 239). Despite some protestations to the contrary, the idea of cosmopolitanism is mostly linked to the idea of the declining importance of the nation state. Alongside the emergence of *Empire* with its simultaneous de-territorialisation and weakening of nation states, for Hardt and Negri, there is the forward march of the multitude. 'The multitude's resistance to bondage – the struggles against the slavery of belonging to a nation, and identity, and a people, and thus the desertion from sovereignty and the limits it places on subjectivity – is entirely positive' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 361). In a chapter in their book entitled *Endless Paths (The Right to Global Citizenship),* Hardt and Negri write:

> Autonomous movement is what defines the place proper of the multitude. Increasingly less will passports or legal documents be able to regulate our movements across borders ... The cities of the earth will at once become great deposits of cooperating humanity and locomotives for circulation, temporary residences and networks for the mass distribution of humanity. Through circulation the multitude reappropriates space and constitutes itself as an active subject (Hardt and Negri 2000: 397).

Hardt and Negri are of course referring to mass migration, that 'ha[s] become necessary for production' (2000). And the way the multitude becomes 'political' according to Hardt and Negri, is in the demand for global citizenship:

> Residency papers for everyone means in the first place that all should have the full rights of citizenship in the country where they live and work ... *The general right to control its own movement is the multitude's ultimate demand for global citizenship* (Hardt and Negri 2000: 400).

While their unbridled optimism of the revolutionary potential of the migrant has been rightly criticised, Hardt and Negri through through their analysis of contemporary capitalism do point to the importance of the phenomenon of migration and its potential for producing new subjectivities and languages of resistance.

It is instructive though, that despite the grand scheme of a cosmopolitan world and the romantic notion of the multitude moving across borders, the main way in which the multitude can at least initially defend and advance its rights is, Hardt and Negri contend, through 'full rights of citizenship in the country where they live and work'. In confronting xenophobia in South Africa we need to address the notion of citizenship and this means, as this paper will argue, confronting a trajectory that has seen argued in 1999 that 'the line between citizen and non-citizen is being drawn more clearly than before' (Peberdy (b), 1999, 2). In addressing this issue we need to take cognizance of Robin Cohen's typology of denizens and helots. He calls the more privileged group denizens who, while holding multiple citizenship, do 'not have the right to vote in the country of their residence or domicile ... Many of these alien residents may be well-paid expatriates who are not particularly concerned with exercising the franchise and have compensating employment benefits – a group in short, that can be seen as transcending the limits of the nation-state' (Cohen, 1991, 163). Hobsbawm also points to a group of migrants 'who now commute between homes, or even jobs and businesses, in the old country and the new ... Family occasions in one country, old or new, are attended at short notice by friends and relatives from three continents' (2007, 87). Cohen refers to the helots as 'people who have illegally entered the country, people who have overstayed the period granted on their entry visas, asylum-seekers who have not been recognized under the international Conventions, those who are working illegally, and those who have been granted only limited rights' (Cohen, 1991, 163). Helots are often excluded, detained or deported and 'regarded as disposable units of labour-power to whom the advantages of citizenship, the franchise and social welfare are excluded' (Cohen, 1991, 164).

It is the helots that have come under sustained attack in South Africa and it is their circumstance that needs to be most urgently addressed.

'Citizens of nowhere in the world' (Arendt, 1958)

> The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships – except that they were still human (Arendt, 1958, 297).

Pronouncements of integrating displaced immigrants back into communities across South Africa in the present hostile environment are a recipe for further disaster. The

example of Francisco Nobunga who fled the Ramaphosa shack settlement in Ekurhuleni during the May xenophobic attacks is instructive. He returned to his dwelling with his South African-born wife, Sylvia Nosento. He lasted three weeks before he was killed. He produced a South African identity document as demanded by his attackers but it had a Mozambican address (*The Star* 22 July 2008).

The government insists on speedy re-integration, yet those expelled will have to enter an environment fraught with the persistent threat of violence. In the *Sunday Times* Victor Khupiso writes of what 'On Friday nights in Ramaphosa squatter camp, it's time for what locals call their "Kwerekwere-Free (Foreigner-Free) Society" campaign'. In haunting detail Khupiso chronicles how groups of young people spread out over the camp to hunt down foreigners. One of the young people told Khupiso that he could 'proudly say foreigners had decided to leave our area because they know what would happen to them if they are found. They would burn. Hell is waiting for them. We have stored some tyres' (*Sunday Times* 26 July 2008). The HSRC (2008) report calls 'on the government to conduct a national audit on the occupation of RDP housing and to take steps to ensure that only South Africans occupy this form of temporary shelter. Non-South Africans are welcome to acquire property through the usual commercial means or to take temporary accommodation that should be provided in designated areas until such time they move into private residence' (HSRC, 2008, 9-10). Does this mean that those non-South Africans occupying RDP houses will be evicted? This will only further stigmatise and isolate the poorest of African immigrants and embolden locals to 'take the law into their own hands'. It is also to misread the socioeconomic status of the majority of African migrants. The chances of them acquiring 'property through the usual commercial means' are pretty slim. The consequence of the HSRC (2008) recommendation is to have African immigrants living in 'Bantustans' as a permanent feature of the urban landscape. The recommendation of the HSRC report will only serve to exacerbate an already volatile and violent environment by feeding into and reinforcing an 'us' and 'them' attitude.

In similar fashion a SAMP report on the 2008 attacks by Jonathan Crush et al. reaches some rather strange conclusions and recommendations. They call for 'South African employers who flaunt labour laws in their hiring and employment of migrants ... to be exposed and prosecuted' (2008, 41). Given that migrants are stymied by the state in becoming legalised, they do not have access to basic social grants and state support. Thus, the denying of migrants who are deemed 'illegals' of jobs will leave them bereft of access to making a living, and play into the hands of the state in wanting to hound migrants into deportation camps and then back to their countries of origin. As their own report indicates a staggering 1.5 million people have been deported since 1994. Should not the demand rather be that migrants be given full rights to organise and be protected by labour law legislation?

If one reads Arendt carefully, a startling realisation beckons. This is that the discourse of human rights as well as the practice of bestowing them on particular classes of people, can actually serve incredibly oppressive and inhuman purposes. A person with citizenship rights exists because someone else living in the same territory, but in some way differently qualified, does not. Some have rights to housing and education and dignity entrenched, others less so. Ultimately, when everyone has been through the due process of law, another human right, some people will be packed off to

deportation camps for removal from their homes and livelihoods (the illegals) and others will be allowed to stay (citizens and 'genuine refugees').

Standing in utter nakedness of rights, including the right to life, in May 2008, some people living among us had only their bodily humanity to offer as proof that they deserved to be treated fairly, equally and with dignity. This was not enough.

What we do to the bodies of those without full rights differs only in a matter of degree. Some are robbed and killed; others are routinely mocked, locked up and deported by police. Still others are forced into living in ways that in practice deprive them of human rights; they work as virtual slaves on farms or sell their bodies. Because they are not citizens, in terms of the constitution their enjoyment of the fruits and protections of law in South Africa is limited. These are the perfectly legal marginalisations that most South Africans, including parliamentarians who decry actual killing and maiming, are perfectly comfortable with. And in bearing our human rights so proudly while others go without, we become less than fully human. That is the most scary thought. We become somehow marked by our arbitrary privileges and shamed by them.

If, according to Arendt, the refugee becomes fully human at the moment that they are stripped of all rights, in the sense that they are just human, purely, bodily a human form but nothing else, then perhaps the opposite is also true; that clothed with our rights which we are comfortable having and asserting against illegals, we become less human in the face of our acceptance and reinforcing of the nakedness of some among us. How do we respond to the breakdown between *the* refugee and *the* citizen?

In presenting the view of expediting the granting of those in camps the necessary documentation for them to legalise their stay in South Africa and affording those who have jobs the full protection of the labour laws to the parliamentary portfolio committee on foreign affairs on 25th July 2008, there was no support from the gathered parliamentarians. One ANC MP, Mtkeni Sibanda, argued that the attacks were an exaggeration and that the refugees were badly behaved and that there were forces behind some of the refugees stoking the fires of dissent. Another ANC MP, Dr Luthuli, raised the issue of being overwhelmed by African immigrants. The PAC member Dr Pheko asked why was I emphasising the killing of African immigrants when South Africans were also killed. He also said he was a refugee and that there was never an attempt or numbers did not destabilise the centre. He studiously avoided any support for granting existing refugees citizenship while proclaiming to be a 'Pan-Africanist till his death'. The DA representative Sheila Camerer started her input by making mention of the fact that the committee had undertaken a couple of reports on the rising xenophobia. I wondered why then the president of the country had not bothered to take cognizance of the reports, made reference to them in his response to the May 2008 attacks, and why fellow committee member Mtkeni Sibanda thought reports in the media and those like mine were exaggerated. She then went on to say that her constituency in Johannesburg's Northern surburbs takes in a part of Alexandra and that overwhelmingly those arrested for burglary and other crimes, the police chiefs told her, were African immigrants, especially Zimbabweans.

I witnessed here in strident language 'the signs of passing from ultra-nationalism to chauvinism, and finally to racism' (Fanon, 1990, 125).

It also illustrates that while emphasis has been placed in much writing on globalisation by sociologists on the movement in increasing scale of good and services across national borders there has been also a move to re-territorialise space through what Turner has called an 'immobility regime' that is geared to controlling the ability of migrants to enter a country. This is the paradox of globalisation that witnesses increased mobilities alongside 'new systems of closure' (Turner, 2007, 289).

Building a fighting coalition from below

There is a basis around which organised labour, social movements and the organisations of African immigrants can unite for an anti-xenophobia movement that serves also to demand the legalisation of all African immigrants and to pressure the government into making the organs of state like Home Affairs more responsive to the needs of immigrants. In the longer term the Immigration Act of 2002 needs to be reviewed so that it is designed to make it much more user friendly to African immigrants.

Building a united front will not be easy:

> Can we learn to conceive, theoretically and politically, of a 'grassroots' that would be not local, communal, and authentic, but worldy, well connected, and opportunistic? Are we ready for social movements that fight not 'from below' but 'across', using their 'foreign policy' to fight struggles not against 'the state' but against that hydra-headed transnational apparatus of banks, international agencies, and market institutions through which contemporary capitalist domination functions? (Ferguson 2006, 107).

For example, because of the lack of rights of African immigrants they are fodder for employers wanting to circumvent unions and create casualised jobs. The fight against casualised labour and unemployment has to bring African immigrants into the trade union fold. Of course, for organised labour to make this move means to play an effective part in the anti-xenophobia movement. This would mean breaching some of their own established ways of thinking through identity, entitlement and definition of social good. This is one that primarily reserves redress and delivery for those South Africans previously disadvantaged by apartheid, a status that a Nigerian migrant patently would not enjoy. These are just some of the conceptual and political breakthroughs that need to be made. It is not enough to issue press statements. Programmatic action is needed. Would COSATU, for instance, be as vocal about the excesses at Lindela as they are about the Scorpions? There are some positive signals like the principled campaigns of solidarity with Zimbabwean and Swazi workers as witnessed most recently by the August 2008 march on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) meeting in Johannesburg.

Similarly many township residents making up the social movements in an environment of scarce resources also see African immigrants as competitors. It is incorrect to suggest that the mere fact of social movement presence in a township acted as a guarantor against xenophobia, as some have done. Many shack dweller settlements in Durban for example have for over a decade now ensured that no more shacks are built. To then claim that because there has been no violence, there is no xenophobic sentiment is disingenuous. Further, the overwhelming number of townships in South Africa reported no xenophobic activity during the recent upsurges, whether strong social movements existed there or not. We need to recognise though

that there is some evidence that even within social movements that are radically anti-neo-liberal, some of its members harbour profound xenophobic attitudes. Social movements are just as captive of the nationalist imagination as the mainstream left and just as apt to act according to a territorial logic of who 'deserves' delivery as trade unions are.

However, there are also impressive counter-tendencies. The march sponsored by the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) against xenophobia during the May 2008 violence that drew in a broad number of organisations is a salutary case in point. The challenge is to build this kind of coalition into a permanent fighting organisation geared to defending and advancing the interests of African immigrants.

There are also issues of whether immigrants should maintain their own organisations and seek working relationships and joint campaigns or whether there should there be a concerted effort to form one fighting organisation. These debates need to address concerns that have dogged efforts at non-racial organisation in the past. There is every danger that a migrant essentialism may also arise that, perhaps for good reason, prevents broad fronts developing. There are transnational networks to be created with those in the United States mobilising under the banner 'no human being is illegal', and with European migrant mobilisations of the undocumented, for example. There are tactical and strategic issues to be confronted that can only be taken forward in the cauldron of debate, discussion and struggle.

There are possibilities, in line with the hopes of Ferguson, to not only fight from 'below' but also 'across', to not only challenge the transnational apparatus 'of contemporary capitalist domination' but also to challenge a neo-liberal and exclusionary sub-imperialist state. Let me be clear. The stark policy choice is between increasing repression exponentially, to visit upon the bodies of (foreign) black Africans almost apartheid era levels of pain, surveillance and discomfort in our cities, hoping thereby to keep surplus populations in the 'Bantustans', or to accept and integrate the fact of migrancy into our economic and political thinking. To some extent the latent logic of the manner in which immigrants have been treated both by township residents, the police and government departments, has been to make South Africa a more painful place to live than where they came from before.

For policy makers, government functionaries and South Africans in general who see migrancy as an evil, recent xenophobic attacks, although embarrassing, have had an upside in slowing figures of 'illegal' entry and increasing mass repatriations. I am not one of those policy makers and perhaps that is what makes it easier for me to criticize. Migrancy should be a right, as difficult as that may seem to be to manage economically and socially. It is part of a struggle for survival. The challenge to commodification of basic services, evictions and proper housing has thrown up radical subjectivities and often pushed back the threat to bare life posed by the neo-liberal transition. This is all laudable and good. What it has not done is to crack the prison house of nationalist language and thinking about our future among those struggling for a better life for all. In the context of a continent in severe economic distress, with powerful pull factors into the territory of South Africa of immigrants also seeking a 'better life' and whose claims to oppression and exploitation are no less stark than those of black people who happen to have been born within South Africa's borders, such repression-orientated thinking is not going to address the issue of xenophobia.

What the outbreak of xenophobia has shown is that it is not enough to conceptualise the struggle as one for full citizenship and new economic policies for those entitled to a South African identity and decommodified services and a basic income grant for its people. In order to avoid repressing those seeking entry to South Africa as a result of extremities of poverty in other parts of Africa, there is a need for a shift of mindset to conceive of the leadership tasks of the revolution to at least being *sub-regional* in nature and expanding outward. What this means is that programmes that address economic deprivation and development need to have this construct rather than any other as their starting point.

During the struggle against apartheid, South Africans involved in liberation movement activities were wont to remark on the inevitability of the success of the destruction of white minority rule. Not only were demographics on their side, but the sheer desperation of a people fighting for survival and dignity sent cadre after cadre to the breach. In addition this struggle would be marked by history as one for social justice. In twenty years from now, if South Africans persist in their exclusivity, might not organised or unorganised immigrants reflect that their struggle too for entry into and inclusion into South Africa bore the marks of inevitability? They had demographics on their side and the desperation of a people fighting for dignity and survival. History too would mark their struggle as being one for social justice and against sub-imperialism and South African arrogance and callousness.

Notes

1. Michael Ignatieff's phrase is 'The repressed has returned, and its name is nationalism' (1993) p.2.

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Prendre en compte les échelles: Le mouvement patriotique et la construction de 'l'autochtone' en Côte d'Ivoire

Introduction

La part grandissante de la littérature consacrée à l'autochtonie en Côte d'Ivoire a traité de nombreuses dimensions différentes de ce phénomène.[1] On pourrait détecter un léger parti pris en faveur des aspects socio-économiques, idéologiques et politiques (voir Marie 2002; Chauveau & Bobo 2003; Banégas 2006, 2007; Marshall-Fratani 2006) et une relative négligence des dimensions religieuses, médiatiques, intellectuelles et universitaires – mais voir Dozon (2001), Arnaut & Bahi (2007); Arnaut (2007); Arnaut & Blommaert (à paraître) et Théroux-Bénoni & Bahi (à paraître). Dans cette littérature, la question de la construction identitaire reçoit l'attention qui lui est due. Si Arnaut (2004b) et Banégas (2007) insistent sur la nécessité de faire attention à l'aspect générationnel et à l'affirmation de la 'jeunesse', Marshall-Fratani (2006) se concentre particulièrement sur les processus de construction identitaire, d'incertitude et de repli sur soi liés à la violence et au discours de violence qui caractérisent le conflit en cours en Côte d'Ivoire. Dans une large mesure, Marshall-Fratani (2006) développe et affine l'idée générale selon laquelle les identités autochtones-allochtones seraient extrêmement flexibles (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000; Bayart, Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2001; Mbembe 2000; Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005). C'est également le postulat de départ du présent article. De plus, nous suggérons qu'il est intéressant de porter une attention ethnographique aux dynamiques complexes du soi et de l'altérité (Baumann 2004) en termes de (ré-)articulations à travers les changements sociologiques à long-terme ou qui imprègnent la société (Hall 1990; Li 2000). Si la plupart du temps, les dimensions temporelles de la construction identitaire sont mises en évidence, il est sans doute ironique que dans le cas des mouvements autochtones, les opérations spatiales présentes dans la construction identitaire suscitent moins d'intérêt (mais voir Geschiere & Gugler 1998; Marshall-Fratani 2006). C'est à cette question que cet article souhaite apporter sa contribution.

La plupart des auteurs s'accordent pour dire que dans leurs formes récentes, 'autochthones' et 'allogènes' doivent être envisagés comme des identités post-ethniques voire même post-nationales qui réarrangent et conditionnent la citoyenneté (Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Arnaut 2004). Dans le cas de la Côte d'Ivoire, l'année 2000 est une année charnière. Dans le contexte de la rédaction d'une nouvelle constitution, les débats sur les conditions d'éligibilité des candidats à la présidence – les deux parents (mère 'et' père) ou seulement l'un d'entre eux (mère 'ou' père) devaient-il avoir la nationalité ivoirienne? – se sont largement répandus dans la population et on y recourrait pour distinguer les vrais Ivoiriens (*les 'et'*) des Ivoiriens

suspects (*les 'ou'*) et des faux Ivoiriens (*les 'ni'*). Plus tard, après l'insurrection de septembre 2002, la polarisation qui avait commencé dans le milieu des années 1990, était tout à coup territorialisée dans la division entre le nord aux mains des rebelles et le sud aux mains du gouvernement qui se mit à son tour à tracer clairement une opposition entre les 'Nordistes' et les 'Sudistes'. En 2000 déjà, Dozon avait noté la montée du caractère post-ethnique et post-national de ces nouvelles formes d'identification en disant que depuis l'introduction de l'idéologie autochtone d'*Ivoirité* au milieu des années 1990, 'l'akanisation' de l'identité nationale ivoirienne s'était graduellement transformée en 'sudisation'.[2] Cet article défend l'idée selon laquelle cette territorialisation de l'identité mérite d'être développée à moins que nous supposions d'emblée que les 'Nordistes' et les 'Sudistes' sont des étiquettes identitaires monolithiques, ce que je l'espère, elles ne sont pas.

En tenant compte des opérations spatiales dans les constructions identitaires, nous distinguons deux dimensions importantes. La première se réfère à un espace (historique) particulier en rapport duquel les identités sont construites, étant donné le fait que l'identité en autochtonie est ancrée/bâtie/enracinée dans des espaces particuliers. La seconde dimension de spatialité dans la construction identitaire fait référence aux espaces concrets d'assemblée et de médiation et examine les processus de co-présence et de communication dans ces espaces dans la sphère publique qui semblent jouer un rôle important dans la formulation de nouvelles identités dans la culture publique. Par ailleurs, cet article défend l'idée que les deux dimensions de spatialité dans la construction identitaire bénéficient largement du concept analytique 'd'échelle'. Comme je l'explique ici, l'échelle permet la déconstruction de configurations spatiales à la fois physiques, sociales et discursives, et particulièrement dans des opérations complexes qui sont le mieux décrites comme 'glocales' de nature.

Le focus empirique de la double analyse de spatialité dans la construction identitaire est l'infrastructure rhétorique et organisationnelle de ce qui est communément connu comme les groupes de Jeunes Patriotes.[3] Pris dans leur ensemble, ces groupes, allant des habituelles organisations de la société civile à des milices armées et des lobbys, sont actuellement l'incarnation du discours d'autochtonie en Côte d'Ivoire. En référence à la première dimension de cette enquête, nous étudions dans un premier temps l'histoire du discours identitaire lié à la spatialité en Côte d'Ivoire. Dans un deuxième temps, pour ce qui est de la deuxième dimension, nous nous concentrons sur les parlements populaires, tels que 'La Sorbonne', qui constituent l'infrastructure médiatique dans laquelle le discours autochtone prend forme. Avant d'entamer cette analyse, nous devons examiner de plus près le potentiel analytique du concept d'échelle.

Faire de la place à la 'glocalisation'

Une quantité considérable d'ouvrages a été publiée en sciences sociales au sujet de ce qui divise, unit et relie le local et le global (Amin 1997). Parallèlement, une ligne de recherche s'est développée dans une géographie sociale, politique, et culturelle, qui utilise l'échelle comme un important instrument analytique – Uitermark (2002) parle de 'littérature de re-classement selon une échelle graduée' (*re-scaling literature*). Pendant les deux dernières décennies, le concept de l'échelle a été repensé en tant qu'élément d'un revirement vers le social dans la géographie qui étend l'idée que

l'espace est constitué de manière sociale, à la 'reconnaissance bien plus forte que le social est nécessairement constitué dans l'espace' (Massey 1992: 80). Alors que dans la géographie l'échelle était traditionnellement considérée en termes de taille et de niveau, dans la géographie politique il est vu plutôt en termes de relation. Ainsi dit, le 'local' n'est pas appréhendé comme un espace autonome avec des relations extérieures aux espaces à des échelles plus élevées (régionale, nationale, ou globale) mais en tant qu'entretenant des liens locaux supplémentaires qui sont 'en fait des relations "internes" qui constituent ensemble "le local"' (Howitt 2000: 6).

Pour beaucoup d'auteurs qui ont contribué à cette ligne de recherche, l'aspiration était d'arriver à une compréhension plus solide de la mondialisation comme organisation spatiale de la circulation des capitaux et du travail dans laquelle le lieu est continuellement restructuré (Swyngedouw 1992: 429). Ces restructurations entraînent des luttes continuelles pour se créer des espaces (Massey 1999: 21-22). Cela implique des 'redéfinitions d'échelles [qui] modifient et expriment des changements dans la géométrie du pouvoir social en renforçant le pouvoir de certains et en dépouillant d'autres de leurs pouvoir' (Swyngedouw 1997: 169). C'est, en définitive, ce que le terme 'glocalisation' essaie de saisir: l'échec progressif post-Fordiste de la nation-état et sa restructuration contestée 'tant au sommet aux niveaux supra-nationaux ou globaux qu'en bas à l'échelle individuelle, des configurations locales, urbaines, ou régionales' (Nielsen et Simonsen 2003: 914). Le terme 'glocalisation'' sert ainsi à exprimer l'intégration mutuelle du local et du global (et tous les niveaux intermédiaires) – une chose à laquelle la littérature fait souvent référence en définissant les échelles comme 'emboîtées', c'est-à-dire de manière relationnelle, dialectique et 'simultanée' (Howitt 2000: 8).

En dehors du terme 'glocalisation' qui est maintenant d'utilisation courante, la théorisation de l'espace, du lieu et de l'échelle en géographie, commence seulement à faire son entrée dans l'anthropologie (voir par exemple Crehan 1997; Corsín Gimenez 2003, Arnaut 2005). Évidemment, cela n'a pas empêché les anthropologues de réfléchir sur les interconnections globales-locales et même de définir leurs propres modèles d'analyse des échelles. Je peux citer par exemple: (a) les publications récentes sur les mouvements d'autochtonie (en Afrique) (Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005, Arnaut 2004a) et (b) le modèle de cascade que Appadurai (1996, 1999) a conçu pour comprendre l'apparition de la violence ethnique à grande échelle en cette période de mondialisation. Ces deux approches partagent avec la littérature de l'échelle mentionnée plus haut la conviction que 'les formes modernes de surveillance de l'état et de contrôle de la population ainsi que de l'organisation capitaliste et de la discipline du travail' (Alonso 1994: 382) ont consisté en une série d'opérations de longue haleine impliquant les personnes et l'espace (migration, expropriation, colonisation forcée, stéréotype concernant certains types de travaux, etc.). Alors que la mondialisation radicalise ces processus, l'on observe comment les vieilles et nouvelles identités politiques émergent essayant de fixer ces 'mobilisations'. L'on pourait soutenir que les mouvements d'autochtonie sont des efforts pour fixer les espaces et les identités l'un sur l'autre.

Ainsi, un certain nombre d'articles sur les mouvements d'autochtonie en Afrique les situent dans une oscillation entre mondialisation et localisation, impliquant un flux global et une fermeture culturelle voire ethno-nationaliste ou nativiste (voir Geschiere

& Nyamnjoh 2000; Bayart et al., 2001). La manière dont l'interconnexion entre ces deux notions se fait, est plus largement établie par Appadurai (1996) qui comprend les interactions entre le local et le global en termes de cascades afin de saisir 'l'inspiration globale' ainsi que 'la véritable intimité' des constructions d'identité, des antagonismes ethniques, et de la violence brutale qui parfois jaillit d'elles. Appadurai voit largement circuler 'des identités à grande échelle' (*large scale identities*) s'insinuant dans le discours local et les antagonismes sociaux et menant par la suite à ce qu'il appelle des 'implosions'. Bien que le terme 'cascade' suggère fortement le caractère directionnel (du haut vers le bas), Appadurai prend soin de décrire ceci comme un processus interactif:

> Les sentiments locaux sont le produit des interactions à long terme des cascades locales et globales d'événements qui créent des structures du sentiment (*structures of feeling*), qui sont sociales et historiques et font partie de l'environnement dans lequel, progressivement, il devient possible de voir un voisin comme un monstre, un commerçant comme un traître étranger, et un commerçant local comme un impitoyable exploiteur (1996: 153).

L'histoire de l'identité politique naissante de l'autochtone Ivoirien dont je parle peut être relatée dans la perspective du modèle de cascade de Appadurai. En des termes plus généraux, nous observerons comment les catégories et les identités qui proviennent des arènes idéologiques globales (théorie de la dépendance, multiculturalisme, etc.), se reflètent dans des antagonismes nationaux (régionaux, sociaux et 'ethniques') et successivement et de manière cumulative entraîne la construction de 'l'allogène' et une série d'étrangers associés qui sont confrontés à l'autre encore plus vaguement défini comme 'autochtone' Ivoirien.

L'invention et réinvention de l'autochtone Ivoirien

Les années 80. L'économie des plantations de café et de cacao de la Côte d'Ivoire remonte à la période coloniale et s'accroît bien plus après l'indépendance en 1960. L'admiration extérieure pour le pays – souvent exprimée par l'épithète 'miracle' (*miracle Ivoirien*) – fait référence principalement à son économie extravertie basée sur la migration qui a fonctionné comme source d'emploi et/ou de richesse pour une grande partie de l'Afrique Occidentale (surtout pour les anciennes colonies françaises) ainsi que pour les Européens, les Américains et d'autres investisseurs internationaux. Pendant les années 60 et les années 70 la Côte d'Ivoire était connue comme une terre, non seulement de réussite économique mais également de paix sociale et de stabilité politique. Les premières fissures dans le miroir se produisirent dans les années 80 quand en même temps qu'une crise profonde de l'économie, le consensus politique fut ouvertement rompu par l'apparition d'un parti socialiste – le *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) de l'actuel Président Gbagbo – et que la paix sociale fut fortement perturbée par l'éruption régulière de protestation de la société civile contre le régime du Président Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) et le régime de parti unique du PDCI (Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire).

Le parti socialiste FPI surgit d'un mouvement d'opposition anti-Houphouët qui existait depuis les années 50. Les options idéologiques de ce mouvement étaient plutôt divergentes – mettant les nationalistes à coté des communistes – mais étaient la plupart du temps articulées à partir d'endroits qui se considéraient comme périphérique à

l'espace national hégémonique Ivoirien. Pour le FPI de Gbagbo et pour beaucoup d'autres socialistes, cet endroit était la région Bété, dans le Sud Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. Depuis les années 50, la région Bété était devenue la nouvelle frontière de l'économie des plantations plus que jamais expansibles. En même temps qu'un flot massif des personnes étrangères (nationaux et non-nationaux) qui devinrent soit les nouveaux propriétaires des terres soit s'installèrent en tant que travailleurs migrants, l'on assista à l'apparition d'un ethno-régionalisme Bété parmi ses élites. En s'appuyant sur les idées des partisans de la théorie de la dépendance tels que André Gunder Frank et, principalement, Samir Amin (1967), les idéologues de gauche firent la distinction entre l'impérialisme des capitalistes lointains en France et loin au-delà, et celle des élites politiques et économiques Ivoiriennes qu'ils voyaient comme des proches collaborateurs des capitalistes lointains. Le fait que les rapports entre les deux catégories d'ennemis politiques soient souvent formulés dans des métaphores 'culturelles/religieuses' est important à cet égard. Ainsi, les capitalistes opérants localement sont présentés comme 'masquant' ou protégeant les intérêts des impérialistes lointains.[4] En termes de 'vampires' ou de 'sorciers', les exploiteurs proches sont présentés comme des personnes épuisant le sang/la vie (les ressources économiques et culturelles) des nationaux qui sont transférés dans les centres globaux d'exploitation capitaliste inaccessibles et lointains (Amondji 1984; Gbagbo 1983; voir Arnaut 2004a).

Ainsi, en combinant les schémas idéologiques internationaux aux expériences régionales et sociales, et aux constructions 'culturelles/religieuses', les gauchistes ivoiriens des années 80 articulèrent leur opposition sur un antagonisme entre une vague catégorie de 'nationaux' exploités, dépossédés, subalternes ou périphériques (souvent marqués de l'étiquette de 'peuple Ivoirien') et une double catégorie d'étrangers: (a) les élites nationales et locales visibles et proches et (b) les capitalistes transnationaux en grande partie invisibles et lointains y inclus les néo-colonialistes français. Dans ce schéma, les travailleurs migrants les plus pauvres étaient vus de façon ambiguë comme des victimes et des instruments du capitalisme exploiteur (Arnaut 2004a).

Les années 90. Renforcé par les développements internationaux vers la démocratisation, l'opposition de gauche réussi à obliger le PDCI et Houphouët-Boigny en 1990 à abroger la règle du parti unique. Avec l'introduction du multipartisme, les millions de travailleurs migrants devinrent une force électorale puissante et dès l'abord, leurs élites définirent leur circonscription électorale en termes régionaux tel que 'du Nord' avec toutes ses connotations d'émigration et de dépopulation, de pauvreté et autres, par opposition au Sud comme lieu d'immigration, de richesse économique, et de pouvoir politique. Alors que ces revendications pour l'affirmation du Nord étaient au début formulées par des fractions dans l'ancien parti au pouvoir, après la mort de Houphouët-Boigny en 1993, elles entraînèrent la dissolution du PDCI et menèrent à la formation d'un nouveau parti politique, le RDR (Rassemblement Des Républicains) en 1994. Dans la bataille qui s'en suivit entre d'une part, le nouveau RDR dirigé par Alassane Ouattara, et, d'autre part, le vieux PDCI dirigé maintenant par le Président Henri Konan Bédié, ce dernier se repositionna comme plus 'nationaliste' contre le RDR libéral (conservateur) et 'transnationaliste' basé sur les migrants.

Pour exprimer leur propre nationalisme et rejeter le transnationalisme du RDR, les porte-paroles et les idéologues du PDCI se servirent souvent des idées et des métaphores développées par l'opposition anti-Houphouëtiste d'avant 1990, en particulier au sujet de la culture nationale et en ce qui concerne la double identité/localité des impérialistes (locaux et globaux). En commençant par le dernier aspect, le président du RDR et ancien Directeur du FMI Alassane Ouattara fut traité comme un représentant de ses électeurs migrants, et accusé d'être un non-Ivoirien (Burkinabé) qui se faisait passer pour un Ivoirien – on parle de 'vagabondage de nationalité' – mais qui était en fait un émissaire ('le cheval de Troie') des centres de pouvoir de capitalistes transnationaux (tel que le FMI). Deuxièmement, le nationalisme du PDCI s'exprima dans une rhétorique culturaliste d'un genre nouveau. Pour cela les idéologues du PDCI récupérèrent des idées de gauche existantes au sujet de la culture indigène nationale (par opposition à la Francophonie, à l'Occident) et les insérèrent dans le discours du multiculturalisme naissant des années 90, quoique d'un genre quelque peu essentialiste et fondamentaliste (voir Stolcke 1995). En dehors de ces deux courants d'idées, le PDCI tissa le concept d'une culture nationale plurielle mais pourtant unifiée nommée *Ivoirité*.[5] C'est dans un contexte de formulation de l'Ivoirité que le terme 'autochtone' fut mis en avant. Dans un ouvrage financé par le gouvernement, l'éminent anthropologue ivoirien Niangoran-Bouah (1996) énuméra 'les tribus autochtones de Côte d'Ivoire'. Un des aspects critiques de cette liste fut que la plupart des peuples autochtones provenaient du Sud du pays. Ainsi le Nord était assimilé aux migrants et aux 'allogènes' qui y vivaient (voir Arnaut & Blommaert in progress).

Dans le discours culturaliste de *l'Ivoirité*, le profil culturel (opposition, RDR) de la circonscription électorale du Nord se matérialisait le long des lignes ethniques telle que le 'Dioula' et des lignes religieuses comme 'l'Islam' et, de manière plus importante, était qualifié de périphérique si non incompatible avec la culture nationale unifiée. Enfin, avec en toile de fond ce nationalisme culturel du PDCI, la nouvelle législation anti-migratoire (limitant la participation politique et les droits économiques des allogènes) fut votée. Les tensions qui résultèrent de ces développements, entraînèrent un coup d'état vers la fin de l'année 1999 et l'éviction du Président Bédié.

Les années 2000. L'épisode le plus récent dans la politique d'identité Ivoirienne commence par l'accession au pouvoir du socialiste Laurent Gbagbo en octobre 2000, mais prend une tournure radicale avec l'insurrection militaire contre son régime le 19 septembre 2002. D'une manière générale, avec l'arrivée au pouvoir des socialistes, les catégories anti-impérialistes 'des exploiteurs étrangers' contre les 'nationaux exploités' refont surface, ainsi que l'idée que les exploiteurs locaux cachent les impérialistes lointains. Dans ce schéma récupéré, les nouvelles distinctions inspirées de *l'Ivoirité* – (Dioula, Musulmans) – sont intégrées. Le résultat de tout ceci est bien formulé par Charles Groguhet qui était à l'époque le chef de la milice patriote le *Groupement des Patriotes pour la Paix* (GPP), un des membres de l'Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes. Dans un discours, prononcé le jour où la Côte d'Ivoire commémorait le premier anniversaire de la rébellion de septembre 2002, Groguhet énonce:

> On est fatigué des Rassemblements des Dioula Renégats, RDR, on est fatigués du Rassemblement Des Rebelles, nous sommes fatigués des intégristes Musulmans, nous sommes fatigués et les ivoiriens sont fatigués des valets locaux de l'impérialisme et du

> néocolonialisme [*applaudissement*] et les ivoiriens sont fatigués du néocolonialisme et de l'impérialisme. Oui nous sommes fatigués en tant que peuple (Groguhet 19/09/2003).

Dans la citation ci-dessus, l'identification de l'ennemi prend la forme d'une liste qui s'effondre sur le 'nous' rangé dans une identité singulière de l'Ivoirien 'en tant que peuple'. Comme nous l'avons dit, la liste des ennemis des Ivoiriens de Groguhet combine les ennemis 'historiques' de l'opposition de gauche, c'est à dire les impérialistes et les néo-colonialistes ainsi que leurs 'valets locaux' et les 'étrangers' de la période de *l'Ivoirité* des années 90 (les Dioula, les Musulmans, et le RDR). En conclusion, à travers des jeux de mots sur 'rebelles' et 'républicains', le RDR est profondément associé à l'insurrection de septembre.

Comparée aux identifications des 'ennemis étrangers' par d'autres membres du mouvement patriotique, la liste de Groguhet est plutôt conservatrice parce qu'elle récupère simplement des catégorisations existantes. D'autres, tel que le Ministre Bohoun Bouabré (Washington Press Club, 30/09/2002) actualisèrent cette liste en identifiant les rebelles à des terroristes musulmans probablement reliés à ou au moins inspirés par ceux qui furent responsables des évènements du 11 Septembre aux États-Unis. Une autre de ces mises à jour est celle du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale, Mamadou Koulibaly (2003). Koulibaly considère également que les rebelles sont des terroristes mais il ajoute que ceux-ci obéissent aux ordres des autorités politiques françaises qu'il accuse de 'gangstérisme d'état'. S'adressant à un auditoire un peu plus jeune, les dirigeants de l'Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes quant à eux usent de la rhétorique panafricaine pour situer la bataille du peuple Ivoirien dans un contexte d'éveil de tous les Africains contre le néo-colonialisme actuel, ou se servent du discours anti-globaliste pour plaider en faveur de la protection des ressources naturelles nationales et contre la privatisation, afin d'illustrer des points plus généraux sur la souveraineté nationale mise en danger (Blé Goudé, janvier 2003).

En somme, je soutiens que ces identifications divergentes et continuellement changeantes des 'ennemis étrangers' qui coexistent dans le mouvement patriotique, peuvent illustrer le point de vue de Appadurai au sujet 'des interactions à long terme des cascades locales et globales' par lesquelles des antagonismes infra-nationaux (régionaux, ethniques) sont articulés en termes idéologiques 'globaux'. Cependant, la juxtaposition des identités allogènes ne nous permet pas de parler d'une implosion radicale dans un antagonisme linéaire. Les cascades, pour ainsi dire, sont (toujours) visibles. Dans l'ensemble, je pense qu'il est difficile d'analyser une telle situation à l'aide des instruments analytiques de Appadurai, et je suggère que nous utilisions les concepts d'échelles développés dans la géographie politique.

Re-scaling **l'allogène**

La mondialisation, selon Brenner (1997: 159) peut être mieux conceptualisée en tant que 'reconfiguration et re-térritorialisation des échelles de l'espace superposées, et non comme une implosion mono-directionnelle des forces globales dans des espaces sous-globaux'. Ce point est retenu par plusieurs auteurs pour soutenir une vision constructioniste des échelles *qui n'est pas* 'un cadre hiérarchique prédéterminé pour ordonner le monde' (Marston 2000: 220). Cela a deux conséquences importantes pour le concept analytique de l'échelle. Comme cela a été dit, les échelles sont vues comme

'emboîtées', c'est à dire superposées mais simultanées, emboîtées les unes dans les autres de manière dialectique plutôt que condensées (dans le sens de 'implosées') ou hiérarchique (dans le sens qu'elles apparaissent en série et de manière isolée) (Howitt 2000). En outre, les échelles sont vues comme socialement construites et politiquement motivées 'du dessous' et comme offrant 'des possibilités à des groupes sociaux de créer leur propre politique d'échelle afin de résister aux constructions d'échelles fondées sur le capital (*capital-centered*)' (Marston 2000: 232).

Que les patriotes Ivoiriens soient effectivement en train d'infirmer ou de confirmer la construction ces échelles economiques, est une question que je ne traiterai pas dans cet article. Ce que je pense que les réflexions ci-dessus sur l'échelle et la politique des échelles nous aident à faire, c'est de mieux comprendre la liste de Groguhet comme exemple de 'cascades à partir du bas'. La liste de Groguhet n'est pas une tentative de fusion des 'ennemis étrangers' mais de classement de l'allogène selon une echelle graduée (*scaling*): il s'agit de différencier d'une manière progressive et même directionnelle des catégories de personnes qui sont situées dans des sphères liées de différentes échelles. En commençant par les Dioula, Groguhet vise aussi bien le niveau ethnique sous-national (Dioula, rebelles), le niveau politique national (RDR) que la région Ouest Africaine (Burkina Faso et Mali) où l'on trouve d'autres Dioula ou des personnes parlant Dioula (Bambara) et d'où provient la grande majorité de travailleurs migrants dans le sud Ivoirien. Cette même région, souvent appelée 'Le Grand Nord', est mentionnée comme lieu 'd'origine' des rebelles (certains d'entre eux sont revenus d'exil du Burkina Faso et du Mali pour diriger ou soutenir l'insurrection de septembre). En re-catégorisant finalement 'l'ennemi étranger' en tant que fondamentalistes Musulmans Groguhet passe à des échelles plus globales – un passage qui est répété dans le bond final qui va 'des valets locaux' de l'impérialisme à l'impérialisme lui-même.

Considérée comme une tentative de classer 'l'ennemi étranger' selon une échelle graduée, la liste de Groguhet ne présente ni une fusion ni une simple différentiation, mais plutôt, une série d'identités emboîtées dans laquelle, un niveau plus local dissimule un niveau plus global. Pour faire cela, Groguhet s'appuie sur un modèle d'échelle local (national) qui provient des années 80 telle que la théorie du 'masque – écran' des socialistes et qui a été reformulé dans les années 90 dans le contexte de l'Ivoirité en ce qui concerne Alassane Ouattara comme faux national et partisan de capitalisme global. Après l'insurrection de septembre, ce schéma de l'étranger local masquant l'étranger lointain, a été encore re-articulé et intégré dans des théories de complot plus complètes sur les étrangers locaux et globaux reliés ('emboîtés').[6] Cette théorie de complot plus complète, et en particulier celle (assez encyclopédique) de Groguhet, combine la familiarité à la portée globale et offre à son auditoire une compréhension rhétorique d'un monde hostile plus large qui commence par les voisins Dioula éloignés et s'étend aux bases lointaines du pouvoir du capitalisme global.

Une telle différentiation des espaces emboîtés de l'altérité, ainsi que l'ambition d'avoir prise sur eux, peut être un élément important des mouvements d'autochtonie, comme il ressort de quelques réflexions récentes sur l'autochtonie (voir Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005). Le point de départ de ces réflexions est que l'autochtonie est un phénomène post-national, qui se réclame souvent de l'État-nation, mais c'est une nation-état en crise, en passe de devenir plus local et global en même temps (Comaroff

et Comaroff 2001: 254). Dans la même veine, Mbembe (2001: 278, 283) soutient que les conflits d'autochtonie éclatent souvent autour des zones infra-territoriales ou extraterritoriales. En survolant les réclamations des mouvements d'autochtonie, Abdulmaliq Simone (2001: 25) conclut qu'elles ne visent pas tellement 'à mettre le territoire sous le seul contrôle d'une force particulière, mais à permettre aux acteurs locaux de sentir que leurs opérations dans les espaces localisés sont également des conduits vers ou des extensions d'un monde beaucoup plus grand'. Avec l'identification des ennemis locaux en tant qu'acteurs régionaux et globaux, l'effort des patriotes Ivoiriens pour mettre politiquement sur la touche, d'expulser physiquement, ou même d'exterminer leurs co-résidents 'Dioula', devient une opération avec des conséquences régionales et globales.

En résumé, insérer le concept d'échelle dans le modèle de cascade de Appadurai, nous permet de le dépouiller de son orientation mono-directionnelle et hiérarchique et de faire de la place à des efforts locaux/nationaux pour récupérer de manière rhétorique le global en le re-ordonnant de manière discursive dans les échelles de l'altérité. Néanmoins – et c'est une question sur laquelle je ne peux pas trop insister – comme Nielsen et Simonsen (2003) l'ont fait remarquer, les échelles ne sont pas seulement une matière discursive mais également de véritables frontières, réseaux et espaces physiques (Smith & Low 2006). J'étudierai ces aspects du *scaling* dans un secteur d'activité qui le plus souvent est abordé dans son aspect discursif plutôt que dans sa matérialité at spatialité, c'est-à-dire, dans la manière dont les patriotes Ivoiriens se servent des médias locaux ou de proximité comme composants importants de la sphère publique nationale.

La Sorbonne comme espace autochtone à multiple echelles (multiscalar)

Le discours de Groguhet cité plus haut fut prononcé dans un de ces parlements populaires d'Abidjan appelé *La Sorbonne*. Située au cœur du Plateau, quartier administratif et politique de la ville d'Abidjan, *La Sorbonne* est le parlement le plus ancien et le plus prestigieux des parlements populaires, dont dérive les autres, qui surgirent au cours de ces dernières années (Bahi 2003 ; Silué N'Tchabétien 2006).

Dans cet optique, ce que Appadurai (1999: 322) dit au sujet du rôle des médias locaux est important mais offre une aide limitée pour expliquer pourquoi les infrastructures particulières telles que les parlements populaires. Ici aussi, le début d'une réponse peut être offert en examinant certains aspects du concept de l'échelle, *en particulier les concepts de* 'remontée dans l'échelle' (*upscaling*), et 'descente dans l'échelle' (*downscaling*) introduit par Cox 1998 (voir Adams 1996; Arnaut 2005).

Il faudrait peut-être plus de recherche et un autre article pour avoir une compréhension adéquate de la façon dont dans le mouvement patriotique en général et les parlements populaires en particulier, le national descend dans l'échelle, d'une part à un corps mental/physique comme lieu de défi (cf. 'sacrifice' comme 'offrande de soi pour le pays') et de vulnérabilité (le corps blessé engagé dans un combat au corps à corps avec les ennemis qui l'entourent et qui ne sont pas déclarés), et d'autre part aux espaces de co-présence matérielle sous forme de réunions (des rassemblements d'activistes aux démonstrations de masse) qui peuvent également prendre la forme de proximité virtuelle ou médiatisée comme dans l'émission pro-patriotes à la télévision nationale, intitulée 'On est ensemble'.

Ici, je peux simplement souligner la manière spécifique dont cette descente dans l'échelle a lieu à *La Sorbonne*. Comme j'explique ailleurs (Arnaut 2008), je pense que nous devons voir *La Sorbonne* – peut-être plus que les autres parlements populaires qui proviennent récemment d'elle – comme ayant un double noyaux de proximité sociale et d'autonomie intellectuelle. En tant qu'agora le plus ancien et le plus actif, *La Sorbonne* obtient la proximité sociale dans un format de co-présence matérielle qui fait ressortir le défi patriotique dans la communication face-à-face et montre sa vulnérabilité devant l'acclamation ou le mécontentement publique. En tant que parlement populaire le plus prestigieux, *La Sorbonne* obtient l'autonomie intellectuelle en mettant en scène ses 'professeurs' qui éclairent leurs auditoires par des analyses politiques. En combinant les deux fonctions, *La Sorbonne* apparaît comme un nouveau lieu de l'opposition physique/mentale, ou comme les patriotes le disent 'de résistance'.

En somme, décrire l'utilisation de médias par le mouvement patriotique ivorien en termes de classement selon une échelle graduée (*scaling*), nous permet de continuer notre lecture critique du modèle de cascade de Appadurai. En se concentrant sur les infrastructures locales spécifiques des médias (par opposition à ceux tout à fait 'universels' mentionnés par Appadurai), nous détectons *des lieux de médiation* qui constituent les paysages médiatiques particuliers par lesquels les messages suivent des trajectoires complexes.[7] En suivant ces trajectoires nous sommes amenés à remplacer les cascades par des échelles, et à discerner non seulement des processus de 'descente dans l'échelle' (*downscaling*) mais également des processus de 'remontée dans l'échelle' (*upscaling*). Les forums de l'ère Gbagbo ne servent pas seulement de lieux de destination où la propagande politique ou les messages présidentiels accèdent aux bases du public à travers des processus linéaires, s'écoulant goutte à goutte vers le bas. Le cas de *la Sorbonne* illustre comment des extraits de 'propagande politique' peuvent revenir à surface dans des lieux concrets et localisés 'semi-isolés' particuliers où ils peuvent de façon convaincante être réitérés sous forme de sagesse populaire ('libre expression') ou de vérité scientifique ('analyse politique').

Remarques de conclusion

Le cas présenté dans cet article est celui du discours de Groguhet à *La Sorbonne* vu comme un exemple de politique d'identité et de l'utilisation des médias par un acteur important dans un mouvement d'autochtonie. L'introduction des 'échelles' comme outils analytiques, tout d'abord, nous permet de percevoir l'autochtonie plus clairement comme des processus de 'glocalisation' de l' État-nation en crise – processus qui comportent la 'remontée dans l'échelle' (*upscaling*) vers le global ainsi que la 'descente dans l'échelle' (*downscaling*) vers l'individuel et le local. Le cas actuel nous donne l'occasion de montrer seulement des fragments de ces processus. Dans le registre de la politique d'identité, j'ai démontré un processus de 'remontée dans l'échelle' par un exemple de re-classement de l'allogène dans une série d'identités 'glocales' emboîtées. J'ai démontré le processus de 'descente dans l'échelle' en détail dans le registre de l'utilisation de médias avec un exemple de re-classement de la propagande présidentielle.

Le point de départ d'une vue générale de l'autochtonie basée sur l'échelle est que, au total des divers processus de classement (*scaling*), le corps local est relié aux forces,

individus et institutions les plus globaux. J'ai essayé de montrer comment, dans le registre des politiques d'identité, ceci se produit par le re-classement (*re-scaling*) de l'allogène; une politique de l'échelle qui offre aux 'autochtones' une compréhension rhétorique d'un réseau mondiale d'ennemis qui relie leurs voisins 'Dioula' à des bases de pouvoirs internationales, ou selon les mots d'Abdulmaliq Simone (2001: 25) qui 'permet aux acteurs locaux de sentir que leurs opérations dans les espaces localisés sont également des conduits vers ou des extensions d'un monde beaucoup plus grand'. La liste de Groguhet a consisté à articuler cette 'compréhension' de manière négative, mais nous devons savoir que de même qu'elle catalogue une série 'd'autres' ennemis glocaux, elle indique des 'individus' glocaux alternatifs avec lesquels le peuple Ivoirien *peut* positivement s'allier. Ceci devient clair quand nous survolons la géopolitique du régime de Gbagbo.

Au cours de ces dernières années nous avons pu observer une 'multilatéralisation' des relations étrangères à l'écart des 'ennemis étrangers' déclarés énumérés par Groguhet et vers de nouveaux alliés. Au niveau régional, Ouest africain, le régime de Gbagbo a remplacé ou a complété ses liens historiques (coloniaux) avec le Burkina Faso et le Mali – représenté par les 'Dioula', les musulmans, et les 'rebelles' dans la liste de Groguhet – en forgeant des liens plus forts avec, entre d'autres le Libéria et la Guinée. L'éloignement d'avec la France 'néo-coloniale' est mis en parallèle avec les efforts de rapprochement avec, par exemple, le Royaume-Unis au sujet duquel un patriote m'expliqua qu'à la différence de la France, le Royaume-Unis a donné à ses anciennes colonies la liberté de choisir la direction dans laquelle elles voulaient se développer. La multilatéralisation inclut les efforts du régime de Gbagbo pour renforcer les liens économiques avec la Chine et l'Inde, qui sont présentés comme des puissances du monde sans histoires impérialistes. Enfin, les attaques rhétoriques contre les 'fondamentalistes musulmans' et 'les rebelles/terroristes' caractérisent dans l'option politique du Président Gbagbo la recherche de meilleurs rapports avec les Etats-Unis, ou plutôt avec l'administration Bush et son entourage de fondamentalistes chrétiens, ainsi qu'avec Israël. Pendant une causerie informelle à *La Sorbonne*, un patriote compara la Côte d'Ivoire à Israël et expliqua que comme les Ivoiriens, les Israéliens étaient entourés (et menacés) par les Musulmans.

Ce petit inventaire des exploits géopolitiques du régime de Gbagbo et leur rationalisation dans la bataille des patriotes contre les 'ennemis étrangers', illustrent, je pense, comment la répartition interne de la population Ivoirienne coïncide avec les efforts de repositionnement géopolitique du pays. Dans la déclaration au sujet de Israël, nous voyons comment les patriotes articulent conjointement la répartition des 'Ivoiriens' – l'exclusion des musulmans (c'est-à-dire, migrants, 'Dioula', militants du RDR, etc.) – et rationalisent le repositionnement géopolitique de la Côte d'Ivoire dans son rapprochement d'Israël. En d'autres termes, l'autochtonie Ivoirienne forme la base du repositionnement géopolitique de la Côte d'Ivoire dans la répartition de sa propre population en autochtones et allogènes. Cela, cependant, n'est pas un jeu abstrait des catégories dictées comme ci-dessus mais une pratique bio-politique concrète d'auto-division. L'on peut effectivement 'rencontrer' l'autochtone (l'on peut tout aussi bien 'battre' l'allogène)!

Pour trouver les contre-parties de l'allogène 're-classé' (*scaled*), nous n'avons qu'à descendre simplement dans les lieux de co-présence tel que celui où la liste de

Groguhet a été proclamée. Là, la construction politique populiste du 'peuple' est rabaissée dans l'échelle au niveau du corps résistant, de la 'libre' expression de l'individu.[8] Dans des lieux comme *La Sorbonne* le repositionnement géostratégique et la répartition bio-politique de la 'nouvelle Côte d'Ivoire' sont simultanément basés sur les corps visibles et réels localisés à une distance où ils peuvent se voir et s'entendre l'un l'autre, et regroupés sur des lieux oppositionnels qui essayent de retenir toute l'authenticité culturelle et la pureté politique dont ils se sont réclamés par le passé.

La Sorbonne est une 'glocalité' s'il y en a: par son nom, ses 'professeurs', et son 'instruction', elle a atteint l'universalité ; par son emplacement, la co-présence des corps résistants et sa libre expression, elle se réclame de la localité absolue. Dans son propre emboîtement, *La Sorbonne* intègre la distance à la proximité. C'est ce qui rend transnational le mouvement d'autochtonie Ivoirien apparemment autocentrique et fortement lié au territoire, et fait du mouvement patriotique une 'nouvelle forme d'activisme civique transnational'. Malheureusement, dans ce processus il ne localise pas seulement le 'transnational' mais il re-térritorialise également le 'civique'.

Notes

1. Une première version de ce texte a été présentée à l'atelier 'Les médias et le global' convoqué par Dorle Dracklé et Ulf Hannerz à la 8ème Conférence EASA à Vienne en septembre 2004. Puisque la version originale de ce texte n'a été actualisée que de manière minimale, et parce que la situation en Côte d'Ivoire n'a pas cessé de changer, ce texte montre des signes évidents de vieillesse. Deux des phénomènes récents les plus significatifs qui n'ont pas été traité dans ce texte sont 'les grins' (voir Silué N'Tchabétien Oumar 2006; Théroux-Bénoni & Bahi à paraitre) et les changements de contenue des messages véhiculés par les parlements populaires depuis l'accord de paix de Février 2007. Puisque cet article veut être avant tout programmatique dans sa nature, une mise à jour complète n'a pas semblé nécessaire. Je voudrais remercier les compagnons de route du CERAP, de l'Université de Bouaké et de l'Université de Cocody: Silué N' Tchabétien Oumar, Koné Téhéna, Atchoua N'Guessan Julien, et surtout Gadou Dakouri et Aghi Bahi, ainsi que Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni pour leurs encouragements et leur aide. Aussi je remercie Nathalie Delaleeuwe pour aider avec la traduction.
2. Dozon (2000: 59) écrit: 'Autrement dit, loin de disparaître, l'ivoirité s'est aujourd'hui déplacée du pôle akan ou baoulé à un vaste ensemble régional sudiste'.
3. En se faisant habituellement appeler 'patriotes', le mouvement pro-Gbagbo semble avoir gagné la bataille pour le terme 'patriote' dans laquelle également les militaires insurgés et certaines organisations de la société civile contre Gbagbo sont impliqués. Le premier et le plus grand groupe rebelle est le Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) qui avec deux autres groupes plus petits forme maintenant la coalition des Forces Nouvelles. Un groupe de médiateurs qui essaye de relancer le débat politique et d'ouvrir l'impasse entre les 'patriotes' pro-Gbagbo et les 'patriotes' rebelles s'appelle lui-même la Coalition Patriotique pour la Renaissance et contre l'Impunité (CPRI).
4. En 1984, Gbagbo (se cachant derrière le pseudonyme de N'Zembele) écrit au sujet de Houphouët-Boigny qu'il 'sert d'écran entre les Ivoiriens et les vrais exploiteurs qui habitent la plupart du temps en France' (N'Zembele 1984: 77). Dans le domaine politique Amondji (1984: 230) observe comment 'derrière le masque de F. Houphouët, les agents de l'impérialisme régissent directement et dans les petits détails'.
5. En fait l'inventeur du terme 'Ivoirité' est l'ancien écrivain et dramaturge anti-Houphouëtiste Niangoranh Porquet qui en 1994 écrit lapoésie politique Masquairides –

Balanfonides. Dans cet ouvrage Niangoranh Porquet utilise l'image, développée dans les années 80 pour démasquer Houphouët-Boigny et les élites du PDCI comme 'de faux nationaux' à l'époque post-Houphouët d'Alassane Ouattara. Dans ce nouveau monde de masques innombrables tissés de simulation, une des plus puissantes caractéristiques des 'faux nationaux' est 'Masque noir, peau blanche'. Avec cette inversion de l'image de Fanon 'masques blancs, peau noire' l'auteur rappelle l'idée anti-impérialiste que derrière les visages noirs de la bourgeoisie locale agissent les capitalistes français 'blancs'. Les masques les plus dangereux dans la poésie de Niangoranh Porquet sont ceux à double-couleurs tels que 'les masques rouge-noirs', les 'masques de la complicité [et] de la duplicité' (1994: 24) derrière lesquels se cachent 'les mercenaires incurables, [...], les réfugiés (apatrides), [...] les menteurs, [et] les renégats' (ibid : 48) encore appelés 'les domestiques de l'impérialisme [et] les esclaves du néo-colonialisme' (ibid : 29). En dehors de cette image qui ressemble énormément à celle de Groguhet, Niangoranh Porquet parle également des 'vampires 'qui se nourrissent' de la chair des autres 'et 'du sang des victimes innocentes' (ibid: 33). 'Les fausses vies' (factice leur vie) font tout cela pour 'les fossoyeurs de ce monde' qui veulent 'éliminer notre race' dans 'une lutte sans merci' (ibid.: 30). Ce génocide est, selon le poème, le but final de la 'blanchitude' (idem; voir Arnaut 2004a).

6. Dans sa contribution 'pro-Patriotique' à une conférence à Bruxelles, la célèbre dramaturge Werewere Liking (2003) met en avant l'image del'Afrique comme 'berceau de l'humanité' et comme représentation de la temporalité de l'humanité, tout en comparant l'Occident au'cercueil de l'humanité' représentant la mort éternelle. Ce 'fantôme' occidental demande, explique t-elle, une alimentation permanente: il doit 'boire constamment le sang des autres afin de retrouver le cercueil chaque matin' (2003: 6). Le remède qu'elle suggère est celui d'un conte simple, et par extension, l'art. Sans cet antidote culturel, prévient-elle, 'nous deviendrons tous des fantômes' (c'est un destin de fantôme qui nous attend tous!) (idem).
7. Une partie de cette complexité se trouve dans le fait que ces lieux ont une histoire et une stratification propres – l'on pourrait faire la distinction entre les 'lieux' restants des années 80, les 'lieux' existants encore des années 90 et les 'lieux' naissants du début des années 2000.
8. Je m'appuie ici sur la définition de Hall du populisme: 'l'utilisation du 'peuple' comme un signifié vide pour regrouper sous une seule 'grande tente' des intérêts différents et antagonistes' (Hall 2002: 26).

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ADDRESS

Sociology, Hypocrisy, and Social Order

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Address of the Interim President at the First General Assembly of the African Sociological Association, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, July 2007.

For the Record

Welcome to the inaugural Congress of the African Sociological Association (AfSA). Sociologists across Africa hardly know, or interact with one another unlike our colleagues in economics and political science that run continent-wide initiatives that bring their members together. There is the West African Economic Association and the Kenya-based African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Initiative for the training postgraduate economics students across Africa. Furthermore, South Africa currently hosts the African Political Science Association.

The formation of African Sociological Association is driven by the desire to give sociologists in Africa a platform to analyse the continent's social problems and participate in the activities of the International Sociological Association. The formation of AfSA was first mooted at the 1998 World Congress of Sociology in Montreal, Canada. Further discussions followed at the: 30th Anniversary of Codesria, in Dakar; South African Sociological Association meeting in East London; Codesria biannual congress in Kampala, Uganda; and 2006 World Congress of Sociology held in Durban, South Africa.

Three of the regular faces at past consultative meetings on the association are Professors Fred Hendricks and Jimi Adesina, and including the speaker. But the credit for the hard work for this inaugural Congress goes to Professor Jimi Adesina who mobilised a grant from Ford Foundation. Professor Adesina coined the acronym of the Association while Professor Fred Hendricks has been editing our highly rated journal – the *African Sociological Review* – which is being funded by Codesria, Dakar.

Our immense gratitude to Professor Bayo Oluskohi, the Executive Secretary of Codesria for his tireless support for all noteworthy initiatives that are aimed at promoting scholarship in Africa. AfSA has also enjoyed the unassailable support of Drs Ebrima Sall (Director of Research) and Jean-Bernard Oedraego (Director of Training) at Codesria who are also sociologists.

This Congress would not have materialised without a generous grant from the East Africa Office of Ford Foundation. We wish to thank Ford for the funds and Professor Tade Aina, a distinguished sociologist who is currently heading the East Africa office of the organisation, for embracing our proposal on the formation of AfSA. We wish to

acknowledge the travel grant from the Lagos Office of Ford Foundation, made possible by Dr Babatunde Ahonsi who is also a well-known sociologist. AfSA is immensely grateful to the National Research Council of South Africa, the Vice-Chancellor and the authorities of the Rhodes University for their invaluable contribution in cash and kind towards this Congress.

Universities in Africa began to offer sociology degree programmes over sixty years ago. Interest in the discipline has grown as demonstrated by the number of institutions that currently offer degree programmes at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Besides, sociology courses have been integrated into various professional programmes like medicine, engineering, architecture, and town planning. Finally, the skills of sociologists are being utilised in government, the private sector, and academia in Africa today.

Pioneer African sociologists succeeded in carving a niche in world scholarship. One of them, our esteemed Professor Akinsola Akiwowo is being honoured at this inaugural Congress for his efforts to indigenise sociological concepts and paradigms. His efforts paid off when the ISA organised a panel on *indigenisation and universalism* at the 1982 World Congress of Sociology in Mexico City. The *International Sociology* (the official organ of ISA) also published a series of exchanges on his ideas in its 1986 and 1987 issues.[1] I salute Professor Akiwowo, my former teacher at Ibadan, and congratulate him most warmly and sincerely for honouring our invitation to accept our award at this historic Congress. Professor Akiwowo was for eight years the only African on the Executive Committee of the ISA. I recall his efforts to bring young African sociologists into the fold of ISA.

Furthermore, it is a privilege and an honour to welcome to this meeting and also congratulate our second awardee, Professor Bernard Magubane, an outstanding scholar and a leading light for generations of African sociologists.

Finally, this inaugural Congress offers us a golden opportunity to celebrate the known and *unknown* sociologists/anthropologists. I am talking of Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon whose contributions to the study of colonialism and race remain unmatched. The third is our own indomitable Archie Mafeje who passed away recently. Professor Mafeje surmounted all racial barriers through remarkable intellect to establish a niche in world scholarship. AfSA is using this occasion to launch a memorial lecture which will be delivered by another distinguished scholar, Professor Kwesi Prah, in his honour.

Now to my inaugural address.

Introduction

The founders of western sociology, namely Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, proclaimed a secularist *proselytising* mission because of their emphasis on the application of the *scientific method* in the production of knowledge that would engender peaceful-coexistence in all human societies.[2] However, peaceful co-existence, social stability and order continue to elude humankind despite more than a hundred and fifty years of the contributions of sociologists to knowledge. One could therefore surmise that the persistence of conflicts and wars that are religiously, racially, economically, and tribally motivated in all human societies underscores the mistaken idealism and expectations of the founders of western sociology.

This cynical appraisal of the impact of the contributions of sociologists worldwide towards the study of, as well as the quest for social order inevitably leads to a consideration of a neglected overarching factor in the understanding of the persistence of social conflicts and wars in human societies. And it is vital for African sociologists whose continent is most affected by racially, ethnically, economically, and religiously motivated conflicts and wars[3] to focus on this factor if others are unwilling to do so.

The aim of this inaugural address is to draw our attention to the role that hypocrisy plays in human affairs. The goal of the discourse would be wellnigh achieved if African sociologists spearhead discourse on hypocrisy in the context of social interactions within and between nations. Hypocrisy appears to be the key to the understanding of the dysfunctions in globalisation, inter- and intra group as well as communal relations. Hypocrisy seems to provide the clue to an unsettled world that is beleaguered by terror.

Conceptual Overview of Hypocrisy

Hypocrisy simply means 'behaviour which pretends to have a moral standard or an opinion that does not reflect what is actual or the true viewpoint of an individual'.[4] Another dictionary indicates that hypocrisy is about 'insincerity by virtue of pretending to have qualities or beliefs that one does not really have'.[5] Jesus Christ was peeved with hypocrites when he remarked:

> Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisee, you hypocrites. You clean the outside of the cup and dish, but inside they are full of greed and self-indulgence. Blind Pharisee, First clean the inside of the cup and dish, and then the outside also will be clean.[6]

Similarly, Prophet Mohammad (SAW) noted that:

> Hypocrites are known for three shameful acts: when they talk they lie; when they make promise they break it and when they are trusted they betray the trust.[7]

The Holy Qur'an therefore vilifies hypocrites in unmistakable terms:

> The Hypocrites – they seek to deceive Allah but is Allah Who deceive them. When they stand up to prayer, they stand without earnestness, to be seen of men but little do they hold Allah in remembrance.[8]

Furthermore,

> The Hypocrites will be in the lowest depths of the Fire: no helper wilt thou find for them.[9]

The study of hypocrisy never attracted serious attention until Naom Chomsky began to explore it in the context of world affairs.[10] The outburst of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela at the 2006 UN General Assembly where he displayed one of Chomsky's books also helped to draw attention to hypocrisy as a heuristic concept in social analysis and/or in the study of relations between nation-states.[11]

One is compelled to focus on hypocrisy in order to understand social conflict, instability, and wars because the interrogation of overarching factors like social class, poverty, social identities, race, ethnicity etc., by sociologists has so far failed to provide credible answers to the central problematic in sociology, namely, social order. The vision of the founders of western sociology which is to analyse and generate knowledge for the promotion of peaceful co-existence has remained an illusion. Peaceful co-existence and social order will remain elusive so long as there is less

sincerity and more of hypocrisy within and between nation-states. Following are anecdotal data to support this thesis. This address is expected to push African sociologists to explore the role of hypocrisy in the study of various dimensions of social life, health, inter-group relations, conflict, crime, law, gender, sexuality, labour relations etc.

The West and Rest of the World

The West has presumably been in the forefront of democracy, good governance, world development, and peace. The United States proclaimed its independence on the platter of *no taxes without representation*. It entered the first and second world wars in order to protect the sanctity of democracy and human rights. The West under the hegemonic influence of the US fought the former Soviet Union because it regarded communism as an affront to the flowering of the human spirit. Furthermore, the West has been the largest single contributor to peace-keeping in the world. Thus, it is to the eternal credit of the West that democracy which was hitherto regarded as an anathema in many contexts of human existence is being grudgingly embraced even by nation-states that treated it with contempt.

But has the West under the hegemonic influence of the US lived up to these laudable ideals? This has not necessarily been the case if a dispassionate analysis of the role of the West in world affairs is undertaken. The intractable Middle East crisis in which the Palestinians have been waging a relentless war of independence since 1948 is attributable to the inertia on the part of the West to act as the honest broker. The closeness of the US in particular and the West in general to Israel (with the exception of France in certain instances) is stalling the peace process. Dispassionate observers are inclined to argue that the behaviour of the West is inconsistent with its values of democracy and self-determination. It is undeniable that the resolution of the Israel-Palestine crisis would have saved the world from all forms of brutal and catastrophic terror attacks.

The invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain without UN authorization under the pretext that the late Saddam Hussein harboured weapons of mass destruction which were never found is yet another instance of Western hypocrisy. Furthermore, the allegation by President Chavez of Venezuela that the US through the CIA attempted to overthrow his *democratically* elected regime; the assassination of President Salvador Allende of Argentina including the overthrow of his democratically elected Government by the CIA, as well as the inertia on the part of the US to intervene and enthrone democracy when Liberia badly needed its assistance point to the fact that *national interest* rather than unfettered commitment to democracy and good governance is central to their mission in, and vision of the world.

The Republic of Iran was a close ally of the US prior to the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini. The US was in fact determined to transform the Shah of Iran into the 'police man' of the sub-region and it armed Iran under the Shah with a sophisticated arsenal. Ironically, the Islamic Republic of Iran is now described as an axis of evil by President George W. Bush of the US.

The unintended consequences of US hypocrisy in its relationship towards Iraq vis-à-vis Iran are now glaring. The US is at loggerheads with the Shiite dominated Iran over the nuclear weapons/other issues while it is at the same time the main backer of

the current Shiite dominated regime in Iraq. The overthrow of Saddam has expanded the clout of the Shiite dominated Iran in the Middle East to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia (a close ally of the US) that leads the Sunni worldwide. Ironically, the overthrow of Saddam has altered the balance of power in favour of Iran, the arch enemy of the US that also backs Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

Finally, the US worked hand-in-hand with Osama Bin Ladin and the Mujahadeen to defeat the former Soviet Union in order to contain the spread of communism in Afghanistan.[12] Ironically, Osama Bin Ladin who received all his training in terrorism under the tutelage of the US/CIA is now regarded by the US as its number one enemy as a result of 9/11 and other alleged terror attacks.

But hypocrisy as a tool in social and international relations is not the preserve of the US alone but also underpins the behaviour of its European allies, notably, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The United Kingdom under Tony Blair collaborated in the invasion of Iraq. Secondly, Britain's hypocrisy is glaring in the legal manoeuvrings over the extradition of the late General Augusto Pinochet to Spain over criminal charges on the disappearance/death of not less than 3000 during his regime. Baroness Margaret Thatcher, Britain's former Prime Minister was quick to remind Tony Blair that the United Kingdom owed a lot to the General for the support that he gave to their country during the Falklands War and it was necessary for the British establishment to show appreciation towards the General during his travails. The General was *somehow* allowed to return to Argentina instead of being extradited to Spain to answer the charges.

Thirdly, there seems to be a gap between commitment to transparency and accountability on the one hand and national interest on the other as amply shown by the way in which the British Government stalled the investigation into a deal on the procurement of sophisticated fighter aircraft by Saudi Arabia from the Untied Kingdom. What follows is the reaction of a senior Minister when the Liberal Democrats demanded an investigation into the deal:

> 'I have, as in normal practice in such as sensitive case, obtained the views of the Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Secretaries as to the public interest considerations raised by this investigation', the Attorney General told the House of Lords yesterday. 'They have expressed the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage to United Kingdom/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation which is likely to have seriously negative consequences for the United Kingdom's public interest in terms of both national security and our highest priority foreign policy objectives in the Middle East'.

The Conservatives accepted the statement, and said the affair should end there, but the Liberal Democrats accused the Government of giving into Saudi pressure.[13]

No criminal charges have been laid against those that are involved in the deal/scandal.

Fourthly and just lately, all the soldiers of British Commonwealth origin who are currently serving in the British Army formed a Union to fight all sorts of discriminatory practices that are targeted at them. A Belize-born named Marlon Clancy who is spearheading the Union claimed that 'other soldiers dressed as members of the Ku Klux Klan' attacked him and were saying:

> they were going to take the 'nigger' to burn. That black people never used to have rights, they shouldn't have rights now.

Mr Clancy, still a serving soldier, said his complaints were not acted upon – 'Nothing was done. Because I made the complaint I was further victimised'.[14]

One could therefore surmise from the foregoing examples that the United Kingdom is after all inclined to sacrifice human rights in favour of its *national interest*.

Although the French did not endorse the invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain, a stance that angered its long time allies and one that caused the now discredited and jailed Republican congressman Bob Ney to rename *French fries* as *freedom fries*,[15] they are by no means devoid of hypocrisy. While the French revolution was fought on the platter of *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, this sentiment is not always manifested in their behaviour.

The French were very hostile to Guinea when the late Sekou Touré was the only nationalist leader in colonial French Africa to demand independence for his country and Guinea was singled out for serious punishment. Moreover, the French hurried out of Vietnam after they were defeated and they were also forced to grant independence to Algeria after thousands of Algerians had lost their lives. Thirdly, they have a discriminatory immigration policy despite their pride regarding the *rainbow team* that won the world cup five years ago under the leadership of Zinedine Zidane, the son of an Algerian immigrant. Finally, no observer would gloss over the conditions under which African immigrants live in France today. The 2006 riots by African immigrants most especially in Paris bear testimony to the hypocrisy of the French over access to basic social and economic rights for people of colour.

So much about politics: let us turn attention to the hypocrisy of the West in the context of the world economic system. The attempt to regulate world trade through the WTO has turned out to be a ruse after all. Low income countries that envisaged that the WTO would make it possible to maximize gains on their agricultural products in the context of a regulated world market are now disenchanted due to the absence of a level playing field for all nation-states. While the high-income countries surreptitiously continue to subsidise their goods and are able to protect their industries, the low income ones are being forced/manipulated to remove subsidies from theirs. Here are some reactions from the South towards the implementation of WTO.

First, Kweku Fukuo from Ghana remarked:[16]

> I still do not know exactly what Africa expects of the WTO. It seems to me we only attend because everybody else agrees we are poor and to hear what the rest of the world can do for us. What a pity. The level of apathy is just too dangerous. Well, cocoa may not be affected now, first it was sugar, then each other products that we export and then we will find out we are not needed in these meetings.

Victor Owo from Nigeria intoned:[17]

> As a Nigerian and an African, I don't expect much from the WTO, what I know for sure that they will bring up policies that will make Africans poorer. Ghana sends cocoa to the developed world, and then it comes back as chocolate, more expensive than the cocoa itself. This only makes the rich countries richer.

What about Mitsuru from Japan who argued that:

> African governments should put pressure on the international community to make realistic and reasonable profit from the international trade. While I pay $3 for a cup of coffee in Japan, Kenyan farmers get peanuts instead of what they really deserve. It is not a trade in modern times. What a shame.

And also John Alege of the United Kingdom who claimed that:[18]

> The WTO is hinged on capitalist domination of the global economy. African countries are advised to adopt free market economy, removal of trade restrictions, yet the world's rich countries protect their producers and restrict African exports. It is now time for WTO to, not only consider creating enabling conditions but also remove those that continue to weaken the nation states in Africa.

Other Western European Countries have also not been above board on hypocrisy as amply shown by the protest of a group of Norwegians who were fathered by German soldiers during the Second World War who are now seeking redress over the violation of their human rights. One hundred and fifty Norwegian adult children are seeking compensation through the European Commission of Human rights for alleged harassment/abuse dating back to 60 years![19]

The West and Africa

Africa is poverty stricken as amply shown by the UNDP annual statistics that indicate that most of the poorest countries in the world are in Africa with nearly two-thirds of the population in the continent living on a US dollar a day.[20] Sub-Saharan Africa is also ravaged by parasitic and infectious diseases, the most virulent among them is HIV/AIDS. The prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS which currently lacks cure range from about two percent in countries like Senegal to about 20 percent in Southern African countries (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland), making sub-Saharan Africa the carrier of the heaviest burden of the disease worldwide.[21]

The institutions of many African countries are in a state of disrepair. Affordable health care is still elusive to large segments in the population while universal and/or quality education is also not yet accessible to all. Child labour is widespread and millions of the able-bodied are underemployed or unemployed.

Girl-children and women who constitute a formidable subgroup in the population in Africa are still brutalised in various ways because they are the targets of wide ranging harmful cultural practices that are embedded in the social structure of the various communities in the continent.[22] Infant and maternal mortality rates are still at an all time high.[23] African women are more likely to die during child birth than their counterparts elsewhere in the world while substantial proportions of their children die before the age of five. Life is cheap in Africa because of these factors.

One of the reasons for the dismal state of Africans and Africa can be attributed to corruption among its top public functionaries. Most African countries are among the most corrupt in the world.[24] African leaders consistently demonstrate the *neurotic need for power and money*. Elections are hardly free and fair and those who assume the mantle of leadership through rigged elections enrich themselves within the shortest possible time. Besides, they are determined to hang on to power in clear violation of their country's Constitutions.

The West is always inclined to bemoan corruption among African leaders while the World Bank/IMF is quick to underscore its implications for good governance and rapid economic development in Africa. They attempt to put pressure on African countries to behave through Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index which is the framework for ranking countries on corruption worldwide.[25]

Paradoxically, African leaders remit the funds that they siphon from their national treasuries to banks in the high income countries. The late President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now Congo, Kinshasa, who enjoyed the support of the US/CIA during his thirty-two year reign of terror stole not less than US$5 billion which he kept in Swiss Banks. And it has been suggested that all the funds that were stolen by Mobutu equal the foreign debt of his country. The late General Sani Abacha, the former Nigerian dictator, transferred not less than US$1.5 billions from Nigeria to banks in Europe and other parts of the world. The former Governors of Bayelsa and Plateau states in Nigeria were caught in the United Kingdom carrying huge amounts of US dollars and pounds sterling. Finally, it was suggested at one time that a handful of Nigerian leaders could easily pay off the debt of about US$33 billion which the country owed its creditors before substantial proportions were written off by Western creditors.

Another report claims that 'at least US$1 billion of illegal gains made by former and serving politicians and civil servants in Kenya, were uncovered' while the Goldenberg scam involved between US$3 and 4 billions of revenue that are stashed away in foreign banks.[26] The banks in Luxemburg, Britain and most especially in Switzerland where authorities enforce secrecy in banking transactions are 'reputable' for receiving stolen and misappropriated funds from Africa and other third world countries.

The standpoint of the West on corruption smacks of hypocrisy because the West is by and large the sole recipient/beneficiary of stolen public funds from third world leaders. While assuming a moral high ground through 'sermons' on the importance of good governance in Africa, the West often turns a blind eye to its banking institutions that receive and live off stolen funds. It is a trite observation in common law that a thief/corrupt individual/organisation and any person/organisation that knowingly receives stolen goods is criminally liable.

Attempts by third world and African countries to retrieve stolen funds from its banks are hampered in various ways. The erstwhile Nigerian administration needed all the wits to retrieve just a part of the stolen funds which Sani Abacha deposited in western banking institutions. Congo Kinshasa has so far not recovered from Western banking institutions the billions of dollars that Mobutu Sese Seko stole during his long reign. The Philippines has so far not retrieved most of the funds that Ferdinand Marcos stole from the country.

What would it be like if all corrupt African leaders had no safe haven in the West for stolen and misappropriated public funds? What would it be like if western banks and their governments voluntarily disclose and return stolen funds without legal and bureaucratic hurdles? What would it be if there is an Index of transparency for the *recipients of stolen funds just like the one that currently ranks countries on the scale of corruption worldwide?* What would it be like if all the stolen funds are kept in banks within Africa? Not only will the West be upholding its proclaimed commitment to democracy, transparency, and good governance, it will also be making positive

contribution towards freeing Africans from the exploitation by their leaders. The West has not helped by its hypocritical stance on stolen funds. Rather, the West seems to be colluding with African leaders to exploit the peoples of Africa.

Hypocrisy in Africa

Hypocrisy is a universal phenomenon because it also transcends social and inter-state relations in Africa. A number of examples will drive this point home starting with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU).

Africans are still as far apart as possible despite nearly five decades of the existence of OAU/AU. The mass deportation of Nigerians from Ghana by the late Dr K. A. Busia and retaliation by Shehu Shagari of Nigeria demonstrate the gap between the proclamation of African unity and brotherliness/sisterliness among Africans. What about the forcible eviction of Nigerians from Equatorial Guinea or the incarceration and brutal treatment of Nigerians who are attempting to cross to Europe by the Libyan and Moroccan Authorities? How else could one explain the fact that it is more tasking for Africans to obtain visas to African countries than Euro-American countries? The African Union is meaningless if there is no *free movement for Africans* within their continent. Freedom of movement around Africa is therefore the minimum condition for economic, political, and social integration.

There are other examples of hypocrisy at country level in Africa and we would discuss a handful staring with Nigeria. The erstwhile administration in Nigeria proclaimed the fight against corruption as one of its cardinal goals. The Obasanjo Administration enacted a law that established the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to demonstrate its commitment to this goal. The agency has been hitting the headlines and a week hardly goes by without reports of Governors or legislators or Chairmen of Local Government Authorities including top civil servants that are under investigation or arrested for corruption or misappropriation of public funds. Yet, the credibility of EFCC is being questioned due to its double standards. Critics argue that the erstwhile Head of State used EFCC to target his political enemies. They also note that the Commission has not come clean on the weighty allegations that are levelled against the former President and his friends over use/misuse of public funds in the President's bid for a third term in office. Nor has the agency convinced the public on the veracity of allegations concerning the acquisition of shares by top government officials in privatised government firms. There is therefore a divergence between what the administration professed and its response to corruption. One commentator observed:

> Sir from the undisputable description of a hypocrite (i.e. from Prophet Mohammad's (SWA) standpoint), will it out of place to conclude that today's leadership in Nigeria is hypocritical? Nigerians have been told endless lies. They have been promised in vain. Their trust in the leadership has been betrayed. Thus, the only thing that seemed to remain in their possession before now has turned forlorn. And that is hope. Yet the same leadership continues to preach patriotism to the hopeless populace as if patriotism can be achieved in a vacuum. At least people can still remember your promise. Shortly after you were sworn into office as President in 1999, that there would be no First Lady for you and that you would not appoint more than 21 Ministers. Were those promises fulfilled? And shortly after that, you also promised Nigerians that your Government would make electricity stable within six months. In the end, more than one trillion has been spent on

> electricity before we were told that the monster NEPA (now PHCN) had become insuperable problem. With such colossal sum sir, sincere government somewhere else would have turned a country like Nigeria into an 'Eldorado'.[27]

Further to the East, the present Kenya Administration was elected because the Moi Regime was believed to be corrupt. However, the Kibaki Administration is also enmeshed in corruption. The Head of Kenya anti-corruption agency[28] escaped to London in 2006 because he feared for his life. According to him, he had become the target because the government was unwilling to give him the necessary support to deal with corrupt officials.[29] Not too long ago, the Government of Kenya hurriedly deported two Armenian Brothers with strong connections with the presidency. The public felt this step was taken in order to forestall a high-powered enquiry whose outcomes might have linked top government functionaries and/or their next of kin to corrupt deals that are detrimental to the people and Government of Kenya.

Then there is the crisis in Ivory Coast which has split the country into two simply because the authorities changed the Constitution to ban a Northern Muslim opposition leader from contesting for the presidency on the ground that he is a foreigner despite the fact that he previously served meritoriously as the country's Prime Minister!

What about the Government of South Africa that has been criticised by civil society organisations and the international community over its stance on HIV/AIDS despite the fact that the prevalence rate in the country is among the highest in the world?[30] Besides, former Vice-President Jacob Zuma complicated matters further when he claimed that he successfully prevented HIV/AIDS infection by taking a quick shower after sexual intercourse with an infected lady friend!

South Africa has approved same sex marriage despite the fact that opinion poll indicates that most South Africans are not in favour of same sex marriage. The decision to approve same sex marriage seems to downplay the feeling of the majority in the population. This is a situation in which there is conflict between popular opinion and judicial directives/constitutional provisions on human rights and what remains to be settled is which should take precedence over the other. All of these send mixed signals and lack of candour in public policy and there is no better way of summing up the situation in South Africa today than in the words of our redoubtable Professor Ali Mazrui who observed as follows:

> With the collapse of political apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the danger of white domination of South Africa receded. But the risk of South Africa being dominated by white values increased. When South Africa devised the most liberal constitution in the world, it was on its way towards embracing the West through its own civilisation. South Africa has abolished the death penalty long before the US has done. And South African gays and lesbians have received more civil rights than gays have done in much of the rest of the world. The dictatorship of the white man has ended in South Africa, but has the dictatorship of white values triumphed?[31]

Arab Africans are inclined to look down on black Africans, describing them in sub-human terms. This attitude led to years of civil war between the Arab North and the Black South in Sudan and it also explains the on-going crisis in Darfur in which thousands of black Africans who are mostly Muslims like their Arab brothers/sisters have been (and are still being) killed by the Janjaweed with the support of the Arab

Islamic Khartoum regime. Ironically, the black African countries that always support the Palestinians in their struggle as well as the Arab League over the Israel-Palestine conflict have not made a big issue over the genocide in Darfur.

Hypocrisy and Sociology

What do the foregoing anecdotal analyses of behaviour patterns in the West and Africa mean? They only indicate that there is a window of opportunity for sociologists to interrogate hypocrisy in their study of social interaction and international relations. The study of hypocrisy in diverse contexts of social interaction holds the key to the understanding of persistent social conflicts and wars. Such efforts are likely to produce the knowledge for tackling social conflicts and wars within and among nation-states.

Talking about the study of hypocrisy inevitably brings into focus the seminal contributions of the Chicago School of sociology to the analyses of nuances and social processes in human behaviour and groups. Therefore, we cannot but revisit the works of Erving Goffman which include *The presentation of self in every life*, *Asylums*, *Stigma*, etc.

There is room for macro and micro-sociological studies on the contribution of hypocrisy to social disorder worldwide. We need studies that ascertain the trajectory of stolen and misappropriated public funds by African leaders, focusing on their magnitude, recipients, and impact on poverty in the continent. We need comparative studies on stolen funds in western banking institutions vis-à-vis the flow of the much desired foreign direct investment (FDI) into African countries. We need to expose the hypocrisy of the different actors that exacerbate corruption, bad governance, poverty, social disorder etc., in Africa.

Furthermore, we need to focus on voting patterns in the general assembly and the security council of the United Nations and their implications for peaceful co-existence in the world. It is desirable for African sociologists to take a critical look at what, why and how African leaders are managing the affairs of their countries and the impact of their actions on poverty alleviation and economic development. We need studies whose outcomes will prick the conscience of the West and our leaders; studies that will bring the much desired change in our continent.

Concluding Remarks

In concluding, the study of hypocrisy is the key to the understanding of terrorism which now transcends all the sub-regions of the world. Peace and social order will continue to elude humankind unless we interrogate hypocrisy in the study of social relations, economy, and politics. To sum up, the vision/mission of the founding fathers of western sociology will remain a mirage unless and until African sociologists spearhead the study of the role of hypocrisy in social conflicts and wars within and among nation states.

Notes

1. See A. Akiwowo, 'Contribution of Sociology of Knowledge from An African Oral Poetry', *International Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1986, 343-358; A. Akiwowo, 'Universalism and Indigenization in Sociological Theory: Introduction', *International Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1988, 155-160; A. Akiwowo, 'Indigenous Sociologies – Extending

the Scope of the Argument', *International Sociology*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1999, 115-138; O.B. Lawuyi, and O. Taiwo, 'Towards an African Sociological Tradition', *International Sociology*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990, 57-74; M. A. Makinde, 'Asuwada Principle: An Analysis of Akiwowo's Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge from an African Perspective', *International Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1988, 61-76.

2. Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, freely trans. and condensed by Harriet Martineau, 3 vols, Calvin Blanchard, New York, 1855; T. Timascheff, *Sociological Theory,* Random House, New York, 1967.
3. Africa has been the theatre of conflicts and wars for several decades. Some of them are: the civil war in Nigeria; war of liberation in Southern Africa; post independent war in the former Portuguese territories; the civil war in Congo and much more recently that that attracted the involvement of other neighbourin countries like Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe; the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia; Sudanese war in the south and the ongoing one in Darfur, Ethiopia-Eritrea war, Somali war, Western Sahara against Morocco; the civil war in Algeria in the run off to independence and following the annulment of the election that the Islamic Party was poised to win, etc.
4. See *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, 2000.
5. Wordreference.com, English Dictionary, 2006.
6. Holy Bible
7. See Abbas, *The Nation* (Nigeria), 2007
8. See Verse 142, Women IV, Part 5 of the Roman Transliteration of the Holy Qur'an, by A.Y. Ali, Published by Alhaji Sanni Danjinjiri, Kano, 1934, p.104.
9. See Verse 145 of Part IV, Women IV of the Roman Transliteration of the Holy Qur'an by A.Y. Ali Published by Sanni Danjinjiri, Kano, 1934, p.104.
10. See Noam Chomsky, *Case Studies in Hypocrisy – Human Rights Policy,* AK Press, 1999.
11. N. Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival America's Quest for Global Dominance*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2001.
12 M.A. Gress, et al., ed., *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, University of Kansas, 2002.
13. BBC politics.co.uk Friday December 15, 2006.
14. BBC New Wednesday 7 March 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6425529.stm.
15. *The Nation* (Nigeria), January 21, 2007.
16. 'What can Africa expect from WTO', BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4511628.stm, December 16, 2005.
17. ibid.
18. ibid.
19. 'Commonwealth Soldiers Form Union', See BBC News Wednesday 7 March 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6425529.
20. UNDP 2006 Human Development Report, UNDP, New York.
21. UNDP 2006 Human Development Report, UNDP, New York.
22. See reports of Inter-African Committee for the Prevention of Harmful Practices Affecting Women and Children in Africa.
23. UNDP 2006 Human Development Report, UNDP, New York and WHO 2006 Annual Report, WHO, Geneva.
24. The countries that are poorly rated are: Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Sudan and Niger.

25. The 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html
26. Kenya Economy – Development So Far, Corruption worth US$1 billion Disclosed in Kenya, http://www.afrol.com/articles/10709, 03 January 07.
27. Femi Abbas, 'The Message: No! Mr. President, No!', *The Nation*, Friday February 2, 2007.
28. Mr John Githongo was interviewed on the BBC over the scale of corruption in Kenya and why he ran for his dear life.
29. BBC News Africa February 15, 2006.
30. HIV/AIDS in South Africa AVERTing HIV/AIDS updated November 2005 indicated that the prevalence rate among pregnant women was 30.2 percent in 2005.
31. Ali Mazrui, 'Clash of Civilizations', BBC Focus on Africa, Vol. 18, No. 2, April-June, 2007, 36.

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RESEARCH REPORTS

Family planning dialogue: Identifying the key determinants of young women's use and selection of contraception in Namibia

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Background

Irrespective of the overriding socioeconomic and political milieu, young women in the age group 15-24 years are recurrently exposed to sexual and reproductive health risks and infections, as well as unintended pregnancy and childbirth (Mfono 1998; Al Azar 1999; Meekers & Klein 2002; Creel & Perry 2003; Prata et al., 2005). The acknowledgement that young women are 'at risk' of unplanned pregnancies, or are 'vulnerable' to infections, has invited much research into the social and demographic dynamics of this life phase and to the devising of programmes to address reproductive health agendas. UN reports (for example, World Youth Report 2003; UNFPA 2004) indicate a global decline in unwanted teenage pregnancies, but a high proportion, nonetheless, of premarital births still occurring among young women who are economically and emotionally ill-equipped for motherhood (Creel & Perry 2003). Facilitating young women's abilities to take charge of their sexual and reproductive health would be central to reducing unwanted fertility and to improving their general situation in society.

Studies of African fertility have shown that significant proportions of young women, who endure unintended pregnancies, have had no or poor education on the topics of sex, contraceptive use or reproductive health in general (Muhwava 1998; Burgard 2004). Several researchers have emphasised the urgency for accessible family planning information and services for sexually active young women – in particular, services that demonstrate confidentiality and convenience (Abdool et al., 1992; Agyei & Migadde 1995; Khan & Rahman 1997; Karim et al., 2003). If young women are to use contraception effectively and consistently, it is further argued, they must encounter more encouragement to do so from their peer networks, adults generally and the mass media. Additionally, existing services need to be regularly scrutinised to assess

whether they are meeting the varied demands of young women (Hersh et al., 1998; Juarez 2002; Creel & Perry 2003).

Substantial evidence is found in the literature for how broadening the choice of contraceptive methods results in increased overall contraceptive prevalence (Magadi & Curtis 2003; Chen & Guilkey 2003). The provision of a wide range of contraceptive methods increases the opportunity for individuals to obtain a method that best suits their needs (Ross et al., 2001). Apart from health service requirements, young women, as anecdotes suggest, need the finer negotiating skills to mediate decision-making in sexual relationships. Many do not feel comfortable discussing sexual or reproductive issues with parents or other adults in responsible positions (for example, teachers or health care workers) (Meekers & Ahmed 1997; Whitaker et al., 1999). Likewise, these authoritative figures are often unwilling or unable to provide comprehensive, accurate, age-appropriate reproductive health information to young people. This is partly due to their discomfort in discussing the subjects of sex or reproduction or to the erroneous view that providing any information on these topics will encourage increased sexual activity (Karim et al., 2003). Because of such factors, many young women enter into sexual relationships with insufficient insight into the consequences of sexual encounters and with limited knowledge of protective measures against pregnancy. Whilst these are general problems, and not unique to the Namibian situation, they are of particular concern in the post-independent era where health, sexual and reproductive services are being revamped for a largely youthful Namibian population.

For non-Namibian readers the following brief remarks about Namibia's social and economic background might be useful. Namibia is the most arid country in sub-Saharan Africa. In the western border of the country lies the Namib desert, to the south, the Kalahari. Despite its harsh climate, close to half of Namibia's approximately 1.9 million people earn a living through agricultural production (Central Bureau Statistics (CBS) 2003; Ministry of Health and Social Services (MOHSS) 2003; National Planning Commission (NPC) 2006). Much of the land on which agricultural activity is pursued remains in the hands of several thousand white farmers, a situation that has since mid-2004 ignited processes of redistribution and restitution (NPC, 2006). At the end of the nineteenth century, the Germans colonised the country, setting up infrastructure to access newly discovered diamond and mineral mines. After the First World War, South Africa was given the 'guardianship' of South West Africa, as Namibia was called, and encouraged white settlement by giving title to land for commercial farming in the central and southern areas. This setup has structured highly inequitable income distribution levels. Today unemployment is high, and approximately 47 percent of the population is living in poverty (CBS 2003; NPC 2006). In such circumstances, where large numbers of people endure poverty, women's health usually suffers and their ability to access good quality services becomes more of a challenge (Buvinic 1998; Oxaal & Cook 1998; Shapiro & Tambashe 1999).

Namibia inherited a health system that was segregated along racial lines and based entirely on curative health services. Shortly after independence major changes occurred in all sectors and many of them were drastically restructured to meet the challenges of the post-apartheid era. The government of Namibia committed itself towards ensuring the equitable distribution of resources and accessible basic services

for the disadvantaged (NPC 1997). In 1992, two years after Namibia's independence, the first ever Namibian demographic and health survey (NDHS) was conducted. It was conducted at a stage when a large-scale re-organization of Namibia's national health service was occurring and most primary health care programmes were being established. The 1992 NDHS results revealed that only 23 percent of Namibian women were using contraceptive methods. This percentage changed quite significantly by 2000; the second NDHS survey results show that the contraceptive prevalence rate had increased to 38 percent (MOHSS 2003). The overwhelming majority of current users employ modern contraceptive methods (more than 97 percent) while traditional methods have dwindled into relative insignificance. The survey also shows that while most young women in Namibia are aware of HIV/AIDS and the risk of pregnancy, they are still engaging in unprotected sex.

Prompted by calls emanating from the 1994 ICPD Programme of Action, the Namibian government introduced a reproductive health and family planning programme with the overall objective of promoting, protecting and improving the health of family members, especially women and adolescents. Currently, young people's reproductive health and development represents one of the 'priority areas' of the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MOHSS 2001). Whilst there is no detailed or separate policy on adolescent and youth-friendly health services, the reproductive health programme of the MOHSS is actively targeting the youth to consider their health service needs. In addition, the national school health policy under the Ministry of Education is addressing problems associated with the general health of school-going children and is promoting the development of programmes on life skills and sexual health education (NPC 2000; MBESC & MHETEC 2003).

Against this background of increasing action in the national health domain, there is much curiosity about young women's access to, use and selection of contraception. Specifically, the following research question is addressed in this article: *What are the socio-demographic determinants of contraceptive use and method choice among young women in Namibia?* Whilst this research question is a basic one in demographic and reproductive health studies, it has yet to be provided with a definitive answer in the case of Namibia. We address the question through the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods.

Quantitative and Qualitative Methods

The Namibian Demographic and Health Survey (2000)

At the time of writing, the 2000 Namibian Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) offered the most recent and accessible dataset with information on contraceptive use and young women's choices in respect of contraceptives in Namibia. The survey included a total number of 6755 women, aged 15-49 years; a subset of this group was drawn for study and analysis. Young women (15-24 years old) who were exposed to the risk of conception at the time of the survey, that is, those who were not pregnant at the time of the survey, were selected. This reduced the sample to 2576 young women. A smaller number of young women (1776) described themselves as 'sexually active'. This group was selected as the particular unit for study. Table 1 shows the age distribution of all non-pregnant young women in comparison with the non-pregnant sexually active group of young women.

Table 1: Age distribution of young women (15-24 years)

Age group	All women		Only sexually active women	
	N	%	N	%
15-19	1380	54	695	39
20-24	1196	46	1081	61
Total	**2576**	**100**	**1776**	**100**

(Source: NDHS, 2000)

Methods of quantitative analysis

Two related processes, viz., the decision to practise contraception and the choice of method determine the prevalence of a specific contraceptive method. Therefore, these processes are modelled here in two stages. In the *first* stage the determinants of the decision to use contraception are examined. This analysis is based on data gathered from the 1776 young women who were identified as 'ever sexually active' in the NDHS. Contraceptives, by definition, are used for the purpose of limiting, preventing, delaying or spacing births (MOHSS 1995). Thus it is sufficient to consider young women who are sexually active but who are either users or non-users of contraceptives. The determinants of contraceptive use are therefore modelled using a binary logistic regression. It was chosen as the most suitable method because of its ability to detect changes in measurements that are brought about by addition of new variables to the equation. In logistic regression the dependent and independent variables do not need to have a linear relationship and data for variables do not need to be normally distributed. The results of the logistic regression models are converted to odds ratios, which represent the effect of one unit change in the explanatory variable on the indicator of contraceptive use. Odds ratios larger than one (1) indicate a greater likelihood of contraceptive use than for the reference category; odds ratios smaller than one (1) indicate a smaller likelihood compared with the reference category.

The relevance of a particular independent variable as a predictor of contraceptive use can be determined by comparing the magnitude of the regression coefficient with that of its standard error. Evidence of the usefulness of the independent variable becomes apparent if the coefficient is much larger than its standard error. The overall form of the model was determined by the square of the multiple correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variable (R^2), measuring the percentage of variation explained by the variables. The models assumed no relationships between the independent variables. The models were fitted to the data using backward stepwise procedure, where the full model was fitted but at every step, terms already in the model were checked to see if they were still significant. To test whether a variable is significant the t-value was produced for each variable coefficient. The value was used to test whether any levels of categorical variables could be combined or whether any term of categorical variables should be removed from the model. The 5 percent significance level was used as a basis for deciding if a particular variable should be retained in the model. In all cases a reference category was chosen. The models were interpreted in terms of the odds ratios. The odds ratios are generally obtained by taking the exponential of the parameter estimate (e^{β}) and used to compare odds between two groups.

The logit model is of the form

$$\text{logit (p)} = \log(\frac{p}{1-p}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \ldots\ldots + \beta_k x_x$$

The odds of using contraceptive methods can equivalently be determined in terms of probability of current use, p, as

$$p = \frac{\exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \ldots\ldots + \beta_k x_k)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \ldots\ldots + \beta_k x_k)} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{z}}$$

where $z = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \ldots\ldots + \beta_k x_k$

In the second stage, determinants of the choice of methods among sexually active young women who are using contraceptives are examined. The interest here is on examining which method is preferred by young women, why it is preferred and what the characteristics of young women are who are using a specific contraceptive method. The response variable is choice of method among the commonly used methods in Namibia (the injection, male condom, pill and other methods). The determinants are modelled through the multinomial logistic regression using injection as a reference category. The multinomial logistic model is of the form:

$$\log(\frac{p_j}{p_J}) = \sum b_{jk} x_k$$

and this can be interpreted as the logarithm of the ratio of the odds of an individual belonging to category j for j = 1, 2, …….., j-1, to the odds of being in the reference category J. In applying the multinomial logistic model to contraceptive method choice, it is necessary to point out an assumption of the model: the assumption of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the choices women make. This did not pose a serious problem as women who used more than one method concurrently were able to indicate the method that they mostly relied upon. All analyses were performed using SPSS.

Qualitative Methods: Focus Group Discussions

A select number of focus group discussions were conducted in 2004 to build additional and nuanced understandings of young women's attitudes towards health service utilisation, contraceptive use and contraceptive method choice. The data drawn from focus group sessions are regarded as supplementary to the survey data, to further illuminate the statistical findings. Most surveys, including those used in demographic and health studies, offer detailed but snapshot overviews of sexual and reproductive behaviours (Caldwell 1985; Naidoo 2007). Thus, more in-depth and interpretive insights regarding problems, fears and motivations associated with reproductive health and use and non-use of contraceptives need to be derived through the complementary inclusion of qualitative data. In this study, focus group discussions were deemed vital to fill gaps, which could not be addressed through quantitative data analysis.

The following categories of young women were represented in the groups: married and never married, with and without children, current users, non-users of contraceptives, school-goers and school dropouts. In total, six focus groups were held in both urban and rural areas. Each group consisted of 8 to 10 participants. Those in school were interviewed separately from the out-of-school young women and the groups were fairly homogeneous with regard to age. A semi-structured group interview format was adopted that ensured that the same subject matter was discussed in each group. However, apart from this guide, the group interviews offered space for the exploration of interesting issues that arose spontaneously. The discussions were audio recorded. Table 2 shows the age distribution of the young women who participated in the group discussions.

Table 2: Age distribution of focus group participants

Age group	no. of participants (N)	percent (%)
15-16	8	15
17-18	14	26
19-20	9	17
21-22	12	23
23-24	10	19
Total	**53**	**100**

(Source: Indongo, 2007)

Audiotapes were transcribed and focus group discussions that had been conducted in Oshiwambo were translated into English. The audio tapes of each focus group discussion were reviewed several times in order to get an adequate impression of the discussion climate and to construct verbatim transcriptions in which hesitations, silences, enthusiasm, anxiety and other socio-psychological indicators could be noted. The general findings, together with pertinent verbatim quotations, were then organised according to selected themes, so that different attitudes, beliefs and emotions could be illustrated and related to the quantitative data.

Overview of General Results

Sample characteristics

The majority of the 1776 sexually active women drawn out as the sample were between the ages of 20 and 24, and from the rural areas of Namibia. Most respondents had enrolled for or had obtained secondary or higher education and most (75 percent) were still unmarried at the time of the survey. Nevertheless, the majority of the young women reported having borne at least one child. Of interest is the fact that only 8 percent of the young women reported that they had discussed family planning issues with their mothers and only 10 percent discussed family planning with their partners.

Table 3: Sexually active young women by background characteristics

Characteristic	Percent (%)	Frequency (N)
Age group		
15-19	39	695
20-24	61	1081
Place of residence		
Urban	43	761
Rural	57	1015
Discuss FP with partner		
No	90	1604
Yes	10	170
Discuss FP with mother		
No	92	1637
Yes	8	137
Regions		
Northwest	28	505
Northeast	17	305
Central	27	472
South	28	494
Time to nearest health facility		
Less than an hour	77	1373
1 hour or more	16	291
Education level		
None	8	144
Primary	26	469
Secondary+	66	1163
Marital status		
Not in union	75	1329
In union	25	447
Number of living children		
None	46	824
At least 1	54	952
Total	**100**	**1776**

(Source: NDHS, 2000)

Findings: Determinants of contraceptive use

Overall, the prevalence of contraceptive use among *sexually active young women* in Namibia stands at 52 percent. This prevalence is still below the Southern African region prevalence level of 60 percent (Asterline & Inding 2000; World Population Data Sheet 2006). Although the proportion of young women users has increased, there is still a large sector of sexually active young women who are not making use of contraception. The differences between users and non-users are explained in relation to characteristics presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Age distribution of sexually active young women using contraceptive methods and their estimated odds ratios of the likelihood of contraceptive use, by background characteristics

Characteristic	%	odds ratio
Educational level		
Never been to school (r)	35	1.000
Primary education	45	1.523
Secondary or higher	58	2.207**
Listen to radio at least once a week		
No (r)	42	1.000
Yes	54	1.289*
Read newspaper at least once a week		
No (r)	45	1.000
Yes	58	1.449**
Health directorate		
Northwest (r)	44	1.000
Northeast	52	1.208
Central	64	1.769
South	50	0.679**
Discuss FP with partner		
No (r)	51	1.000
Yes	62	1.394
Discuss FP with mother		
No (r)	51	1.000
Yes	65	1.108
Place of residence		
Urban (r)	58	1.000
Rural	48	0.608
Interactions		
Not discuss FP with mother & urban (r)	n/a	1.000
Discuss FP with mother & rural	n/a	1.690*
Northwest & Urban (r)	n/a	1.000
Northeast and rural	n/a	1.638
Central & rural	n/a	1.319
South & rural	n/a	3.006**

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$, based on Wald's chi-square test for the significance of the regression coefficient.
R = reference category; n/a = not significant, -2 log likelihood = 2297.67**
(Source: NDHS, 2000)

The results show that contraceptive use is higher among young women with some level of education. Among those who have never been to school, only 35 percent reported that they use contraceptives. The logistic regression results show that young women with at least secondary education are more likely to use contraceptives than those who have never been to school (odds ratio = 2.207). This finding supports evidence from the international literature that displays a consistent argument about the regulating and empowering effects of completed secondary education, including increased

knowledge of fertility processes and positive attitudes towards use of modern contraception. As is the experience generally, increasing education would also affect the distribution of authority within Namibian households, enabling women to engage partners and parents on issues concerning sexual and intimate relations (Cochrane, 1979).

The data analysis reveals that media access also influences young women's use of contraceptive methods. Young women who reported that they listen to radio or read newspapers at least once a week use contraceptives more than those who do not have access to such media. For example, among young women who state that they listen to the radio at least once a week, 54 percent (odds ratio = 1.289) report that they use contraceptives. Similarly, for those who read newspapers or magazines the odds of using contraceptives equals 1.449. With regard to rural-urban differentiation, young women in the rural areas are less likely to use contraceptives than those in urban areas (odds ratio = 0.608). A total of 58 percent of young women who live in urban areas claim to use contraceptives as compared to 48 percent of young rural women. A further, and noteworthy, finding regarding urban or rural residence was on the question of how 'communication with mother on family planning issues' interacted with the young women's use of contraceptives. Whilst family planning discussions with mother was not significant as a main effect, it had a *significant interaction effect on contraceptive use* (See 'interactions' in Table 4). Young women in rural areas who discussed family planning with their mothers were more likely to use contraceptives than young women in urban areas who do not discuss family planning with their mothers (odds ratio = 1.690). *This is a strong indication of the importance of parental involvement (especially, the mother's intervention) in the reproductive health of young women*. Despite shifting intergenerational relations, Namibian parents are usually respected as knowledgeable, and thus are well placed to play a major role in nurturing the life skills and social practices of their children.

In formulating the research concerns of this project, the researchers surmised that young Namibian women who raise the topics of family planning or use of contraceptives with their mothers were likely to be discouraged or reprimanded for their pre-marital sexual activity, particularly in this era of increasing levels of HIV infection. Alternatively, if talking about family planning led to increased use of contraceptives, this could suggest a receptiveness, or a liberal pragmatism, on the part of mothers that could be harnessed in the interests of young women's health and that could consequently boost state initiatives to increase access to family planning. The data reviewed supported the latter, more progressive position. The results confirmed that as many as 65 percent of young women who discuss family planning issues with their mothers use contraceptives. In addition, the results also show a significant relationship between contraceptive use and discussing family planning with partner: 62 percent of those who discuss family planning with their partners use contraception. This is in line with the findings of Whitaker et al. (1999) who maintain that communicating with a partner is an important self-protective health measure that can aid one to learn about a partner's prior sexual behaviour and associated concerns that will inform safer sexual behaviours (see also Briggs 1998; Babalola 1999; Benefo 2004).

The results also show significant regional differentials in the use of contraceptives. Regional differentials are viewed in terms of interaction with place of residence (rural-urban). The results show that the odds of using contraceptives for young women who live in the rural areas in the South health directorate is three times the odds of young women using contraceptives who live in the urban areas of the Northwest health directorate. This indicates a generally low prevalence in contraceptive use among young women in the Northwest health directorate.

Findings: Determinants of contraceptive method choice

Young women decide on what contraception to use on the basis of what is available and most convenient at the time (Agyei & Miggade 1995; Bugard 2004; Bender & Kosunen 2005). The results of the present study show a greater prevalence of modern contraceptive methods: the injection had the highest prevalence, followed by the male condom and then the pill.

Table 5: Predicted probabilities for young women's choice of contraceptive methods, by selected variables

Variables	Other methods	Pills	Condom	Injection
Age (in years)				
15-19	0.0095	0.132	0.304	0.554
20.24	0.0077	0.142	0.216	0.635
Discuss family planning with friends				
No	0.0142	0.138	0.232	0.616
Yes	0.0022	0.141	0.288	0.569
Health Directorate				
North West	0.0047	0.089	0.682	0.224
North East	0.0138	0.186	0.064	0.736
Central	0.005	0.113	0.197	0.685
South	0.0116	0.133	0.188	0.667
Number of living children				
None	0.0059	0.097	0.507	0.394
At least one	0.0094	0.158	0.110	0.723
Marital status				
Not in union	0.0077	0.120	0.241	0.631
In union	0.0191	0.099	0.246	0.618
Education level				
Not been to school	0.0037	0.111	0.237	0.648
Primary	0.0105	0.211	0.261	0.517
Secondary or higher	0.0069	0.157	0.243	0.594
Time to nearest health facility				
Less than 1 hour	0.0089	0.125	0.260	0.606
1 hour or more	0.0063	0.211	0.200	0.582

(Source: NDHS, 2000)

The results indicate that the youngest sector of sexually active users, i.e. those in the age group 15-19 years, have a higher prevalence of condom-use than those aged 20-24 years. Young women who discuss family planning with their friends also revealed a high percentage of those choosing to use condoms with partners. Condom-use was also higher among childless young women, while those with at least one living child chose the injection. The results also show a significant relationship between method choice and the marital status of a woman. Among married young women, the injection was the preferred choice, with the male condom, for the most part, unpopular. Some association was also noted between method choice and the educational level of young women. Only 14 percent of young women, who have never been to school, chose to use male condoms. Most of these women chose the injection. However, a higher percentage of young women with some level of education express a preference for male condoms.

Although the injection is the most preferred method, there are differentials in method choice with respect to health directorates. Young women who live in the Northwest health directorate had a higher probability (0.682) of choosing male condoms than any other contraceptive method. The Northwest health directorate comprises mainly the area that was formerly known as 'Ovamboland' where more than fifty percent of the Namibian population live. It is regarded as one of the most underdeveloped areas in Namibia, with poor health facilities and a high proportion of indigent people. It is also the area where traditional practices and staunch religion have currency in the rearing and socialisation of children. In the current context where the dangers of HIV infection are central in state and community health discourses, there are many programmes promoting the use of condoms countrywide. Through these programmes condoms are distributed and obtained freely at health centres, schools and other public places such as bars, restaurants and hotels. Hence, despite a social milieu in which women might actively seek out more secretive approaches to managing their fertility, for example, through injections, there seems to be sufficient room for the promotion of male condoms in Namibia. On the one hand, it might seem unusual for the condom to gain such wide acceptance in a rural-like environment but, on the other, it exists as testimony to the success of programmes that have been put in place in the country.

Qualitative Insights: Central themes of focus group discussions

Themes on contraceptive use: 'Constructive talk' and its effects on contraceptive use and health service utilisation

The investigation of 53 young women's attitudes and opinions through guided group discussions was intended to throw additional light on the key findings of the quantitative data analysis. It was in these terms that family-based dialogues on matters of sex and pregnancy prevention were probed. Two general themes emerged in regard to parent-child communication. The first, relates to mutual insecurities (that is, of parents and young daughters). Poor parent-child communication was raised as a concern and as a barrier to young women's use of contraceptives. Some young women indicated that they did not feel comfortable speaking to parents; in many cases, parents were unaware that they were sexually active. Some young women indicated that they discussed contraceptive use mainly with their friends, who were an important source of

influence and information. For these women mothers were reticent and un-engaging. However, some young women suggested that in cases where mothers were more forthcoming, they did not 'feel free' to discuss sexual issues with their mothers. Thus, although there is room for meaningful discussions with their mothers this is debilitated by feelings of insecurity and norms of propriety guiding dialogue across the generational gap. The fear of negative sanctions was deeply embedded and most young women, especially from rural areas, talked about respecting adults and about feeling 'too guilty' to discuss sexual issues with them. Two vignettes are offered below:

> My mother is never comfortable bringing up the discussion of sex with me. She has to first tell you a rumour about neighbours whose daughter fell pregnant before she drags you into what she wants to tell you (in school, aged 17, FG 3, 2004).
>
> Discussing sexual issues with my father is totally out. My mother sometimes likes to bring up the topic when we are alone in the kitchen; but when she asks me anything about boyfriends or sex, I get very angry because I am embarrassed to talk to her about my sexual experiences (out of school, aged 22, FG 2, 2004).

Despite this, the second dominant theme on the topic of communication was the acknowledgement that mothers are wise and experienced and that younger women desire more talking and advice on the topics of sex, fertility and reproductive health. It was reiterated that most parents are willing to talk – but that they simply do not know how to bring up these topics for discussion. Mothers, as we learnt from the focus groups, were also less willing to talk about sex if their husbands were against it. Fathers of young girls were usually unhappy, believing that the conversations encouraged young women to contemplate early experimentation. In their view too much talking was part of the problem and not the solution to teenage pregnancy (see also Karim et al., 2003). The comments below illustrate the awkward space in which parent-child relations are being reworked in present-day Namibia:

> Yes… parents really *have* to talk to us. If we have good platform and every parent in the community is supportive, we will not even be making mistakes of falling pregnant, we will not even contract STDs because we will be able to use contraceptives which are protective and safe every time. We will be able to have planned sexual intercourse because our boyfriends will be willing to wait until the right time rather than now when we have to involve ourselves in rush and take chances with sex (in school, 20, FG 5, 2004).
>
> My mother is a good friend of mine. We talk a lot ... she gives me advice even regarding boyfriends and leaves the option for me to decide ... she warns me about the danger of falling pregnant when I am still young ..... and about HIV/AIDS ... However, I have a boyfriend in our neighbourhood and we have sexual intercourse ... my mother does not know about this ... I cannot talk to her about having sexual intercourse because I still do not know how she will react ... I rely on sneaking out of the house while she is at work during the day to have sex with my boyfriend ... Sex does not leave a scar on someone … as you will still look the same after having it … (in school, 17, urban, FG 5, 2004).
>
> Now that I am at the University, my mother is more comfortable discussing contraception with me ... she knows I know a lot about contraceptives ... she is therefore sort of assured that I cannot fall pregnant because I can use contraceptives ... I think parents want us to use contraceptives but it is just *difficult* for them to tell us straight that we should use them (urban woman, 23, FG 5, 2004).

Apart from the familial context, a third theme emerging out of the focus group discussions was young women's expressed discomfort in negotiating contraceptive use in the public spaces of sexual and reproductive health facilities. Those who were married were more comfortable and felt freer to utilise health facilities than those who were unmarried. In addition, unmarried childless women viewed themselves as enduring immense prejudice and firm questioning from older health staff. One comment is referred to below:

> The nurses at a nearby clinic are of the same age as my mother. I do not feel comfortable discussing my sexual problems with them. It is so embarrassing; they will think that I do not have respect for elders (out of school, rural, aged 23, FG 4, 2004).

After probing the 'type of nurses' the young women would find most preferable, there was general agreement that they wanted young nurses (of similar ages to themselves) to serve them. This is exemplified in the following statement:

> If the nurse is of my age, and I know that she is not married, it's no problem I can talk to her freely because I know that she also has a boyfriend (in school aged 24, FG 3, 2004).

Access to health facilities was another factor that could impede health service utilisation and acquisition of contraceptives. The structural environmental factors like location of the clinic, time taken to be attended to, the physical and administrative structure, availability of youth-friendly personnel, privacy and, most importantly providers' attitudes and their manner of engagement were referred to as important factors that facilitate or hinder accessibility to health care. Provider attitudes and 'talking skills', similar to the case of dialogue with parents, were crucial in influencing young women's willingness to utilise available services. A young woman in one of the focus group discussions in the urban areas said the following:

> I prefer the private clinic than the government owned hospital, because the way the nurses look at you and ask you questions, you will feel that you have committed the worst offence ever, but in the private hospital the nurses cannot really shout at you because it is business and they know that you are paying your money (out of school, 18, FG 6, 2004).

Others were concerned about the 'labelling' of the clinics that serve a specific clientele (the sexually active youth) as indicated in the following statement:

> Some clinics have labels that are embarrassing like 'family planning'. Everyone who finds you there will know what you have come for (in school, 19, FG 5, 2004).

From the focus group exchanges it was clear that many young women would avoid such places for fear that their intimate affairs would become obvious to all. The vignettes referred to in this discussion highlight the fact that whilst state initiatives to create youth-friendly sexual and reproductive health services are to be welcomed, there should be constant monitoring of the social constraints that come into play and that could inhibit young women's accessing of such services.

Themes on contraceptive method choice: 'Gendered constraints' and their effect on selection of contraceptive methods

In responding to questions on the contraceptives they are most familiar with, and which they might prefer, the women referred largely to modern methods such as the

condom, the injection and the pill. Whilst the quantitative data showed that the injection was most widely used, most of the women in the focus groups suggested that they preferred to use condoms. There were three reasons for this. First, a majority of the women talked about the condom as preferred because of its widespread availability, convenience, low cost and usefulness in preventing the spread of sexually transmitted infections as well as averting pregnancy. Below are some comments from the focus groups:

> I think that the condom is the best method for young women because it is more discreet and used by the man. When you use the condom you are not only protected from unwanted pregnancy but also from STIs (urban 24, employed, FG 2, 2004).
>
> Male condoms are easy to grab and can easily fit in a jeans pocket. Female condom is big and even if you want to grab, it cannot fit in a trousers pocket unless you have a handbag (college student, aged 21, FG 5, 2004).
>
> I use the male condom because it is my boyfriend who carries it and he is the one who should suggest that we have to use it. He is a man and he has to take all sexual decisions. I cannot tell my boyfriend to use a condom unless he suggests it (out of school, aged 19, FG 2, 2004).
>
> The fact that the female condom has to be inserted for some time before beginning sexual intercourse puts off the man's feelings. A man has to beg for sex for some time and a woman has to pretend even if she knows that she is ready for sex (university student, aged 23, FG 5, 2004).

A second reason for the popularity of condom-use has to do with suspicions of hormonal methods and beliefs that their use could lead to long-term sterility (Nare et al., 1997; Kaufman 1998; Maharaj 2006). This view persisted among young women regardless of their educational level. Here is one view:

> I don't have any problem with the condom but regarding other methods of contraception, there can be side effects. For example, someone who uses pills to avoid unwanted pregnancy can find herself left sterile forever (out of school, 19, FG 4, 2004).

Schoolgirls, who expressed fears about the long-term consequences of the injectables, mentioned that time factors and clinic location were also barriers preventing them from going to clinics for injections. Clinics are located outside the school gates and girls would need permission from the principal or teachers to visit them during school hours. They also argued that clinics offered family planning services during weekdays only, leaving weekends for emergency cases only. Thus, condoms were a lot more convenient and easier to access (often on the school premises).

A minority of young women were not keen, and some of them quite resistant, to using condoms. Three reasons were offered for why this group of women found condoms problematic. First, condoms were regarded as working against the sustaining of a long-term and meaningful intimate union because they reduced sexual pleasure for both men and women. To some extent this seemed to be what women had heard from other people and was not derived entirely from their own lived or sexual experiences. Below are two statements that confirm this view:

> If your boyfriend does not get sexual pleasure from you he will leave you for other girls who don't use condom. They will do it flesh-to-flesh and he will like it more than when you do it with condom (rural, aged 24, FG 4, 2004).

> Sometimes when men use the condom they feel that they are not doing their duty as men in terms of sexual satisfaction; they like their women to feel fluid entering their bodies (rural, aged 19, FG 4, 2004).

A second problem concerned what the women described as the stigmatization that accompanies the possession and use of condoms. They reiterated that if a person was known to be using condoms, that person was regarded as promiscuous; hence users of condoms were regarded as having loose morals. The following statements support this:

> If you are seen with a condom, even by your boyfriend or friends, you are stigmatized. You are seen as a 'cheap bitch' who is looking for men to sleep with (urban, aged 21, FG 6, 2004).

> Condoms are good for us; the only problem is that you need to [negotiate] with your partner. If your partner does not understand it brings fighting around condom use again. Condoms involve participation of the men because he is the one to use it. Sometimes you are in a steady relationship that you don't want to spoil and [you then] leave everything to the man to decide (rural, aged 24, FG 2, 2004).

Religious teachings were cited, by some young women, as a third problem that acts to inhibit condom use. Some religions forbid the use of contraceptives, associating family planning with promiscuity and immorality. Most of the young women interviewed in this study belong to the Catholic and the Evangelical Lutheran churches. In Namibia, both of these churches are ardently opposed to premarital sexual relations. Although Catholics and the Evangelical Lutherans have organizations to fight STIs, including HIV/AIDS, their religions are still in support of abstinence for unmarried people and faithfulness to one partner for those in marriages. However, not all the women who belonged to these faiths subscribed fully to their practices. One woman claimed:

> Christianity is not adhered to nowadays when it come to sexual practices; I go to church every Sunday but I still have sexual intercourse with my boyfriend either with or without a condom, although I am told every Sunday that sexual intercourse outside marriage is a sin and use of contraceptives is killing (urban, aged 24, FG 6, 2004).

In these circumstances, young women seemed to prefer the injectables to enable them to pursue their intimate relationships without inviting an unplanned pregnancy. Those who were out of school, especially, highlighted that the injection was the most convenient method for them for the reason indicated in the following statement:

> When you are on injection, no one can tell that you are using any form of contraceptive, not even your boyfriend. [In addition] you do not need to remember anything everyday like taking the pill or carrying the condom. No one can even stigmatize you with sexual activities (urban, aged 23, FG 2, 2004).

The focus groups provided a safe setting for young women to express their thoughts and experiences of contraceptive use. It was striking that most of them talked so straightforwardly about their preference for the male condom. The injection was favoured largely in circumstances where the women desired discretion and did not believe that she had full control over her sexual and reproductive being. Some young women were afraid of being labelled unfavourably or stigmatised by family members or partners if condoms were to be found in their possession. Others preferred to use condoms but lacked the skills to engage partners or initiate conversations on the use of

condoms in their relationships. This raises questions about male dominance and young women's limited power to assert their preferences in intimate unions but also about a larger reticence embedded in the cultural and societal dynamics of personal and family relationships in Namibia. The young women emphasised that communication between sexual partners on how to prevent pregnancy or infection was often limited. As the macro-data in this article shows, where communication does indeed happen, the family planning and reproductive health benefits are considerable. Thus, in reflecting on their lives, the young women appropriately noted that initiatives were required to popularise talking about sexual issues, so that they could gain confidence in negotiating safer sexual practices and become more actively involved in decision-making on contraceptive use.

Concluding discussion

The key determinant of young Namibian women's contraceptive use emerging out of this study was whether (or not) they communicated on matters of sex and reproduction with their mothers. The quantitative data analysis revealed that 'family planning discussions' with mother had a significant interaction effect on contraceptive use. Considering the staunch cultural and religious framework within which day-to-day activities are conducted, we speculated initially that talking routinely to mothers about family planning was likely to have a negative or discouraging influence on contraceptive use. The popular discourses, as exemplified by some of the focus group dialogues, suggest ambivalence on whether Namibian mothers would be pro- or anti-contraceptive use. Additionally, young women who have not been socialised to talk to their elders as equals may themselves resist any dialogue on topics dealing with intimacy. However, as was the case with Whitaker et al.'s (1999) study, communication with mothers (and parents generally) was talked about as desirable and necessary. In this sense, both the quantitative and qualitative data were quite consistent.

It was interesting to note that young women in rural areas who discuss family planning with their mothers were among those who had a very high probability of using contraceptives. The data analysis indicates, however, that only a small minority of young women discuss family planning in the private domain of the family, implying potentially significant possibilities that need to be further explored in future studies and interventions. These findings draw attention to the immense importance of educating parents, in particular mothers, about sexual and reproductive health issues and of the need to create the conditions for normalising talking about such issues. Parents need to be aware of the importance of reproductive health education if they are to play a vital role in alerting young women (who become sexually active) to the likelihood of pregnancy and infection. A more enlightened, contraceptive-conscious, younger generation would decrease the incidence of unwanted births in Namibia (Adetunji 2000; Population Report, 2003). In addition, de-stigmatising the condom (and the women who carry them) will serve vital and empowering contraceptive purposes. Meekers and Klein (2002) also conclude, in their study of young women in the Cameroon, that condom promotion programmes play an important role in reducing the incidences of unwanted pregnancies.

Parents' participation in guiding their children's sexual and reproductive behaviour is not stressed sufficiently in both Namibia's national reproductive health policy and the family planning policy. Instead, there is greater focus on cultivating better communication between intimate partners. Whilst the benefits associated with continuously engaging gender barriers and refashioning sexual unions to make them egalitarian are important (Agadjanian 2000; Richardson 1990) similar efforts have to be placed on raising awareness and sensitising parents, mature health workers and the 'elders' of the broader community to the particular needs of sexually active young women. As recommendations, we emphasise that policies and programmes should seek to creatively integrate several approaches in addressing the need for more substantive sexual and reproductive health education. This would be important in confronting the 'silences' that often leave young women in an information vacuum. Interventions should augment parental understandings and sensitivities as well as those of partners – understandings that could lead to improved abilities to prevent pregnancy as well as postponement of sexual initiation (Grunseit & Kippax 1993). Carefully constructed education programmes that work through parent's and young people's misconceptions and fears, would be more useful than the present state of denial and disengagement affecting intergenerational dialogue in many households. If *Parent Education Programmes* are organised in greater earnest they would go a long way towards breaking down socio-culturally constructed communication barriers and improving parents' skills in advising their children on sexual and reproductive health issues.

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Local perspectives on transnational relations of Cameroonian migrants

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Introduction

International migration is a crucial theme widely discussed in Cameroon, both privately and in public. While individuals have long been travelling, studying and living abroad, the vision of finding a better future elsewhere has gained prominence over the past fifteen years. It has become a popular conviction that Cameroon has little to offer to its economically, intellectually and – arguably – politically aspiring citizens.

This development has to be seen in the context of the country's economic and political liberalisation of the 1990s. In line with structural adjustment programmes, government employment has decreased significantly, and with the devaluation of the FCFA in 1994, local buying power has drastically reduced (Konings 1996, Monga 1995). Moreover, the country's democratisation has been accompanied by an increase in corrupt and illegal practices (Eboussi Boulaga & Zinga 2002). As the civil unrest of February 2008 confirms,[1] many Cameroonians are dissatisfied with the country's 'cosmetic democracy' (Nyamnjoh 2002, see also Ngwane 2004). Thus, in the absence of valid prospects of a decent future at home, many Cameroonians have turned to alternatives elsewhere. Most have focused on the West, i.e. the US and Europe, where economic and educational opportunities are thought to be plentiful. However, with increasing restrictions on migration to Western countries, alternative destinations within Africa and in the Near and Far East have gained currency.

The issue of Cameroonians' urge for international migration and the possible impact of Cameroonian migrants on their home communities was the subject of a collaborative research project involving three anthropologists and ten graduate students of the University of Zurich (Switzerland) and the University of Yaoundé 1 (Cameroon).[2] The project was conducted in Cameroon in July to September 2007 and entailed a one-week preparatory seminar, four weeks of field research and one week of data analysis. The project was generously supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Laboratoire CASS-RT in Yaoundé.

Research design

The focus of the project was on transnational relations of Cameroonian migrants within the non-Western world, and the perception of these relations by members of the

migrants' communities of origin. Transnationalism here refers to mobility across multiple national borders and to migrants entertaining regular and sustained contacts with individuals and communities in two or more nation states.

Starting with the above hypothesis that – besides migration to the West – alternative destinations have gained currency, we centred our investigations on three regional clusters: While a first team focused on intra-African migration, a second engaged with the migration of Muslim Cameroonians to Arab countries, and a third researched Chinese-African exchange relations. All three teams collected data on the motives of migration, preferred destinations, networks of migration, the role of the family in the migration enterprise, communication and exchange relations between migrants and their relatives and friends at home, as well as the perception of migrants in their host and home countries. The research team on migration to Arab countries further investigated the role of religion for Muslim migrants, while the China-Africa team collected additional information on the Chinese presence in Cameroon. In order to diversify our findings, we conducted research in three locations, i.e. in the two major cities Yaoundé and Douala in francophone Cameroon, and in Bamenda and its rural surroundings in the Anglophone part of the country.

In terms of methodology we worked with informal and structured interviews as well as e-mail communication with migrants living abroad. In total, we talked to approximately eighty informants, including migrants' relatives and friends, prospective migrants and return migrants. In researching exchange relations we also used photographic documentation. Due to the brief research period, all project participants were encouraged to capitalise on existing contacts with migrants or their family members. Unfortunately, our attempts at collecting quantitative data from foreign embassies and the Cameroonian immigration service yielded no valid information.

Theoretical framework

Transnationalism is a relatively new approach to the study of migration which was introduced in the mid-1990s by a group of female anthropologists working on migration from Asia and Central or Southern America to the United States (Glick Schiller et al., 1995, Glick Schiller 2004). Up to then, classical theories of migration have worked with the concepts of assimilation, ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism, thus focusing on various trajectories and frameworks of migrants' economic, legal and cultural integration into the receiving nation state (for example, Handlin 1951). As classical migration research was informed by the political question of how to ensure migrants' loyalty to their chosen country of residence, most authors ignored the possibility of migrants simultaneously entertaining social, economic or political relations with both their host and home countries. This latter perspective has been adopted by the proponents of transnationalism who study migrants' contacts and activities across national borders as well as the practicalities of multiple loyalties. Some are also concerned with the question of the degree to which transnational social spaces offer alternative economic, political and social avenues from which not only migrants but also sending and receiving states could benefit. A number of authors have argued that it is no coincidence that the new paradigm of transnational migration emerged in the 1990s, but reflects transformations in migration patterns, linked to new

communication technologies, increased mobility and other aspects of globalisation (Portes et al., 1999, Vertovec 1999).

While the majority of classical and contemporary studies have engaged with migration from the South to the North (i.e. the US and Europe), alternative developments have also been documented. For example, over the past twenty years, migration within Africa has increased significantly due to acute political and economic crises, resulting in waves of refugees, irregular migration and increased labour migration (Adepoju 2004, Whitwell 2002). Taking into account these recent trends in migration and research, we considered it useful to focus on South-South migration and to contribute to the theoretical framework of transnational migration by adding an African perspective to the dominantly Euro-American approach. In the following we will summarise our major findings and relate them to existing research.

'Bush faller': Cameroonians' longing for international migration

The focus of Cameroonians on international migration as the only way to a better future has been reflected in many conversations with informants: 'Everyone wants to leave – if not legally, then illegally'. 'Those who are still here, are the ones who haven't made it yet.'

Paradigmatic for the idea of a better life elsewhere is the concept of the *bush faller* (in Pidgin English, the lingua franca in Anglophone Cameroon). A bush faller is 'someone who made it', i.e. who left Cameroon and now leads a good life in the West. As the etymology of the term shows, *falling bush* implies going to the bush to hunt, gather or harvest; i.e. one never returns from the bush with empty hands. But *the bush* has a double connotation: on the one hand it is associated with wilderness and backwardness, on the other with places of enrichment – thus the US and Europe equally qualify as *bush*.

While *bush faller* is a novel term, there have been earlier concepts, such as *been to* which refers to elite members of the post-colonial era who, with the help of mission networks or personal connections, studied abroad, and returned to Cameroon to take up white-collar jobs with the government or international corporations. In comparing the two notions, a shift in ideals of personal success is evident: Whereas *been to* implies mainly educational achievement and is a term no longer in use, *bush faller* is associated with adventure and self-enrichment.[3]

As most Western countries have fortified their borders with the aim of reducing the number of immigrants, migration to the US and Europe has become more difficult. Many Cameroonians, however, have not given up but have tried alternative, often illegal ways, some successfully, others with negative experiences.[4] For a long time, migrants have emphasised economic and educational success in recounting their experiences at home; thus international migration until recently has been considered in a positive light. Over the past years, however, new perspectives have emerged with much more critical and ambivalent undertones. For example, in August 2007 the Cameroonian feature film 'Paris à tout prix' (by Josephine Ndongo) opened nationwide. It tells the suffering of a young woman who ended up in Europe as a prostitute. Furthermore, a book entitled *From dust to snow* (edited by Lydia and Wilfred Ngwa) was released and sold in Cameroonian bookstores, in which migrants (predominantly Cameroonian students) told of their positive and negative experiences

of living and studying in the West. To which degree and in which ways these novel, critical perspectives have a lasting impact on local perceptions of international migration remains to be seen.

While for many Cameroonian migrants the US and Europe remain their 'dream-destinations', their movements are not limited to the West. Neighbouring countries such as Gabon and Nigeria have long been established migration destinations, and over the past years, other African countries, such as South Africa, as well as destinations in the Near and Far East (Dubai and China) have gained currency.

Intra-African migration

Migration has been a relevant feature since the pre-colonial period in Africa in general and Cameroon in particular (Warnier 1985). Most studies, however, have focused on seasonal/labour/urban migration without paying much attention to national borders (Gluckman 1941, Konings 2001, van Velsen 1971). In line with the recent shift in migration studies, new research projects have emerged that investigate transnational migration within Africa and return migration from Europe to Africa (Hahn & Klute 2007, Martin 2005).[5] As some researchers have argued, southern Africa (in particular Botswana and South Africa) have become an attractive destination for labour migrants. As a result, discourses on xenophobia have increased in these countries (Crush & McDonald 2000, Lubkemann 2000, Nyamnjoh 2006).

In Cameroon as well, South Africa has become one of the preferred destinations within Africa. Other targets are Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many migrants fit their choice of destination to their financial resources. Those who have enough money and connections to travel to the US or Europe would not choose an African country. South Africa features as a possible alternative, as it may offer opportunities to continue to the West. Cameroonians here are valued as skilled hairdressers and as outstanding in the intellectual domain. The neighbouring country Gabon features as an option for those with limited capital, and also runs an employment programme for English teachers. At the same time, Gabon has the reputation of a country in which Cameroonians are treated as foreigners with very limited rights. Thus African destinations are scaled: South Africa counts as the United States of Africa, and migrants living there are considered 'bush fallers'. Other African countries, however, are less valued.

Among the reasons for migration are unemployment, poverty, the search for educational opportunities, business, adventure, religious travel and family reunion. Although many migrants may be motivated mainly by economic incentives, we have to assume a mix of different and changing reasons. The majority of migrants are young men and women, mostly from the middle or lower strata of Cameroonian society. As Fleischer (2006) has argued with regard to Cameroonians living in Germany, the family plays a significant role in the decision making and in the preparation of the journey. Similar to her findings, most of our informants confirmed that families generally support the migrants' endeavour both morally and financially. However, the preparatory phase is generally characterised by extreme secrecy and caution. In the early stage only the closest kin are informed, as migrants fear the possible interference of envious or mischievous relatives. Such interferences may be of practical or occult character, and may lead to the failure of the migration enterprise. Consequently

migrants publicise their journey only when all preparations are completed, and the visa stamp is in the passport. Another reason for their secrecy is their apprehension that close relatives may disagree with their planned adventure. For many, a break with their family is unacceptable, and the blessings of their parents are absolutely necessary, as no one can be sure of his or her future success.

Most migrants have regular contact with their relatives and friends at home. Frequently, however, they need time to establish themselves, before they initiate contact. Mobile phones are the most common way of communication, while letters and e-mails are used to a lesser degree. Mobile phone networks have been operative in Cameroon since the late 1990s, and the latest mobile phone models are among the most wanted presents. A large number of migrants regularly send money or goods to Cameroon. Those who live in distant places normally take the opportunity of money transfer via for example Western Union. The distribution of the money is entrusted to a close relative or friend at home (often stationed in Douala or Yaoundé) with detailed instructions of the amount of money to be paid to each person or the goods to be bought. Conversely, migrants living in nearby countries request fellow Cameroonians travelling home to take money or goods along. Frequently, however, these items do not arrive at their intended destination. Thus many migrants prefer to save their presents, until they themselves travel home.

A number of informants remarked that incessant or exaggerated requests for goods and remittances by members of the extended family are a nuisance and burden to migrants. Consequently, some limit their communication to a minimum. Similarly, Nyamnjoh (2005) reported that Cameroonians living in 'Whiteman Kontri' (the West) compare themselves to zombies – threatened by their relatives with witchcraft attacks and enslaved to work for the latters' enrichment without consideration for their personal wellbeing. It is important to remark, however, that exchange relations between migrants and their families are not one-sided. Frequently, relatives also support the migrants with goods, such as spices or food items, to give them a flavour of home. Moreover, they provide spiritual services, such as blessings, prayers, rituals, thanksgiving and almsgiving (*sarika*), to ensure their success and spiritual fortification. This spiritual support is considered crucial and is highly valued by most migrants.

Migration of Cameroonian Muslims to Arab countries

The migration desires and experiences of Muslim West Africans is a neglected subject that merits further research. One body of literature related to this field is concerned with historical slavery and forced migration mostly from Eastern Africa to the Mediterranean and Arab world (Alpers 1997, Hunwick & Powell 2001, Lewis 1976). Another group of studies deals with contemporary transnational relations of Muslim migrants from West Africa, concentrating mainly on brotherhoods from Senegal and Mali and their connections to Europe and the US (Babou 2002, O. Kane 1997, Riccio 2001, Soares 2004). Among other things, these studies indicate that the Islamic networks create a transnational public space which migrants employ for economic activities. Furthermore, they offer them social and moral support, and confirm their construction of a distinct West African Muslim identity.

In Cameroon there is no comparably strong and well organised brotherhood as, for example, the Murid order of Senegal. Nonetheless, Muslim Cameroonians participate in international migration, and among their favoured destinations are Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates (Dubai). The Gulf States constitute a region with a high demand for foreign labour (Whitwell 2002); and while most labour migrants there are from South Asia or the Middle East, there may also be opportunities for West Africans.

Our research team on Muslim migration to the Arab world concentrated its inquiries on the Briquetterie, considered the main Muslim quarter of Yaoundé. For many of its inhabitants, Arab countries are preferred destinations of migration. Primary motives for migrating to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya or the Sudan include education, trade and prospective marriage partners. For example, the Saudi embassy offers stipends for Islamic Studies to African Muslims. While men may study in Saudi Arabia or other Muslim countries, women are offered stipends only for the International University of Africa in Khartoum.

In Yaoundé there are a number of national and international Islamic networks which may assist the aspiring migrants in the preparations for their journey. One well established means of travelling is the pilgrimage to Mecca which, besides religious accomplishment, may offer also economic incentives. Many pilgrims take along trade goods which they sell during their journey and then return with souvenirs from Mecca (for example, clothes, decorative items), widely desired among the Muslim community in Yaoundé. The pilgrimage is one of the few travel options also available to single women. As mentioned by some informants, the latter may even aspire to find an appropriate husband during their journey. However, to which degree single African women may remain in Saudi Arabia and establish contacts with Arab men remains an open question which requires further research in Saudi Arabia.[6]

In addition to Islamic networks, family relations play a significant role in the planning and execution of the journey. Unlike the case of intra-African migration, Muslim migrants are less apprehensive and secretive in the planning of their travels, as the possibility of studying in Saudi Arabia or Sudan is seen as a blessing for the whole community. Frequently, the stipends offered to the migrants are too little to cover even their living expenses and, in the absence of work opportunities, they remain dependent on the financial support of their families. Thus many students have regular contact with their relatives and friends – mainly through letters, since mobile phones are not easily accessible or relatively expensive. Here as well, the support is mutual and pilgrims often act as carriers of presents in both directions.

For Muslim students their stay abroad is limited in time; after finishing their studies, they are required to return home. Back in Cameroon there are only very few jobs where they can apply their acquired training. Some are lucky to be employed with Islamic organisations; others work voluntarily or for a small salary as Koranic teachers.

Chinese-Cameroonian exchange relations

A substantial Chinese presence in Africa is a relatively recent but significant phenomenon. While academic interest in Chinese-African relations has started only recently, the body of literature is growing at a constant rate.[7]

China has shown an increasing interest in opening up new markets and investment opportunities and in accessing the energy resources of the African continent. In return, it has offered debt forgiveness and development assistance as well as strategic partnerships with African governments (Alden 2005, van den Looy 2006). The latter are equally interested in collaborating with China as they envision new business opportunities and ways to bolster regime stability. As Alden (2005) argues, several African countries have benefited from Chinese investment and tourism. Moreover, China's policy of 'cooperation free of political conditionality' has opened new avenues for those governments notorious for human-rights violations or engagement in armed conflict. Yet members of the public may perceive the presence of Chinese workers and entrepreneurs less positively than African governments. As Dobler (2007) has noted with regard to Oshikango in northern Namibia, locals have responded to the rapid expansion of Chinese enterprises with discourses of xenophobia.

An increased Chinese presence can also be noted in Cameroon, mainly in the country's major cities Yaoundé and Douala. Many Chinese are entrepreneurs running shops with Chinese import goods or Chinese restaurants. Some of the latter are exclusively for Chinese customers and also offer opportunities to Chinese sex workers (Ndjio 2007). Others engage in the agricultural sector, growing vegetables, raising chickens or fishing; their products are destined primarily for Chinese customers in Cameroon. A third group are workers in Chinese construction companies, employed to build roads and public buildings, such as the new football stadium in Yaoundé.

Compared to the business opportunities Chinese encounter in Africa, their country offers little migration incentives to Cameroonians. Nonetheless there are a few who have moved to China and work as translators or coordinate trade with African customers. Over the past years there has been a demand for English teachers, which motivated some Anglophone Cameroonians to move to China. This option, however, has turned out to be ambiguous. Many of the teachers are sent to rural areas where they have to work long hours for little money. In addition, they face considerable communication problems, as only few made an attempt to learn Chinese before leaving Cameroon. Some informants also complained about latent racism. In China an American accent is in demand and so they saw it necessary to pretend to be Afro-Americans. But although China is considered 'no bed of roses', it is seen as offering the possibility of moving on to the US.

Local perspectives on Chinese-Cameroonian relations are ambivalent. Many parents support the decision of migrants, hoping for their economic success in China. On the other hand, the strong presence of Chinese and their goods in Cameroon has produced frequent criticism, particularly by Cameroonian businesspeople who see their interests endangered. Cameroonian consumers, as well, have expressed their dissatisfaction; on the one hand, the Chinese offer a wide range of goods at all prices, so 'there is something for every purse'. On the other, the quality of the cheap items is often so poor that Cameroonians complain about being dumped with substandard goods. Finally, the attempt of Chinese individuals to enter the informal sector has raised criticism and incomprehension among Cameroonians. Many are wondering, why these 'whites' (Chinese as well as Europeans and Americans are considered 'whites' on the basis of their skin complexion) debase themselves to such a degree that they even sell homemade cakes in the streets. Seemingly, China must be even poorer than

Cameroon. This consideration contributed to China's decreasing attraction for Cameroonian migrants, as compared to other destinations in Africa, the Near East and the West.

Conclusion

These elaborations represent the preliminary results of a brief research project centring on 'local perspectives on transnational relations of Cameroonian migrants', conducted by Swiss and Cameroonian anthropologists and graduate students. The aim of the project was to gain a basic overview over Cameroonians' ideas and experiences of international migration, particularly with regard to South-South migration, and to identify subject areas that merit further research.

One such area concerns the relevance of spiritual or occult aspects of migration. As outlined above, the preparatory phase of migration is characterised by secrecy and caution due to migrants' apprehension of practical or occult interferences. Yet the threat of occult aggression also remains valid during the migrants' stay abroad. Relatives play a significant role in this regard, both as possible sources of occult aggression and in providing spiritual protection. In-depth research into the ambivalent role of the family and practices of secrecy surrounding the migration enterprise may prove informative. As concerns the study of exchange relations between migrants and their families, there has been a one-sided focus on remittances and goods sent by migrants, while the economic, moral and spiritual support provided by relatives and friends has largely been neglected. We suggest that both directions of exchange relations ought to be considered.

Researchers of transnationalism also concern themselves with national frameworks of migration. In this respect, we believe detailed research into the migration of Muslim Africans to Arab countries will yield valuable information. In particular, researchers may investigate the motives of Muslim governments for supporting African students, as well as the impact of the migrants' experience and Islamic training on ideals and realities at home.

Finally, as concerns research on Chinese-African relations, this is a vibrant field – particularly for anthropologists, as the majority of observations, so far, have been contributed by economic and political scientists. On the basis of our own experiences, we see the potential for a very fruitful collaboration of Chinese and African social scientists, thus integrating both perspectives. A first step in this direction was realised in the conference 'China in Africa: Who benefits?', co-organised by the Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian Studies in Frankfurt (December 14-15, 2007), which brought together European, African and Chinese academics and policy makers.[8] We look forward to more such international and interdisciplinary collaborations – not only with regard to research on Chinese-African relations, but more generally in the field of transnational migration.

Notes

1. For reports on the upheavals responding to rising oil prices and the President's attempts to change the Cameroonian constitution, allowing him to stay in power unlimitedly, see for example. BBC News, 29.02.08. 'Deadly violence rages in Cameroon', (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7268861.stm), The Post (Buea), 11.04.2008. Cameroon: Amending the Constitution for One Man (http://allafrica.com/stories/200804110638.html).

2. The project participants were Dr des Michaela Pelican (University of Zurich), Dr des. Peter Tatah (University of Yaoundé 1), Dr Basile Ndjio (University of Douala), as well as Achu Owen Teneng, Afu Isaiah, Arrey Marie Tudor, Constance Chamu, Datidjo Ismaila, Deli Teri Tize, Delphine Nchufuan Fongo, Emmanuella Nsaise Maimo, Emuke Nnoko Ngaaje and Laurentine Mefire Mouchingam. Academic and technical support was provided by Prof Dr Antoine Socpa (University of Yaoundé 1, Laboratoire CSS-RT) and Francis Njilie (Laboratoire CASS-RT).
3. The term 'been to' and its vernacular equivalent 'woyayie' (the one who 'has arrived') are also used in Ghana (Martin 2005, van Dijk 2002). A similar notion to 'bushfaller', yet with a much longer history, is 'Jaguar', widely used in Western Africa (see Rouch 1954/1976, Stoller 1999).
4. For example, Olivier Jobard has made a photographic documentation of the illegal migration of Kingsley, a young man from Limbe, Cameroon (available at http://www.mediastorm.org/0010_NST.htm.)
5. See also the African Migrations Programme of the International Migration Institute (IMI) in Oxford, UK (http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/research/african-migrations-programme); the Special Issue on Africa of the online journal Migration Information Source of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, US (http://www.migrationinformation.org/issue_sep04.cfm); the Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa (TRANSREDE) research project of the Sussex Centre of Migration Research, UK. (http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SCMR/research/transrede/).
6. In an article on Nigerian sex workers Onyeonoru (2004: 116) mentions that the Saudi Arabian authorities protested against the influx of Nigerian prostitutes into Saudi Arabia.
7. The African Studies Centre (ASC) in Leiden put together a web dossier on China-Africa relations, available on their library homepage (http://www.ascleiden.nl/Library/Webdossiers/ChinaAndAfrica.aspx).
8. Conference presentations are available on: http://www.izo.uni-frankfurt.de/Aktuell.html.

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Adjustment Patterns and Obstacles Against Social Rehabilitation of Sex Workers in Nigeria

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Introduction

The literature on the trafficking of young women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation is deficient in several important respects. A great deal of research attention has been devoted to the cause and effect of sex trafficking (Guest, 2000; Loconto, 2002; Agbu, 2003; Olateru-Olagbegi, 2006), the effectiveness of the legal instruments aimed at curtailing the scourge as well as the assessment of the success or otherwise of several governments' policies and implementations in meeting the United Nations (UN) and United States (US) standards on compliance with anti-trafficking movement (Porter, 2003). Very few studies however, have been conducted to assess the aftermath of victims' 'rescue' from trafficking. Therefore, this article examines the coping patterns of victims of sex trafficking undergoing social rehabilitation in Nigeria, a country referred to by the United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) as a leading country of origin, transit and destination of the trafficked, particularly the under-aged (Skogseth, 2006).

The imperativeness of a qualitative integration and reintegration process for victims of trafficking, emanated from the several studies on the health hazards that characterize the process of trafficking from the pre-trafficking stage through the travel and transit to the destination stage (Burkhalter, 2004; Zimmerman, C. Yun, K. Shvab, L. Watts, C. Trappolin, L. Treppete, M. 2003). HIV/AIDS researchers and epidemiologists have found that women and children in the commercial sex industry are most vulnerable to HIV exposure during their initiation and the first six months of sex work (Burkhalter, 2004). This they opined is the period in which the victims have the least ability to protect themselves and are thought to be safe because of their youthfulness and newness in the trade. Other forms of abuse and risks that women experience during their initiation and practice of sex work include physical, sexual and psychological abuse, the forced or coerced use of drugs and alcohol, social restrictions and manipulation, economic exploitation and debt bondage, legal insecurity, abusive working and living conditions and a range of risks associated with being an illegal migrant (Zimmerman et al., 2003).

Due to the aforementioned physical, mental, psychological and emotional health implications of trafficking, the rehabilitation process is believed to be a time of physical recovery, and psychological and social reorientation. This is premised on the fact that the women who have experienced such extreme violence may have their

perspective about life irreversibly changed by their social experiences. Zimmerman et al., (2003) noted that women reconstruct their lives and relationships, for better and for worse, based on the assumptions, emotions and contexts that presently exist for them. They however remarked that not all women who have been abused will be favourably disposed to the idea of rehabilitation as their reactions towards abuse and exploitation differ. Many women will not see themselves as victims or wish to be treated as such, as the trafficking experience has made them strong and self-reliant. While there are women who feel devastated as a result of their trafficking experience, others who have developed personalities that reflect the strengths and independence that helped them navigate difficult times of trafficking see themselves rather as conquerors.

The radical feminists who hitherto had seen prostitution as the quintessential form of male domination over women also support the idea of social rehabilitation of sex workers, though not because of public health concerns. Feminists saw prostitutes as victims of ignorance, abuse, and poverty whose only chance to take back their life and become fully integrated in society was to go through a training programme followed by employment in a regular job (Barry, 1995; Dworkin, 1997; Turda and Weindling, 2007). They had initially opined that the feminization of poverty is responsible for the emergence and growth of commercial sex work, further described as the epitome of women's subordination, degradation, and victimization (Mackinnon, 1989; Weitzer, 2005).

Nigeria ranks among the major countries of origin of trafficking victims with a high volume of young women and girls, particularly the under-aged, trafficked into several African, Middle-eastern and European countries, mainly for the practice of commercial sex work (Norli, 2006; Olateru-Olagbegi, 2006; Skogseth, 2006). In one of his visits to some European countries in the year 2001, the then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, was startled when he was confronted with the high number of Nigerian nationals that have taken to sex work in Europe, especially Italy. He directed that a 'search party' be constituted and trafficked Nigerian girls be brought back home (Ayorinde, 2001). In July 2003, the President signed into law the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administrative Act and established the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other related matters (NAPTIP), with the mandate to enforce the law and bring back victims of trafficking with the aim of rehabilitating and reintegrating them. Similarly, 'anti-trafficking units' were established in the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) to combat the crime and intercept the traffickers and the victims.

Although the government's stance on trafficking and efforts towards curtailing the crime were applauded by many, scholars have expressed some measure of pessimism about the success and sustainability of rehabilitating sex workers in Nigeria (Agbu, 2003; Loconto, 2002). This expression of doubt is founded on the circumstances surrounding the pathway to rehabilitation centres, the ability of the centres to provide an equitable economic empowerment that the sex workers were used to in the practice of their trade, and most importantly, the sincerity of purpose inherent in the rehabilitation initiatives of the government and non-government agencies. In addition, the issue of subjecting sex workers to compulsory HIV/AIDS screening upon arrival and keeping them in the rehabilitation centres to learn a vocation, whether they want to

or not, has been regarded as a serious human rights issue, which could have a telling effect on the emotions of the sex workers and adversely affect their adjustment to the rehabilitation process (Aghatise 2002; Loconto 2002; Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, 2003).

Also, cynics have severally expressed strong pessimism about the sincerity of purpose embedded in government's resolution to rehabilitate the sex workers. They believe that the initiative is buoyed more by the desire to score political points and launder the image of the administration before the international community. Presently, Nigeria is categorized in Tier Two of the Trafficking in Persons Country List by the United States government and Transparency International. This tier of the list includes states that do not meet minimum standards of combating human trafficking but are recognized to be making efforts to do so (Agbu, 2003; Skogseth, 2006). Similarly, non-governmental organizations involved in rehabilitation have often been accused of having more interest in the financial benefits that come from supporting local and international agencies, than true social service. All these may affect the success of rehabilitation and the adjustment of clients to the rehabilitation process.

Therefore this study assessed the adjustment pattern of the clients of the rehabilitation centres, the response rate of specific social categories of the clients and identified obstacles militating against effective social reintegration process in Nigeria.

The study is important because an insight into adjustment patterns will assist policy makers and social welfare organizations involved in rehabilitation to be aware of the response rate and physiological needs of their clients which will lead to better social service delivery.

Adjustment and Social Influences

The concept of adjustment refers to the quality of adaptive change basic to human experience over time. It involves the present necessities of the individual, the way these have been shaped by past experience, and their relationship to present and future satisfaction (Hollander 1971; 114). According to Hollander, life adjustment therefore depends upon a process of learning, with social influences. In the process of adjusting, the individual has to contend with physical factors in the environment to sustain life.

There are two major ways scholars have viewed adjustment. The first is the classic socio-cultural emphasis on the individual's adaptation to social demand. The second view is concerned with the individual's satisfaction in relationships with the social environment, and or growth and actualization. With reference to the latter, adjustment has been distinctively conceptualized by Szasz (1961), Homans (1967) and Maslow (1970). In Szasz's view, society is conceived as a force requiring an individual's compliance through socialization. From a different, though related point of view with Szasz's, Homans views adjustment in 'ego-centric' terms as the satisfaction achieved by the individual through a pleasing relationship with the environment. This view, unlike Szasz's, focuses on the individual needs (rather than the conception of society as a force) and satisfactions in certain relationships or transactions with other people, within the social constraints of a culture. From Maslow's point of view, adjustment is sometimes presented in terms of an unfolding of the individual's potentialities through maturation and experience. It is a view that grew out of those theories of personality that emphasize self-actualization.

From the foregoing positions, though differing in emphasis, these views relate to the key theme of individuals functioning within the framework of social demands and requirements for social acceptance, as Hollander (1971) argued. Therefore adjustment as a projected or internal behaviour may be due to a response to social influence or as a response to internalized frustration and conflict. With respect to the former, Hollander meant that the essential quality to adjustment is dynamism, that is, prospect to change. Adjustment occurs whenever the individual encounters new experiences from the external factors that require response. For example, although the victims of sex trafficking might have been deceived or coerced into sex work, they may adjust to the realities of their situation and strive to see the positive angle to it which may be in the form of the financial benefit that accrues from the practice. But there are also internal motivations of the individual, which arising from past learning may operate to move the individual toward the achievement of social goals in the environment. Both the former and latter positions are anchored on the belief that adjustment is socio-culturally construed through social influences. The society and social order therefore present members with strong influences which are highly pervasive (Ash 1959).

Study Areas and Methodology

The study areas, Edo and Lagos States were selected based on their importance to the issues of trafficking in Nigeria particularly, trafficking for the purpose of sex work.

Edo State was initially part of the defunct Midwestern State which was also carved out of the defunct Western Region in 1963. It remained part of a twelve state federal structure created in 1967 until it was renamed Bendel State in 1976. In 1991, Bendel State was further split into two to establish Delta and Edo States. The present Edo State now consists of 18 Local Government Areas (LGAs) after it was increased from its initial 12. The people of Edo State can be divided into five main ethnic groups distinct from each other in certain linguistic, social and some cultural features. These are the Bini, Esan, Etsako, Owan and Akoko Edo (Okogie et al., 2003). The State has a high rate of unemployment, low income profile and poor standard of living (Okogie et al., 2003). The Federal Office of Statistics (1999) estimated the incidence of poverty in Edo State to be 53.3 percent in 1996. Edo State is widely regarded as the leading state of origin of trafficked victims in Nigeria (Ahiante, 2000; Aghatise, 2002; Onyeonoru 2003). In response to the high incidence of sex trafficking in the state, the anti-prostitution law was signed by the state government in 2001, while the federal government also located the zonal office of NAPTIP in the state capital, Benin City.

Lagos State is widely regarded as the economic capital of the country largely due to the enormous economic activities that pervade the city and its link to the outside world via the waterways and air transport. It is also noted to be one of the fastest-growing cities in the world, with people of different ethnic origins residing in the city. Lagos State is selected as a study area due to the predominant role that it plays as destination point for most victims of sex trafficking in the country as well as the transit state for those to be taken out of the country. Also, the results of fieldwork studies carried out in the state reveals a growth in the HIV/AIDS prevalence among the sex workers, from 2 percent in 1988/89 to 12 percent in 1990/91. By 1995/96, up to 70 percent of sex workers tested positive (USAID 2002). Also, Lagos has the highest number of brothels

and resident prostitutes in the country and plays host to a number of rehabilitation centres for sex workers.

This study was conducted between November 2006 and June 2007 in the two states. Both primary and secondary data were collected within a qualitative research design. Primary data were made up of information obtained through 60 in-depth interviews (IDIs), 35 key informant interviews (KIIs), and six case studies. Respondents were selected through a combination of purposive sampling method and the snowball method. The respondents for the IDI were made up of 60 clients of six rehabilitation centres in the two states who were victims of international trafficking for the purpose of sex work. For the KII, 18 caregivers at the selected centres, five parents of victims of sex trafficking, two opinion leaders, two officials of the anti trafficking unit of the Nigerian Immigration Service, Lagos and eight experts or officials of collaborating agencies were selected. Six girls who were judged special cases based on their responses to the interview were selected for further interviews using the life history method. This was to enable a detailed narration of their social experiences during their recruitment and initiation into sex trade. Collection of secondary data included information sourced from agencies that were considered central to the subject of the study. These include the Ministry of Women Affairs, the anti-trafficking units of the Nigerian Immigration Service and Nigerian Police Force, Federal Office of Statistics, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and records of rehabilitation centres. Content analysis and ethnographic summaries were adopted for the analysis of the data.

An Overview of the Selected Rehabilitation Centres

Six rehabilitation centres in the two states studied were purposively chosen to represent government owned, non-governmental and faith-based.[1] This was to assist in a comparative understanding of adjustment pattern in the three types of rehabilitation approaches: the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), and the Lagos and Edo States Zonal Office/Shelters. These two centres were established by the federal government as a follow-up to the signing of the anti-trafficking Acts. In addition to rehabilitating the victims, they also intercept, arrest, investigate and prosecute the traffickers. The two centres are run in collaboration with the IOM who donated buildings and facilities as well as assisting in capacity building and other logistics. The rehabilitation approach adopted by these centres is the social welfare approach. The Edo State Skill Acquisition Centre, Benin City and the Idia Renaissance, Benin City, are owned and controlled by non-governmental organizations. They were created aftermath of the passage of the Edo State anti-trafficking law of 2000 which criminalizes prostitution and sex trafficking. Both of them were established by the wife of the former executive governor of the state in response to the staggering increase in the volume of trafficking, which also positions the state as the origin of more than 80 percent of trafficking victims in the country particularly for sex work. The management of the former is under the office of the wife of the governor of the state while the latter is a personal brainchild of Mrs Eki Igbinedion (the ex-governor's wife). The two centres, both financed in collaboration with the UNICEF and other supporting agencies are non-residential, and they adopt the social welfare rehabilitation approach to meet their sex workers' rehabilitation

objectives. The Real Woman Foundation, Magodo GRA, Lagos and the Wholistic Ministry, Ebute Meta, Lagos are owned and managed as voluntary institutions of religious bodies. They were both founded and managed by local Churches with the main aim of providing rehabilitation facilities for women and children with a history of abuse and neglect while facilitating their spiritual rebirth. The two centres make use of the faith-based approach which entails Bible-based counselling, and also skill acquisition.

It is worthy of note that the approaches of these centres are not mutually exclusive as features and methods of most of the centres are related. However, this does not becloud the visibility of the disparity of the approaches employed by the different centres.

Ethical Considerations

The study complied with the ethical standards on research work involving human subjects. The dignity and privacy of every individual who, in the course of the research work, provided valuable information about him/herself or others were protected. The rehabilitation centres were notified of the aims, objectives, methods and anticipated benefits of the research work and obtained a letter of introduction from the office of the head of department requesting their permission to collect data from their organization. In the same vein, written consent was obtained from senior officers of the centres before the study was conducted. In addition, no individual became a subject of the research unless he or she freely agreed to participate, no pressure was applied.

Finally, the identity of the rehabilitation clients, officials of the centres, medical personnel and their medical establishments, parents and opinion leaders were held in confidence, while the consent of the experts of collaborating agencies and NGOs were sought to reveal their identities and that of their organizations.

Findings

Influence of Social Categories and Social Rehabilitation Factors on Clients' Adjustment Pattern

Clients' Age

The study shows that the age of the clients under rehabilitation has some effect on the adjustment pattern. The responses received from the clients, the experts as well as the caregivers suggest that the age of the clients under the programme is an important factor that could determine how they adjust. The younger clients within the age bracket of 10-15 adjust better than the older ones to rehabilitation process. The reasons behind this are captured by one of the caregivers:

> …obviously, the younger ones are the ones that are actually forced into sex trade. It was never in their mind initially to partake in sex work, some of them don't even know what it entails. Also the younger ones do not have much drive for the acquisition of wealth to be able to conceive of the benefits of prostitution. Lastly, their youthfulness makes them to possess amenable minds that can be easily modified unlike the older ones that already have a mindset that Europe is where the money is. – Female caregiver/KII/ESSAC Benin.

All the experts acknowledge the importance of clients' age as one of the factors that determines their response to rehabilitation. It was also generally suggested that those

within the adolescent age of 15-25 are the most difficult social category to manage. This is premised on the belief that those within the age category may have made the decision to engage in sex work by themselves. Their decision to engage in sex work will be dependent on certain expectations that will be modelled after the success of the rich Europe-based sex workers that they hoped to emulate. Their inability to make such success will be too devastating for them to focus their minds on the rehabilitation programme. Also it was noted by one of the key informants that:

> …those within this age range are young, vibrant and they are usually of the belief that the time to make all the money they needed, to make them rich is within this period. Also, in Benin in particular, there are several people of this age range that have built houses and owned worthy properties. Therefore, the race to become rich is usually fierce among youths within this age range. – Edo State Coordinator WOTCLEF/KII/ Benin.

Another age category of clients that adjust lesser than the 10-15, but better than the 15-25 age range, is those above the age of 25. Experts and caregivers pointed out that this category of clients may 'have seen it all' and probably will like to settle down and get married. They adjust better during rehabilitation with the expectation that it will offer them a new lease of life as they may also be losing out in the sex market that craves for younger girls. Most of the sex workers in this range may want to fall back and either be traffickers (barons) or they might want to choose another trade entirely. Hence, an option of rehabilitation that will offer such an opportunity may be a welcome development.

Trafficking Experience

The experience of the clients during the process of trafficking was discovered to have the most emphatic influence on the pattern of adjustment of the clients. The caregivers of all the centres as well as most of the experts all mentioned the experience of the clients in the hands of the traffickers as the strongest contributory factor affecting the adjustment pattern. One of them stated:

> Those of them that were intercepted as they arrived at their country of destination in Europe without being allowed to practice sex work adjust the least. In fact they are usually very aggressive. You can't control them. Meanwhile those of them that were intercepted along the course of the laborious journey across African deserts and forest are usually very thankful and they adjust best. At the time of their interception, their heart will be yearning for rescue and they would only be grateful to be helped back home. Meanwhile, the Europe bound girls that were intercepted within the country or at the border are also difficult to control and they adjust poorly as they do not see reasons why they should be here. – Male Caregiver/KII/NAPTIP Lagos.

As offered by the caregiver, the point of intercepting the clients before they are brought to the rehabilitation centres dictates the adjustment pattern. This is due to the fact that those that got to Europe after overcoming the tortuous journey may begin to see their arrival in Europe as a consolation to their trafficking experience only to be turned back before 'reaping the fruits of the long suffering'. A resident medical expert in NAPTIP, Lagos described this scenario as 'psychologically paralyzing'. She went further to describe this category of clients as the 'most challenging' to manage. Aside from the point of interception, the experience of the clients during the journey was also said to be important. A medical expert offered:

> …it also depends on what they went through during the process of their journey. Quite a number of them must have been through grave psychological and physical trauma which will inhibit their response rate. Such people first need to be given a 'human treatment' of psychological therapy to make them feel like you and I again as their experience in the hands of the traffickers must have made them feel like animals ... yes it is that bad. – Medical Doctor/KII/Private Hospital Benin.

A general observation of the clients as regards their dispositions towards routine activities reveals that the foreign-based appear more withdrawn and reluctant to join the others for recreation. They only partake in mandatory activities and would want to withdraw back to their rooms immediately after the completion of such activity rather than join others in watching the television, play cards and other games. According to the officials, beside the interception point factor and the stress of the journey, the apprehension of the victims of international trafficking as it borders on the fear of their traffickers, the effect of the oath-taking and the reception that awaits them at home are important factors that negatively affect their adjustment.

Prostitution History

The length of period spent in sex work, the social experience of the clients in the practice of sex trade, the push factors into sex work as well as the perceived material benefits of sex work which all forms part of the prostitution history were all also seen to have an influence on the adjustment of the clients. The study reveals that the longer the sex workers have spent on the trade the more they get adjusted to rehabilitation. This notion is also premised on the condition that their long stay has been characterized by unpleasant social experiences. Those who were getting profitable patronage from the practice will only see the process of rehabilitation as an unnecessary distraction. This is particularly true for the foreign-based sex workers that have just finished settling the debt of their traffickers and are just making their own money. A caregiver sheds more light:

> ... whatever these girls do, their mind is set on the material achievement of whatever they engage in. If they could not lay claim to the benefits of their sojourn into sex trade, then they are going to pose a big problem for us to rehabilitate as they would continue to wallow in self-guilt which will impede the assimilation of rehabilitation lessons. – Male caregiver/KII/NAPTIP Benin.

However, the new entrants and those that were intercepted immediately after paying their debts are said to be the least adjusting group for the reason supplied by a caregiver: '... they are yet to see the "benefits" of sex work and this makes them feel they are failures'. – Female Caregiver/KII/ESAC Benin City.

Again, those that spent longer periods on sex work and might have seen little or no benefit, view their exit from the trade as good for them. The majority of those within this category are said to be the home-based or the internally trafficked or the young sex workers who were not allowed the freedom to spend their income the way they liked. Those that were yet to really get into the mainstream of sex work or that were intercepted within the country are said to also belong to the category of those that have low response rate. An expert philosophizes:

> …it can be equated to the story of a kid that is prevented from going near the fire, if he encounters nasty experience with the fire; he would understand why the prevention was

> being done in the first place. Those who have made up their minds to prostitute but have not spend good time in the trade before being brought here still feel they are being deprived. Only those that have seen and got their hands burnt adjust best. – Female Caregiver/KII/Idia Ren Benin City.

In considering the push factor, the respondents recognize those that went to the practice as a result of poverty and greed to have lower adjustment than those who went in as a result of ignorance, peer pressure and other factors. One was quite emphatic:

> Greed is even worse than poverty, and I believe those that enter because of greed are more than that of poverty. Everybody just hide under poverty. Poverty can be cured easily with material intervention but how do you cure the problem of greed. – Opinion Leader/KII/ Benin City.

The itemized factors that make up the prostitution history are not mutually exclusive to other factors that affect the response rates of the clients. However, the strength of these factors cannot be overemphasized as caregivers acknowledge that it is the first information they try to find out from the clients upon arrival. As one of them puts it: 'The prostitution history is like a symptom that makes us to know which drug to prescribe' (Male caregiver/KII/NAPTIP, Lagos). Another added: 'It is almost like a factor that determines whether the rehabilitation process will be successful or not as far as that individual is concerned'. (Male caregiver/KII/NAPTIP, Benin).

Mode of Admission

In order to determine the influence of the mode of admission to adjustment pattern, the clients were grouped according to their response on how they became clients of the centre and this was compared with their rate of adjustment. The study discovered that the manner through which they became clients of the centres plays a role in determining their rate of adjustment to rehabilitation exercise. Those that voluntarily opted out of the practice and approached the officials who eventually referred them to the centre were observed to adjust better to rehabilitation than those who got to the centres through other modes. Also those who were encouraged into the centres through different forms of campaign, social work and evangelism (by religious organizations) came second, while those that did not have a say in their admission (those under forced rehabilitation) to the centre appears the least to adjust. The caregivers and experts speak on the relationship between the mode of admission and adjustment pattern.

> Those who are voluntary easily accept the rehabilitation process because they came back with the consciousness that they are no longer interested in the experiences and act, either because it is not good for them or it is not right. The involuntary ones will want to go back as it will be difficult to rehabilitate them. Those who were enjoying the business will not want to get out no matter what you do for them because they take pleasure in what they were doing. This is why the rehab centres are like prisons to them, as soon they are opportuned, they may want to jump out. – Edo State Coordinator, WOTCLEF.

Another expert also added:

> Though it is desirable to voluntarily leave the practice, it may not be wrong to force them into rehabilitation programmes. The reason being that those that practice sex work do not know the dangers of their practice most times until when it is late. Therefore, decisions cannot be left totally for them to take. Don't forget that majority of them got

> trafficked due to their ignorance about many things. After they are compelled to attend the rehabilitation programme, it is now left for them to decide what to do with themselves. Ignorance will no more be tenable. – KII/UNICEF Lagos.

However there is an opposing view:

> If the prostitutes need rehabilitation, then everybody in Nigeria needs to be rehabilitated because prostitution is a matter of choice though not in the case of the underage. The adults have the right to do what they want with their body, so why rehabilitate. It is only the children that are exploited that need to be rehabilitated. Involuntary admission of the adult prostitutes is a waste of time and tax payers' money. Beside, it is a flagrant abuse of the rights. The issue of choice should have been accommodated in the anti-trafficking law… – KII/Founder GPI B

Involuntary admissions as discovered inhibits the adjustment rate of the clients as the only thing that they want was to 'gain their freedom'. Three clients in this category were said to have been so desperate to leave that they beat the security network in the Benin shelter of NAPTIP and escaped.

It was equally observed that majority of those that were compelled to undergo the programme employ other means to get themselves out of the shelter. Another caregiver narrates:

> Some will even pretend to be adjusting well once they sense that it would assist their exit from the centre. They would partake in all programmes with unusual enthusiasm. It only takes our expertise and experience to break their deceits and ignore their acting. – Female Caregiver NAPTIP Lagos.

The low adjustment rates of involuntary clients were also observed as most of them appear withdrawn and would not interact with their colleagues. Also their relationship with the caregivers remains official despite the friendly overtures from the caregivers. This finding supports the strength of the rehabilitation theories that postulated that the process of behavioural change cannot be forced or applied through any form of pressure. (Prochaska, DiClemente and Norcross, 1992).

Rehabilitation Environment

The rehabilitation centre where there is relative freedom of movement (faith-based approach) and the non-residential (nongovernmental social welfare) centres were found not to be related to patterns of adjustment of their clients. However, there is a major difference between the adjustment pattern of the centres where movement are restricted (governmental social welfare) and those where there is relative freedom. According to a caregiver of NAPTIP:

> This place is not open to their families and friends to visit and we don't also allow the girls to go out except on Sunday when we take them to Church and bring them back, or when we take them to court to act as prosecution witness. This is so done to protect them from the traffickers who may be desperate to reach them and gag them. Hiding them here conceals their identities and saves them from the problem of stigmatization. – Male Caregiver/KII/NAPTIP Benin City.

For the Lagos shelter of NAPTIP:

> The only time they go out is for court proceedings, not even for Church services as the Pastor is invited to come and minister to them here. You know part of the reasons why we

> keep them here is for them to help us in the course of bringing the traffickers to book and also to testify as witnesses against the traffickers in the law court when they are caught. – Female Caregiver/KII/NAPTIP Lagos

It was observed in the course of the interview sessions with the clients of NAPTIP Lagos and Benin that the majority of the clients were withdrawn, exhibiting deep sober feeling, and would rather want to leave the shelter. Some of the clients complained of lacking toiletries and some other basic needs. However, the caregivers refuted their claims and even went ahead to show the researchers the toiletries and other available infrastructure provided for the convenience of the girls which are quite adequate. This claim and counter-claim go a long way to exhibit the level of the clients' negative disposition to their stay in the shelter.

Investigating the relative adjustment patterns of the clients on the selected variables may not serve the whole purpose of identifying where more rehabilitation effort should be directed, but could only provide clues to specific group need, which are internal issues to the system. Particularly, the findings of the study indicate that these variables are not mutually exclusive as they are connected with one another to determine clients' adjustment rate. Apart from clients' adjustment, the paper also reports the findings on the obstacles that militate against effective sex workers' rehabilitation in Nigeria. These are contained in the next section.

Impediments to effective sex workers' social rehabilitation process in Nigeria

In practice, some problems exist in the social rehabilitation of the sex workers in Nigeria, which adversely affect the adjustment of the clients to the rehabilitation programme. The general performance of the sex workers in the rehabilitation centres is observed to be below expectation even though there are degrees of differences in the rehabilitation methods. For instance, if the rehabilitation programmes are very effective, they would attract more voluntary clients rather than forced clientele. Also, effective rehabilitation will ensure that the rate of recidivism and growth of trafficking for sex is checked. The causes of the problems concerning social rehabilitation are as a result of both internally or externally generated factors as revealed from the interviews with key informant. They highlighted the problems of finance, political will, corruption, quality and dedicated caregivers among other problems. They speak further:

> Finance is one major impediment; if there is enough finance, things will improve and those vulnerable to these acts will not be. In fact with economic improvement, the problem will reduce drastically. There is lack of Political will especially by the ministry of women affairs because of increased fraud and dishonesty. So if the funds are made available, they will be rightly appropriated. Lack of patience and finance to sustain long term rehabilitation is another. – KII/COSUDOW Benin.

Hear a more radical voice:

> The major problem is that of Government irresponsibility. Rehabilitation of sex workers especially child prostitutes is not supposed to be a task for NGOs. It is a task of a government that recognizes its people's welfare and knows that each citizen is entitled to a minimum means of livelihood. Our constitution states that socio-economic level is limited to economic entitlement. The government is deliberately impoverishing the people to its own benefits and bragging about rehabilitation so that the outside countries

> will think it has policies and provide more grants and aid that will go into their pocket. – KII/GPI Benin City.

In addition to the problem of inadequate funding, the caregivers of all the rehabilitation centres also expressed the enormity of the lack of cooperation from the families of the clients especially their parents. 'Even when the parents were not involved in the trafficking of their daughters, they find it difficult to absolve them back into the family. We have several cases like that, when we took the girls to their homes after the rehabilitation only to meet brick walls from parents to accept the returnees.' – Female Caregiver/KII/NAPTIP Benin City. Another one stated that 'the major problem is that of stigmatization. Even when we try to raise funds for the upkeep of the clients, most of the supposed donors will hold back or become reluctant donor once they learn that we are sourcing for money to take care of ex-prostitutes' (Female Caregiver/KII/ Wholistic Ministry Lagos).

More fundamentally, the social relationship between the clients and the management is discovered to be problematic indeed, especially in the government-owned centres. The clients have very little control over what is being done to them. They see very minimal opportunity in participating in decision making which makes them feel dehumanized. Another problem is the cost of management incurred by the centres. Many of the centres visited complained of inadequate funding and attributed their limitations in effecting maximum rehabilitation programmes to the shortage of funds to procure tools and materials necessary for effective rehabilitation. As a result of this, clients are sometimes discharged even when it is obvious that the clients are not fully armed with what would sustain them. The number of trained personnel in social work, counselling and rehabilitation are inadequate in all the centres visited particularly the two NAPTIP shelters. The staff in the investigation department is twice that as those in rehabilitation and counselling. It thus appears that the government is more interested in the arrest and prosecution of the traffickers than rehabilitation of their victims.

Apart from these internally generated factors and conditions, there are also some exogenous factors that create some problems in the rehabilitation effort. Of all the problems, the clients are mostly concerned with the stigma the society attaches to a prostitute. One of them expresses her mind:

> …everybody is only trying to make life better in their own way, why should the society crucify us. When we came at the airport, the NTA was everywhere showing on the network (service) haba we be thieves? Other people wey dey go hussle why dem no dey show dem too when dem deport them?[2] It's not fair now! – Sandra/24/IDI/NAPTIP Lagos.

With this kind of notion in mind, the clients experience low self-esteem, which invariably disturbs the speed of their recovery in the system. Another client in one of the faith-based centres succinctly maintained:

> …to Nigerians, prostitution is a scar that never heals. Even among so-called Christians in the Churches, once it is being mentioned that you are an ex-prostitute, people's faces will start turning towards you and they are only looking at you to know who to stay away from. At times, you could be worse than an AIDS carrier.

The stigma is even more defined within the family than in the larger society. Some of the clients are abandoned by their people and stigmatized as wasted daughters. The sex

workers also have a peculiar problem of lack of home support. Usually, the presence of the problem of lack of home support translating in lack of sense of belonging creates frustration and disappointment, which inhibits the rehabilitation exercise. Closely related to the above is the worry about the feelings of their family members when they are finally discharged. The clients feel so strongly that they are wasted, even if they are discharged, their people will not still forgive them for their previous misdeeds. The problem is particularly more pronounced among the repatriated sex workers. In this case, the returnees harbour the fear of lack of home support upon meeting with their family. While some parents would rather not want anything to do with prostituted daughters, others who were instrumental to their daughters' journey will see them as failures and reject them. As the interviews with the parents reveal, none of the parents will claim responsibility to be behind the trafficking of his/her daughter despite the clients overwhelming report of their parents' involvement. Another obstacle is the problem of unemployment. Though these girls are being given vocational training, they are not adequately established to make them financially independent enough for the new vocation to be a rewarding alternative to what they earned in sex.

Caregivers in the rehabilitation centres noted that getting employment for the rehabilitated ex-sex workers could be Herculean, as many employers would rather not have anything to do with them. '…that is why we simply train them to be on their own.'

These among others are some of the major problems reported to be militating against the entire rehabilitation efforts of the care agencies in Nigeria. The whole problems could be subsumed under inadequate finance, poverty, and lack of proper commitment and understanding of the plight and aspirations of the sex workers under rehabilitation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is little doubt that the Nigerian government is poised to associate with other Nations that are solidly against human trafficking and sex work. Besides the signing into law the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) law, the country entered into agreement with the governments of Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain to provide international cooperation to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons. The efforts of the anti-trafficking units of the Nigerian Police and Immigrations towards intercepting the process of trafficking within the constraint of the country's porous borders have also been widely acknowledged (Abawuru, 2005; Ojo, 2005; Skogseth, 2006). However, findings from this study reveal that the government is not doing enough to demonstrate its sincerity to ensure the social re-absorption of those rescued from the cold hands of the traffickers and sex work. Apart from the inadequate number of trained personnel in the government-owned rehabilitation centres, the response rate of the clients in the government-owned centres is low when compared to that of the non-governmental and faith-based centres. Attempts to rehabilitate the sex workers proved most successful in the religious/faith based centres.

The home-based clients adjust better than the foreign based clients. This difference in the adjustment pattern is a function of some social background antecedents and prostitution history variables. Evidence from the study reveals that there is need for more attention to be paid to the foreign-based clients and those that were intercepted

and brought for rehabilitation. The study suggests that the inability of the clients repatriated from Europe to equal the successes of the Europe-based 'predecessors' and the feeling of guilt and failure account for the low response rate of this category.

The study also found that the mode of admission into the rehabilitation centres whether voluntarily or involuntarily, and the trafficking experience are very important social categories that determine the response rate of the clients to rehabilitation. These results confirm the fears earlier expressed by the human rights watchers that arose against the involuntary mode of admission into rehabilitation centres (Loconto, 2000; Jeffreys, 2002). Finally, the outcomes of this study provide an understanding of the adjustment pattern of the clients of rehabilitation centres in Nigeria and factors that account for the differential response rate.

Hence, the study makes the following recommendations to enhance the delivery of social service by the government and non-governmental agencies saddled with the responsibility of reintegrating the sexually trafficked. First the design of intervention programme should be sensitized to the different social experience of the clients in the practice of sex work and include specialized programme for specific categories. Specifically, the foreign-based clients and those with severe medical problems as a result of their trafficking experience should be placed under intensive care. Second, social rehabilitation and counselling of trafficked victims is a daunting task that should not be mingled with an equally Herculean task as law enforcement, arrest and prosecution of the traffickers. It is suggested that these two functions are separated and not located in a single agency. Third, media coverage of the arrival of deported trafficked victims should be discouraged as it has grave psychological consequences on the rehabilitation process. The dignity of the deportees needs to be protected, and their human rights respected to encourage the voluntary return of those trapped abroad. Lastly, public enlightenment and education on sex work and trafficking should include reducing the harm of the society on the rehabilitated sex workers, which is perpetrated through suspicions, discrimination and denials of rights.

Notes

1. Faith-based here means centres that uses religious morals as an approach to counsel and reorientate their client, working more on the spirituality of their clients as a way of effecting behaviour change.
2. 'We are no thieves, other people that also left the country for greener pastures are not so treated when they return. Why are we different?'

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'I want to be a star': Doping technology and the incidence of performance-enhancing drugs among actors in Nigeria

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Introduction

Drug and alcohol abuse has become an ever-increasing problem in Nigerian society with serious health and social implications. It has led to mental illnesses among young people and the deterioration of the health of the nation's active population. Drug and alcohol abuse contributes significantly to the incidence of domestic aggression, violent crimes, broken homes and juvenile delinquency in Nigeria (Ebie and Pela, 1981; Adelekan, 1991; Obot, 2004). Drug abuse now starts at an early age, particularly among street children. While young girls tend to abuse hypno-sedatives more than the boys, the reverse is the case for stimulants (Ebie and Pela, 1981). Observation shows that alcohol and cannabis appeared to be the more abused drugs in Nigeria before heroin and cocaine were added to the problem from the early 1980s. Indeed, substance abuse remains a serious crisis in Africa aggravated by abject poverty, wars, socio-political upheavals, and ineffective social welfare programmes across the continent.

In reaction to the substantial risk of drug abuse on the health of users and its attendant negative impact to the society, the Nigerian Federal Government set up the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) to combat the trend. These agencies, owing largely to official corruption over the years, made no appreciable impact in checking the trade and use of illicit drugs. A research study also found that NGOs and CSOs were not making the expected impact on drug demand reduction (DDR) in Nigeria because of poor funding and inadequate information on drugs (Obot, 2004). However, with the ongoing fight against corruption by the present Nigerian government, the agencies are beginning to perform, especially NAFDAC. But the incidence of drug abuse remains high among the urban poor mainly because the economic and social problems that lure people into drug abuse and addiction have not been significantly addressed.

The abuse of alcohol and other substances among performing artists is a serious crisis confronting drama school authorities, theatre workers and the general society in Nigeria. Drug abuse has led to various forms of accidents, crimes, and deviant behaviour on and off the stage, studio and movie locations. Its impact on the mental health of young and aspiring actors is producing alarming statistics by the day (Hagher, 2000, Nwadigwe, 2006). Indeed, many theatre trainees have become habitual users even before gaining admission into higher institutions of learning. But drug abuse in

the Nigerian higher education sector is also not peculiar to the arts. There is currently a high and increasing rate of alcohol and drug abuse among medical students at Nigerian university campuses. Nevertheless, Hagher (2000) affirms that students in the performing arts, especially young actors, use alcohol and drugs in a bid to enhance their performance on stage. The problem is adversely affecting the education and professional development of performing artists in schools prompting research proposals to the Nigerian educational authorities to investigate the trend (Nwadigwe, 2006).

The link between the performing arts and youth delinquency generates a seemingly endless debate among scholars particularly on the relationship between the screen (television and films) and exhibition of deviant behaviour among its audience (Wilson, 1992). Besides the desire among many teenagers and youths to take alcohol and other drugs, the entertainment industry in general and theatre in particular appears to present an alluring motivation for young people to indulge in such acts. Two reasons can be adduced for the trend. First, the theatre is credited with the psychological power to move people's emotions. Thus, actors on stage, radio, television and in films are idolized as celebrities and young people tend to imbibe their performances as their own reality. They often accept as real and imitate the lives exhibited on stage and screen by the actors such as smoking, drinking, drug use, violence and romance depending on the predisposition of the viewer.

The second reason is that the art of acting, being a psychological and physical process, requires the creation of another realistic life through the body and brain as basic tools of the actor. But many performers, especially beginners, lack the skill and technique to accomplish such art with believability. Tucker (1994) affirms that inexperienced screen actors are lacking in technique, react badly to pressure and this hampers their performance. Many inexperienced actors suffer from performance anxiety or 'stage fright' and therefore turn to alcohol, stimulants and other drugs, albeit erroneously, to bolster their courage to face the audience. According to Hagher (2000):

> Some inexperienced and uninformed actors commit the blunder of soaking themselves in alcohol and drugs in order to achieve what they believe is extra-special acting. These actors believe that drinking or drug-taking would enable them release inhibitions, to be able to say and do things they normally would be too inhibited to say or do. This unfortunate practice is very widespread among young actors world-wide.

The involvement of entertainers in drug abuse is a multidimensional phenomenon and a matter of global concern to professionals, regulatory agencies and health workers. According to McManus (2004), the use of performance enhancing drugs, regarded as the 'scourge of the professional athletic world', has been found to be spreading its ugly tentacles to the performing arts industry. Indeed:

> The entertainment industry is particularly plagued with drug abuse. Top performers on the music scene often become involved with heavy drugs at some stage in their career. Many film stars are habitual drug users (Awake, 2001).

McManus (2004) also observes that it is not unusual for performers to suffer from performance anxiety, otherwise known as 'stage fright' and many performers turn to stimulants to reduce such performance-related anxiety for improved presentation. The prevalence of drug addiction and abuse in the performing arts has become so

worrisome to American authorities that the NIDA began a programme to educate entertainers on the personal and social hazards of the phenomenon. The agency instituted the 'Prism Awards' for actors, directors and script writers in recognition of accurate portrayals of drug abuse and related violence in film and television (Cargo, 1997). A front runner for 2006 best Oscar, Phillip Seymour Hoffman, is currently engaged in a campaign against drug abuse. Hoffman had a spell in a rehabilitation camp in his early twenties, having been involved in drugs as a young fresh graduate from a New York drama school (Porter, 2006).

In Nigeria, young actors seeking to overcome anxiety and improve their performance have often resorted to stimulants even while undergoing training in theatre schools. This researcher has counselled a number of his students found taking narcotics and stimulants backstage before and during performances. The disturbing fact is that many of such performers develop a dependency on drugs, get involved in aggressive behaviour and crimes, suffer health complications and often induce their peers to join in the habit. This poses a significant menace not only to the image, professionalism and sustainability of the performing arts industry but also to the personal health of the victims and allied problems they cause to their families and the society.

Methodology

Purpose

The purpose of the study was to find out why some actors and actresses use performance enhancing drugs, in what circumstances the drugs and stimulants are used, the kinds of doping technologies and drugs they use, categories of performers that use such drugs and the effects of drug use during and after performance. The aim of the study is also to collect data direct from the artistes involved so as to help in suggesting effective and sustainable approaches to prevent or curb the trend.

Study Site

The site of this study is Onitsha, a large commercial city on the banks of the River Niger, in Anambra State, southeastern Nigeria. Onitsha is reputed to be 'the largest market town' in West Africa with an estimated population of 1.2 million (Maja-Pearce, 2001). The ever-increasing markets and industrial activities in the area have made Onitsha the destination of business people from various parts of Nigeria and the West African subregion. Since the recent rise of the Home Video industry in Nigeria, Onitsha has maintained a leadership role in the production and marketing of video films, picking up from where the popular 'Onitsha market literature' had left (Haynes and Okome, 1997; Maja-Pearce, 2001).

Indeed, the Upper Iweka market in Onitsha is a hub of video film production and marketing in Nigeria, feeding other major markets as the Idumota in Lagos, Sabon Gari in Kano, and Pound Road and Ariaria markets in Aba (Maja-Pearce, 2001). This potential has made Onitsha the meeting place of film producers, marketers and actors from different parts of Nigeria. The area and its environs also have rich forest and water resources and other natural features that continually attract film directors as locations for shooting. Stage productions are equally thriving in Onitsha and adjacent cities,

promoted mostly by independent producers, marketing companies and theatre staff and students from the nearby University in Awka. Therefore, Onitsha is a veritable location to find actors and performing artists.

Data Collection and Analysis

Data for this study were gathered from in-depth interview schedules, focus group discussions and personal observations among actors in Onitsha, southeastern Nigeria. Participants in the study were recruited through the snowball technique. Having caught two of his students in the act of taking stimulants and drugs backstage, the researcher took them into his confidence and built a rapport with them. Another actor was involved in strange behaviour while on set at a film location. The researcher, being a member of the production crew, tried to assist the actor. In the process, the actor admitted taking some stimulants before coming to location. These three actors were interviewed independently and they became the key informants. They also helped to recruit and convince other actors who have used or currently use performance enhancing drugs and stimulants to participate in the interviews.

A total of 64 men and women ranging from 19-54 years in age were interviewed. The interview schedules lasted over a period of nine weeks and were arranged to give privacy and independence to the respondents. This was supplemented by Focus Group Discussions (FGD) involving a set of 16 respondents (an average of five participants per session). The interviews were conducted in the English language and where appropriate the Pidgin English dialect was used. Informants were met at rehearsal venues, theatres, studios and shooting locations. The venues for the interview sessions were subsequently arranged at the convenience of respondents. Some were interviewed at their homes, some at the rehearsal venues and others at their business offices to find out their opinions and experiences concerning stimulants and performance enhancing drugs.

In recognition of prevailing socio-cultural norms, a separate group discussion session was arranged for women. The Focus Group Discussion sessions enabled the researcher to compare the information obtained at the individual interview sessions with that of the groups. Respondents openly deliberated on the key facts at each session and this added validity to the findings. The interviews and discussion sessions were recorded on audio tapes and augmented with notes about respondents' non-verbal expressions. The tapes and notes were periodically reviewed with trained field assistants at the end of each interview session. The field assistants, however, did not participate in the actual interview sessions since the presence of 'strangers' could cause respondents to withhold some information. Research has shown that participants in deviant behaviour often withhold information or present false data to researchers whom they could not trust.

The interviews yielded a body of qualitative data which were organized according to thematic relevance for easier analysis. These themes are: notions of drugs and abuse, motivations for taking stimulants, categories of drugs, doping technologies and users, and impacts of drug use.

Notions of drugs and abuse

All the respondents agree that drug abuse results from misuse or unauthorized use of drugs. However, there are divergent opinions on the definition of drugs. Fifty-five of the respondents argue that 'hard drugs' are harmful and identify such drugs as cocaine, heroine, marijuana, LSD and 'ICD'. They also claim that other drugs are 'mild' and do not cause much problem unless one takes an overdose of them. Ten of the respondents admit that they hear of substances, drugs and medicines but cannot really differentiate the 'harmful' ones from the 'harmless' ones. Eight respondents agree that all drugs are harmful whenever they are misused. However, the status of alcohol generated some interesting arguments and respondents hotly debated this point during the Focus Group Discussions. One of them simply identified as Teekay (aged 26) says:

> I believe that alcohol is not really a problem as such even though it can intoxicate. If it is that harmful, why is it sold and consumed freely at every street corner in Nigeria? Why are NAFDAC (National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control) and NDLEA (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency) not arresting all those dealers and consumers? I think that over-consumption of anything, even water, is bad. That is the problem with drunks and alcoholics and not the drink itself. For me, those who cannot control their consumption should not take alcohol.

The interviews and focus group discussions generally reveal that many performing artists who use stimulants and intoxicants do not know the chemical properties of the drugs, their side effects as well as the actual risk they pose to their health and the society.

Motivations for taking stimulants

According to some respondents, stimulants help the user to be 'confident', 'high' and 'sharp', thereby overcoming 'shyness', 'fear' and 'timidity'. The respondents in this bracket are mostly young artistes who are relatively beginners in the act. An adolescent respondent (aged 19), who prefers to be called Iyke, has this to say:

> I want to be a star. But, I am naturally shy. So, to go on stage and face a crowd, I need to take something to fire me up. Even at film locations, I find it hard to face the camera and crew without feeling jittery and messing up. But when I drink or smoke something, it helps me to get the courage I need to perform my role. Many times, I take a small bottle of strong gin with me and use it backstage from time to time. I am not the only one. Many artistes drink gin or smoke *igb`* (marijuana) before and during performances.

From the data gathered at the interviews and discussion sessions, it appears that older actors and actresses who use stimulants exert some measure of influence on the younger ones who often see them as role models. A respondent and veteran in the theatre industry (aged 51), who pleaded anonymity, claims he learnt to use intoxicants as a young man from older actors and musicians with whom he worked at the early stages of his performing arts career. He goes further to say:

> We frequent bars before performance. During intermissions, the big stars retire backstage to 'cool off' as they used to say. They were famous artistes and I admired them. Some drink, some smoke different things, some chew leaves and some even take personal injections. They were quite generous and can share with anyone who showed

> interest. I guess I started taking hot stuff from that time. But it does not hurt me or spoil my show. It just makes me feel normal as I mount the stage or set to perform.

The mentoring influence of established performers over the younger ones appears to go beyond professional matters and inculcates a whole way of life. A respondent and notable Nigerian movie star, aged 54, whom for the purpose of anonymity we will refer to as Tippo, speaks in the affirmative:

> The star syndrome is like a cult. Similarly, hero-worshipping is powerful. It is a culture. They idolize and glorify whatever habits the star indulges in, whether good or bad. For example, I am a chain-smoker and I drink a lot of alcohol. My doctors have warned me against the habit. Even now, I still experience health complications related to it. It is a personal problem I've been trying to deal with. It has nothing to do with my profession. They are habits I picked from the street as a youth. I grew up in a polygamous home with extreme poverty, neglect and frustrations. But some of my admirers, especially young actors, try to drink and smoke heavily whenever we meet; either to imitate or outdo me. When I tell the younger artistes that it is not good for them, they simply laugh it off. But surely, it affects them negatively during or after the performance unlike me.

Apart from the urge to perform well and be a celebrity, one of the motivations for the use of stimulants by performing artists is economic. This is common with female artistes as revealed during the interviews and FGDs. Many film producers offer attractive fees to induce actresses to perform intimate scenes or engage in some form of nudity. Owing to the nature of Nigerian society, many women reject such roles due to the scandals and stigma associated with it. But due to harsh economic conditions, the almost irresistible pay, and promise of future parts and benefits in other movies and modelling contracts, many women accept such roles. An actress that goes by the nickname, Kessy, aged 29, explains:

> Many girls accept such romantic and nude parts because of the pay. Things are hard, there is no job and we are struggling to survive. It takes more than mere professionalism to take off your dress before strangers and face the camera. Those who did it in the past faced a lot scandal. The mass media also make it worse by reproducing the pictures. I know one girl who had her wedding engagement broken by her fiancé because of the part she played in a movie. For a decent woman to play such roles in our culture and environment, you need some stimulants to push you on. What you see on stage and screen is fiction. It is not real life. It is only a play. Everything ends on the set but many people don't understand it that way. We are not loose women; just trying to do a job and earn a living. After all, is it not better than going into the street to engage in prostitution?

A popular Nigerian actress, Cossy Orjiakor, reacting to media reports about her nude performances states: 'Anybody can fondle my boobs. There is nothing bad in those roles whether in *Shattered Home*, *Outkast* or any of the films I've appeared in, for God's sake! I'm interpreting the script the producers gave me...' (Orjiakor, 2002, p.12). Another erotic performer, Shan George, concedes that nude roles especially in the Nigerian film *Outkast* have made her 'popular' and richer (George, 2002, p.29). Similarly, Akobundu (2002) observes that money and drugs are associated with nudity in Nigerian movies.

Some male artistes also use drugs to help them develop hormones necessary for muscular build-ups. Some of these actors admire the physique of some popular

Western movie stars and Rapp musicians and desire to be like them. According to Slow, a muscular actor and performing arts graduate aged 27:

> I like macho men. With a good muscular physique, you can always get a role in films especially action and romance films. I started by going to the gym to lift weights and build up my muscles. There I met some athletes and we became friends. One day, they showed me some drugs. I don't know the names of the drugs but the weightlifters said that they are anabolic steroids which help to enhance their performance at sporting events. I used the drugs and noticed that they helped to pump up my muscles and veins and I've been getting parts in movies since then. I believe I'll get a big contract soon. But the drugs are expensive and you have to use them often to be in top shape.

The motivations notwithstanding, there appears to be a general consensus among the respondents that frequent use of drugs can lead to addiction.

Categories of drugs and users

Data available from the interviews and FGDs indicate that the actors and actresses use assorted stimulants ranging from 'mild' to 'hard' drugs. Data supplied during the interviews indicate that performing artists use a variety of stimulants including Ephedrine, marijuana, cocaine, heroine, pemoline, alcohol, and traditional concoctions made from herbs, roots and sap of plants and trees. There are some other drugs that are used by artistes though respondents could not tell the brand names. Indeed, an interesting piece of information obtained during the interviews and discussions is that some users do not actually know the names and possible side effects of some of the drugs they used, particularly the steroids.

Some users in this category admitted that they used the drugs on the recommendation of their friends and peer groups who often peddled such drugs without labels or the product's literature. These categories of drugs, mostly in capsules and injectable forms were used at variable doses depending on the peddler's prescription and assessment of a client's body weight. Narrating his experience, a respondent called Skido says:

> A friend introduced me to those drugs. Some were in capsules and others in injection vials. He told me how to use them. I bought it from him and used it as he told me. The next day he came around and I told him how I felt. He advised me to reduce the dosage since according to him, my body weight was lower than he estimated and it seemed I had a light brain. I reduced the dosage and felt better after sometime. But I didn't continue because being a jobless graduate I couldn't cope with the high cost.

During the FGDs, some of the respondents claimed that they had heard of such drugs as EPO, LSD, as well as other doping technologies as gene or blood doping and hormone-boosting surgeries which are often used by people in the entertainment industries. However, though none of them admitted undergoing any such surgery, they could not tell if any of the drugs they have used fall within the category of EPO or LSD.

On the whole, alcohol and marijuana appear to be the most abused drugs among the artistes interviewed. Virtually all the respondents including women admitted taking considerable quantities of alcohol, particularly before performance. On the other hand, 48 respondents (75 percent) admit using marijuana regularly or periodically. In addition, 7 respondents (11 percent) still use cocaine or heroine while five respondents (eight percent) use steroids periodically. Out of these five one is female. It also appears

that artistes use a variety of drugs depending on the circumstances such as availability, cost and peer pressure. The users of performance enhancing drugs also cut across various age brackets from teenagers to very mature adults. Nonetheless, data obtained during the interviews show that youths and middle-aged artistes (19-45years) constitute the majority of users.

Impacts of drug use

The impacts of performance enhancing drugs on their users are varied and appear to be dependent on the individual body anatomy of users and nature of drugs used. Data from the interviews show that performance enhancing drugs helped the users to build mass and strength, increase oxygen delivery in tissues, mask pain, relax their nerves and brain, control their weight, and get stimulated to take action by breaking their inhibitions. Similarly, respondents reported a number of side effects after using the drugs. Such effects include acute headache, exhaustion, body aches, muscular spasms, dizziness, depression, sleeplessness (insomnia), eye redness and pain, loss of libido, drowsiness and general lack of interest. A male respondent (aged 24) who holds a diploma in dramatic arts and goes by the nickname Buddy narrates his first-time experience after taking performance enhancing drugs:

> A friend gave me those tablets. It is called Pemoline. But he calls it P-tabs, because the letter 'P' was written on the tablets. According to him, 'P' is for power. He said the tablets would give me extra strength. I needed it because I was cast for a competitive role in a movie that demanded a lot of stamina. It worked well for me and I noticed that I was not tired easily. The directors and producers commended my performance. However, the next morning I was totally exhausted. My muscles and nerves were aching and my eyes were feeling as if grains of sand were in them. I couldn't do any work. I had to take some pain killers and lie in bed. The feelings began to subside after two days.

Another respondent, Fredo (aged 28), admitted having 'unpleasant feelings' after taking some performance enhancing drugs which he could not identify at the time of the interview. He says he felt 'edgy' and 'impatient', lost his temper at a movie location and physically assaulted an actress for being 'rude'. The most alarming after-effect according to Fredo was 'the apparent loss of sexual feeling' as he 'could not have an erection for about three days' though he felt better in subsequent days.

Some common features among these respondents were the tendency to follow the recommendation of their peers and reluctance to consult trained medical personnel. Some of the respondents admitted using the drugs again despite the side effects. A female professional dancer and choreographer (age undisclosed) who prefers to be called IT, admitted using some LSD and amphetamine which give her extra energy to dance. She concedes that the drugs have some side effects such as 'exhaustion, nervousness, numbness at the nipples and finger tips' but observes that the feelings subside and disappear with time. Another female respondent, called Love, says her first experience at drinking alcohol before performance was influenced by her friend. But she noticed that it deadened her synaptic responses as well as cognitive and physical ability. Though she felt confident she was equally dizzy, drowsy and tired. According to Love, she had to lie to the director that she was ill and was excused to go home while her double went on stage for the night's show.

Discussion

The use of drugs to enhance performance is becoming entrenched among performing artists. This ranges from non-habitual to habitual use which often leads to addiction. Available data indicate a tendency among such drug users to adopt various forms of doping technologies such as oral applications (ingestion), intravenous and intramuscular applications (injections) as well as nasal applications (smoking and sniffing or inhalation). The use of more advanced doping technologies such as blood doping or gene doping and surgeries was not found among the sample population although a number of respondents have knowledge of it especially as used by top-class athletes.

The motivations for using dope is mainly to enhance performance by masking pain, increasing oxygen delivery, building bone and muscles, stimulating, relaxing and controlling the weight of users. A majority of young artistes that use performance enhancing drugs were influenced by peer groups while others imitate the lifestyles of super stars that they admire as their idols or role models. Anxiety and the urge to overcome 'stage fright' (performance anxiety) is also a major cause of doping among young actors in Nigeria. Such beginners in the dramatic arts often start with alcohol, graduate to amphetamine, opium and other narcotics and may advance to steroids.

Furthermore, a level of ignorance appears to exist among users of performance enhancing drugs particularly in the area of risk awareness. The notion of what constitutes illicit drugs seems debatable among users. Similarly, the awareness of the personal health hazards and social consequences of drugs among the users appears superficial. Thus, most users do not seem to consider the potential harm of such performance enhancing drugs until they become addicted. A handful of users who are aware of the risks obviously consider the expected benefits as outweighing the hazards thus adopt the Machiavellian principle of 'the end justifies the means'.

Besides the social impact of drug addiction such as crime, maladjustment, aggressive attitudes, violence, broken homes, and assorted deviant behaviour, performance enhancing drug users also suffer personal health problems associated with adaptability, nervous and mental breakdown, cell damage, bronchitis and cancer. The users of performance enhancing drugs seem to be aware of the illicit nature of the act and are thus reluctant to consult doctors. Instead, many of them often resort to self-medication in managing complications arising from the drugs they use.

There is a link between economic hardship and addiction to performance enhancing drugs in Nigeria. The high level of poverty and youth unemployment in the country places several graduates and skilled persons in a desperate struggle for the few available jobs. In the entertainment industry, the situation appears worsened by the weak legal system that allows non-professionals in search of glamour, fame and wealth to invade and hijack the industry. Thus, artistes are under intense pressure to get contracts and survive and such contracts depend on a track record of superlative performances. To some actors and actresses therefore, doping in all its ramifications is a survival strategy, a means to an end. The economic motivation often supersedes other considerations for users of drugs particularly in the negotiation of risks to personal and community health and security.

The ready availability of performance enhancing drugs on the streets of Onitsha (the study area) is indicative of weak law enforcement machinery. Users of narcotics

and other heavy drugs obtain their supplies freely from peddlers and several joints in the locality. Nigeria has two specialized drug regulation agencies, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC). They are charged with the responsibility of checking drug abuse with the assistance of other law enforcement agencies. However, the more active of these agencies, the NAFDAC, appears to have lost the battle against illicit drug trade in Onitsha. Apparently frustrated by the brazen impunity enjoyed by drug barons due to their immense influence and criminal network, the NAFDAC and WHO recently declared Onitsha a drug disaster area (Ekeoba, 2006). The NAFDAC boss has escaped a number of assassination attempts from criminals believed to be agents of drug barons based in Onitsha. Indeed, the high level of crime and the violent activities of hoodlums, miscreants and ethnic militia on the streets of Onitsha have been linked to the booming trade and flagrant consumption of drugs and narcotics (Okoli, 2003). The flourishing trade in narcotics in Nigeria is mainly driven by commercial gains (Alubo, 1985). The ready availability of drugs is a key factor in its consumption and this is the case in Onitsha.

Conclusion

The incidence of drug addiction and abuse to enhance performance is rising among actors in the entertainment industry and this manifests itself in the adoption of different doping technologies to achieve desired results. The phenomenon, from the findings of this study, is prevalent among different categories of performers in the Nigerian theatre and motion picture industries. But the attention of authorities and the media is often focused on athletes in the sports sector with relative neglect of performing artists. Nevertheless, the risk posed by drugs to personal health and societal well-being remains substantial. The ripple effects of such risks can be better recognized by the fact that such actors are seen as superstars on stage, television and films and thus adopted as role models particularly by young people who idolize them.

Peer influence, a weak legal system, poverty, and youth adventurism and delinquency contribute in perpetuating drug abuse and its flourishing trade. There is therefore a dire need to review the legal codes and enforcement machinery as they apply to drug sale and consumption in Nigeria. The drug regulatory authorities must also turn their searchlight on actors, dancers and musicians to curb the rising incidence of performance enhancing drugs in the entertainment industry and its ripple effects on the society. The Nigerian anti-drug and regulatory agencies (NAFDAC and NDLEA) should borrow the approach of NIDA in USA by getting involved in the promotion of drug-free performances by artistes through awards, sponsorships and incentives to discourage doping in the industry.

Alcohol and drug abuse is a national problem that affects the health, development and future of the citizens and the society. While drug abuse now starts at an early age, it appears to mature and reach its climax when such youths enter the higher institutions of learning. A systematic programme of drug education and counselling should be mapped out by theatre and drama schools and incorporated into the curriculum to educate trainees on the personal and social hazards of performance enhancing drugs. The fight against alcoholism and drug abuse in general really needs an extensive approach beginning from the cradle to the class and beyond.

Since the theatre is a purveyor of culture, Goodman and de Gay (2000) in their editorial notes maintain that theatrical performances should continue to be a symbol of a people's positive values and cultural identity. Thus, it can be used as a potent medium to fight drug abuse on campuses. However, a performer who indulges in such negative behaviour can rarely be an effective tool for its eradication in his community. Efforts must therefore be made by all stakeholders to ensure that the performer's conduct, on and off the stage or set, does not portray negative values and deviant culture. Finally, the various guilds in the performing arts and film industries in Nigeria should enact strict anti-doping regulations for members and enter into partnerships with drug enforcement agencies to combat the trend among artistes and save the profession and society from imminent disaster.

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Measuring Ethnic Identification and Attachment in sub-Saharan Africa

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In the past six years, methodological efforts to frame the issue of weak states have led to indices that rank states on the bases of a range of social, political, economic and security variables. Contestations and violent intercommunal conflict in Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe or so-called 'trouble spots' in Africa (to quote a recent article in the *Washington Post* Baker 2008: A17), are evidence of the chasms and domestic anarchy in countries that have been described variously as weak, failing or collapsed.

A recent version of these indices is the Index of State Weakness in the Developed World published by Brookings Institution and prepared by Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick (2008); their work relies on a set of indicators to characterize all aspects of state weakness. Other examples include the Fragile States Briefs produced by Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project at Carleton University that begun in 2006; State Fragility Index (2007) produced by Monty Marshall and Jack Goldstone at George Mason University; Failed States Index which started in 2005 and is produced by the Fund for Peace. These reports are based on an array of indicators including social, economic, political, security, crime, human development or social welfare and environment which are combined to create a composite score of state performance. Variations of the index methodology also include the report (2004) released by the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, which discusses threats of weak states to the US, and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance at the Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2007), which focuses on 'political goods' such as safety and security, rule of law, transparency and corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger developed at the University of Maryland (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008) is an exemplar of these indexes. The conceptual frame is a familiar one: the incidence of instability or armed conflict can be forecasted if we know the extent of democracy, economic freedom, social development, militarization and regional armed conflict.

Generally, these indexes are based on models that relate collapses in the economy and civil society to major violent intercommunal conflict such as domestic unrests, riots, insurgencies, armed conflicts, civil conflicts or wars. State weakness, failure and eventual collapse are also catalyzed by another critical dimension: the proliferation of small arms (Klare 1994, 2004).

A latent variable in these constructs is ethnic differences: the recognition that ethnic (and religious) enmity is correlated with the incidence of intercommunal conflict or wars and state weakness. Rotberg (2004, 5) thinks that 'civil wars ... usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic or other intercommunal enmity'. The 'fear

of the other that drives so much of ethnic conflict stimulates and fuels hostilities between regimes'.

But, the role of ethnic differences or a certain ethnic enmity in intercommunal conflict is indeed a puzzling one; when long-time neighbours become enemies overnight based on ethnic or religious affiliation or loyalty is this in response to state breakdown? When long-time neighbours become marauding killers overnight, isn't this the result of a collapse of state authority, rather than merely the result of deep-seated ethnic or religious enmity? But if there were no underlying ethnic or religious differences or enmity, why the seemingly precipitous change in social relations and interactions? As Nelson Kasfir (2004, 54) argues, there is 'more probably going on than can be accounted for by the cultural or ideological cleavages that predate outbreaks of violence' in the countries experiencing intercommunal conflict.

My research argument is that if ethnic differences – what we know also in sub-Saharan Africa as a certain latent 'tribalism' – are to blame for community conflicts, it is predicated on a certain level of metaphorical social distance[1] between social groups, or its proxy measures, ethnic identification and attachment. I use ethnic identification and attachment as proxy measures because precise social distance data are currently unavailable for sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, I write about the results of differences in terms of ethnic identification and ethnic attachment in a sample of sub-Saharan countries (for which there are data). I pose the following research questions: what do these measures tell us about the strength of ethnicity? And does this construct add to our understanding of the role of tribalism in intercommunal conflict in the region? Let me give a background to this argument.

Ethnic Differences and the Role of Small Arms in Intercommunal Conflict

We are aware that a key variable in understanding the nature of armed conflict is the level of unregulated small arms and light weapons circulating freely on the black market since the end of the Cold War. Gamba (1998), Lumpe (2000) and Boutwell and Klare (2000) among others, have written about the role of illegal small and light weapons moving unchecked across porous borders globally. During the Cold War, arms transfers were made from government to government under the patronage of super powers. After the Cold War and since the 1980s, arms are transferred from government to self-styled insurgents and guerrilla movements facilitated by globalization and stockpiles of arms left over from the Cold War (Small Arms Survey 2001, 2006). These weapons are readily available because they are inexpensive, portable, easy to conceal and use (Klare 1999).

In the movie, *Lord of War* (2005), inspired by actual events and starring Nicholas Cage, the global networks of illegal arms trading are starkly rendered; recently, a widely publicized arrest of a Russian linked to the trade was made in Thailand (March 2008). The question, however, is: what is the relationship between official state stockpiles and availability of (licit and illicit) small arms in any community? The Small Arms Survey (2006) argues that in 'poorer' states where security is weak and governments are unstable, stockpiles of arms make armed conflict more likely. There is some recognition that the licit and illicit commerce in small arms are related; this is because arms that are acquired and exported legally, but not adequately monitored eventually find their way on the black market. While the Small Arms Survey estimates

the volume of illegal arms circulating in sub-Saharan African and globally, it is difficult to ascertain the flows of these arms and to intercept them prior to the incidence of armed conflict in any particular country; it is only when community tensions become full blown armed conflicts that our collective attentions are drawn to the existence of these weapons.

The availability of these weapons encourages warfare or violence as a method of conflict resolution. And when there are any community differences (cultural/ethnic, social, economic or political), these inexpensive and portable weapons only worsen community clashes by extending the duration of violence.

The ethnic diversity and heterogeneity in Africa does not necessarily have to be baneful; like any region, these diverse African cultures have lived in harmony and experienced conflict; however, the finding that cultural differences are significantly related to intercommunal conflict (Atiku-Abubakar and Shaw-Taylor 2003) in sub-Saharan Africa suggests a residual persistence of perceptions of ethnic superiority (from the pre-independence era) rather unlike racism in its economic and political outcomes (inequities); in that, patronage based on family and kinship ties and networks of ethnic interest trump other networks in society. This phenomenon of ethnocentrism is analogous to the historical phenomenon of 'tribalism,' with its baggage of adherence to tradition and allegiance to tribal identification (Young 1994, Glickman, 1995).

The immediate pre-independence period focused efforts on building nationalism and nation-states comprising various ethnic groups; this programme of modern nation-states and nationalists was less focused on ethnic patronage (Davidson 1992, Apter and Rosberg 1994). The argument was that so-called 'tribal unions' or 'tribal associations' did not have any place in the emergent post-colonial nations; the new nationalism was based on a progressive ideal of a community of diverse ethnic groups and the 'savage backwoods'[2] of the pre-colonial era was to be abandoned. There was tension between the so-called traditionalists, the chiefs and the favoured citizens of the pre-colonial ethnic nations and the new nationalists as these newly African countries gained independence. The realities of social conflict were apparent; Davidson (1992:111), for instance, notes that the 'new political parties (being formed in the African countries) drew authentic and sometimes overwhelming popular support from their ethnic roots'. Independence movements that once acted in the name of national independence grappled with the potential of devolving into ethnic sub-divisions. The post-independence period therefore, became a project tracking the challenges of nationalism and the hydra of ethnic allegiances (Rothchild 1997, Kieh and Mukenge 2002, Nnoli 1998, Irobi 2005). The challenge then, was how to mitigate the role of ethnic loyalty or tribalism in the immediate post-independence nationalist project. The challenge now, is how to mitigate the flow of small arms so that ethnic differences, where they exist, do not become full-blown violent and tragic conflicts pitting ethnic groups against one another.

Data & Methods

I use country-merged data from Afrobarometer surveys conducted from 1999 to 2001 (round 1) and in 2004 (round 2). Since 1999, Afrobarometer surveys have been an important source of survey data in Africa on public attitudes about democracy, governance, public services, and economy; but data on the conventional measures of

social distance were not collected in rounds 1 and 2. The surveys use clustered stratified multi-stage area probability samples of citizens 18 years or older. Respondents are administered face-to-face interviews based on a structured questionnaire.[3] Twelve countries were surveyed in round 1 including Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe yielding a sample size of 19,527; for round 2, four more countries were added: Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique and Senegal yielding a sample size of 24,248. A minimum sample size of 1,200 cases (or slightly less) was selected for each country; larger sample sizes were drawn from Nigeria Uganda, Kenya and South Africa.[4] The surveys are conducted through a collaboration of social scientists in African countries. The project is coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Michigan State University. The project has received funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the US Agency for International Development, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of International Development (UK).

Importantly, the multi-stage area probability sample design uses probability proportionate to population size method. Each country sample 'is *stratified* by key social characteristics in the population such as sub-national area (e.g. region/province) and residential locality (urban or rural). *The area stratification reduces the likelihood that distinctive ethnic or language groups are left out of the sample* (emphasis mine). And the urban/rural stratification is a means to make sure that these localities are represented in their correct proportions' (Afrobarometer Sampling document: http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html; accessed April 2008). This is important for our analytical purposes to ensure that country samples contain the spread of ethnic groups and that all ethnic groups are represented.

A review of the questionnaire yielded the following items for analytic purposes; in round 1, these include:

> (1) 'Besides being (insert nationality), which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost'. This is a root identification question. This '*identification'* question is open-ended and responses were post-hoc classified into 15 categories which included the core categories of ethnicity, race, religion, occupation, class, gender, party, and continental.
>
> (2) 'Of all groups in this country, (members of your identity group) are the best.' This item is a dimension of ethnic attachment – this '*group is best'* question uses Likert scale responses.
>
> (3) 'You feel much stronger ties to (members of your identity group) than to other (people of your nationality)?' This item is the other measure of ethnic attachment. This '*stronger ties to group'* question uses Likert scale responses.

Curiously and inexplicably, the items '*group is best'* and '*stronger ties to group'* were not asked of respondents in Ghana, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda in round 1. The root question item about identity was not asked of respondents in Ghana.

In round 2, the '*group is best'* question was not fielded, and the '*stronger ties to group'* item was revised to read: 'Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to: group or national identity?' I recoded the '*stronger ties to group'* item from

round 1 to be dichotomous as was done in round 2. The root question '*identification'* in round 2 was not revised. To fit a general linear model, I recoded the '*group is best'* and the '*identification'* variables in both rounds to be dichotomous as well.

I hypothesize that countries that have had intercommunal conflict would have significantly higher proportions of respondents choosing tribal or ethnic identification and attachment (besides nationality). Specifically, I argue that the countries described as 'trouble spots' (for which there are data) including Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe will show higher proportions of respondents reporting tribal or ethnic identification and attachment when compared to the other countries in the sample. I argue that if this is the case, these countries may be arguably more tribalistic or ethnocentric when compared to the others.

Now, this research design is bounded by the fact that ethnic identification and attachment could be the *result* of past ethnic violence and conflict. In which case, attachment to ethnicity or tribalism may actually be the outcome (not the cause) of (past) ethnic violence. Ideally, of course, this can be tested only with an experimental (or quasi-experimental) design, where we would capture ethnic identification and attachment pre and post conflict. I do not attempt to achieve such a design in this study. Rather, I use a correlational design that does not make any declarations about causality.

I used reliability analysis to assess whether the two questionnaire items from survey round 1, *group is best* and *stronger ties to group* have a common *attachment* factor. I used frequency distributions and the contrasts function in the GENMOD procedure in SAS to test whether proportions of respondents in each country are significantly different based on ethnic identification, and those who say their ethnic group is best or who say they have stronger ties to their ethnic group. In round 2 (2004), the tests were repeated but only for ethnic identification and respondents who have stronger ties to their group. The GENMOD procedure is appropriate because it allows for the estimation of user-defined contrasts in a linear model through a nonlinear link function when the response or dependent variable is non-continuous (in this case, dichotomous) and the predictor (independent) variable is categorical. This procedure is based on the normal approximation for proportions. I used the binomial distribution option and asked for test of differences among least squares means.

Findings

Cronbach's alpha yielded a coefficient of 0.9 indicating that we cannot reject my contention that *group is best* and *stronger ties to group* measure a common factor I call (ethnic) attachment. A high alpha coefficient means the items are positively correlated. Table 1 presents data from round 1 showing ethnic identification or percent of respondents choosing ethnic group or tribe as main identity group besides nationality. Generally, most respondents in surveyed countries in this round chose sub-national identities when asked to identify one, but in Botswana, 32.9 percent or 1 out of 3 respondents chose not to differentiate by sub national group. By comparison, in each of the other countries less than two percent of respondents chose not to differentiate by ethnicity/tribe, religion, gender or occupation.

Table 1: Besides nationality, which specific identity group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?

Country	Tribe/Ethnicity	Identity Group with highest %	
Botswana	28.9%	Won't differentiate,	32.9
Lesotho	1.9	Occupation	32.8
Malawi	39.1	Tribe/Ethnicity	
Mali	38.5	Tribe/Ethnicity	
Namibia	43.0	Tribe/Ethnicity	
Nigeria	47.4*	Tribe/Ethnicity	
South Africa	21.6	Tribe/Ethnicity	
Tanzania	3.0	Occupation,	76.4
Uganda	11.8	Occupation,	62.0
Zambia	7.7	Religion,	32.9
Zimbabwe	36.0*	Tribe/Ethnicity	

$p < .01$/

In this round, less than a tenth of respondents in three countries, Lesotho, Tanzania and Zambia (1.9, 3 and 7.7 percent respectively) chose ethnicity or tribe as their identification group other than nationality. In Uganda, ethnic identification is also comparatively low. In these countries, more respondents chose occupation or religion for identification. But, notably, approximately one out of two respondents in Nigeria (47.4 percent) and Namibia (43 percent) chose tribe or ethnicity. Approximately one out of three (36 percent) Zimbabweans chose ethnicity. The proportion for Nigeria is significantly higher when compared to all the other countries except Namibia. The proportion for Zimbabwe is significantly higher when compared to Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, but not significantly higher or different in comparison to Botswana, Malawi, Mali and Namibia.

Results in table 2 are based on the sub-sample of respondents who chose ethnic identification besides nationality (from table 1). In this table, Nigeria emerges as the country with significantly higher proportions of respondents expressing attachment to ethnic group when compared to Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (all countries with comparatively higher proportions of respondents choosing ethnic identification – see table 1). The proportion of Zimbabweans saying their ethnic group is best is not significantly higher when compared to Malawi (but the estimate is significantly lower than in Namibia and South Africa). The proportion of Zimbabweans expressing stronger ties to their ethnic group is significantly higher when compared to Malawi, (but again, this estimate is significantly lower than in Namibia and South Africa).

Table 2: Attachment to Ethnic Group Identity

Country	Of all groups in this country, members of your ethnic group are the best	You feel much stronger ties to ethnic group than to other nationals of country
Malawi	46.9	67.9
Namibia	67.3	75.7
Nigeria	87.3*	91.6*
South Africa	70.9	78.3
Zambia	50.4	69.8*

* $p < .01$

In round 2, the analysis was expanded to include 16 countries. Like table 1, table 3 shows percent of respondents choosing ethnic group or tribe as main identity group besides nationality. Clearly, more respondents in more countries chose occupation rather than tribe or ethnic group when asked about attachments to social group in this survey round; this includes one of the countries of interest, Kenya, where, approximately one out of three made this choice. And in Zimbabwe approximately one out of every three respondents chose religion when asked about attachments to social group. Note that while the proportion of respondents in Nigeria, the first country of interest, in this survey is comparable to the previous round (47.4 percent in round 1 versus 49.3 percent in round 2), the proportion of Zimbabweans has dropped by 25 percent (36 percent in round 1 versus 10.9 percent in round 2). In fact, the proportions of respondents choosing ethnic identification (besides nationality) in Zimbabwe together with South Africa (10.8 percent), Zambia (13.3 percent) and Cape Verde (1.1 percent) were the lowest among the countries in this survey round. Although the proportion in Zambia has almost doubled, it is still among the lowest.

There are some notable increases in proportions of respondents choosing ethnic or tribal identification as well. Lesotho and Tanzania which had previously reported low proportions of respondents choosing ethnic identification in round 1 are reporting increases of 53.7 percent and 23.3 percent respectively in round 2. In Botswana, 53.7 percent of respondents now choose ethnic identification, an increase of almost 25 percent. There are notable decreases as well; proportions in Malawi and Namibia declined by over 20 percent and in South Africa, the proportion decreased by almost 11 percent.

Table 3: Besides nationality, which specific identity group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?

Country	Tribe/Ethnicity	Change from Round 1	Group identity with highest %	
Botswana	53.7%	24.8%	Tribe/Ethnicity	
Ghana	39.4		Tribe/Ethnicity	
Lesotho	55.6	53.7	Tribe/Ethnicity	
Malawi	14.8	-24.3	Occupation,	42.0%
Mali	36.0	-2.5	Tribe/Ethnicity	

Country	Tribe/Ethnicity	Change from Round 1	Group identity with highest %	
Namibia	20.9	-22.1	Gender,	33.6
Nigeria	49.3*	1.9	Tribe/Ethnicity	
South Africa	10.8	-10.8	Occupation,	31.0
Tanzania	26.3	23.3	Occupation,	52.5
Uganda	20.2	8.4	Occupation,	55.2
Zambia	13.3	5.6	Religion,	25.8
Cape Verde	1.1		Occupation,	30.1
Kenya	19.4*		Occupation,	55.6
Mozambique	28.9		Occupation,	46.2
Senegal	33.8		Occupation,	44.8

* $p < .01$

The proportion of Nigerians choosing ethnic identification is significantly higher when compared to the other countries, except for Botswana and Lesotho. Of the other two countries of interest, Kenya and Zimbabwe, only 19.4 percent and 10.9 percent of respondents chose tribe or ethnic identification besides nationality; that is approximately one out five respondents chose ethnicity or tribe in Kenya and approximately one out of ten chose tribe in Zimbabwe; note the difference in the proportions choosing ethnicity or tribe from round 1. The proportions of Zimbabweans choosing ethnic identification is significantly lower when compared to all the other countries except South Africa and Cape Verde, and the proportions of Kenyans choosing ethnic identification is significantly lower when compared to all other countries except Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Cape Verde.

Table 4: Attachment to Ethnic Group Identity

Country	Most strongly attached to ethnic group identity
Botswana	51.7%
Ghana	35.1%
Lesotho	18.9%
Mali	54.7
Nigeria	49.7*

* $p < .01$

Similar to table 2, results in table 4 are restricted to countries where more respondents chose ethnic identification besides nationality (from table 3); compared to the other countries, the estimate of respondents in Nigeria is significantly higher than in Ghana and Lesotho, but not in Botswana or Mali.

Discussion and Conclusion

Results from these analyses are mixed; we cannot reject the hypotheses when it comes to Nigeria, but our hypotheses do not hold for Kenya and Zimbabwe. In the first survey round, while results from Nigeria allow us to maintain the hypotheses of greater ethnic

identification and attachment, Zimbabwe's rates of ethnic identification were only significantly different for countries where ethnic identification was low (except South Africa). For ethnic attachment, the results for Zimbabwe are not conclusive and so I cannot say that Zimbabwe has higher rates of ethnic attachment. In round 2, Nigeria again confirms the hypotheses, but here again, the hypotheses of higher rates of ethnic identification and attachment do not hold for Kenya and Zimbabwe.

Nigeria is an exemplar of the ethnic identification and attachment as evidenced by their post-colonial history and past conflicts (for example, the Biafran war) and the current insurgency in the Niger Delta. But the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe need explication.

In news reports (Gettleman 2008, *New York Times*), the recent (January-March, 2008) conflicts in Kenya were attributed to ethnic enmity or differences as members of Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups visited violence on each other. My analyses show that most Kenyans do not identify themselves ethnically or tribally; so what explains the ethnic violence? What my analyses don't do is investigate the interaction of socioeconomic class and ethnicity or tribal attachment. Since more Kenyans identify themselves by occupational group, a reasonable next step would be to look into how class differences interact with ethnic or tribal differences.

It is not clear that the conflict in Zimbabwe is based on ethnic or tribal differences; the rates of ethnic attachment, especially, in both survey rounds were not remarkable. Although Mugabe's regime has been accused of complicity in the deaths of thousands of members of the Ndebele ethnic group in 1983, the current turmoil stems from governmental or political intransigence and an economy crippled by a messy land redistribution programme. The results of the analyses suggest that a mapping of the root causes of the conflict in Zimbabwe perhaps should begin with an in-depth examination of the structure of political power and the distribution of 'political goods' in Zimbabwe and not ethnic or tribal differences or enmity.

It is noteworthy that only three of the countries experiencing intercommunal conflict are included in this study; data from Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan would provide more opportunity to test and hone the hypotheses.

There are other intriguing findings here; while the rate of respondents choosing ethnicity did not change for Nigeria and Mali, in Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania, ethnic identification increased markedly from round 1 to round 2. In Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe, ethnic identification declined considerably between survey rounds. It is not clear what caused these rates to change or if we should be concerned about them, and whether or not these rate changes may indicate non-sampling errors in the design of the surveys.

The analyses shows Zambia to be the least ethnocentric or tribalistic; in Zambia, ethnic identification and attachment is minimal, and this is not for want of different ethnic or tribal groups. In both rounds, less than 14 percent of respondents expressed ethnic identification or attachment. A closer study of Zambia's ethno-social landscape would inform this discourse. Ghana and Mali (in both rounds) are interesting cases because they have comparatively high rates of ethnic identification and attachment, but have been able to avoid intercommunal conflict.

Finally, although considerable progress has been made in describing weak states, identifying their characteristics and predicting their political instability, what is lacking, I argue, is a mapping of exactly how ethnicity or tribalism, or precisely, social distance between ethnic groups contributes to community violence. The results from this analyses show that this role is nuanced and tribalism or ethnocentrism cannot always be fingered singularly in intercommunal conflicts – at best, tribalism interacts with other factors to create conflicts (compare Kenya and Zimbabwe). A precise measurement of ethnic social distance will help us distil its main effect and allow us to make predictions about the level of ethnic antipathies or antagonisms before they blow up into tragic violent confrontations. The Afrobarometer surveys provide a platform for measuring ethnic social distance in sub-Saharan Africa.

Notes

1. The conventional social distance scale developed by Emory Bogardus (1926) was derived from the dual conceptual foundations of geometric (spatial) and metaphoric distance although a precise measurement of geometric distance is suppressed in the Bogardus scale (Ethington 1997). At any rate, the social distance scale remains one of the enduring and successful concepts in sociology, and Bogardus's original version yielded a 'racial distance quotient' measured on a seven point cumulative scale that showed the extent to which respondents would accept a member of a racial out-group. A score of 1.00 indicates no social distance. The cumulative questions are as follows: Would willingly admit members of each race: (1) To close kinship by marriage; (2) To my club as personal chums; (3) To my street as neighbours; (4) to employment in my occupation in my country, (5) To citizenship in my country; (6) As visitors in my country, (7) Would exclude from my country. As reported by Philip Ethington (1997) this scale or some modification of it, has been applied in over 300 studies of gender, class or status, to examine social distance or social relations.
2. Basil Davidson (1992), page 113, quoting Attoh Ahuma's 1911 book *The Gold Coast and the National Consciousness*.
3. The latest full questionnaire is obtainable at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/questionnaires/
4. Sample sizes for each country are as follows:

	Round2	**Round1**
Botswana	1,200	1,200
Ghana	1,200	
Lesotho	1,200	1,177
Malawi	1,200	1,208
Mali	1,283	2,089
Namibia	1,199	1,183
Nigeria	2,428	3,603
South Africa	2,400	2,200
Tanzania	1,223	2,198
Uganda	2,400	2,271
Zambia	1,198	1,198
Zimbabwe	1,104	1,200
Cape Verde	1,268	
Kenya	2,398	
Mozambique	1,400	
Senegal	1,147	

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DEBATE

Can the 'African household' be presented meaningfully in large-scale surveys?[1]

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Introduction

The African continent, as is the case with all other continents, contains a variety of household (or homestead) structures. The focus of this article is on the manner in which researchers give account of such various household structures in specific southern African contexts. Certain researchers argue that households can easily be classified if clear criteria are in place and if the concepts *family* and *household* are not confused.[2] Others argue that African households are too complex to fit into preconceived 'Western' categories. In this regard Budlender (2003: 62) cites a publication by Russell (1993) wherein the complexity of Swazi households/homesteads is stressed in order to illustrate the inadequacies of census categories: 'Russell ... notes that some scholars are doubtful as to either the possibility or usefulness of compacting the diversity of "African experience and structure into one simple paradigm"'. Although acknowledgement of the complexities of African household structures comprises a large section of the present article, I want to concur with Budlender (2003: 62) who states: 'While the point about diversity is true, it is nevertheless important to find some practical way of implementing meaningful surveys, interpreting them, and allowing those interpretations to inform social policy'.

I argue here that there is a tendency to overstate the uniqueness of African households, namely by comparing it with a simplified model of Western households, and that clear-cut differences between so-called African and Western households do not always exist.[3] Since both these conceptions, of Western and African households, have for years existed side by side in South Africa, the country offers useful data with which to test the validity of using preconceived household categories of different types of households. In this article I will first analyse some of the discussions relating to households in South Africa by looking at the assumed divisions between African and Western households. Thereafter I will discuss some of the complexities related to households by focusing on selected qualitative research studies and by highlighting that households are by nature difficult to capture adequately, regardless of a label such as 'African' or 'Western'. It will be shown how these complexities of African households can become distorted and how incomplete (or even incorrect) deductions can follow from current South African census and household survey practices. In the

last section of this article I will attempt to make recommendations for quantitative studies of households that can accommodate the diversity and complexity of South African households – whether labelled 'African' or 'Western' – more adequately.

Brief overview of South African household debates

In South Africa a number of arguments regarding households have been put forward over the last three decades. Below a brief outline of some of these arguments is given.

An indication of the complexity of household structures can be seen in a debate in which Margo Russell (1994) severely criticised a survey on household structures analysed by Anna Steyn. Steyn (1993) analysed quantitative research to ascertain the type of family structures within which South Africans lived during the 1980s. She concluded that certain family structures were more common amongst certain population groups (referring to the white, Indian, coloured and black racial categories in South Africa). According to Susan Ziehl, (2002: 28-30) Russell argued that Steyn's study, amongst other things, did not take the domestic life cycle concept into consideration and was therefore overstating the prevalence of the nuclear type family form. Ziehl (2002) gave a balanced view on this debate by teasing out the different assumptions and conclusions made by the two authors, and by pointing to the importance of a longitudinal approach in understanding the dynamics of households. In my view the Steyn-Russell-debate alludes to an important aspect that is still relevant today, a fact that Russell (1994) mentioned at the end of her article, namely the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative research. One of Russell's main criticisms against Steyn is that she did not use the rich social anthropological qualitative literature on black households to explain the quantitative data. This same challenge of using qualitative data to understand (or at least not misunderstand) quantitative data is still relevant today.

Another debate relating to households is the issue of household heads, which both Debbie Budlender (2003) and Susan Ziehl (2001) commented on. Both authors are critical of the concept 'household head' as it is used by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA).[4] Budlender (2003: 52-53) refers specifically to the October Household Surveys conducted by StatsSA from 1994-1999 and the 1996 census. She shows how enumerators often had different conceptualisations of a household head, which is not clearly defined in the enumerator's manual:

> The enumerator is told to let the respondent decide who is the household head. CSS staff argue that, as in the case of 'race', the concept may be fuzzy or 'unscientific', but most respondents will 'know' what one is talking about (Budlender, 2003: 53).

Ziehl (2001), in turn, after the 1996 census recommended that the term 'household head' should be scrapped and that the oldest person should be written down first. However, in the 2001 census the following appears on the census form:

> The head or acting head is the person who is the main decision maker in the household. If people are equally decision makers, take the oldest person.

In the 2005 General Household Survey (GHS)[5] the instruction to the enumerator is:

> Ask who the *head* (or the *acting head*) of the household is...

and later:

If more than one head or acting head, take the oldest.

The problems regarding the term household head thus seems to receive attention, but are far from being resolved. Based on the term household head, various data sets are analysed for a number of purposes, for example it is quite common to find that a table or figure by StatsSA presented according to the race of the household head. Some of the problems with the term are also discussed in detail by O'Laughlin (1998) where she demonstrates practically that so-called female-headed households with migrant income earners in Botswana cannot be distinguished from female-headed households without migrant income earners – an argument that is also relevant to South Africa. The term household head is rather useless in this context and the fact that absent migrant household members are not included in standard household questionnaires is problematic in at least the southern African context. The issue of absent household members in different contexts is discussed further below.

In the 1990s other lines of enquiry related to households focused on the domestic fluidity of especially black South African households – including so-called 'coloureds' or South Africans from 'mixed descent' (see Seekings, 2003: 1; Spiegel, 1996; Spiegel et al., 1996). 'Inter-household networks of mutual assistance' (Beittel, 1992: 221) have also been touched upon. In 2003, a South African-based journal, *Social Dynamics*, published an issue on households where other issues such as unpaid domestic work done by young female relatives and the concept 'household head' was also scrutinised (Seekings, 2003).

In this 2003 journal Russell (2003: 12; 13; 23) stated repeatedly that the 'conjugal system' is central to 'white' South Africans and kinship is central to 'black' South Africans. Russell thus argues that the conjugal couple is not central to 'black' South African family lives and that there are clear-cut differences between 'black' and 'white' South African households. Although there are certainly different household practices based on different heritages, I want to argue here against overstating such differences to the extent that alternative practices are not recognised.

Historical experiences in South Africa impacted heavily on household structures in that a migrant system was enforced on black people by the apartheid regime. In practice this meant that many waged workers lived in urban centres near their places of work while their families were legally required to stay in rural areas or the so-called homelands. An oscillating migrant system developed in which waged workers lived in urban centres for the greater part of the year and only returned to their families for short breaks. It is important to note that migrant household members are neither unique to blacks living in apartheid South Africa, nor was it necessarily always imposed on families (see Adepoju, 2006: 27ff; Manchuelle, 1997: 2; Rabe, 2006: 26ff and Wilson, 1972: 120-143). However, the migrant system in South Africa was vigorously and increasingly enforced upon huge numbers of black South Africans from the late nineteenth until the late twentieth century. Such a prolonged imposed system put enormous pressure on households, which would seemingly undermine the very idea of a conjugal couple, as partners are often separated residentially for the greater part of the year. The apartheid system thus contributed greatly to different experiences for white and black South African households because black households had to endure various restrictions in their living and working conditions.

Apart from these created divisions between black and white South African households, diverse cultural practices are also found, which are sometimes narrowly ascribed to racial differences only. In this context Russell argued that an author had seriously erred in conducting a qualitative study on commuter couples in South Africa without paying attention to race:

> One legacy of the *apartheid* project is a reluctance to acknowledge cultural differences between different racial groups. The fashionable emphasis is on what people share, and how unequally shares are distributed. All-too-often, this impedes understanding of social phenomena. Take for example, one study of marital separation. The sample of twelve couples who live apart presumably contains black and white people, but it requires some detective work on the part of the reader to establish this, for race is the one factor never mentioned. Although the author tells us that 'the respondents have different first languages' (Rabe, 2001: 279), she makes the surely ill-judged assumption that culture or race are irrelevant in a study of the conjugal couple (Russell, 2003: 9).

Russell (2003: 8) argues that:

> Black and white South Africans are brought up with two radically different kinship idioms. One is derived from the conjugal system which has predominated in north-western Europe for at least five hundred years; the other is the consanguinal descent system characteristic of most of Africa.

I would argue that that Russell's insistence on linking the conjugal system to white South Africans' households and kinship to black South Africans[6] is misleading in its oversimplification, as neither Western nor African culture is that one-dimensional. Many Africans (from different racial categories) construct their households with varying, and sometimes conflicting, values in mind. Socioeconomic aspects, such as migrancy, work opportunities and (lack of) infrastructure, can also affect the current household structure, as a longitudinal approach to household structures, as suggested by Ziehl (2002), could uncover.

Russell's insistence on the overriding importance of the consanguine system amongst black Africans blinds us to the importance that the conjugal system has for some black Africans. The conjugal system is in fact of great importance in certain African contexts as illustrated by Robertson (1984: 182) when describing that in Central Accra, Ghana, '[c]onjugal relations are intimately entwined with economic reality'. However, in these relationships the wives are required to be submissive towards their husbands and the nature of the relationship between the couple is one of 'mutual respect' rather than 'romantic love'. The importance of the couple's relationship seems to be restricted to economic aspects which is also observed in the so-called 'vat-en-sit marriages' in South African urban areas. These latter relationships are characterised by couples who share households without honouring the customary rites of marriages (such as wedding ceremonies or the exchange of *lobola*/bridewealth). These 'vat-en-sit marriages' entail an underlying survival strategy where the couple's resources are pooled (Beittel, 1992: 209-210). In these two examples of black African contexts the conjugal couple is thus recognised as increasing the economic survival chances of the individual by giving access to more resources and resource people.

However, the conjugal couple is more commonly defined by its emotional bonds than by the economic advantages the conjugal bond may hold for partners. In this

regard Colin Murray's (1981) extensive anthropological study in Lesotho, which was (and still is) a major sending area of migrant workers to South Africa, is of importance.[7] Murray (1981: 103) comments on the implicit assumption that Africans do not have close ties between spouses/partners:

> Thus there is some substance to criticism of kinship analyses based on the imposition of western categories such as that of the nuclear family. But such criticism is quite gratuitous if it leads the critic either to insist by contrast but without appropriate evidence on the importance of the 'extended family', or to undermine the credibility of evidence – now surely overwhelming – that the enforced separation of spouses generates acute anxiety, insecurity and conflict. The latter tendency implies an alternative, distinctively African view of marriage and the family which does not presuppose intimacy between husband and wife and which is not therefore undermined by the separation of spouses.

Russell's argument that the conjugal couple is not of similar importance to black Africans compared to whites had in fact been used to justify the enforced separation of couples through the migrant system. Murray's argument here is thus in reaction to such misconstructions of 'African traditions'. The conjugal couple should therefore not be so easily dismissed as unimportant for black Africans. In Rabe's (2001) study on professional couples who are residentially divided due to different work opportunities, no difference was found in the expressed emotional attachment of interviewees from different racial categories. In this study, however, people were represented as lonely, as struggling to cope without partners and people who would prefer to live with their partners. Russell's insistence on the historical importance of the kinship system in Africa has little value to a *black* woman living alone (away from all other extended family members) in Mamelodi with her children and struggling with public transport because her *black* husband needs their only car during the week in a different town. Race was not discussed in that study because the aim was to look at the coping mechanisms of professional people when their job opportunities divide them residentially from their partners. All the couples had lived in neo-local households before the separation (with the exception of one couple who had had relationship problems which ended in the killing of the wife by the husband, who then committed suicide) and no differences were found between people from different racial categories.[8] One cannot use decades of anthropological studies from different contexts (see Russell, 2003: 14ff) to tell a researcher that the highly educated urbanised neo-local black/white/coloured households in her study do not consider the conjugal couple as important.[9] To summarise – research has to be evaluated within its context.

In the Ghanaian example, in 'vat-en-sit marriages', amongst migrant couples from Lesotho and amongst professional urbanised blacks, the economic and/or emotional ties between couples are thus of importance. In fact, Russell's (2003b: 153-176) own research indicates that there are differences regarding verbal statements on Western conjugal systems between urban and rural blacks. Note that the second article by Russell (2003b) in this *Social Dynamics* issue can in itself be regarded as contradicting the argument that black and white South Africans have vastly different experiences of family life, since especially young black urban South Africans have different views regarding historical practices. Russell's argument that the conjugal couple is not central to black South African family lives and that clear-cut differences exist between

black and white South African households, can therefore not be cast in stone, although it should be put in context.

'Western' households

The idea of the dominance of the nuclear family as a result of industrialisation was particularly promoted by Goode in 1982 (Ziehl, 2001: 36) and Goode maintains this basic premise in a recent publication (see Goode, 2003). The simplicity of such a 'Western conjugal system' could seem alluring comparative material when one wants to show the complexity amongst African families and households.[10] However, just as there is not 'an African family', or 'an African household', there is also not 'a Western family' or 'a Western household'. Demographic and historical research in the USA and in various parts of Europe shows the complexity of family structures over time (see Cooper, 1999: 13-37; Kertzer, 1991: 155-179; Teachman et al., 1999: 39-76), and 'Western conjugal system' cannot be an appropriate term to capture the diversity found amongst various European and North American countries.

When looking at so-called Western households, the complexity of households is well documented, but at times not well interpreted. Russell is for example aware of Laslett's earlier work on nuclear family households in Europe (compare Russell, 2003a: 42; 1993: 783) and it is important to note that she traces 'Western social practice' (2003a: 5; 8; 11) mainly back to Laslett's work in England (Russell, 2003a: 13); she sometimes refers to such households as 'northern European' (2003a: 6) or 'north-western European' (2003a: 14). However, Kertzer (1991: 159ff) shows a much more complex picture regarding family and household structures in Europe by alerting us to the development in Laslett's work over time. Laslett had developed his arguments regarding the universality (or not) of the nuclear family household over time by identifying different practices in different regions in Europe (cf. Laslett, 1972; 1983: 516ff). Laslett was involved in various debates and was sensitive to conflicting views on the dominance of the nuclear household and was convinced of the historical centrality of the nuclear family only in England – not the *West*. Kertzer (1991) furthers these arguments regarding the complexity of households by analysing evidence from various studies and from different contexts.

Similarly, white South African households cannot uncritically be equated with so-called Western practices. Russell (2003a: 13) herself distinguishes between different European influences on white South Africans, which therefore undermines the concept of *a* Western household. Although these historically (north-western) European household practices have a bearing on white South African households in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries, another history also developed in South Africa. In this history, European immigrants from different countries arrived in South Africa at different times, they married and shared households with people from different European or other countries and people from various other cultures. White South African households developed their own practices which have some similarities with certain European households and some differences. For example: interracial households in South Africa were restricted due to apartheid policies, but black domestic workers often shared households with white employers. Furthermore, despite the enduring taboos and restrictions on interracial marriages and other sexual liaisons, millions of South Africans have mixed descent systems.

When we thus want to research different households in South Africa, we should acknowledge the diversity found amongst black African households, white households as well as all other racial groupings found in South Africa. I would like to put forward a premise that will guide the rest of this discussion: Regardless of the racial category of individuals, households are difficult to capture adequately in surveys or census data. The heterogeneous population of South Africa with its diverse cultural roots together with the long history of an enforced migrant system contributes to this difficulty.

Household research in South Africa

Prior to 1996 South Africa had had a troubled statistical history, since the apartheid policies of the time heavily influenced the gathering of data (cf. Bah, 1999). For example, the people residing in the former 'homelands' (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were excluded from censuses, as the apartheid regime did not consider these areas as part of South Africa. In 1996 the first census which covered the entire South Africa was held. One of the key aims of the 1996 census was thus to determine how many people actually lived in South Africa. Ziehl (2001) states, in addition, that the South African government wanted to establish the population distribution and determine the socioeconomic status of its citizens in order to evaluate the impact of the government's policies. She further argues that the issue of household structures did not enjoy a prime position. Ziehl made a number of recommendations for future household surveys towards the end of her article (see for example comments on household head above), but the article was published in 2001, the year in which the next census took place.

From 2002 onwards, annual General Household Surveys (GHS) were conducted by StatsSA, which replaced the former October Household Surveys:

> Statistics SA conducted the GHS annually from 2002 since a need was identified for a regular survey designed specifically to measure the level of development and the performance of government programmes and projects. The GHS was thus developed for this purpose. The indicators measured in the 13 nodal areas identified for the Integrated Rural Development Strategy (IRSD) formed the subject matter for the survey. (Statistics South Africa 2006: I).

StatsSA has announced that in future, a census will take place every ten years in South Africa (the next census is thus planned for 2011). A 'Community Survey' was conducted in 2007, which is described as an extended household survey. According to the head of StatsSA, the questionnaire for this survey was developed after wide consultation with various stakeholders (StatsSA, 2006). The questionnaire used in this survey reveals that the definition of household head (see above) and the de facto system of including household members (see below) is continued (StatsSA, 2007).

I will mainly focus on the 2005 General Household Survey here but I will also refer to the questionnaire used in the 2001 census in South Africa.

Household de jure versus household de facto

In referring to the migrant system, Spiegel et al., (1996: 11-12) coined the term 'stretched household' to explain some of the dynamics associated with such households. The term indicates that all the members of a stretched household do not share their daily meals or live together, but they are all committed to contribute to the

household in one way or another. Of the four criteria traditionally associated with households, namely: 'co-residence, productive co-operation, income sharing and commensality', only 'shared income and its expenditure' is applicable in 'the southern African context of labour migrancy' in such a stretched household. The members of a 'stretched' household may thus not live and eat together on a daily basis, but they have a commitment to contribute to that household on an ongoing basis.

This 'stretched household' term of Spiegel et al., (1996) is, however, not unique. Bustamante (2005) uses Glenn's term 'split-household', which describes Mexican breadwinners working in the USA while sending money to their families living in Mexico. In more general terms, Wallerstein & Smith's (1992: 13) analysis of households in relation to the world economy states that '[A] household is [not] necessarily a group resident in the same house, or even in the same locality, although ... this is often the case. Households are defined as those who have de facto entered into long-term income pooling arrangements'.

Thus we can conclude that not all household members, including couples, always share a residence, and that this phenomenon is not unique to 'black South Africans'. In this regard, the terms household de facto and household de jure are commonly used, with the former referring to households where all members live together on a daily basis and the latter to households which have absent household members for certain periods. The distinction of present and absent household members is particularly stressed in debates regarding 'household head' (see for example Budlender, 2003; Murray, 1981: 47-56; O'Laughlin, 1998: 6). The earlier entrenched migrant system of southern Africa certainly contributed to the importance of these distinctions, but it applies by no means to southern Africa in particular or even to Africa. The Canadian Census 2001[11] (Canadian Statistics, 2001), for example, was based on de jure households, as the instruction to enumerators was to regard the following people as part of the household.

Absent household members are a reality in different parts of the world. As stated before, there is a danger in problematising African families and African households by comparing them with a simplified 'Western category', or in the case of South Africa, with 'white South Africans'. Beittel (1992: 199-200), for example, chronicled how few white immigrants lived with their families in the Rand (referring to the Witwatersrand with Johannesburg as focal point) in the mid-1890s; historically, these family households too could be adequately described as stretched households.

According to the 2005 General Household Survey (as well as the mentioned 2007 Community Survey), members have to stay for at least four nights of the week in the household to be considered a household member. On the questionnaire (StatsSA, 2006), the following is stated:

> B Has …… stayed here (in this household) for at least four nights on average per week during the last four weeks?
> 1 = YES
> 2 = NO. *End of questions for this person*.

Yet under the 'Summary of the key findings' of this same questionnaire, the following is reported: 'Persons outside the household are important sources of financial support to household members that were not employed' (Statistics South Africa, 2006: iv). It is difficult to understand how such a conclusion can be drawn from the GHS

questionnaire if no questions are asked about persons not residing in the household. I strongly want to recommend for future surveys the inclusion of absent members into the household. The following examples of household structures obtained from two qualitative studies will further illustrate this point.

Sample household structures

In my doctoral study on fatherhood (Rabe, 2006), thirty in-depth interviews (and a further ten follow-up interviews) with men working at a goldmine south-west of Johannesburg were conducted in 2002 and 2003. At the outset of these interviews, a semi-structured interview schedule which contained the question 'How many children do you have?', was used. I noted the answers to this question, but then I continued with probing questions to form a fuller picture of the interviewee's household structure(s), the number of biological children, the number of children he supports financially, the number of children he lives with, his relationships with female partners, etc. The aim of my research was to gain insight in the relationships between fathers and their children, but it was striking how the initial answer to 'how many children do you have?' and the eventual complex relationships men have with any number of children indicate how differently the interviewees interpreted the initial question. The following three men all answered initially that they had three children, but their relationships with their children and their households structures were as follows:

Example 1: Lucky is a Zulu man in his early fifties whose wife passed away shortly before my first encounter with him (she died of natural causes related to high blood pressure and diabetes). After a short spell as an underground mineworker, Lucky worked in the human resource office where his daily job entailed collating statistics. Although he told me he had three children initially, he had had five biological children with his wife. I obtained the latter information when I asked about the ages of his children and he answered: '... in fact my children are five, they are not three. I am just mentioning these ones because the others are staying in Durban, that is where I am coming from'. He was also the biological father of a sixth child younger than his other five children. This sixth child was born from an extramarital affair. He had no contact with this child and he believed the child's mother was remarried – he did not consider this child his responsibility. His wife used to be a teacher. She worked in Kwa-Zulu Natal and lived there with their only daughter and their youngest son. At the time of the interview the daughter was working in Kwa-Zulu Natal and the youngest son was studying at the University of Cape Town. His eldest son, a policeman, was married and lived with his wife and children in a separate residence nearby, and the third son, a clerk, lived with his girlfriend, also in the vicinity. They had weekly family gatherings where the children and grandchildren visited him (he mentioned that his children were very diligent in their visits as they believe he was lonely after his wife's death). His second son, a male nurse, married during the time of my interviews (I saw Lucky on a regular basis) and after they paid *lobola* of R21000, this daughter-in-law, a medical doctor, had moved in with him and his son.

His first answer of having three children is probably related to his memory of raising his three sons mostly by himself, while his daughter and youngest son were

raised by their mother. He speaks fondly of his late wife, although we changed the subject when he became misty eyed.

If we imagine Lucky's answers to different questionnaires, we find the following:

– How many children do you have? Three.
– How many children have you fathered? Six.
– How many children live with you in your house? One.
– How many children are you supporting financially? One (his student son) or perhaps he might answer two and thereby include the son living with him, since Lucky had contributed to the *lobola*.

On the 2005 General Household Survey, Lucky would have been shown to live with one son and daughter-in-law. Three income earners would be recorded for this household. His six biological children would also be noted, but we would not know that he supports his student son than it is not living with him.

Example 2: When I asked Stuart if he had any children, he answered: 'Yes, three.' He is the biological father of three children and all three children have different biological mothers. His eldest, a boy, he had had with his girlfriend with whom he shares a dwelling. However, their son, who is deaf, attended a school in Port Elizabeth for children with special needs and they therefore saw him only twice a year. Stuart and his girlfriend hailed from Port Elizabeth and his grandmother still lived there. Stuart's father had passed away, but he saw his mother daily even though she lived in a separate household with his sister. His other two biological children also resided in Port Elizabeth with their maternal grandmothers. The biological mothers were employed in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town respectively. Since both these biological mothers were employed, Stuart believed the children were taken care of. He did send money to these two children, though, and he also saw them on his annual visit to Port Elizabeth. His girlfriend was, however, very unhappy about any contact he had with these women or their children.

If we imagine Stuart's answers to the mentioned questionnaires, we find the following:

– How many children do you have? Three.
– How many children have you fathered? Three.
– How many children live with you in your house? None.
– How many children are you supporting financially? Three (although he is fully supporting only one child and making contributions to two others).

In the 2005 General Household Survey, Stuart and his girlfriend would have been shown to be a male-headed household with no children living with them. Stuart's three biological children and his girlfriend's one biological child would be recorded. We would not be able to know whether they are the biological parents of the same child, since their son was not living with them, and therefore none of his information is recorded on this questionnaire. We would also be unaware that some of the income of this household is spent outside the household to support children.

Example 3: Tony is separated from his first wife, with whom he had no children. He now has a common-law wife, Lucy, whom he plans to marry in future (he had had a

civil marriage with his first wife). Tony and his partner lived with Tony's parents during our first interview. Tony's brother, the brother's wife and children as well as other relatives also lived in the same household. After government subsidised housing developments in the area, Tony and Lucy managed to secure their own house by the time we had our second interview. The house is registered in Lucy's name, who is unemployed and legally not married. Tony encouraged Lucy to apply for the house since he does not qualify for such a subsidised house, as he is employed.

Tony also told me he has three children. Tony and his partner are the biological parents of one daughter. This young child was resident with them. Tony's partner has two other biological children with two different men. The younger of the two had started school shortly before our second interview. This child lived with Tony's parents during the week, since their home was close to her school, and she lived with Tony and his partner during weekends. Over the weekend Lucy helped her daughter with her washing for the week and Tony helped her with her school work (both Tony and Lucy had completed Grade 12). This child would probably live with Tony and his partner throughout the week when she was older, but Tony felt she was too small to manage the public transport on her own. Lucy's eldest biological daughter lived with relatives of her biological father, who had initiated this arrangement, and he insisted on supporting her financially. When I was still trying to understand the relationships, Tony said to me:

They are my children, I treat them as my own children because if you start saying this one is not my children, it is going to hurt their mother. She will say, *ai*, you are not treating my child as your children. You see?

Tony's parents (and other family members) shared a meal at Tony at Lucy's house over the weekends. Tony also made contributions to his parents' household – mainly by buying bags of maize meal when requested. Both Tony's parents were employed, and they paid the school fees of Tony's brother's children.

Tony's parents lived with the mentioned Grade 1 girl, Tony's only brother's school-going children, and Tony's two cousins, of which one is a police reservist and the other a taxi driver. Tony's unemployed brother and his wife moved out of the household to a government subsidised house at more or less the same time as Tony and his common-law wife did the same. This brother and his wife lived from a little money Tony's brother had saved before he resigned from his job at the same mine where Tony worked (the reason for his brother's resignation is of a personal nature).

If we imagine Tony's answers to the different questionnaires, we find the following:

– How many many children do you have? Three.
– How many children have you fathered? One.
– How many children live with you in your house? Two (during the first interview); One (during the second interview).
– How many children are you supporting financially? Two.

If the 2005 General Household Survey was conducted during the time of my second interview with Tony, three unconnected households would have been recorded. In the case of Tony and Lucy, a male-headed household would have been recorded, since Tony would have been regarded as the main decision maker in the house. Tony would have been the partner and they would be recorded as having one dependant child in the

household. Lucy would have been recorded as the mother of three children and Tony as the father of one. Tony's wages would have been recorded as their source of income.

Tony's parents' household would have his father as the household head, living with Tony's mother as the wife, and three dependant grandchildren together with two other family members of whom one (the taxi driver) is earning money. It would have been established that the three grandchildren have living biological parents that are not part of the household. The fact that Lucy's middle biological child lives with Tony and Lucy for three nights of the week would be unrecorded, and we would also not know of the financial assistance from Tony towards this child and to his parents' household.

Tony's brother's household would have been recorded as a male-headed household with no dependants and no income except for a bit of interest from savings.

Example 4: All the men I had interviewed for my doctoral research are labelled black, and it may therefore be wrongly deduced that only 'black households' are problematic when trying to fit them into so-called Westernised categories. The following example is, however, one of the white respondents in the commuter couple study (Rabe, 2001) that Russell (2003) found so problematic as mentioned above.

Jimmy was a naval officer and therefore, throughout his career, had spent time away from his wife, namely when he was at sea, on compulsory courses and engaged in other work-related activities. These activities often took him away from home for weeks at a time. At the time of my interview with him in 1999, he had for the preceding five months been living in the Navy headquarters in Pretoria. His wife was a successful businesswoman and she lived with her mother in Cape Town. Jimmy went home once a month for a weekend, and there was no clear indication when he would return more permanently to Cape Town. In the General Household Survey, the household in Cape Town would have been registered as a female-headed household consisting of a daughter and mother. The relationship between Jimmy and this household would be unrecorded.

Discussion

We could continue with countless examples of various household structures which would not be well reflected in various surveys. The issue I wanted to illustrate with these examples are the following: When conducting a household survey it is important to collate basic information on absent household members, especially if they contribute financially to that household. We cannot begin to understand households appropriately if such basic information is not included. Apart from having a clear understanding of the contributions made by absent household members, we also have to know whether the household income is used to help sustain absent household members or other households. Dependant children often do not live with their parents, in order to be close to educational institutions. In some such cases the parents pay all educational expenses and/or other expenses, but in other cases they do not. In certain cases, children help to carry household expenses of parents, or parents those of children (or those of any other household with or without relatives), even though they do not live in the same dwellings or in dwellings in close proximity. A number of household varieties exist in South African society, and the legacy of migrancy certainly contributed to this variety. If we aim to understand the complex dynamics of

households, it is paramount that questions with reference to household members who contribute to or use resources from a particular household be added in censuses and large-scale surveys.

Conclusion and recommendations

The diversity of black African households and families is an undeniable fact. Similarly, so-called Western households and families are also characterised by variety. In fact when a social researcher embarks on *any* study related to families and/or households, the complexity of these systems is a challenging aspect of the study.

When conducting large-scale surveys and censuses which focus on household structures, further complexities emerge. Without becoming unwieldy,[12] such surveys and censuses must be able to accommodate the complexities of households. For example, if we want to begin to understand household dynamics, we should at least know of absent household members who contribute to the household's income or who use some of the household's income in another household. StatsSA's approach of looking only at the de facto household is therefore misleading, (particularly when household surveys are undertaken and not censuses) and can lead to distorted deductions. Similarly, the insistence on identifying a household head does not explain much about households. It would be of far greater value to understand the relations between the household members and to identify all the income earners regardless of whether they reside inside or outside the particular dwelling. Surveys and censuses have many users and it is therefore of the utmost importance that the data do not mislead users into false interpretations.

Notes

1. This article was first presented at the International Sociological Association Congress in 2006 in Durban, with the title: Is the 'African household' a myth?
2. An argument presented by the Swede Jan Trost when this article was presented as a paper at the 2006 ISA Congress.
3. The similarities and differences in the understanding of different household structures in different parts of Africa, India, Latin-America and other developing countries is a challenging avenue for research but it will not be included here.
4. Formerly known as South Africa's Central Statistical Service (CSS).
5. The GHS replaced the October household surveys.
6. I use the crude distinction between white and black South Africans here in the way Russell presented her arguments.
7. Russell (2003: 30) refers to his study when she cites Murray's phrase of 'divided families'.
8. In addition, certain of the people in the study (Rabe, 2001) could not fit into the usual South Africa racial categories due to interracial marriages and different nationalities. The interviewees were selected because they followed professional careers and they were separated from their partners due to work commitments.
9. I cannot agree with Russell (2003: 9) that a single study which does not mention race is indicative of a general trend of 'a reluctance to acknowledge cultural difference between different racial groups'.
10. See for example how Swazi homesteads are misrepresented because the role of indigenous enumerators is undervalued (Russell & Mugyenyi, 1997).

11. I could not obtain a copy of the 2006 version.
12. Surveys or censuses should not become too cumbersome for enumerators or too difficult to interpret by various people and organisations who want to use the results of such surveys and censuses.

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