Biafra in the Present: Trauma of a Loss

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Abstract
This paper forms part of a wider attempt at engaging the issues of nation-building, war, and trauma within the context of a developing sociology of trauma. It focuses, specifically, on Biafra, a recurring issue in the political and economic discussions in Nigeria. It delimits the focus to trauma. The Igbo perception of their increased marginalisation in the scheme of things in contemporary Nigeria brings to the fore the idea of Biafra, an Igbo attempt to create an Igbo nation-state which subsequently resulted into the war which foreshadowed many of the conflicts that would threaten to 'shatter' many post-colonial Africa. The war was traumatic: it inflicted fear and suffering. With the use of cultural trauma and the notion of the loss of assumptive world, the paper suggests that its loss was more traumatic because of the shattering of the cognitive representation of Biafra, an entity which was to bring a sense of belonging and connection that would cohere the Igbo being. In the wake of the loss of Biafra, the assumptive world of the Igbo was shattered. The paper suggests further that current recollection of Biafra by the Igbo serves as an illustration of the 'collective trauma' of its loss. The theoretical basis for the argument in this paper is that Biafra is rooted in the psyche of the Igbo.

Keywords: *trauma, assumptive world, Igbo, Biafra, nation building*

Introduction

This paper addresses a past unsettled; one that political discourse of the present brings alive in the collective and individual memory. In the discourse is a reminder of things unsettled, the recollection of which is an excursion into meaning reconstruction in the context of a perceived marginalisation. The focus is on Biafra, a nation almost brought into existence, yet exists in the psyche of a people and whose loss in the sense of not being brought to existence, is one of a 'shattered assumption'. The paper addresses this 'shattered assumption' and brings out the 'trauma', not of war but what was at war that never in the end was. It looks at some of the issues relating to the 'trauma of loss' pointing to

the importance of reading the dynamics of remembrance within the context of social and political practices. The goal is to contribute to the debate on the critical notion of nation building with its attendant war and violence inquiring into the 'assumptive world' of a people. The paper shows how recollection of Biafra, which foreshadowed the conflicts that would threaten to 'shatter' many post-colonial states in Africa, is bounded up with contemporary power relations and political arrangements in Nigeria. Though Biafra is past, it is one that never passes away and 'recounted' by a collective that considers it pregnant with respect to its present life.

The point that Biafra is alive is one that is frequently made in the analysis of contemporary politics in Nigeria (see for example the contributions by Amadiume, Ezeigbo, Ikpeze in Amadiume, 2000; Smith, 2005) Smith (2005: 42), writes that "collective memories about Biafra are being revitalised, reinscribed, and surely, to some degree, reinvented. As Nigeria tries to forge its way forward in the post-military era, Igbos feel compelled to put the issues of Biafra back on the table because, from their perspective, adequate representation and influence in a civilian government, so dominated by networks of patronage, depend upon redressing issues of marginalisation that have their roots in Biafra." Whilst Smith's observation is correct, especially the Igbo perception of their marginalisation in the *scheme of things*, the rooting of the marginalisation in Biafra, which echoes the prevailing discourse of the perceived Igbo marginalisation in the country, is somehow off the mark.

A similar remark can be made in relation to an earlier observation by Ikpeze, (2000), who provided a history of marginalisation before the Biafra war. He made a distinction between the British colonial administration's marginalisation of all ethnic groups in Nigeria, a feature of marginalisation before the war and marginalisation of the Igbo, an ethnic group by other ethnic groups in Nigeria, specifically, the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba. His observation would seem somehow correct but not quite. What would be the case is that the British colonial administration laid the foundation for the perceived Igbo marginalisation in its 'divide-and-rule' policy which favoured the North in relation to the South of the country. I'll return to this later in the paper but will argue that the perception of marginalisation formed part of what underlay the crisis that led to the Biafra war in the first place; its loss only deepened the perception. One can suggest also that current engagement with Biafra can be read as a process of confronting the trauma of its loss for the Igbo. For over two decades, as many commentators (see for example, Harneit-Sievers and Emezue, 2004; Amadiueme, 2004) have pointed out, there was silence on Biafra; a silence which was officially-induced and sanctioned as the following statement (in Amadiueme, 2000: 41) by the then Head of State, General Gowon attests:

> "The so-called rising sun of Biafra is set forever. It will be a great disservice for anyone to continue to use the word Biafra to refer to any part of the East Central of Nigeria. The tragic chapter of violence is just ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again, we have an opportunity to build a new nation" (Yakubu Gowon (1970 :37)

The silence that followed was to deny the Igbo and indeed the country as a whole the opportunity to express the suffering brought about by the war, in the case of the Igbo and the necessary reflection by ordinary Nigerians. This would have eased, arguably, to a considerable degree, the present anxieties among the Igbo and their perceived marginalisation would possibly have been dampened. Indeed, it is what was lost, Biafra, as distinct from the perceived marginalisation, which is the real source of present anxieties among the Igbo. In other words, Biafra, an 'assumptive world' of the Igbo was shattered; this shattering, a trauma in itself continues to surface in critical moments such as when issues of revenue allocation and political arrangements are discussed. The questions arise: how does the theory of assumptive world help us to understand Biafra as a traumatic loss? What is it about Biafra that makes its loss traumatic? What does Biafra mean for the Igbo? The paper discusses these questions. The immediate circumstances leading to the war and the key social actors that played an active role in the build-up are also discussed. The discussion draws on some of the significant pieces of research and reflective articles that have been written on Biafra.

The paper has three sections: an introductory section which presents the main conceptual frame of discussion. In this section, the key notion of 'assumptive world' is discussed in relation to cultural trauma, the core discursive concept. A justification for its use is discussed in the section. This forms the basis for the second section which charts Biafra as what was lost by a people, the Igbo; here, a brief history of the war is provided followed by a discussion of what Biafra means in the socio-psychology of the Igbo. In this discussion, is a highlight of the experience of the Igbo within the broader context of the history of the formation of a Nigerian nation-state. This is very crucial in the task at hand. It is very important to bear the following remark in mind: it is not Biafra as war, a historical event, that qualifies it as trauma but Biafra as an 'assumptive world' that was shattered. The last section examines the trauma of the loss of Biafra followed by a brief concluding remark.

Conceptual clarification: assumptive world and cultural trauma

The discussion of individual trauma would seem inevitable as it allows a better understanding of the core concepts of assumptive world and cultural trauma.

The starting point of such a discussion of trauma is, in very many cases, Freud. One sees, for example, his understanding of traumatic neurosis in the work of Caruth, a prominent trauma theorists. Such a strategy will not be applied here because the objective is not to provide a review of trauma. The discussion of individual trauma is confined to the aspects that have immediate relevance to cultural trauma. As has been remarked by various writers (see for example, Alexander, 2004; Kansteiner, 2004; McNally, 2003), trauma has become one of the key interpretative categories of contemporary politics and culture. It is a conceptual tool with historical application and moral specificity concerned with concrete psychological dynamics set in motion by events (Kansteiner, 2004). It is, as the extensive literature shows, a widely applied conceptual tool whose application goes beyond psychoanalysis and psychology.

As an essentially psychological phenomenon, its effects and symptoms have been extensively discussed using various approaches that range from autobiographical accounts, personal testimony in fictional narratives, literary studies and short-piece public reflections. In all these, there is one common understanding: trauma is largely taken as the shattering of the victim's basic assumption of him/herself and the world.

There is, similarly, an acknowledgement that the issues thrown up in the various discussion of trauma do have significant bearing on the construction of identity (Stocks, 2007; Zelizer, 2002). In general, a discernable central thread in most of the writings about trauma is the adherence to the simple point that psychological trauma results from an extremely disturbing event, an experience which fractures the apparently coherent self (Stocks, 2007) or shatters ones worldview (Jannoff-Bulman, 1992; Everly, 1995; Leys, 2000). As suggested by Janoff-Bulman, whose work will be discussed later, the disturbing event has three characteristics: it is out of the ordinary, directly experienced and perceived as a threat to survival and self-preservation.

What is thus perceived as trauma consists of overwhelming life events that pose intense threats to both biological and symbolical survival and generate terror (Leys, 2000). In other words, events are experienced in such a way as to induce an intense psychological crisis.

These events, it has been variously shown, inflict fear and suffering, induce pain, anguish, fear, loss and grief and bring about the destruction of a 'coherent and meaningful reality' thus pushing the traumatised to the limit, as phrased by psychoanalysts. Therefore, by definition, "trauma overwhelms our abilities to cope and adjust, calling into question the most basic assumptions that organise our experiences of ourselves, relationships, the world and the human conditions itself" (Landsman, 2002:13). The general assumption in these writings is that trauma is the experience of the individual's emotional, cognitive being and a

"crisis of meeting" (Lietchy, 2002).

It is undoubtedly clear and indeed common knowledge that trauma generally refers to individuals. However there are, of recent, highly significant and influential writings on trauma that have ascribed it to a group (Alexander 2004; Zelizer, 2002, Olick, 1999; Caruth, 1996). When ascribed to a group, it is phrased as 'collective trauma' or 'cultural trauma' (see Payne et al, 2004, for an extensive review) and in many cases, an association is made between the two. In these writings, collective trauma would imply, in a rather simple sense, trauma that affects a group with, as Smelser (2004) puts it, "definable membership". Neal (1998), like many other writers noted earlier, has suggested that it has a bearing on identity and as Smelser (2004), citing Erikson (1994) points out, any given trauma may be community-disrupting and identity–disrupting or community-solidifying and identity-solidifying but could be a mixture of both. Trauma is perceived therefore as a cultural trauma when members with a sense of belonging to a collective such as state, ethnic or religious group feel they have been subjected to a fearful and painful event that leave marks upon their collective consciousness and memory. The association between collective trauma and cultural trauma appears to be made in perceiving cultural trauma thus. In fact, Smelser (2004: 44) highlights the association when he states that "the idea of collective trauma, collective memory, and collective (e.g. national) identity are so frequently associated with one another in the literature on socio-cultural trauma." Some writers couple cultural trauma and identity with notions of what being a member of a certain community means (Zlizer, 2002). As Alexander (2004:1), one of the foremost 'collective trauma' theorists outside psychology and psychoanalysis, puts it, cultural trauma occurs "when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways." When these horrendous events cause the death of innocent victims, they engender traumatic bereavement and may trigger a process of collective bereavement in which the grieving involves the larger society (Piver and Prigerson, 2005). Furthermore, these events have an impact on the future of the collective. The defining word is collective hence, the association usually made with cultural trauma. But does this reference to collectivities render trauma cultural? This is a question that has become a main and indeed, most powerful critique of Alexander's conceptualisation. The question is asked further as to whether one can yield something fruitful in making sociological of what is essentially a psychological concept. Here, the reference is to Hans' (2005) perceptive critical engagement with Alexander's notion of cultural trauma. In his words, "But is the approach conceptually and theoretically viable – or does it lead astray and neglect

the true potential of psychological trauma research for historical sociology?"

The validity of this question does not, in my view, rob cultural trauma of its utility. Its analytical power might be considered the critical issue of objection which is somehow justified. However, such an objection would seem tempered if one accepts Smelser's (2004) sharpening of the concept of cultural trauma when he brings in 'memory', which Eyerman (in same volume as Smelser's piece) discusses in detail. For Smelser, cultural trauma is "a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation which is a) laden with negative effect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society's existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural suppositions" (Smelser, 2004: 44). One sees in Smelser, a definition of cultural trauma that roots it socio-psychologically, via collective memory, in Durkheim's *conscience collective*. He suggests that "a cultural trauma refers to an invasive and overwhelming event that is believed to undermine or overwhelm one or several essential ingredients of a culture or the culture as a whole" (Ibid: 38), thus distinguishing it from individual trauma.

Caution is called for in making a distinction between cultural trauma and individual trauma to avoid what Alexander (2004) calls 'naturalistic fallacy', which is the analogical transfer of the psychoanalytical model of individual trauma to the study of the collective memory. Alexander uses this phrase to warn against the assumption that events themselves create trauma in his attempt to deal with the tension, as Hans (2005: 367) puts it "between the psychological definition of trauma and his definition of cultural trauma." The "naturalistic fallacy" that Alexander refers to would seem evident in the growing body of work on Trauma which tends, somehow, to craft an imprecise concept of cultural trauma that yields little insight. This point is instructive for the present discussion which is neither a focus on the event, the Biafra war, nor individual experience of the war. As was pointed out in the early part of this discussion, trauma, at the level of the individual, is generally conceived as a psychic injury caused by an overwhelming experience of a catastrophic event, where the memory of the event is repressed and the response occurs in an often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive fashion (Caruth, 1996:11; Olick, 1999:343). As the discussion also highlights, individual trauma tends to be defined as a 'pathological state' requiring psychoanalysis to bring it back to its original state (Lifton, 1995). The underlying assumption, as can comfortably be said, is the existence of a psychic unity which becomes shattered by unassimiliable event and requiring of integration. This would seem to apply both to individual psychological trauma and collective trauma. However, in the case of collective trauma, Alexander suggests, rather emphatically, that it is discursively constructed and distinct from psychic trauma. In effect, it is a socially constructed process and includes several issues around which the

narrative about the trauma is developed.

It is noticeable that event is central in both individual psychological trauma and cultural trauma. Though in Alexander's social constructionist trauma thesis, events are not inherently traumatic, what makes them so, are the cultural template through which the traumatised experience them. However, for Smelser (2004), several definitional accomplishments must be made before an event can qualify as cultural trauma: it must be remembered, or be made to remember. In addition, the memory must be made culturally relevant, that is, represented as obliterating, damaging, or rendering problematic something sacred – usually a value or outlook felt to be essential for the integrity of the affected society. Finally, the memory must be associated with a strong negative affect, usually disgust, shame or guilt.

In dealing with trauma in this paper, the focus is not with the events which are traumatic but the 'objects' to which one attaches oneself, which slip away from one's 'clutches'. These 'objects' are meaningful and are part of the core of one's being. Biafra as war, an event, was traumatic because it inflicted fear and suffering, induced pain, anguish, resulted in the loss of close ones and property; Biafra, as a 'meaningful object' to which there was and still is cognitive attachment was traumatic because it slipped away inducing loss and destruction of an aspect of Igbo *being*. The one could be said to be an experience of an event, a concrete experience of the victim, the traumatised; the other, the 'representation' of loss of a self, an identity, or a loss of an aspect of a self/identity. Both have distinctive qualities and affect individual's and collective's fundamental assumption. The former implies a recollection, a remembrance of the event. To remember trauma in this way, as the trauma literature shows, is to bear witness and give testimony (Niemeyer, 2001). It involves, one may add, like the latter, an active process of interpretation and meaning-creation. The focus here is not with understanding of the experiences and treatments of trauma victims of the Biafra war. The focus is on the loss of Biafra as an assumptive world; a loss which was not perceived as such during and immediately after the war but now evident in its 'representation' in the political discourse of the present.

The Biafra war, as an event and Biafra, as assumptive world, continue to disrupt individual and collective memories and as such tend to 'frame' state and politics in Nigeria as evidenced both in political discourse and political practice. The continuous debate on the creation of more states in the Igbo states is a case in point. The concept and theory of assumptive world is utilised in this paper to give a perspective on Biafra as a meaningful object. That is, Biafra as a purpose to the Igbo. Seeing Biafra in this light presupposes an assumption or beliefs that ground, secure, or orient the Igbo. The assumption is the aspects of the Igbo *being,* their identity. Thus the loss of Biafra is a traumatic one. But what makes

the trauma cultural? Simply, the trauma is cultural above all else because of the shattering of the assumptive world of the Igbo. It qualifies as such because of the shattering of aspects of the Igbo being. The critical notion here is assumptive world which allows for an insight into the social and cultural repercussions of the fact of the Igbo not being able to realise Biafra. This immediately distinguishes the suffering resulting from the war experienced by individuals and the pain of the loss of what is meaningful which manifest in the anxieties of the Igbo in current political discourse. A brief elaboration follows.

The initial conception of assumptive world by Parkes (1971:102) defines it as "the only world we know and it includes everything we know or think we know. It includes our interpretation of the future, our plans and prejudices. Any or all of these may need to change as a result of changes in the life space." It is an "organised schema …. Which contains everything that we assume to be true [about the world, the self, others] on the basis of our previous experience. It is this internal model of the world that we are constantly matching against incoming sensory data in order to orient ourselves, recognise what is happening, and plan our behaviour accordingly" (Parkes, 1988:56). As Kauffman (2002:2) suggests, this implies a conception of a basic organising principle of human experience and beliefs and temporality. He adds that Parke's concern is with the psychology of change, specifically the psychology of healing from the wound of loss that is present in change. Assumptive worlds are constant internal contracts and change is the disruption of the constancy of these constructs …..The concept of the assumptive world is, in the broadest sense, a principle of the normative constancy and belief, a constancy principle of the psychological organisation of the human world and one's experience of oneself and the world. The assumptive world is the principle of the conservation of psychological reality" (Kaufmann, 2002:2). In other words, it is the 'ordering principle', as he puts it, for the construction of one's world.

As an 'ordinary principle' one can argue that it's meaningless in ones being becomes apparent in that it is the instrument with which our 'reality' is constructed yet, it is itself that 'reality' in an existential sense. In Janoff-Bulman is the suggestion that assumptive world is illusion and it is through this that culture is constructed. This would mean, if read correctly, that culture is in a sense illusion, where illusion is about beliefs. As she writes, at the core of our internal world we hold basic truths of ourselves and our external world that represent our orientation towards the total push and pull of the cosmos. She adds that "Our penchant for preserving rather than changing knowledge structure suggests the deeply embedded, deeply accepted nature of our beliefs about the benevolence and meaningfulness of the world and our own self" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992:51). When this, that is, the normative constancy of beliefs, is disrupted, then we have

a loss of our assumptive world; a loss that is one of beliefs about meaningfulness and self-worth. For her, therefore as Kauffman (2002) remarks, the concept of assumptive world is about loss of basic valuations. But these valuations, one might add, do not necessarily have to be individual but could be collective valuations. This is to suggest that the concept of the assumptive world is not one that applies exclusively to the experience of an individual but also applicable to that of the collective.

In fact this point is implicit in some of the major contributions to the concept and indeed, in quite a few, somehow explicit, especially in those that 'widen' the lens beyond psychology. Becker's (1962, 1971) contribution, for example, factors what can be referred to as the 'anthropological' and indeed the 'sociological', in essentially what is a psychological concept. This would seem immediately understandable given that he drew extensively from anthropology to explore the logic of transference in therapy. Transference, as is well known, is a language of psychoanalysis, which refers to what psychoanalysts consider the overblown sense of power and importance that a patient projects upon an analyst in therapy. Its analysis is considered very useful in getting into a patient's unconscious conceptions of power and power relationships. Becker literally takes transference out of this psychoanalytical context and expanded it to a wider relational context, a *psychology-sociology* movement. For Becker, the logic of transference applies to some of the relationship in which we engage in society as people and symbolic relationships. Transference thus occurs whenever an "exaggerated sense of power is used to cope with and calm an otherwise sense of anxiety" (Lietchy, 2002:88). The symbolic relationship to which its logic applies is of immediate relevance here because it is the relationship between a person and material objects; objects that we ascribe symbolic importance, for example, ethnicity, which is often used, in many contexts, as a protective shield. Becker's expanded notion of transference is thus "a way of life in which we all participate" (Lietchy , 2002:88).

Becker's contribution as found in his excursion into the problem of 'man', (1971, 1973 and 1975) revolved around five questions which he asked in an earlier exploration (1962): What are the innate dispositions of human beings? What is the relationship between human beings and nature? What is the direction in time of the action process? What type of personality is most valued? What is the dominant modality of human relationship? These questions, if the reading is correct, are essentially Maslow-*ean*. As is generally known, Maslow writes about hierarchy of needs; this, certainly, is not the same as Becker's five questions but the concern would seem similar in the sense in which it is about what is good for an individual's survival needs; healthy survival, if one can qualify. In Becker's view, what he referred to as our cultural worldview, that

is, our constructed assumptive worldview as interpreted by Lietchy (2002:85) "functions in the manner of a transference relationships. In its very character of normalcy and taken-for-grantedness, it acts as an integral anesthetizing buffer against unconscious and repressed death anxiety."

The Igbo as an ethnic group in relation to other ethnic groups in Nigeria would in Becker's conception of transference be read as participating in transference which other ethnic groups are similarly participating in. The transference, in the Igbo case, would seem to be in the sense of the Igbo self-worth, which they tap upon to bat off their anxiety as a 'marginalised' group. A gaze into the significance of the Igbo person's place of origin, importance of appropriate and permanent marriage, the value of children, reveals, to a considerable extent this self-worth. As Smith (2005:31) correctly notes: "When the Igbo speak about the things that distinguish them from other ethnic groups in Nigeria, they frequently cite the permanence of Igbo marriage. Great pride is expressed about the fact that Igbo pay high bride wealth, about the expectation that elaborate traditional ceremonies are required in order for marriage to be socially legitimised and publicly recognised, and about the shared sense that divorce is stigmatised and relatively uncommon".

This points to the issue of the loss of Biafra as cultural trauma. How is this loss to be understood? If we take the preceding arguments into account, the loss is not only recollected through the facts of the loss of the event, the war, but recalled in the perceived marginalisation of the Igbos. In this, the meaning of Biafra comes to the fore. This point is critical in making sense of the point about the existence of a cultural trauma. So, what does Biafra mean?

The Meaning of Biafra

Based on the preceding description of cultural trauma, it is possible to claim that the current politics in Nigeria and the perceived marginalisation of the Igbos re-evoked and intensified the spectre of Biafra, an existing cultural trauma. One can suggest further that the cultural trauma exists because of the 'threat' to aspects of the Igbo identity.

Here the utility of the theory of assumptive world becomes apparent: as was earlier indicated, it is particularly useful in the notion of Biafra as a locus of articulation of an Igbo identity. When subtly recollected in political discussion, it suggests a construction of 'collective memory', a notion which Olick (1999) indicates is tied to delineation of group membership. According to him, it is "not just that we remember as member of groups, but that we constitute those groups and their members simultaneously in the act (thus re-membering)" (1999:342).

The war that terminated Biafra, the still-born, is widely seen as an ethnic conflict in the sense in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in exclusively ethnic terms and which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. The goal was the secession of the south eastern part of Nigeria from the rest. It was a goal given energy by what might be better referred to as a sharpened *politics of ethnic difference,* anchored, in an invigorated political movement. Biafra secession was thus the political movement of an ethnic group that hoped to succeed and establish an independent state of its own on the territory on which it lived. It was a war that in general, was between the Hausa-Fulani of the North and the Igbo of the South East of Nigeria. Whether or not the war can be neatly wrapped as such is contentious given what has been noted by some observers that the Igbo were catalyst in the formation of a nation among culturally related peoples of the eastern part of Nigeria (see Diamond, [1970] 2007, for example). The narratives of the war by Igbo in their recollections is said to reveal that the notion of a pan-Igbo ethnicity only solidified in the wake of Biafra (Smith, 2005).

The immediate circumstances that led to the war have been well documented (see for example, Cronje, 1972; De St. Jorre, 1972; Obasanjo, 1980; Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990) but a brief discussion of this in the form of highlights will suffice. The account provided here is taken mostly from Nkpa (2001) and John de St. Jorre (1972). The war started in 1967 and ended in 1970. The 15th of January 1966 is a significant date in terms of its precipitation. On this day, Nigeria witnessed the first of the many military coups that have become part of its history. A section of the Nigerian army staged a coup in which the Prime Minister, a northerner, top-ranking politicians from the western and northern parts of the country were killed. There were no politicians in the eastern part, mostly inhabited by Igbo and other minority ethnic group who were killed. The coup brought to an end the first democratically elected government and brought in the first military government headed by an Igbo general. The fact of this generated a lot of tension, in particular, in the northern part of the country. The general perception was that the Igbo overthrew the government because it was headed by a Hausa. What was thus 'sown' in the minds of the Hausas was the idea of an assertion of the power of an ethnic group, the Igbo on the body politics of Nigeria.

Almost five months later as this perception gained wide acceptance, a massacre of the Igbo resident in the northern part of the country was carried out by the northerners. Then on the 29th of July of the same year, there was the second coup in which the Igbo military head of state, General Ironsi and the Yoruba military governor of the Western Region, Lt Col Fajuyi, were killed and a northerner, General Gowon became the new head of state. This did not stop the massacre of the Igbo in the north by northerners; the months of August, September and

October of 1966 saw waves of massacres which subsequently led to what could be described as the *great flight*: Igbo resident in northern Nigeria moved in thousands back to eastern Nigeria, their homeland. About 2 million Igbo were estimated to have been in flight (Nkpa, 2001). This created a refugee crisis, which the military head of government, General Gowon and the Igbo soldier, General Ojukwu, who had assumed leadership of the Igbo, could not resolve. In January 1967, efforts were made to draw a new constitution for Nigeria to replace the British-influenced pre-independent constitution but this failed. Almost four months later, on the 30th of May 1967, General Ojukwu declared that the eastern part of the country had seceded and that part was a new country, Biafra. He effectively became the head of state of the new country. The secession was considered a rebellion by the government of General Gowon and on the 6th of July, 1967, a military operation started against Biafra. The war thus officially started on that day. In January 1970, the war ended and Biafra was split into four states within the Federation of Nigeria.

The central narrative in the literature on Biafra is one of grand scale violence, ruination, in Diamond's ([1970] 2007) phrase, of a "national culture at the moment of birth", massacre (it is variously estimated that up to 2 million people, mostly the Igbos, died in the war) and mass starvation with the resultant trauma. The resultant trauma is not disputed even though there is hardly an extant literature on this; nevertheless one can make this claim given that there is hardly any war, no matter its scale, that does not bring about physical and psychological wound. The Biafra was not an exception as it left many physically and psychologically wounded. Psychologically, as previously mentioned, it induced pain, anguish, fear, loss and grief to the destruction of a coherent and meaningful reality, which is the main point of the present paper.

Biafra, as lodged in the psyche of the Igbo, arguably, therefore, represents, being unchained; unchained from an entity of cultural antipathy brought about by the English colonisers. This entity was a 1917 creation when the northern part was amalgamated with the southern part. For the English, the north was the model that informed their construction of Nigeria. Its feudal character, some writers have been quick to point out, resonated with the English unlike what obtained in the Yoruba-speaking south-western part and the Igbo-speaking south-east. It is significant to note that the English, as carriers of autocracy, then, and zealous propagandists of democracy in contemporary times, met what has been described as a well-articulated political structure, with a complex system of chieftaincy among the Yoruba and a subtly organized autonomous hamlets in the east, which one of the foremost Nigerian historians, Dike (1965, cited in Diamond, [1970] 2007), described as "excess of democracy". As a people, the Igbo celebrated self-achievement more than revel in inherited or ascribed

status more notable a characteristic of a feudal society of which the Hausa-Fulani society in the north has been described. It is this self-worth that was to enable them to re-integrate into Nigeria after the war with less support from the Federal government as claimed by Igbo writers (see for example, Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990; Amadiueme, 2004; Ikpeze, 2004).

The suggestion here is that the celebration of self-worth as distinct from ascribed status formed part of the fundamental 'building blocks', if it can be so described, of the war. Not only was the north feudal, it was predominantly Islamic. As Diamond ([1970]2007: 349) writes, "Northern society was hierarchical and, at least in the upper castes conservatively Islamic. Paradise awaits the true believers the goal is the protection of the status quo. In the view of the Northern Muslim leaders, Nigeria was conceived as a theocracy". What obtained, arguably more than anything else apart from religion, in the entity that was created, were *two cultures*: autocracy and 'excessive democracy'. In fact religion seemed intertwined in the *two cultures*: autocratic Islamic north and democratic Christian south. Given these, the fundamental values of democracy seemed difficult to take root. Indeed, as Uwazurike (1997), has argued, there was an absence of genuine democratic ethos of mutuality and compromise. He notes that "for democracy to prevail in the unscripted struggle for power with authoritarian types, they must always anticipate the onset of an "unsolvable crisis" – and be able to re-equilibrate through timely compromise" (1997:267). It was thus inevitable that a 'clash of culture' would occur.

The sharpening of the *two cultures* was evident in the political governance of the country immediately after political independence in 1960. The model of governance adopted after independent derives from the liberal model dominant in the 1950s. This has been described as a "progressive adaptation of some western model of which the most important have been the British parliamentary or the American presidential systems" (Uwazurike, 1997). Uwazurike (1997) suggested also, and forcefully, that this was an acceptance rather than a proposed model by the nationalists in deference to the colonial British authorities. He added, rather dismissively, that the acceptance was because the tripartite ethno-political class – the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani Moslems and the Igbo - were "anxious as they were for independence on a "platter of gold", that is, without any struggle that might have shaped future directions"(1997: 271). The three ethnic groups expressed themselves politically along ethnic lines and attained power along those lines; while it has been argued that ideological leanings and interest-articulation are significant in analysing the various political alliances and networking evident in Nigeria's political history, a more salient factor and scarcely acknowledged and explored one contributed in a great measure in shaping the political landscape, I argue, is the *two cultures*, which were undeniably ethnically 'coloured'.

The literature on Nigerian politics show that the tendency in Nigerian politics has been the attempt to create a "self-contained regional utopia within which a dominant ethnic coalition – there are no pure ethnic groups really - in a paternalistic fashion, serves as the constellation around which revolve the lesser formations" (Uwazurike, 1997: 272). Indeed, this is what seemed to apply as expressed in the phrase "*Nigeria is a mere geographical expression*" brought together by the British colonisers. It is significant that this phrase is still very much uttered in current political discourse just as it was many decades back and which, as has been noted, was interpreted in the 1990s by a leading northern politician, Maitama Sule as follows:

> In this country, all of us need each other. Hausas need Igbos, Igbos need Yorubas and the Yorubas need the northerners. Everyone has a gift from God. The northerners are endowed with leadership qualities. The Yorubaman knows how to earn a living and has diplomatic qualities. The Igbo is gifted in commerce, trade and technological innovation (cited from Uwazurike, 1997: 273).

The significance of the preceding point is that the cultural basis of Nigerian politics is salient in exploring what made Biafra, *that*, which was lost to the extent that it was traumatic in the collective psyche of the Igbo. The point about the Igbo being gifted in commerce and trade is borne out by the fact that they are the most migratory of Nigeria's ethnic groups, settling in large numbers in all of Nigeria's major cities, and establishing their markets anywhere it seems reasonably possible to make a profit (Smith, 2005). This fact is taken to argue that the Igbo invest more in 'one Nigeria' than any other ethnic group (see Smith, 2005, for example). However, the point is stressed, that the cultural construction of the "Igbo identity and the strength of political ties to place of origin simultaneously produce an ideology of ethnic nationalism" (Smith, 2005). How did this ideology of 'ethnic nationalism' develop from the 'excessive democracy' of village communities referred to earlier?

The answer to this would lie in the making of Nigeria by the British and the experience of the Igbo in this process. Of immediate significance here is the process of what is referred to as 'tripartition' (Ademoyega 1981 as cited in Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990) in Nigerian politics. This process began in 1946 with the colonial government's policy of integrating the northern provinces into the colonial administration and the implementation of the Richards Constitution. Earlier before this, the north and south of Nigeria were governed separately despite the amalgamation of both into what became Nigeria in 1914. The Richard Constitution provided the administrative framework for governance: Nigeria

was split into three administrative regions – the east, west and north. There was nationalist opposition to this coming mainly from the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) considered to be essentially an Igbo party, though, the leaders were from different groups in Nigeria and, the National Youth Movement (NYM) based primarily in the west and led by Awolowo. As Ekwe-Ekwe (1990) noted, the two parties had a different strategy of opposition: the NCNC launched a nationwide campaign while the NYM was only critical of the fact that Nigerian leaders were not consulted before the enactment of the decree.

The point here is the regionalism of the NYM and the nationalism of NCNC took root in Nigerian politics. This was exploited by the British colonial administration in the 1950s when the push for independence became more 'feverish'. During this period, the dominant parties, the Northern Peoples Congress with membership restricted to the Hausa-Fulani, the NCNC, now with predominantly Igbo membership and the Action Group a predominantly Yoruba party became highly politically active in the *scheme of things*. Ekwe-Ekwe (1990) argued that the NPC worked to oppose Nigeria's independence and only shelved this in 1957 when the British gave it the assurance that it would hold the first post-colonial government. The AG, Ekwe-Ekwe adds, worked to ensure the emergence of a post-colonial Nigeria divided into regional groupings. The question is: why would this be the case? What one hardly gets from those writers who give this interpretation is the cultural basis of the politics of the parties. The NPC was principally, as Ekwe-Ekwe (1990) remarked, a reincarnation of the aristocratic oligarchy of Fulani political supremacy which held power before British colonialism. Its ideology is regional 'separatedness' mediated by Islam. This shaped its worldview and could, hardly, have not coloured its politics. It would be inconceivable to think that such a party would yield to the unitary constitutional arrangement favoured by the increasingly Igbo-dominated NCNC with its western-educated leadership now mentally steeped into British parliamentary framework of 'doing things'.

The emerging *two cultures* in relation to the politics in Nigeria suited the British colonial administration very well. For example, as Ekwe-Ekwe (1990) highlights, when the NPC took political hold of the north in the 1950s, it proclaimed a policy of 'northernisation' which excluded southern Nigerians from jobs in the region's public service. Foreigners, particularly Britons, and quite often officials in the employ of the civil services in the south, but who could not cope with the increasingly nationalistic politics of the time, were readily given posts in the north which excluded Nigerians of non-northern nationalities. The north continued to offer this haven for a number of British ex-southern civil servants and other professionals, in addition to British subjects from elsewhere,

well beyond Nigeria's independence in 1960" (p15).

The 'regionalism' of Nigerian politics, brought about by the Richards Constitution, deepened. The political parties, in particular, the NCNC, NPC and AG, became increasingly chauvinist and exclusivist. "What was now in position were regional quasi-autonomous political entities which exhibited the most unimaginable rivalries and, quite often, conflicts with each other, and whose relationship with the centre, varied from the ambiguous to undisguised opportunism. In this dispensation, the political control of the centre by any of the main parties became the necessary condition for the consolidation of power in its regional fiefdom, itself a precondition for existence" (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990: 16).

As the regionalism deepened, the NCNC as indeed other political parties became increasingly less nationalistic though the quest for independence did not evaporate. What was apparent was that the political elite showed strong allegiance to one of the three regions – north, east and west. The allegiance was beneficial economically to the elite because with the growth of regional economies that resulted from the deepened regionalism, they acquired massive wealth. Ekwe-Ekwe (1990: 19) made this remark when he writes "that the regional autonomy of the era provided the varying strata of the emerging Nigerian merchant and bureaucratic classes the first opportunity in history to attempt some form of accumulation of their own, albeit at the behest of the British colonial government which now chaired the pre-independence 'transitional' governments in Enugu, Ibadan and Kaduna (as well as the central one in Lagos) between 1951–1959." Of significance is that ethno-nationalism sharpened during this period underpinned and given direction by wealthy political elite. Under this condition, the orientation to tie oneself to one's place of origin for success in business and the professions would develop and it is not out of place to suggest that such was the case.

The tie to the place of origin implies a premium on 'having people' as Smith (2005) has put it. It manifests in marriage and reproduction. The importance of this has been documented and stressed by anthropologists (see for example, Fortes, 1978). The Igbo, numerous writers have not hesitate to point out, are by no means the only ethnic group in Africa that places premium on place of origin; the Yoruba, it has been observed, are similarly known for such a premium (Oloyede, 2002). However, as Igbo historians have been quick to stress, what is perhaps distinctive is the affective and moral obligations to the communities, their extended families and affines (Smith, 2005; Chukwuezi, 2001; Isichei, 1976), which formed part of the assumptive world that I argue, was to be 'disturbed' in a long *duree* in the entity Nigeria. The 'disturbance' came in the form of an absence of 'having people' in the political economy of the entity, Nigeria. Smith's

(2005:32) notion of 'having people', whilst having a cultural bent, has to be seen as more than that in the scheme of things in the entity that was created by the British. The Igbo, as noted earlier, are 'gifted traders'. But to be gifted is hardly enough for success of any kind; there must exist the condition that allows for the 'gift' to translate into success. The British strategy of 'divide-and-rule' in the form of the Richards Constitution provided the condition. As pointed out earlier, the British gained from it; so did the leadership of the Nigerian political parties whose elite status became more confirmed in their politics of 'regionalism'. For Nigerians as Dudley (1982: 47) remarked:

> "As an employee, he now found that the level of his tax varied with the region in which he resided: he paid the most in income tax if he resided in the East and the least if his residence was in the North. And as a farmer growing export crops, he found that the price he got for his produce varied with the region in which the produce was sold. Thus, for example, he got more for his cocoa if he sold it in the East – which grew little cocoa – than if the same cocoa was sold in the West. As a parent, with children of school=going age, he found that if he resided in the West, he did not have to pay fees for his children in primary schools but he had to do so if his place of abode was in the East or in the North."

For the Igbo, a presumed gifted people in commerce, the disarticulated character of the political economy of Nigeria, was the opportunity that they could hardly resist and the point about their migratory tendency can be understood in this context. Their movement and residence in the North, despite its 'hostility' to the southerners was not a deterrent. They were mostly traders and involved in commerce especially because of the 'politics of exclusion' from the expanding public service in the north. The North was haven for them: any businessperson would cherish a low-tax context to operate as it allows for maximisation of profit.

Further, to trade and make a success out of it requires among many things, the condition that would enable it which would include access to capital. Such an access is created by government policies which make it easier for channels as the financial institution to make capital available.

Business also needs government tender thus making powerful those who award tenders. It thus becomes an essential 'to have people' who will make it happen. Patronage becomes in this sense critical in defining success. For a people anchored in 'having people', such an essential is a given. Networks of patronage are created and navigated as many writers have demonstrated through kinship ties among the Igbo. This is part of the assumptive world of the Igbo. What

therefore makes Biafra that, which was lost, is its 'constituting power' in the Igbo *being*. How can this be read as traumatic? This is discussed in the section that follows.

Biafra as a Traumatic Loss

Contemporary political arrangement in Nigeria continues to face the unresolved problem of how best to keep it as an entity in which ethnic groups will not feel marginalised. It is this feeling of marginalisation, as would seem clear in the discussion up to this point that laid the foundation for the attempt at secession and the subsequent shattering of the assumptive world of the Igbo. The feeling is translated into action in some cases as evidenced in the inter-ethnic violence across the country. Quite a number of ethnic groups fight the Nigerian nation-state for more rights and a greater share in political power and economic wealth, as well as each other over resources and the preservation of their distinct lifestyles. For example, we see the Ijaw and the Itsekiri in the Niger Delta at each others' throats; the Ilaje and the Ijaw; the Yoruba and the Ijaw and the Yoruba and the Hausa in the south west, between Yoruba and Hausa in the north, the Tiv and Jukun, and Fulani and Kuteb in the middle belt of the country, and between the Fulani and Berom in the Plateau region. In addition is the perennial fighting between the Muslims and Christians in the north, evidence of the *two cultures* as argued earlier.

The dynamics of the conflict are almost identical but in the case of the Niger Delta, it is more related to what has been referred to as the material value of the territory (Wolff, 2006). Since the early 1990s, there has been documented evidence of continuous conflict in this part of the country, which is the source of most of the country's oil wealth, killing, as some political commentators estimated, around a thousand people per year (Wolff, 2006). The case of the Niger Delta, it is important to point out, seems rather complex in its conflation of ethnic and territorial claims. The population of this part of Nigeria is estimated to be well over 7 million people who belong to five main ethnic groups variously in conflict with multinational oil corporations – Chevron, Exxon Mobil and Shell - over land and compensation for environmental damage, with the state over the share that they receive in their homeland's oil wealth, and with each other over land ownership of oil exploration areas. Of note, one needs point out, is that, at the core of these inter-ethnic conflicts is the significance of territory as a symbol of individual and collective identities, its strategic value as a source of control and influence. The significance of territory stems also from the fact that it can be used and indeed was used in the Biafra case as a defining criterion in

relation to the Igbo identity – the *great flight* that was mentioned in the earlier section, was one back to the homeland. It is apparent that territory was also the basis of the political entity, Biafra, and a potent source of mass mobilisation before the war in the form of regionalism and the Biafra nation. What this suggests is that territorial components form a significant dimension of ethnic identity, primarily in the form of actual homelands to which an ethnic group attaches importance as its origin. In fact it is a general point in political science literature on ethnicity. Territory possesses, as Wolff (2006) suggests, certain 'values in and of itself' and the Delta conflict, seems to be an evidence of this point. The central point of note in making this statement is that in this context, inter-ethnic relations must be conceived of more broadly than the traditional majority-minority relations that one finds in the analysis especially in relation to disputed territories. We have seen in the case of the Delta part of the country that it is inhabited by members of more than one ethnic group. What is clear is that the inter-ethnic conflicts are not ones in which groups claim the right to self-determination equating independent statehood with such claims. In fact not all the ethnic groups are in a situation in which independent statehood or increased autonomy within the Nigerian nation-state is a possible or desirable option although one hears quite relatively often comments that all ethnic groups should go their separate 'ways'.

The Igbo experience is, however, exceptional. It is, in the discourse of nationalism, an ethnic nationalism as distinct from the civic nationalism. This distinction immediately raises the question of the relationship between ethnic groups and nation. According to Wolff (2006), the key distinction lies in their relationship to the state. He writes: "Nations by definition, require a state to fulfil their potential; ethnic groups do not and historically have not. This is not to say that ethnic groups have always existed or that the make-up of their identity does not change over time. …. Yet, in the same way in which ethnic groups and nations are distinguishable from each other in their relationship to the state, so their political relevance can be determined, at least in the contemporary world of nation state. Ethnicity does not have to matter politically, nationalism does" (2006:54/55). Nationalism he argues is not necessarily tied to ethnicity; in this sense, civic nationalism is thus more virtuous and liberal, whereas, ethnic nationalism is seen as dangerous and exclusive. In civic nationalism, all citizens are considered equal regardless of their ethnicity, cultural or religious, or linguistic background and have the same rights and responsibilities (Wolff, 2006). The state in this conception is 'blind' to difference in the allocation of resources. As Wolff (2006) was quick to point out, this classically liberal notion of civic nationalism advocates the minimal and, in a broader sense, secular state, where everyone is equal in the public sphere and where religion, language,

ethnicity etc., are a strictly private matter. However, as he further stated, civic nationalism "by default, advantages majority cultures: their language, traditions, customs become 'official' whereas those of minorities are relegated to the private sphere, and it is the responsibility and choice of individuals whether or not they want to maintain certain aspects of their identity that 'diverge' from the national identity, which although defined as civic, is in fact nothing but the majority's ethnicity writ large.". (Wolff, 2006:52/53). Civic nationalism creates an illusion of binding all ethnic groups together but it leads to ethnic conflict as the inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria have shown.

Ethnic nationalism derives from the difference which is de-emphasised in civic nationalism. Unlike civic nationalism, it is far less accommodating of difference because it hardly allows for equality in the public sphere and tends to be discriminatory against members of ethnic groups other than the dominant group because they appear different. As pointed out earlier, there is a general consensus that the Biafra war was an ethnic conflict. It was, in the context of preceding discussion, an Igbo ethnic nationalism. It was about the assumptive world of the Igbo. The war, at a general level, arose from the evaluative significance accorded by the Igbo to acknowledged differences between the Igbo and the Hausa which was played out in public rituals of affirmation and political power relations. Conventional explanation would have us believe that unlike the other two bigger ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Hausa and the Yoruba, the Igbo were committed to the entity Nigeria as a nation-state uninhibited by "loyalty to any pre-existing archaic political structure" (Diamond, 2007:349). However, they lost faith in the possibility of a unified Nigerian nation and expressed their sense of nationality in the creation of Biafra.

The expression of a nation by the Igbo and the loss of that meant the shattering of their assumptive world. As Diamond (2004:359) puts it "It meant the collapse of their symbolic universe and living on sufferance in a state that had used every conceivable means to reduce them to its own aspirations and pace, that is to say, to the Nigerian common denominator as it had been determined by colonial powers." This somehow captures the trauma, the damage to their assumptive world. The assumptive world of the Igbo derive from their being; their cognitive representation of this being; who they see themselves as, how they organise themselves and their sense of connection and belonging to their social world – their reality. The damage to this world comes in the form of the breaking of their constitution as Biafra, a cognitive 'representation' of their *being;* the entity Biafra was to bring a sense of belonging and connection in a manner that the entity, Nigeria, would not – one that would cohere the Igbo *being*; their relation to themselves; their being attached to themselves. Biafra thus gives the power of making real, constituting, constructing and bringing forth an Igbo nation.

In the wake of the loss of Biafra, damage was done – the power to make real is shattered, the bringing forth of the Igbo nation is lost, a nation that brings connection to the Igbo. Trauma, collective trauma, sets in. How is this trauma mediated? This is answered by way of a short concluding remark.

Concluding Remark

In concluding, it needs to be pointed out that the concept of trauma does not occupy a key position in the discussion about Biafra, though one finds it implicit in some recent writings (see for example, Smith, 2005). This absence illustrates the marginal status of the concept in the discussion of the Biafra war. Much of the writings are overwhelmingly political which is scarcely surprising. It is, quite rightly, considered a political issue.

Given this, a psychoanalytically 'occupied' term would hardly be considered of utility in providing an insight into a still contentious and contested political arrangement in Nigeria. However, the fact of the undertone of some of the contentions which reflect the social repercussions of historical traumata requires the application of the concept of trauma. This is what has been attempted in this paper.

One can only say that the collective trauma of the loss of Biafra is mediated through the continuous practices of an aspect of their self worth. The Igbo are a migrant people. They are the most migrant of all the ethnic groups in Nigeria and can be found in all corners of the country.

The fact of the loss of Biafra and the anxiety that the Igbo have in contemporary Nigeria has not diminished their migratory 'instinct' to other parts of the country, especially to the north of the country where they were massacred. In such places, they assert their self worth through entrepreneurship and lineage organisations that regularly meet. This gives a sense of community and continuity and "extends the obligations of kinship across the Nigerian political and economic landscape" (Smith, 2006:37). The reproduction of the social structural form in the sense of lineage meetings provides the Igbo the security and protection from the extreme anxiety-provoking awareness of their perceived marginalisation.

They are able to 'exploit' the networks of kinship, affinity and community to 'get on with life'. *Getting on with life* sits at the fore of the Igbo consciousness. It is a culture capital, in the Bourdiuean sense anchored in an Igbo saying which Amadiueme (2004: 50) points at: 'Onye ajulu ana ju onwe ya?' – when others reject or abandon you, you don't also abandon yourself." and serves as mediating the trauma of their loss of Biafra. Significantly, in *getting on with life* is the Igbo memory of Biafra.

They draw on these memories when faced with hostilities. On such occasions as religious hostilities, for example, they recall Biafra. Yet Biafra was what was lost and the loss a trauma for them. This 'oddness' creates in itself a sort of sublimated psychological energy which is the 'real' source of their mediation of the traumatic loss.

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Ethics and the Non-physical Self in Ndorobo World View

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Abstract
Ethics in Ndorobo world view are concerned primarily with Self and its effect on the welfare and moral state of community Other. Significant psychical elements of Self such as personality, character, honesty, desire, and decision can affect the state of community strength through personal behaviour deemed ethical or unethical. Ndorobo ethics is concerned exclusively with governing social conduct for interpersonal relations. This article proposes that elements of the non-physical Self are sources for moral behaviour, and social customary law is the basis for moral duty among the Ndorobo. Germane to the discussion are the roles associated with the non-physical Self that reflect four basic ethical principles in Ndorobo world view: 1) Ethical principle of social unity; 2) Ethical principle of relational exchange; 3) Ethical principle of respect; and 4) Ethical principle of role standards. Conformity to role expectations by Self is highly valued as an ethical axiom that is viewed as natural and necessary in the life of a Ndorobo.

Keywords: *Ndorobo, Non-physical self, Ethical principle, Social unity*

Introduction

At the highest levels of academia, ethics is defined as the systematic, philosophical study of morality. A more pragmatic approach recognises ethics as a discipline that investigates the meanings and purposes behind conduct. The concern is with constructing the moral order of a people based on the perceived rightness or wrongness of behaviour. In this way ethics and morality are part of cultural systems which are composed from and transmitted through the socio-cultural context; and further, ethics as a socio-cultural construct serves as an authoritative paradigm for interpersonal behaviour (Bird, 1981). It is the science of duty i.e. moral duty intent on discovering ideals of both character and behaviour (Uka, 1991). The study of ethics seeks to understand the sources for choice in individual

action whether it be right or wrong and the basis for such action. In this paper, I consider elements of the non-physical Self as sources for moral behaviour, and social customary law as the basis for moral duty among the Ndorobo people of East Africa.

The Maa speaking Ndorobo people inhabiting the southern portion of the Mau Escarpment in Kenya utilise key elements of the non-physical Self to structure basic ethical assumptions. Significant psychical elements of Self such as personality, character, honesty, desire, and decision can affect the state of community vitality through personal behaviour deemed ethical or unethical. Ethics in Ndorobo world view are concerned primarily with the effect of Self on the welfare and moral state of community Other.

Social Construct of Ethics and the Non-physical Self

Of the four general categories of morality (religious, natural, individual, and social), social morality is the most salient classification across cultures (Thiroux 1977). Self must have a code of conduct for interacting with Other and specifically to govern social relationships. In general the collectivist orientation found in African communities has fostered an ethos with a synthesis of personal, social, and spiritual components albeit with social mandates in a prominent position. Modern Western societies seem to lack a symbiosis of ethos and world view. Indeed, meanings and motivations of a personal nature often have little connection to one's social Self. This dichotomy between personal and social meanings of life often create conflicting moral motivations within the daily life of a Western individual since there is no single ultimate ethical code to act as a guide (Moseley 1979). Traditional African morality entertains no such conflict because Self is conceived to be a natural blend of individuality and community membership role acting in concert with each other. The social concept of moral behaviour is supported by Mbiti's view that:

> "the essence of African morality is that it is more 'societary' than 'spiritual'; it is a morality of 'conduct' rather than a morality of 'being'...for it defines what a person *does* rather than what he *is*. Conversely, a person is what he is because of what he does, rather than that he does what he does because of what he is" (Mbiti 1990:209).

This emphasis on proper social behaviour underpins the basis of morality among African people groups. Sarpong writes of the Akan, "what a man is is less important than what a man does...a person is what he is because of his deeds.

He does not perform those deeds because of what he is" (1972:42). Indeed what a person does must go beyond personal, inner Self motivations and reflect communal moral values (Nwagwu 2002).

Ethics in Ndorobo world view are revealed in the elements of the non-physical Self as the sources of personal action. To Ndorobo the question of ethics relates only to the outward demonstration of individual expression and does not include any notions of an inner condition, simply because that which is inside is simultaneously outside. Ndorobo ethics is a morality of conduct rather than a morality of being by defining what a person does instead of what an individual is. The ethical mandate declares, 'You are Ndorobo. Now act like it!' The meaning and purpose of behaviour is evaluated against one's moral duty as Ndorobo. Non-physical Self elements are the source of Ndorobo mode of conduct regulated by community customs, traditions, and taboos.

The relevance and importance of behaviour in Ndorobo morality is key. To be honest (*esipata)*, for example, a person first must engage his/her non-physical element of *esipata* and behave honestly. The emphasis is placed on the act. The dishonest person may be held responsible for becoming dishonest because his personality (*olkuak*) is the result of repeated voluntary acts of dishonesty. The person has the choice between committing dishonest behaviour or refraining from such action. This illustrates the Ndorobo conviction that not only is a person responsible for personal morality, but behaviour is morality.

The rightness or wrongness of an act is measured against community values found in an individual's *olkuak* (personality). *Olkuak* is the cultural mandates for behaviour and values the person is expected to assume as their personality. It is the moral ideal in Ndorobo thought giving rise to harmonious integration of the person with the world. *Olkuak* is a guiding force over Self that aspires toward a quintessential social order in which members of the community live in harmony without quarrelling.

Olkuak is often translated 'personality' but bears little resemblance to the English translation. It is conceived in a radically different mode of thought. Ndorobo view the person as an extension of the community, one pebble in a bucket of sand. One grain is meaningless and easily overlooked; a handful takes form, fills space, and therefore has meaning and use. The personality of the person, their *olkuak*, submerges Self within the community thereby providing Self with purpose, value, strength and most importantly, a means of appropriate expression.

Abandoning one's *olkuak* is equivalent to lost knowledge. It is ignoring knowledge of right and wrong by rejecting the moral imperative and values of one's social heritage. This can only be restored by *Enkai* (divine Creator) through corrective measures that cause a repentant heart. In this way, personality serves as

conscience. The idea that conscience is 'a complex of residual habits' imposed by society is somewhat descriptive of the Ndorobo notion of conscience (Gbadegesin 1991:68). *Olkuak* (personality) serves as conscience by issuing the standard of ethics the person measures himself against and as proctor of moral reasoning. The ideas of moral rightness and wrongness are not found in a separate, bounded element but are included in the functional role of personality. Personality is a discerning element, one that determines good and evil. The individual notions of right and wrong which distinguish people from one another in part are the result of what each *olkuak* has been taught and subsequently accepted.

The source of moral values dictating the behaviour of individuals is not divine commands but rather the cultural demands of Ndorobo community. Elaborate prescriptions guiding the ethical life of each person are given in a coherent system of ethics founded in socially revealed commands and expectations. It is the community not *Enkai* (divine Creator) who is the source of moral right and wrong definition. The supernatural plays an important role in behaviour but not in terms of constituting the source of moral definition or value. Morality for Ndorobo exists in the social conduct of community members. Moral definition and moral values are actively observed in the social behaviour of a person.

The central focus of Ndorobo morality is a concern for community well being. This social character is intrinsic to the notion of right and wrong since unless society existed, there would be no such thing as proper or improper behaviour. Gyekye comments, "A society-oriented morality is necessarily grounded in human experiences in living together" (1987:145). Such is the understanding of Ndorobo ethics. Consideration for both community well being and social unity is the crucible in which Ndorobo morality is structured, not divine pronouncements. One of the compelling reasons for Ndorobo to pursue right behaviour is to attain individual social acceptance and the benefits of relationships therein. This probably more so than the approval of *Enkai* (divine Creator).

If utility as Molema (1920) remarked is a contributing factor perhaps in all moral codes, then the ideals of right moral conduct among Ndorobo have the ultimate usefulness for community and individual survival. The Ndorobo measure of right and wrong is custom. Put another way, good is that which receives community approval and bad is that which is disapproved. Right conduct builds community Other along with Self; wrongful behaviour weakens community's structural integrity. Moral behaviour is deemed social while immoral behaviour is judged as antisocial.

Desire (*iyieunot*) appears to be a focal point in the ethical life of Ndorobo and a crucial element in moral comportment. The Ndorobo recognise the response to moral knowledge is an individual private affair. Having educated and motivated an individual in social morés, a community cannot be guaranteed conformity by

a person. A person may know and even accept a moral rule but be unable to apply this rule in a particular situation because of uncontrolled desire. Abandoning the Ndorobo ethos is generally attributed to the non-physical element of *iyieunot* (desire). Personality (*olkuak*) enables a person to distinguish between that which is good and evil functioning much like a moral sense. But the moral will to carry out the moral directive falls under the responsibility of a person's non-physical element of desire (*iyieunot*). It is not an inability to apply one's moral sense or moral will that results in immoral expression but a conscious act of disobedience by desire. This suggests that within the Ndorobo conceptual scheme evil stems from free will action by a person based on individual desire.

In the discussion to follow, we consider how the Ndorobo world view reflects basic ethical principles Uka (1991) asserts are common to traditional societies and the role of the non-physical Self in these areas of moral comportment. The first principle is the need by every group to restrain violence. Ndorobo world view addresses this requisite through the ethical code of social unity. Ndorobo use notions of hospitality and reciprocity in relational exchanges for the second axiom to prohibit theft and make contracts a matter of social personality. The third fundamental principle in traditional societies is the value of life which is evidenced in Ndorobo respect for life force. The final topic centers around the need in society to regulate affairs between individuals dependent on role expectations. These kinds of precepts include rules for behaviour in kin relations, between the sexes, and marital fidelity.

Ethical Principle of Social Unity

The Ndorobo believe a person is born into a particular social group by the will of the divine Creator, *Enkai*, and is destined to be a product of social forces within that culture. The Ndorobo non-physical Self encompasses elements which join the person and community members together in an integrated fashion. The primary sociocentric element of the person is the non-physical Self component of personality (*olkuak)*. The Ndorobo individual always and necessarily exists as a bearer of *olkuak*. Self is made continuous with community by *olkuak*. The initial capacity for personality is given to a newborn by God and content is generated from the social environment. Personality is to be submissive to the will of the collective Other and by doing so *olkuak* becomes what community makes a person.

The Ndorobo believe personality comes from the actions of the person. It is considered cultural behavioural habits which express features of Ndorobo behaviour expected and shared by members of the community. The individual

presents themselves to the community by way of *olkuak*. It is an observable phenomenon and not an abstraction to the Ndorobo psyche. The person is what is observed by others. Either the person has developed a good *olkuak* and behaves accordingly or has chosen an unsavory personality and shows this by behaviour deemed socially inappropriate. Behaviour is a mirror of an inner state the individual is not capable of hiding or masking.

The Ndorobo morality follows the pattern of traditional societies in that respect for the social rules and norms are indispensable to community unity, peace, continuity, and betterment. Deviant behaviour such as lack of a sense of duty, disregard for elders, and individualism which neglects the in-group is reprimanded as sin against community and the divine. Thus Ndorobo ethics may be interpreted in Durkheimian terms. 'The voice of God' for Ndorobo is actually 'the voice of the people,' that is, the voice of community (1965:37). Malefijt (1989) discounts this as absurd, however I think not. The Ndorobo morality is the will of community set forth in codes of conduct contained in personality and manifested in the behaviour of Self for the ultimate good of both Self and community Other. Social rules endorsed by *Enkai* (divine Creator) function as sacred rules. Thus Ndorobo ethics is a divinely sanctioned means of preserving Ndorobo society against tribal annihilation caused by disunity.

The Ndorobo inhibit destructive behaviour by insistence on harmony of relationships between Self and community Other. With this customary law, the first universal ethical principle to restrain violence is dealt with in a clear manner. The Ndorobo personality is instrumental in keeping social order through unity of purpose and proper relations conforming to *osotuaa (*peace or friendship) found in *olkuak* (personality).

The value the Ndorobo place on social relationships cannot be overstated. Relational unity within the community is not an optional prerogative. Disunity is classified as a cultural sin that is dealt with on the corporate level and must be forgiven by the divine. If allowed to continue, *Enkai* will judge both the individuals in conflict and community members as a whole. A blessing for reconciliation given after a dispute has been resolved illustrates the importance of maintaining harmony in community relations:

Have a sweet smell!
Love each other!
Be in unity as part of the community!
May you stand still!
May God agree with what we say!
May you love one another's nose!
Have a long life and do not step on each other!

Fight for your age-mates to have good fortune![1]

Each line of the prayer is stated in the form of a command. A community elder is the speaker charging those in dispute back to a permanent loving relationship under the unifying umbrella of the community. It is necessary to restore love and acceptance between individual community members without the pretence of wavering in order for *Enkai* to place his blessing on the ceremony. The command to 'stand still' addresses the temptation to act lovingly in the presence of community members and then display contempt in private. Remaining steadfast in thought and deed is characterised as brave; changing from love to scorn is considered cowardly. The charge is to keep relationships united in love by remaining or standing firm in genuine devotion.

The myth, *The sacred Mountain of God*, is widely known among the Ndorobo and is an important literary work of fiction which dramatically illustrates the devastation caused by social disharmony.[2] A great drought and famine ravaged the homeland of the Ndorobo leaving the people to question what offence was committed against *Enkai.* A group of elders were chosen and sent to the Mountain of God to find the cause of the calamities, offer sacrifices, and display sincere repentance.

Once on the mountain, it was learned *Enkai* was very displeased with the tribe for becoming 'a people of war, clan against clan.'[3] The misfortune of drought and famine had come upon the people because community members were at enmity with one another. *Enkai* showed his great mercy by accepting the penance of the elders and admonished the men that the community must live in unity and harmony; if not, famine, sickness, or drought would come again. This pseudo historical account offers insight into moral imperative of social unity. The Ndorobo community demands social harmony in community relationships and uses the weight of divine intervention as a means of ultimate authority validating the moral obligation.

Ethical Principle of Relational Exchange

In Ndorobo custom, every person is expected to show hospitality and generosity toward community Other. This is embraced with faithful execution since at any time a person may find themselves in a position of need. If these obligations are neglected, the individual cannot expect any consideration in return and neither can offspring. The dependent nature of social relationships for personal and community survival is a powerful motivator toward social morality to benefit Self and kin.

The social rules of hospitality and reciprocity emphasised by the Ndorobo personality (*olkuak*) and character (*empukunoto*) are a social means which indirectly serve as a kind of contractual agreement. Give and take exchanges are not formal, written agreements but a social knowledge of who is indebted to whom for social courtesies leading to favourable consideration of future economic needs. These facilitate business type arrangements needed for economic success.

Proper orientation of Self toward the Ndorobo moral code of relational exchanges is the result of a good, inner personality. *Olkuak* is a qualification of moral oughts. Nowhere is this more adequately shown than in a narrative depicting a greedy son.[4] A boy working in the fields sees visitors approaching and quickly runs in the house to eat the porridge ready for that morning's breakfast. He begins gulping down the porridge and in his excitement does not realise it is boiling hot. Suddenly his throat is burned, he becomes deaf and faints. Instantly knowing his folly, his mother comes in and curses him.

The son has committed an unpardonable moral breach. Hospitality is the highest value in Ndorobo world view and is defined partially in terms of offering sustenance to visitors. The son's greed was an immoral act quickly resulting in harsh consequences and punishment. His personality chose an iniquitous attitude, prompted him to wrongful behaviour which consequently tortured his physical body. The concept of *olkuak* creates links whose connectors weave across that which is moral, social, physical and non-physical and, in the process, make the causes in one realm affect others.

The norms of propriety and appropriateness dictated by *olkuak* require self expression conform to those mandates of hospitality and generosity between members of the Ndorobo community. *Olkuak* provides individual acceptance and value of prescriptions for relational exchanges and places it in the realm of the social environment. Conformity to personality becomes a moral issue sanctioned by *Enkai* as a means of coercing members to follow community dictates that proscribe greed and inhospitable behaviour.

Ethical Principle of Respect

The equal value placed on every soul (*enkishui*)[5] upholds the high respect for the sanctity of human life among the Ndorobo. Honoring the gift of life by *Enkai* is to protect one's own *enkishui* and respect the soul of others, be it insiders or outsiders. The Ndorobo tendency to flee in the face of danger to protect Self and the use of trickery to slip away from an enemy assault reflects the value placed on life. The Ndorobo rarely use any type of force against opposing out-groups so as to not offend the divine Creator in killing another. Cleverness and the use of

tricks are highly valued because these offer a way of escape without threatening life force.

It is interesting to note the sin the divine is most annoyed with is ordinarily identified by the Ndorobo as murder. It is *Enkai* who gives life; therefore *Enkai* should be the only one to extinguish life. Murder is viewed as usurping the authority of the divine Creator, not an envious position by any Ndorobo. It is the obligation for respecting the existence and welfare of life force which necessitates the moral standard demanding all human life be esteemed and places it in a position of high ethical significance.

Ethical Principle of Role Standards

The social roles an individual is expected to assume are generally defined by *olkuak* (personality) and include rules for behaviour in kin relations. The conformity of individuals to role expectations is highly valued as an ethical principle. The individual has a strong need to belong, work and live cooperatively with others in the community. This sociocentric Self and the cultural provisions that sustain it are found in personality. *Olkuak* is a culturally encoded dogma transmitted from generation to generation as pragmatic, authoritative principles. It is considered a moral link giving the person the necessary rudder to steer into acceptable, culturally moral waters. When this link is severed the person is doomed to wander into all manner of social ills, become lost to himself and society, and suffer severe reprisals. A Ndorobo folktale of a prodigal son is an allegory meant to teach just such a concept.[6]

In the prodigal son narrative, a Ndorobo father dutifully instructed his two sons in the rules of Ndorobo society. One son refused to listen, disobeyed his father by inappropriate behaviour and left home. He found himself in dire straits without food or clothing soon after leaving his homeland. At this point, the son remembered in his misery the teaching of his father and realised all his trouble was caused by his refusal to submit his personality to community elders.

The only pathway to peace and well-being for the individual in life is through obedience and conformity. The narrative of the wayward son not only emphasises the submissive place of children towards their parents, but also represents individual standing in the community. The father symbolises the community, and the two sons represent individual members of the community. The identity of the person is Ndorobo; therefore, in order for the personality of the individual to become good and mature, the person must allow their personality to be shaped according to Ndorobo ideology. If not, prosperity is not possible.

The primary responsibility of teaching morality falls to family elders and

secondarily to community elders. This is a serious responsibility that if ignored will lead to problematic relations. In a folktale of the father who spoils his eldest son, the boy is so disliked by his brothers that they plot to kill him. The father has failed to insist the boy conform to the traditional Ndorobo social role as an equal brother with equal responsibilities, and the son develops a bad personality. This is an extreme case in which a bad personality seems to be more unethical than murder.[7]

Every person has multiple social identities which interrelate with community Other by what Goodenough refers to as 'identity relationships' (1971:312). The significant defining criteria of social identities among the Ndorobo are age, gender, descent, and tribe. These social identities confer on identity relationships distinct duties, privileges, authority, obligations and impunities Self cannot escape. The identity relationships culturally recognised among Ndorobo may be divided into three social groups: (a) kin relationships, (b) community relationships, and (c) relationships with those outside community. For instance, a Ndorobo man uses his non-physical Self elements to elucidate his social identities as son, brother, age-mate, husband, father, community elder, Ndorobo tribal member, agro-pastoralist, Maa speaker, Kenyan, and an African black man. The personality element defines each of these identities and the social relationships particular to each distinctive identity; and then personality, conscience, character, and honesty bring awareness and obligation to properly abide by the principles governing each specific social identity and relationship. In addition, these components exert influence on the elements of emotion, desire, decision to conform to social propriety.

Failure by an individual to utilise *olkuak* in its intended social role as defining Self, community Other and earthly Other and accepting relationships on the basis of norms is a moral breach. All the elements of Self are held up to the social moral ideal. The role of sanctions and incentives by the social community in the behaviour of Ndorobo is extensive. In a group oriented society such as Ndorobo, the network of complex social relationships containing the opinions of kinsmen, age-mates, and elders wields a strong influence on the behaviour of the single person. The possibility of invoking shame, disgrace, betrayal, or dishonour as a result of behavioural indiscretion is a very real sanction in Ndorobo practice. It is ingrained in the moral consciousness and motivation of Ndorobo to behave in such a way so as to not bring disgrace or disdain to oneself and one's community.

The role of sanctions, incentives, and consequences in the explanation of behaviour should not imply Ndorobo recognise these as the sole reason for moral action. Doing that which is morally correct in order only and always to avoid sanctions or undesirable consequences is overstated. The element of desire

(*iyieunot*) allows for a person to embrace Ndorobo personality out of respect for and acceptance of societal values. Desire becomes a moral will subservient to the moral ought of personality.

Conclusion

Four basic principles are fundamental codes of ethical conduct among the Ndorobo: Ethical principles of social unity, relational exchange, respect, and role standards. It is these social codes which distinguish man from the animal world. The Ndorobo believe their community is a moral society observing moral law by preserving social conventions.

The welfare and unity of the group is not and cannot be separated from the moral behaviour of individuals. This is not true of any animal species for each is driven by instinct alone. Animals possess life in the form of *enkishui* but do not possess the ability to make choices in life experience. Morality exists in humanity because of the free will of man to submit to or rebel against his in-group.

Relations between the individual and the community are a central concern for the Ndorobo. So central in fact that according to traditional Ndorobo medicine, there is a natural, intimate relationship between health and ethical behaviour. A motivational source which encourages the person to comply with the personality element is that the social, that is, the moral misconduct can cause physical and mental illness.

Ethical behaviour reciprocates by restoring physical and mental health. Thus the conceptions of health and illness allow a picture of what a normal individual is considered to be as defined by *olkuak*. Among the methods for preserving good health are: self control, sociability, unity of community relationships, generosity, distinguishing between natural and unnatural things, love in action through respect - all characteristics of a good *olkuak*. A person is morally evaluated according to their personality, whether good or bad. Personality, that is the non-physical element of *olkuak*, is perhaps the most important ethical concept in Ndorobo world view.

Endnotes

[1] Ole Nkaru, personal communication, March 19, 1998.
[2] Simon Ngayami, personal communication, March 11, 1998.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Koseken Mebarni, personal communication, October 11, 1997.
[5] *Enkishui* is the non-physical Self element that is translated 'soul' but is also a synonym for 'life'. *Enkishui* is the most significant psychical element of man

representing life force.

[6] Jackson Ngayami, personal communication, June 19, 1998.

[7] Putiai Krondo, personal communication, December 4, 1997.

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L'imaginaire du Bureau et Les Usages du Fétiche au Gabon

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Résumé
En nous appuyant sur les différents imaginaires qui concourent à l'interprétation de certains faits sociaux des peuples du Gabon, il apparaît que le bureau en tant que lieu de travail se nourrit d'un imaginaire. Celui-ci va de l'expression de la promotion sociale à une prétention à l'acquisition du pouvoir. Cet imaginaire semble trouver ses origines dans la période coloniale où le travail du bureau était la fonction des "Blancs" qui maîtrisaient l'écriture alors que le travail manuel était strictement réservé aux populations indigènes. Depuis cette époque, le bureau de travail fait l'objet de toutes les attentions et convoitises. Et dès lors qu'ils sont installés, certains occupants s'efforcent, par tous les moyens, de le conserver. Les stratégies de conservation et de protection contre les agressions diverses sont visibles à travers les usages des fétiches. Ceux-ci sont souvent représentés par certains objets qui ont une importance culturelle sur le plan local. Ces éléments de défense et de protection dans l'espace de travail semblent le transformer en domaine d'appropriation au point de faire du bureau une zone interdite et avoir tendance à le confisquer pour soi.

Mots-clés: *Bureau, Domaine, Ecriture, Fétiches, Imaginaire, Pouvoir, Protection.*

Introduction

Un sujet se rapportant à la sociologie du travail peut aussi faire référence aux aspects de la sociologie des religions dans l'explication des phénomènes sociaux qui entourent le monde du travail au Gabon. En nous appuyant sur la sociologie de Weber, l'on dira que la compréhension des comportements des individus passe par la prise en compte préalable des structures sociales et des systèmes de valeurs dont les actions sont orientées significativement (Weber 1995:33).

Aussi avons-nous choisi d'étudier l'imaginaire dans le contexte bureaucratique pour montrer son impact sur les comportements des usagers de bureaux au Gabon.

Le mot imaginaire a, chez ceux qui l'emploient, des significations fort différentes, et par certains aspects, il peut donner l'impression d'être une auberge espagnole, ses définitions variant au gré de leurs auteurs. Pour les uns, il est implicitement connoté de façon péjorative, car il s'oppose à la notion de réel, et devient synonyme de chimérique (Thomas 1998:15). En effet, l'imagination a le pouvoir de dépasser ce qui est perçu. Grâce à elle, les mondes clos sont transgressés et le visible est outrepassé; elle est à l'origine d'hypothèses et d'inventions concernant des idées, des personnages, des situations qui n'existent pas ou n'ont jamais existé. L'imaginaire est le monde qui n'existe que dans notre imagination. Il est la représentation de ce qui est étranger au réel, de ce qui n'existe pas dans la réalité. Il relève de la fiction, de l'utopie et de l'illusion (Lazorthes 1999:7).

Toutefois, avec le développement des théories, la notion d'imaginaire a pris un tout autre sens. Pour les autres, le terme ne s'oppose plus à celui de réel, il renvoie à un système, à un dynamisme organisateur des images, qui leur confère une profondeur en les reliant entre elles. En effet, dans sa tentative de faire l'esquisse des repères socioculturels de l'expérience de soi en milieu traditionnel en Afrique noire, Sow (1978:11) qualifie d'imaginaire collectif structuré la société des doubles.

Celle qui fonctionne comme la réplique invisible de la société visible des hommes. C'est le lieu de tous les heurts et malheurs, celui des occurrences dramatiques aussi bien que celui à partir duquel se réalisent les succès quotidiens. C'est aussi l'espace au sein duquel se structurent les désirs, les craintes, les angoisses, les espoirs de réussite dans les aléas de la quotidienneté. L'imaginaire n'est donc pas une collection d'images, un corpus, mais un réseau où le sens est dans la relation avec ces images-là.

Cette conception de l'imaginaire est lisible chez K. Marx par sa manière de soutenir le caractère fétichiste de la marchandise dans l'économie capitaliste. Cette esquisse est prolongée par une analyse de l'imaginaire dans la structure institutionnelle de la société moderne (Castoriadis 1975:221). Ainsi, au centre de nos préoccupations, il apparaît clairement que l'univers bureaucratique au Gabon est peuplé d'imaginaire d'un bout à l'autre et il y a bien là des systèmes de significations imaginaires qui articulent cet univers bureaucratique à partir de certains indices (Castoriadis 1975:222).

Partant de ces indices, notre objectif, dans cet article, est de montrer l'importance et le sens du bureau dans l'univers socioculturel gabonais à travers l'imaginaire qui l'entoure. Dans la pratique, le bureau se définit, de manière générale, comme une pièce rectangulaire, avec une fenêtre face à la porte, un faux plafond, un éclairage intégré ou apparent suivant le niveau hiérarchique, un bureau (meuble) avec ou sans retour (meubles plus bas placés perpendiculairement), une ou plusieurs armoires et caissons de rangement, quelques chaises, un porte-manteau et une

corbeille à papiers. Le bureau est toujours, ou presque, face à la porte, dos à la fenêtre (Pélegrin-Genel 1994:20).

Toutefois, le bureau -comme lieu- est devenu le symbole du travail, de son archétype. Il occupe toute la place. C'est le lieu d'identité sociale, le signe d'une organisation hiérarchique, le symbole du pouvoir (Pélegrin-Genel 1994:60). A partir de ce moment, le bureau devient une sorte d'enveloppe aux contours imprécis et, de ce fait, toute irruption dans cet espace sera ressentie par l'occupant voire le propriétaire comme une intrusion. Ainsi, la seule solution pour protéger son intimité ou son intégrité sera de disposer savamment quelques objets personnels qui symbolisent les limites de son jardin secret (Pélegrin-Genel 1994:64).

C'est l'usage de ces objets, qui transformera le bureau en un "domaine" ; son domaine à soi tel que défini par J. Favret-Saada (1977:334)[1]. Espace public et aussi lieu de représentation du pouvoir, le bureau devient alors une propriété qu'il faut protéger et même défendre. Car il symbolise avant tout le travail et l'identité sociale ensuite. En fait, même s'il est reconnu que "le travail n'est pas seulement un facteur de production indispensable au fonctionnement de l'économie, il est aussi un élément structurant l'identité individuelle et le moyen unanimement reconnu de s'intégrer à la vie sociale" (De Gaulejac 1994:101). Au Gabon, cet élément d'intégration sociale ne s'arrête pas seulement au fait de travailler ou d'avoir un emploi, mais il intègre aussi le fait de disposer d'un bureau car celui-ci est la marque de cet emploi. Aussi, le bureau fait l'objet de convoitises dans un environnement où la compétence ne suffit toujours pas à elle toute seule, "où la moindre réussite ne peut être due qu'à l'effort et où toute autre aisance est suspecte" (Rossatanga-Rignault 1999:89). En effet, "dans un univers où rôde constamment le danger, il n'en coûte rien de suivre certains préceptes traditionnels qui ont fait leurs preuves dans nos sociétés et qui sont susceptibles de prémunir les humains des jeteurs de sorts" (Camus 2001:68). C'est pourquoi, de nombreuses stratégies sont développées.

Elles vont de la protection, fondée sur les diverses croyances et aussi sur les différentes pratiques religieuses.

Aussi, tout au long de cet article, nous essayerons de décrire quelques faits et comportements qui, au-delà de l'appropriation classique énoncée par Fischer (1983:95) et Pélegrin-Genel (1994:151), révèlent un processus de ré-appropriation du bureau en tant que « domaine » relevant des attributs propres à un individu.

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1 *Le bureau sera défini comme ce que Jeanne Favret-Saada, appelle « domaine » en parlant d'un ensorcelé. En effet, pour cet auteur, le « je » de l'ensorcelé c'est l'ensemble constitué par lui-même et ses possessions, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble qui est socialement rattaché à son nom propre. Dans un tel ensemble, on ne saurait distinguer corps et biens parce que les biens font corps avec celui dont ils portent la marque du nom.*

Le rôle fonctionnel et l'usage de quelques objets permettra de soutenir ce processus. Ce sont ces éléments qui, dans cette contribution, perdront leur aspect premier pour se transformer en fétiches à cause des rôles qu'ils sont appelés à jouer (Tarot 1999:500)[2].

Selon De Brosses (Pouillon 1975:108), le fétiche est un objet matériel. Il peut être aussi bien naturel que fabriqué. Il peut s'agir d'un quelconque objet mais on retrouve généralement des éléments comme l'eau, le sel, le citron, une écorce, etc. L'objet qui sert de fétiche n'est jamais un objet quelconque, choisi arbitrairement, mais il est toujours défini par le code de la magie ou de la religion (Pouillon 1975:105).

Ainsi, verrons-nous, tout au long de notre cheminement, les fonctions symboliques des différents objets en situation et enfin, mieux percevoir l'appropriation du bureau comme une constitution du domaine. En un mot comment, à partir de l'écriture, se manifeste l'imaginaire du bureau au Gabon.

L'ecriture Et Les Changements Sociaux Au Gabon

En relevant les changements qui ont affecté la structure et les rapports d'ordre politique au Gabon, Balandier (1982:212) souligne que ce sont l'action d'évangélisation et l'enseignement qui ont formé deux types sociaux nouveaux. Il s'agit du chrétien et du lettré.

En ne nous focalisant que sur le lettré, il nous revient que leur action resta longtemps limitée aux centres importants avant d'être ensuite diffusée en raison même du rôle joué par le lettré dans la plupart des villages.

En effet, l'établissement d'un nouvel usage en matière de dot a accru leur influence. La principale innovation a été, ici, de dresser une liste des dons faits à la belle-famille. Il faut aussi ajouter sa qualité d'auxiliaire des chefs, sa fonction d'interprète ou de commentateur des écrits. Autant dire que les signes étaient nombreux pour indiquer le passage d'une civilisation fondée sur la tradition orale à une civilisation sur l'écriture.

Aussi, le recours à la chose écrite ne s'est pas seulement imposé en tant que moyen visant à fonder les innovations coutumières, il s'est imposé aussi en tant que substitut des anciens procédés de preuve.

L'usage de la preuve ne put que s'affirmer dans ces cas. Soit qu'elle est intervenue dans les situations radicalement nouvelles, soit qu'elle a remplacé les symboles matériels autrefois utilisés.

2 *Pour Camille Tarot, Le fétiche est le nom donné par les Blancs aux objets de culte et aux pratiques religieuses des peuples et des civilisations de Guinée et d'Afrique occidentale aux XVè et XVIè siècles. Alors que le fétichisme est un nom créé par De Brosses pour désigner toute religion qui a pour objet le culte des animaux ou des être terrestres inanimés.*

C'est là que le besoin d'un appareil bureaucratique simple et en contrecoup et les nouvelles fonctions du lettré de village se sont décelés (Balandier 1982:269).

Au Congo, par exemple, l'accroissement de la couche sociale des lettrés a été conditionné par la nature de l'économie des Kongo, très anciennement orientée vers l'extérieur et aussi par la proximité des centres et zones d'attraction. Aussi l'emprise de cette couche sociale qu'il est convenu d'appeler "les évolués" s'explique par une tension collective et une volonté de progrès. Elle s'explique aussi et surtout par le fait que les groupements de parenté et les lignages sont restés vivants et capables de créer un champ social à l'intérieur duquel l'individu s'inscrit, même lorsqu'il se trouve éloigné du foyer commun pendant une longue période (Balandier 1982:393). C'est ainsi qu'un transfert a dû être opéré au point de construire tout un imaginaire autour du bureau.

Le Bureau Et Son Imaginaire

La bureaucratie caractérise l'administration des activités économiques ou politiques par le moyen des règles universelles stables écrites et d'un personnel spécialisé. Malgré les innovations du lexique et la singularité des contextes idéologiques (Akoun et Ansart 1999), la bureaucratie n'est en rien une construction de l'occident moderne.

Le développement qu'on lui connaît fut précédé, en réalité, par une expérience d'au moins deux millénaires dans des civilisations aussi différentes que celle de la Chine ancienne, des empires égyptien, romain et ottoman, et de la cité des Incas dans l'Amérique précolombienne.

Toutefois, la bureaucratie constitue toujours une zone d'incertitude, rebelle à l'analyse scientifique et l'un des terrains d'élection des professions de foi et des mythes idéologiques de notre temps (Crozier 1963:216) Selon le sociologue Thierry Pillon, "le bureau, aujourd'hui, est un monde hétérogène où coexistent encore le bureau traditionnel de type administratif, et le chic débraillé qui prévaut par exemple chez les publicitaires"[3].

Toutefois, la conception du bureau au Gabon relève d'un ensemble de situations et de représentations liées à la définition qu'en donne Max Weber (1995:299), d'une part, et à la situation coloniale qu'a connue ce pays, d'autre part.

En effet, pour Max Weber, l'administration bureaucratique est synonyme de domination en vertu du savoir; c'est en cela que son caractère est spécifiquement rationnel. Par delà l'énorme puissance que détermine le savoir spécialisé, la bureaucratie a tendance à accroître davantage encore sa puissance par le savoir du service.

3 *Interview accordée au journal « Ouest France » du 2 mai 2001.*

Au sortir des années de colonisation, grâce à l'acquisition d'un savoir nouveau qui valorise la connaissance écrite, celle du lettré ou du bureaucrate, aux dépens de la connaissance orale (Balandier 1965:35), le bureau va supplanter les "plantations" et marquer la différence avec le travail ouvrier dans les chantiers forestiers. Aujourd'hui, par exemple, l'employé bureaucrate constitue un élément pertinent pour cerner la situation des employés qui travaillent dans les administrations.

A ce sujet, le sociologue G. Balandier (1954:507) relève par exemple que, parmi les travailleurs brazzavillois, l'emploi de manœuvre, était reconnu par la presque totalité des travailleurs comme "le plus mauvais", parce qu'il exigeait un travail pénible, rapportant les salaires les plus bas et n'entraînant aucune considération. Ainsi les professions le plus attirantes étaient celles qui correspondaient aux techniques nouvelles apportées par les Européens et notamment celles liées à l'écriture (Goody 1994:87)[4]-l'administration et l'enseignement principalement-par le prestige qu'ils procurent. Il semble bien que l'écriture ait établi une hiérarchisation des catégories socioprofessionnelles (Erny 1999:158)[5]. Dans ce contexte, on dirait même que l'histoire coloniale du travail conduit inévitablement au bureau. En effet, au premier rang des cadres locaux indigènes de l'Etat colonial, il y avait les écrivains-interprètes. De 1914 à 1938, ces derniers étaient recrutés et organisés pour les besoins des bureaux du Gouverneur général, des lieutenants-gouverneurs et des chefs de circonscription. Ils étaient destinés à seconder les fonctionnaires européens d'administration générale dans les bureaux des chefs-lieu des colonies et dans les circonscriptions.

Â partir de 1938, ces cadres indigènes seront recrutés par voie de concours ouverts aux candidats titulaires d'un certificat d'études primaires de l'enseignement public, aux agents titulaires de grades locaux indigènes et aux écrivains, comptables ou dactylographes auxiliaires comptant trois ans de services dans l'administration à l'époque du concours.

Ils étaient nommés et promus par décisions des Lieutenants-Gouverneurs, soumises à l'approbation du Gouverneur Général (Ndombi 1995:95).

Le bureau devient alors l'endroit où l'on affirme sa catégorie sociale ou mieux son pouvoir (Crozier 1963:202).

C'est ainsi que les individus s'approprient, par la force de l'imaginaire des identités valorisées grâce à la magie de l'écriture.

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4 *L'invention de l'écriture aux alentours de 3000 avant J.C. ne fournit pas seulement un admirable instrument d'engrangement, de précision et d'analyse conceptuelle, amenant des changements révolutionnaires dans la culture, mais permit l'émergence d'une classe de lettrés spécialisés dans la technique et l'art difficiles de l'écriture et dans la façon de regarder les choses, approche intellectuelle de la réalité.*

5 *Selon Pierre Erny, « certains métiers émergeaient et attiraient tous les regards : ils étaient de ce fait de principaux indicateurs de ce qui était valorisé dans l'univers mental du jeune ».*

En remontant l'histoire, en effet, il apparaît que, dans les premiers siècles des histoires égyptienne, grecque, romaine et chinoise, l'écriture reste un art que possèdent seuls, quelques professionnels hyper privilégiés et auréolés d'un prestige quasi sacré. On ne confiera donc pendant longtemps aux scribes que la transcription d'éléments religieux ou, au plus, intéressant l'exercice du pouvoir (Gaurier et Hesse 1987:75). En réalité, le bureau, dans notre contexte, comme le souligne, J. Tonda (2002:30), répond à la logique des rapports de connaissances constitutifs des relations de commandement et /ou de pouvoir surnaturel du « Souverain moderne » en colonie et en post colonie. Pour ce dernier, commander[6] confère le droit d'exiger, de contraindre, d'interdire, de punir, de récompenser, d'être obéi, bref, d'enjoindre ou de diriger, alors que le Souverain moderne s'appelle la Science, la Technique, l'Etat, le Capital, le Dieu chrétien et le Génie sorcier (Tonda 2002:27).

Au Gabon, le bureau est synonyme d'aisance et signe de richesse. Et si l'argent est le symbole du pouvoir d'une catégorie de personnes, le bureau l'est aussi, par ailleurs. Comme tout pouvoir, le bureau suscite l'envie et la jalousie, il attire "la mauvaise langue" et le "mauvais œil" (Fassin 1992:321). Il semble que ce soient les craintes de la concurrence, de la vulnérabilité et de la déstabilisation dans son emploi qui entraînent les gens à s'abandonner à l'usage du fétiche.

A y regarder de près, l'argent est le premier élément pour lequel l'on utilise le fétiche et relègue les autres avantages au second plan car c'est par lui que l'on peut se procurer les produits du génie scientifique que sont voitures, avions, appareils de toutes sortes, téléphones portables, toutes ces choses extraordinaires qui suscitent, frustrations, haines familiales ou de classe, désirs de mort de l'autre possédant (Tonda 2000:56).

Le bureau, à travers l'imaginaire qu'il nourrit, est assimilé à l'argent, au gain que l'appropriation de ce lieu peut procurer dans l'imaginaire collectif (Mary 1987:142)[7].

En l'occupant, il faudra, entre autres remparts, s'assurer d'une sécurité personnelle de l'emploi et de la promotion. Car quoiqu'inscrit dans la modernité, il y a toujours un imaginaire qui justifie l'usage du fétiche. Notre société ne fait-elle pas partie d'une modernité propre à l'Afrique où des éléments traditionnels s'articulent avec des perceptions plutôt modernes?

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6 *Â ce sujet, nous avons retenu le conflit de compétence relatif à l'époque de la colonisation entre un commandant de cercle et un chef indigène en Haute-Volta rapportée par Amadou Hampâté Bâ, Oui mon commandant! Mémoires II, Arles, Actes Sud, 1994, pp188-198.*

7 *Le terme d'imaginaire est ici compris au sens que lui donne C.Castoriadis, c'est-à-dire comme un magma de significations sociales véhiculées par des images ou des symboles produits par la faculté originaire de poser ou de se donner, sous le mode de la représentation, une chose et une relation qui ne sont pas données dans la perception.*

En observant tout l'imaginaire qui se construit à travers le bureau, nous constatons une ambivalence de comportements liée à son occupation. En effet, l'espace de travail appelé bureau[8], comme l'ensemble des éléments qui accompagnent la vie d'un individu dans son milieu socioprofessionnel, fait partie de la relation que l'homme entretient avec les esprits. Il y passe, en théorie, un minimum de huit heures par jour de travail (Pélegrin-Genel 1994:35)[9].

De plus, c'est l'endroit où l'on reçoit des tiers, sans que cela ne débouche absolument sur des relations particulières. C'est, par excellence, le lieu symbolique à travers lequel s'exerce une suite de luttes entre forces qui sont aux yeux des gabonais des puissances invisibles.

Car, comme le souligne A. Marie, "la réalité africaine contemporaine se caractérise par la précarisation et par la problématisation des solidarités communautaires, dans un climat de contradictions et de tensions accrues qui viennent s'accuser dans l'imaginaire de la sorcellerie et qui engendrent un processus généralisé d'individualisation subjective"(Tonda 2000:56).

Les données de terrain, analysés plus loin, contribuent à conforter cette hypothèse.

Les "Fétiches"

Les éléments qui ont concouru à cette réflexion ont été recueillis dans diverses localités du pays. Aussi, l'analyse qui suivra reposera t-elle sur l'ensemble des bureaux au Gabon.

En effet, pendant plusieurs mois[10], nous avons eu l'opportunité d'être reçus dans les bureaux des administrations publiques et privées, dans le cadre des études de différents projets de développement.

Parmi ces éléments, nous avons retenu des fruits de citron exposés ou dissimulés, du sel dans des bibelots sur lesquels sont plantées quelques fleurs artificielles, des chapelets, l'eau bénite, les Bibles, etc., posées dans un tiroir ou dans un coin du bureau.

Pour ces objets qui ne font pas partie des décors conventionnels, quelle définition leur donner, si ce ne sont pas les fétiches?

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8 *Nous entendons par bureau, une salle pourvue du mobilier nécessaire aux travaux de secrétariat, ou dans laquelle travaillent et reçoivent les membres de l'administration d'une entreprise ou d'une collectivité (bureau du Directeur, de Maire, etc….). c'est aussi un groupe de membres d'une administration, d'une association.*

9 *Les bureaux du XIXè siècle de l'Administration. Lieux de travail au départ, ils abritaient de fait, toute une vie parallèle. On venait y passer 8 heures, mais on s'y faisait raser, coiffer, on s'y changeait, on y mangeait , on écrivait des vaudevilles, on dessinait des caricatures.*

10 *De juillet 2000 à mai 2002, dans le cadre de nos activités en tant que consultant pour les projets de développement au Gabon nous avons pu observer, interroger et analyser ce phénomène.*

Il apparaît, en effet, que ces différents fétiches ont tous un sens et leur vertu est d'éloigner ou de neutraliser les mauvais esprits.

Aussi, les différents entretiens personnalisés, à partir des éléments retenus plus haut, nous ont permis d'analyser le phénomène du fétiche à partir de sa capacité ou de sa vertu à rendre son univers de travail propice à soi en toutes circonstances.

Les données quantitatives qui vont suivre dans cette partie relèvent des enquêtes de terrain par questionnaires et guides d'entretien sur un échantillon mixte composé de 139 personnes dont la particularité est de travailler dans un bureau et d'avoir une expérience professionnelle de plus de cinq années[11].

L'analyse de ces données montre que la plupart des bureaucrates interrogés croient en Dieu, mais en même temps ces personnes utilisent les différents fétiches pour se protéger des mauvais esprits et les maladies mystiques et autres envoûtements qui peuvent perturber la sérénité dans leur emploi de bureaucrate.

Toutefois, pour une meilleure lisibilité, nous avons choisi de différencier les hommes des femmes car il apparaît dans les différentes données que, par endroits, les femmes sont plus enclines à certaines pratiques fétichistes de protection que les hommes.

En effet, selon les informations recueillies chez les femmes, la sorcellerie au bureau se manifeste à travers les maladies "mystiques", les envoûtements et les blocages au travail. Cette sorcellerie est interprétée au travers des envoûtements et des morts mystérieuses (50,75 pour cent) d'une part, d'autre part, il y a le phénomène du vampire et du "fusil nocturne" selon 13,43 pour cent des femmes.

Pour 23,08 pour cent , elles auraient été victimes de la sorcellerie à travers des herbes dans les toilettes du bureau, devant la porte ou par des maladies mystérieuses.

Il apparaît que ce sont les mêmes manifestations qui sont constatées chez les hommes. Ces derniers relèvent aussi des objets "mystiques" pour justifier les preuves de la sorcellerie dans leur bureau.

Ainsi, pour 29,41 pour cent des hommes, la présence de ces objets supposés contenir les herbes, les plumes ou les poudres diverses incitent à la prudence.

Selon 11,76 pour cent d'entre eux, les initiations aux religions traditionnelles et les maladies que n'ont pu traiter que les tradipraticiens autrement appelés les "nganga" témoignent de la réalité de ces manifestations.

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11 Nous avons interrogé 139 personnes (50 femmes et 79 hommes) pendant le mois de janvier 2004 à Libreville. Malgré les réticences des enquêtés à reconnaître les usages des fétiches dans les bureaux, les pourcentages retenus sont ceux supérieurs ou égaux à 10 pour cent pour une meilleure lecture d'un phénomène qui relève encore du secret.

Par ailleurs, à la question contre quoi pensez-vous vous protéger? 31,25 pour cent des femmes évoquent la lutte contre les mauvais esprits et les fétiches des autres, le Diable et les péchés (27,08 pour cent) et enfin le pouvoir nuisible des sorciers (12,5 pour cent). Les hommes aussi se protègent contre les mauvais esprits dans 24,36 pour cent des cas, contre les mauvais sorts et les fétiches (19,32 pour cent), les sorciers et les méchants (11,54 pour cent) et enfin contre les attaques mystiques selon 10, 26 pour cent des personnes interrogées.

Les types de protections sont très variés ; pour les femmes, les principales protections sont l'eau bénite qu'elles aspergent dans les coins du bureau (33,33 pour cent), le chapelet qu'elles accrochent dans un coin de la pièce (24,24 pour cent), la Bible dans un angle du meuble de bureau (18,18 pour cent) et le sel dans un pot servant au décor (18,18 pour cent). Alors que pour 56,82 pour cent des hommes, la prière est la protection essentielle. Les autres protections n'ont pas recueilli un pourcentage supérieur ou égal à 10 pour cent , à l'exemple de l'initiation au Bwiti (09, 09 pour cent) le Biéri ou Melan (4,54 pour cent), les scarifications (4,54 pour cent), etc. Ces faibles pourcentages peuvent laisser croire à une faiblesse des religions traditionnelles, mais ceux-ci restent à nuancer par le fait que les gens n'avouent presque jamais publiquement leurs pratiques religieuses de cet ordre. La peur d'être indexé de sorcier ou de féticheur en est une des raisons. Il semble, effectivement que l'urbanisation dans la vie des Africains engendre une distanciation par rapport aux rites traditionnels. Quelque soit son statut professionnel, la situation urbaine du gabonais lui impose des choix religieux en même temps qu'elle limite sa pratique de certaines croyances (Ngoua-Nguema 1998:35).

En ce qui concerne les matériaux et objets qui servent régulièrement de protection chez les femmes, ce sont la Bible (20 pour cent), le citron (10 pour cent), l'eau bénite (26 pour cent), le crucifix (16 pour cent), le chapelet (16 pour cent) et le sel (12 pour cent). Chez les hommes, ces objets sont assimilés aux gourmettes, aux bagues, aux chaînettes (15, 52 pour cent) et à la Bible (24,14 pour cent). L'eau bénite, le sel et le citron sont utilisés par 18,96 pour cent , de femmes alors que le chapelet concerne 13, 79 pour cent des hommes interrogés. Le piment sert de fétiche à 10,34 pour cent d'hommes.

Ces fétiches ont pour fonction chez les femmes de contrer les attaques mystiques (42, 86 pour cent), de purifier les lieux où ces objets sont placés (14,28 pour cent), d'anéantir les forces négatives (14, 28 pour cent), de briser les mauvais sorts (14,28 pour cent) et d'éloigner les mauvais esprits du bureau (14,28 pour cent). Chez les hommes par contre, ces objets anéantissent les forces négatives (40,74 pour cent), épargnent des mauvais visiteurs (22, 22 pour cent), protègent de tout (22, 22 pour cent), et purifient les lieux où ils sont placés dans le bureau (11,11 pour cent).

Les aspects relatifs aux choix et emplacements des protections varient selon les sexes. Les femmes avancent l'argument de Dieu qui est la plus grande protection (51,85 pour cent). En effet, il ressort des résultats des enquêtes que pour les femmes, leurs objets de protection sont placés à l'entrée du bureau (24,24 pour cent), dans le sac (24,24 pour cent), dans le tiroir (21,21 pour cent), et sur les murs pour ce qui concerne les versets bibliques (12 pour cent).

Chez les hommes, la croyance en Dieu est la protection la plus sûre selon 35,85 pour cent d'hommes, les autres protections étant inefficaces à leurs yeux (13,21 pour cent). D'autres utilisent un fétiche qui leur a été conseillé par un tiers. Cette catégorie représente 11,32 pour cent des hommes de notre échantillon. Les différents objets recensés sont placés à divers endroits du bureau ou sur soi, c'est le cas du citron. Les hommes choisissent aussi la porte ou la fenêtre (32 pour cent), le tiroir (16 pour cent) et même le fauteuil sur lequel ils sont assis pour assurer leur protection (12 pour cent).

Au delà de la différence de sexe, toutes ces stratégies ont pour but d'échapper à toutes les tentatives de déstabilisation dans le bureau. En effet, et au regard des réponses recueillies, il ressort que 60 pour cent des femmes se protégent contre leurs ennemies. Une autre raison réside dans le fait qu'elles s'y investissent pour ne pas perdre leur emploi (25 pour cent). Une minorité veut défier la concurrence des autres (10 pour cent).

Les hommes, quant à eux, utilisent les fétiches pour bloquer l'action des ennemis (29,27 pour cent). Par ailleurs, ils veulent lutter contre les mauvais esprits (17,07 pour cent). Dans une moindre mesure, leur objectif est de faire face à la menace sorcellaire et mystique de leur entourage (12,19 pour cent). Ils tentent aussi de se protéger et surtout de sauvegarder leur emploi (19,51 pour cent) et enfin la prudence recommande de se protéger dans un environnement aussi peu sûr que celui du travail (12, 19 pour cent).

Après avoir recueilli les motivations des différents individus, nous nous intéresserons maintenant aux fonctions symboliques du fétiche au bureau afin de mieux appréhender l'évolution du phénomène dans la société bureaucratique gabonaise. Ceci nous permettra de mieux exposer les motivations qui sous-tendent l'usage du fétiche.

Les Fonctions Symboliques Du Fétiche

L'imaginaire doit utiliser le symbole, non seulement pour s'exprimer, mais pour exister, pour passer du virtuel à quoi que ce soit de plus (Castoriadis 1975:177). Comme le souligne Louis-Vincent Thomas (1995:107), le symbole est l'association d'une image avec une idée abstraite. Aussi, l'usage du symbole

est, en réalité, une mise en œuvre de l'abstraction, c'est-à-dire une démarche vers une codification générale de toute expression. En effet les symboles sont des systèmes de représentations, à degré démographique très faible, mais jamais nuls. Aussi pour interpréter quelques symboles, nous allons adopter la position mixte que propose Gilbert Durand (1992:38) quand il nous parle de trajet anthropologique, c'est-à-dire l'incessant échange qui existe entre les pulsions subjectives et assimilatrices et les intimations objectives du milieu cosmique et social. Ainsi, le bureau, à son tour devient une forêt de symboles fondé sur la répartition et la fonction de la pièce, de la décoration, de certaines parties telles que la porte, le secrétaire, l'armoire, etc. Avec les symboles, nous abordons les formes les plus riches de l'imaginaire, ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler notre imaginal (Durand 1993:9).

Considéré par les historiens des religions comme le premier degré du développement de l'esprit religieux dans l'humanité, le fétiche, qui s'appliquait d'abord au culte des peuples noirs d'Afrique, convient également à l'état religieux de tous les peuples qui attribuent à certains objets vivants ou inanimés de la nature, un pouvoir magique[12].

Il semble donc que la présence du fétiche dans le bureau relève du procès de cultures qui se traduit dans la conception dualiste et conflictuelle du monde moderne par la société gabonaise. Cette société se trouve placée aux confins de la modernité et de la tradition.

Le bureau étant une structure moderne, et si la pratique du fétiche procédait uniquement de la volonté de briser la carrière de quelqu'un à qui on voue une jalousie, alors pour prévenir ce "danger", la personne menacée entreprend des démarches propitiatoires[13] en s'abritant derrière le pouvoir du fétiche. Il se sert, ainsi, d'une sorte de bouclier qui le protègerait de toute offence sorcière. Le fétiche, à travers ses différents usages, joue effectivement un rôle social à travers la réalité symbolique qu'il manifeste dans les différentes situations des agents de bureau au Gabon. Et c'est pourquoi ces derniers vont jusqu'à s'approprier ces espaces au point de constituer des domaines propres.

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12 Aujourd'hui comme hier, les sociétés contemporaines éprouvent toujours le besoin impérieux de se prémunir contre tout et par tous les moyens. Et les individus sont constamment invités à recourir à diverses techniques d'autodéfense psychologiques capables de leur fournir un halo protecteur contre toutes formes d'agression. Ainsi, un coureur de rallye à moto déclarait le 29 décembre 2002 sur la radio « France-Info » que l'élément le plus important de sa moto était le lapin en peluche fixé au guidon et qui allait attaquer avec lui son quatrième « Paris-Dakar ».

13 Â travers son film, sur la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), intitulé : « l'Afrique en morceaux. La tragédie des grands lacs », le réalisateur Jihan El Tahri montre bien ce que c'est que le propitiatoire. En effet, dans ce document, lors d'une passation de service entre deux officiers supérieurs (rwandais et congolais), le nouvel arrivant a amené une chèvre qu'il a égorgée et aspergé son sang partout dans le bureau, sur l'échelle, sur les escaliers, au sol pour chasser les démons rwandais ». Voir Canal+/ CAPA Production/ Plani-Presse 2001.

La Constitution Du "Domaine".

Pour aborder la constitution du domaine, nous partons de la notion d'appropriation[14] sous les deux angles juridique et technique pour aboutir à un effet psychologique ayant une portée sociologique. Ceci, dans la mesure où cette appropriation se manifeste comme l'exercice d'une autorité, d'un contrôle ou d'un pouvoir. Le contrôle psychologique de l'espace se réfère ici à l'idée d'espace personnel. Ce contrôle de l'espace du bureau passe par un ensemble d'astuces mis en évidence pour s'approprier ce lieu. Notons, par ailleurs, que l'idée d'appropriation désigne globalement l'acte de prendre quelque chose pour soi, ou l'acte de rendre quelque chose propre à son usage. L'appropriation inclut, pour ainsi dire, un ensemble de moyens d'actions ou de comportements à travers lesquels s'opère une structuration de l'espace et une re-disposition des choses et des objets. L'appropriation peut se définir comme l'ensemble des pratiques exercées sur l'espace en réponse aux besoins explicites de contrôle (Fischer 1983:95) et de pouvoir. Le bureau, mieux que le domicile est mis en valeur pour des raisons de prestige personnel. L'on y reçoit ses parents et ses amis pour exposer la réussite professionnelle. L'individu s'approprie son environnement pour définir son identité; il se crée ainsi une marge personnelle d'autonomie (Bernoux 1981:141).

C'est, donc, par la possession du bureau que le bureaucrate devient un cadre (Ferréol 2000:98)[15]. Pour certaines personnes qui se font appeler ainsi au Gabon[16], ce terme révèle leur fonction d'employé dans un bureau à un niveau de rémunération et à la possession d'un certain nombre de signes, supposés de richesse.

Car s'il est reconnu que l'attachement très fort au titre de cadre, que manifestent, notamment les agents de bureau, fonctionne comme un leurre, c'est néanmoins un leurre efficace (Gresle, Perrin, Panoff et Tripier 1990) parce qu'il se fonde sur un ensemble de représentations de pouvoir[17] qui conduisent inexorablement vers une confiscation sous forme d'appropriation de l'espace de travail.

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14 La notion d'appropriation peut être définie sous plusieurs angles: du point de vue juridique, d'un point de vue technique et dans une perspective psychologique plus large.

15 Au Gabon, le terme de « cadre » désigne, au Gabon les actifs dont les niveaux de diplômes sont élevés. Très souvent ces hautes qualifications ne s'accompagnent pas de hauts niveaux de revenus.

16 L'ensemble des ressortissants de la province de l'Ogooué-Ivindo au nord-est du Gabon ayant un niveau socioprofessionnel moyen ou élevé se servent du terme « cadre » pour s'appeler entre eux. Ces différents cadres se retrouvent pour des manifestations précises comme les parties de Foot-Ball les dimanches ou les autres manifestations associatives.

17 Pendant de nombreuses années, à Ndjolé, dans la région du Moyen-Ogooué, les hauts fonctionnaires ayant le diplôme de « docteur » issus de cette préfecture forment un groupe de cadres dans lequel ils n'acceptent aucune intrusion d'un moins diplômé qu'eux.

Personne n'a le droit d'y accéder, par exemple, en cas d'absence parce que le bureau devient une propriété à l'intérieur de laquelle on a disposé des "petites choses" particulières. Une sculpture de sa région, les dessins d'école des enfants, un objet-souvenir, des pots de fleurs. Les photographies, les souvenirs de voyages et les présents sont les éléments les plus courants de l'appropriation. Toutefois, au Gabon, le bureau est aussi le prolongement de l'individu dans un système de représentations sociales, c'est-à-dire sa vie. Son corps est indissociable de son esprit, de son entité supérieure. De ce fait, au-delà du phénomène d'appropriation-personnalisation qui est quasi universel, il faut souligner que la constitution du domaine garantit aux bureaucrates la sécurité, l'équilibre socioprofessionnel, l'équilibre spirituel, l'assurance d'être préservé d'un licenciement et la résistance aux agressions diverses et variées.

Le Bureau : Un Espace Public Confisqué

L'exposé de quelques tranches de vie ont été nécessaires pour l'illustration des aspects qui peuvent concourir, sans les justifier, à la compréhension des mobiles qui favorisent la "confiscation" des bureaux.

"…Un jour, je suis parti au travail le matin. Mais l'après-midi, je n'ai pas pu aller. Il y avait des problèmes à la maison entre ma sœur et son mari.

Ils se sont bagarrés au moment où je me préparais à aller au boulot. Il y eu des coups et blessures.

Alors, je ne me suis pas rendu au boulot ce jour-là. Ce n'est que le lendemain que je me suis présenté à mon lieu de travail. Mon chef de service m'a déposé une demande d'explications. Je lui ai expliqué ce qui s'était passé.

Il n'a pas voulu comprendre. Il m'a dit: "Monsieur, vous devez remplir la demande d'explications sans quoi, je fais partir un rapport à la direction. J'ai catégoriquement dit non, je ne peux pas, je vous ai déjà expliqué ce qui s'est passé. Et finalement, il a pris sa décision. Il est parti voir le directeur d'agence. Il lui a expliqué ce qui se passait. Le directeur s'est présenté, il m'a appelé et m'a dit : à partir d'aujourd'hui, vous avez une mise à pied d'un mois…".

"… J'ai fait état de ce qui m'arrivait à ma mère. Elle a trouvé que ce n'est pas normal. C'est un système qui s'est passé mystiquement. C'est ton propre collègue qui est à l'origine de ton malheur".

"Â mon insu, il est rentré dans mon bureau et il a pris le stylo-encre avec lequel je travaillais. Il est parti avec, voir les féticheurs. Ensuite, il est revenu le déposer. Mon sort était scellé. Alors, tout ce que j'écrivais, quand ça partait, tout le monde voyait ça flou au niveau de la direction. On doutait désormais de mon travail. Donc il y a des gens qui font en sorte qu'on vous enlève du travail, ils passent

par une piste obscure. C'est à ce moment que j'ai décidé d'aller voir un féticheur pour qu'il blinde mon bureau dès que j'ai repris le travail. J'ai un petit nœud de tissus noir et rouge quelque part dans mon bureau. Et plus personne ne pourra plus s'attaquer à moi aussi facilement"[18].

Dans le même sens, un autre poursuit : "...Quand je travaillais à Mouila[19], j'avais un jour trouvé à l'entrée de mon bureau des tâches de sang.

Cela était mystérieux pour tout le monde. J'avais voulu négliger, mais quelques semaines après j'étais tombé malade. J'avais tout de suite demandé ma mutation sur Libreville"[20].

"Lorsque j'étais à la RTG chaîne 2, dit ce dernier, je m'enfermais dans mon bureau, dès que j'arrivais pour une séance de travail tous les matins.

Parce que mon entourage m'avait averti de graves problèmes de mysticisme qui y existaient. J'aspergeais mon bureau d'eau bénite et parfois avec de l'huile sacrée qu'un prêtre exorciste m'avait offert"[21].

"Je travaille depuis quinze ans et j'ai perdu mon collègue, il y a quatre ans. Selon sa femme, il avait été piégé par son prédécesseur qui ne voulait pas perdre son poste.

Cette vérité avait été révélée par trois nganga."[22].

En analysant ces extraits de récits, il apparaît que la perte du bureau constitue une hantise pour toutes les catégories socioprofessionnelles du Gabon. Ainsi, tous les niveaux de la société employée sont représentés.

Devant les menaces que font planer les exigences de la flexibilité au travail, les agressions extérieures au milieu du travail, de la rentabilité de ce dernier et toutes autres agressions de différentes natures, les recours sont multiples dans une société qui se nourrit de toutes ces incertitudes dans un univers social de plus en plus individualisant.

Autrefois protectrice, la société moderne individualise.

Devant les incertitudes de cette individualisation, des stratégies de sécurité et de défense se développent.

C'est ainsi qu'en se référant à la relation que l'employé entretient, désormais, avec son bureau, diverses précautions sont prises pour surmonter les aléas que nous impose la société moderne.

C'est alors que le fétiche, support d'une réalité symbolique de protection et de défense, intervient, sous la forme d'un objet ou d'une prière, pour rassurer les bureaucrates dans leur univers de travail.

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18 Extrait du récit de Jean-Louis B., employé de banque à Libreville.
19 Mouila est la capitale provinciale de la Ngounié.
20 Député à l'Assemblée Nationale
21 Ancien Directeur Général RadioTélévision Gabonaise, Chaîne2.
22 Fonctionnaire du ministère du travail

Conclusion

Comme nous venons de le voir, les agents de bureau font grand usage d'objets censés renfermer une force magique susceptible d'être un antidote à la malchance ou aux maléfices. Dans les pratiques rituelles des populations gabonaises, de manière générale, ces objets sont souvent des ossements, des peaux, des plumes, des dents d'animaux, des fragments de racines d'arbres et autres objets hétéroclites (Raponda-Walker et Sillans 1983:77).

Ils ont pour but de porter du bonheur ou de communiquer un pouvoir surnaturel. D'ailleurs, ils tirent leur valeur du système de correspondance fondé sur des liens de sympathie ou d'antinomie entre leurs éléments et les périls qu'ils sont censés éloigner des humains (Camus, 2001:78).

Ainsi, pour bien être et se sentir à leur poste de travail, de nombreux usagers du bureau déploient un certain nombre d'astuces en abritant des objets divers dans leur espace de travail afin de préserver leurs acquis. Mais à côté de ces efforts que l'on pourrait qualifier d'irrationnels, ces mêmes employés font faire valoir d'autres atouts moins évidents pour les esprits rationalistes.

Alors, que dire de plus sur le fétiche au bureau sinon qu'il est une expression de la modernité.

N'est-ce pas là aussi la conséquence du malentendu civilisationnel de la notion de pouvoir théorisé par Max Weber (1995), développé et mis en pratique par les colonisateurs pendant tant de décennies?

Les deux conceptions de l'usage du bureau comme espace public nous inspirent la question de la gestion privée, personnelle ou informelle d'un espace public. En nous basant sur la gestion du bureau comme d'un espace public, n'est-ce pas là une confiscation de cet espace ? Un domaine que l'on emmène avec soi lorsqu'on est obligé de quitter le bureau[23].

Le fétiche est une pratique universelle qui s'adapte à chacun des environnements dans lesquels il est pratiqué et par conséquent, répond à une exigence symbolique propre à toute société. Comme le souligne G. Balandier (1954:281), en situant la société actuelle entre deux époques, le recours à des formes socioculturelles anciennes, pour satisfaire des fins radicalement nouvelles, s'impose, en partie, pour cette même raison. Conserver une façade devant laquelle le colonisateur s'était toujours trouvé désarmé.

En effet, si les formes classiques d'appropriation du bureau sont universelles à travers les expressions de celles-ci, le fétiche, au Gabon repose, quant à lui, sur deux aspects liés au fonds culturel africain de manière générale. Le fétiche se déroule encore dans les villages pour bénéficier de la grâce des esprits.

23 *Les exemples sont légion de ceux qui partent leur bureau en emportant tout ou presque.*

La pratique villageoise, à travers l'usage des fétiches, a été transposée dans un environnement urbain dans le cas d'espèce en modifiant ainsi le bureau comme lieu d'exercice du pouvoir public en lieu de cristallisation de toutes les défenses et protections inspirées de la société.

Finalement, les sociétés ne sont jamais ce qu'elles paraissent être ou ce qu'elles prétendent être. Elles doivent en conséquence, être considérées à deux niveaux au moins : l'un superficiel, présente les structures "officielles", si l'on peut dire, l'autre profond, permet d'accéder à la fois aux rapports réels plus fondamentaux et aux pratiques révélatrices de la dynamique du système social environnant. Au fond, pour paraphraser J. Goetz (Thomas et Luneau 1995:15), ce qui diversifie les civilisations, c'est justement la manière propre à chacune d'elles, d'aborder la réalité et d'établir ses catégories car un monde "étranger" est toujours plus complexe qu'il n'y paraît au premier abord et chacun des éléments qui le constituent, chacune des valeurs qui le justifient demandent, pour être véritablement compris, à être situés dans l'ensemble socioculturel auquel ils se réfèrent et en dehors duquel ils n'ont plus de signification.

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State-in-Society: the Mutual Constitutiveness of the Developmental State and Higher Education in South Africa

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Abstract
Seeking to go beyond the pessimism and reification of contemporary analyses of the state in Africa, this article applies Migdal's State in Society (2001) approach to the field of higher education transformation in South Africa. It argues that the state is best understood through its actual practices, particularly at those points where it reaches into society through policy implementation and, conversely, where society through its institutions in turn reaches into the state. In the course of these engagements, social boundaries are constituted through alliances, accommodations and resistances and have a mutually transformative effect on both state and society. The article shows how, with regard to both the image and the practices of the state, the relationship between the developmental state and higher education in South Africa reveals a range of tensions around issues such as accountability, autonomy, transformation and globalisation; and it concludes that Migdal's approach offers a fruitful theoretical corrective to state-centric and socio-centric views of the state-society relationship.

Key Words*: Developmental state, South Africa, globalisation, higher education*

Introduction

Contemporary analyses of the state in Africa have tended to adopt a rather pessimistic view of its role in modernisation and development. Among the varied explanations offered for the weakness of states in Africa are the ongoing effects of colonial territorial divisions, economic underdevelopment, bureaucratic

inefficiency, ethnic diversity and traditional patrimonialism. Leaving aside the undoubted relevance of such explanations in themselves, what many of these analyses have in common is that they present the state-society relationship as a bifurcated one. Even though they tell us something significant about the state, or the market, civil society, bureaucracy, ethnicity or traditional authority, this is achieved at the expense of reifying these particular units of analysis. By contrast, the following analysis of the state-society relationship, as exemplified in the relationship between higher education in South Africa and the state, aims to side-step the debate over what might be the 'royal road' to understanding modernity in Africa, and instead is premised on the idea that the best way to understand the state and its conditions of possibility rests in the state's actual practices. In so doing, we do not discount the role of state/society theory but rather focus precisely on those moments when the state reaches into society through policy implementation and, conversely, where society through its institutions in turn reaches into the state, government and administration. This latter approach to the state-society relationship on the basis of the mutual engagements of its constituent elements draws upon Migdal's (2001) state-in-society framework, a model which not only offers a way of focusing on the level of social practices but also has the virtue of simplicity.

The article proceeds in five parts. It begins by identifying substantive aspects of Migdal's state-in-society framework in order to provide the conceptual lens for a state-in-higher education inquiry. Following this, it explores, in an introductory way, what Migdal calls the dialectic between the image and the practices of the state, particularly as these pertain to the developmental state in South Africa. On the basis of this theoretical (state-in-society) and empirical (the South African developmental state) grounding, the article proceeds to probe aspects of the state's engagement with higher education institutions, and addresses policy tensions as these relate, first, to the image, and second, to the practices, of the developmental state. The final section focuses on higher education and the national developmental project.

The State-in-Society Framework

The rich and diverse international literature on the state is characterised by a range of competing theoretical perspectives, including Marxist (of both instrumentalist (Miliband, 1973, 1983) and structuralist (Poulantzas, 1973, 1978; Therborn, 1978, 1986) varieties), liberal (Dahl, 1971), Weberian (Skocpol, 1979; Evans et al, 1985) and poststructuralist (Foucault, 1991; Bourdieu, 1994) approaches. This richness and diversity of the debates especially in terms of the

relationship between capitalism and the apartheid state is also reflected in the South African literature across the liberal (Lipton, 1986) and radical (Wolpe, 1972, 1988; Legassick, 1974; Davies et al, 1976; Alexander 1979, 2002) divide. We refer the reader here to an insightful analysis of the debates by Motala (2006). In much of this literature there tends to be a bi-polar focus on the issue of state autonomy versus social autonomy, with either one or the other taking precedence (Hobson, 2001). For example, both neo-Marxists like Miliband (1973) and liberal pluralists like Dahl (1971) favour the latter, stressing the weakness of civil society and of the working class, or the weak market sector, respectively; while statists like Skocpol (1979) stress the former. Apart from a concern with this polarised feature of the state debate, what prompted the writing of this article was a reading of Migdal's (2001) work on how states and societies constitute one another. In contrast to views which set the state and society off against each other, Migdal's *state-in-society* approach is premised on the principle of the mutually transformative nature of relations between state and society.

The two key concepts in his approach devolve to the image and the actual practices of the state in a process of mutual engagement. Whereas the image of the state pertains to a perceptual process that revolves largely around a cultural formation, the practices of the state refer to the engagement of its apparatuses in society, raising the question of the social boundaries that exist between the state and society. To this end we ask; what, then, are the dynamics of the social engagement between the state and society?

In reconceptualising the relationship between state and society, Migdal (2001:231) suggests that conventional theories of the state often concern themselves with the problem of obedience, including the sorts of structures and cultures that might facilitate it. In so doing, they tend to focus on the structural apparatuses of the modern state (such as parliaments, bureaucracies and judicial systems), and in varying degrees tend to reproduce the "analytic isolation of the state [which] has led to a mystification of its capabilities and power" (Migdal, 2001:232). However, in situ the modern state's putative sovereign and external positioning above society is paradoxically a condition that is likely to be tempered, even weakened, by the state's engagement with other social groups. In thus seeking to "understand how the state's sails have been trimmed through its engagement with such social forces", Migdal (2001:250) shifts the relationship between state and society from a problem of *structure* to one of *process*. In contrast to conventional theories, his conception of the modern state tries to capture the dynamics of the state within itself (that is, intra-state, in terms of its multiple parts) and within society (that is, in terms of the drawing and redrawing of social boundaries) as these occur in actual practice.

Image and practices as elements of the state

What emerges with regard to Migdal's understanding of the image of the state is that it is perceived in the main as the "dominant and single centre of society"; one that is "autonomous, unified and centralized" (Ibid: 16-17). This image of an omnipotent state radiating throughout society is prone to mystification, especially when conflated with its reality (that is, its practices), which by contrast often appear 'limited', 'divided' and 'constrained'. The perception of the state as a 'dominant and single centre' not only separates state from society (that is, from non-state actors and social forces) but also elevates it above society. In addition by representing 'the people' or the general interest, the state seemingly marks itself off from other social forces that represent particular interests. However, in 'real politick' the state is immersed in vested interests of all kinds testifying to its location in society rather than 'being' outside or above as implied in dualistic constructions thereof whether considered from the bottom up or top down. While the latter is necessarily the case at the level of practices it is the image which concerns us in terms of how it coheres at the level of perception, that is as a belief system.

Migdal (2001: 237) drawing on the field of cultural studies illustrates by way of example how the norms, values and assumptions (that is, culture) that supposedly cohere and enable the state to move and reinforce itself as a 'single centre', in fact has 'centrifugal tendencies'. What is significant here with implications for higher education in particular and the institutional milieu in general is that in reality the normative consensus is strained such that the centre is pulled in different directions. With this in mind Clifford Geertz's (1973) study of the early Balinese state (cited in Migdal, 2001:238) is used to show how certain cultural practices in that state surfaced a tension between the "integrative effects of the state provided by the controlling political ideal and the disintegrative effects of the power system composed of a myriad of sub-rulers." What is important to note here is that it is within the context of contradictory forces that a political culture (e.g. constitution) is marshaled to galvanise the state's image and in so doing prevent a crisis of credibility or legitimacy and hence institutional chaos or anomie. This element of the image of the state is therefore concerned with the ideological "mortar that binds the bricks of the state together" into a coherent whole, or in other words, the ideas, beliefs and values that unify the state (Migdal, 2001:239).

On the other hand, the element of the practices of the state has to do with the routine performance of the state's actors and agencies as these seek to implement the policies of the state's political projects inside society. In the actual daily practices of the bureaucracy and administration, the state's image could be either bolstered, neutralised or weakened (Migdal, 2001:18). Alongside practices such

as the implementation of policies, there are also other state practices, such as ceremonies and inauguration rituals that serve to "reinforce and validate the social separation between the state and other social actors" (ibid). It is particularly important to consider "those practices – the routinized performative acts – that go against the grain of a coherent, unified and controlling state" (ibid:19), because such practices may also contradict or challenge the unified and coherent image and thereby weaken the social divide.

It is at this latter level that the mutually transformative nature of state-in-society becomes a crucial site for understanding the state/society dialectic. The question of how these social boundaries are manifested in the dynamic of state-in-society engagements is addressed through the political imperatives of the formation of coalitions, alliances, accommodations and zones of opposition and resistance that occur within these mutual engagements.

What we are arguing is that Migdal's framework enables one to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between the state and society as a field of power in which there is a de-distanciation between these two entities (hence state-in-society) and thus a mutual transformation is potentiated. This does not mean that the state and society are not distinguishable from each other but rather that as separate entities they come into contact with each other through their mutual engagements and the logic of their articulation.

What is thus presupposed as far as we are able to discern is that a spatial politick is involved which is taken up by Migdal in his notion of the drawing of social boundaries. This negotiation of boundaries lies at the core of the relationship between the state and higher education institutions as case in point which we will take up later. However, before this we turn to the matter of social boundaries and its relation to the image and practices of the state.

Image and practices in the drawing of social boundaries

Migdal's concept of social boundaries is a means of establishing the formative zones in which relationships between the state and society are redrawn and reconstituted. These boundaries, which occur through the practices of the state as it engages in coalitions, alliances, accommodation and resistance with other social forces, are contingent insofar as state practices may serve either to reinforce, or to contradict and neutralise, the image of the state, and thus shore up or undercut the perception of the state as a unified centre of absolute authority. For Migdal (2001:19),

> while the image of the state implies a singular morality, one standard way of doing things, practices denote multiple types of performance and possibly some contention over what is the right way to act.

In effect, the differences registered in practices across the spectrum of the

state might be more than mere deviations from what the state defines as its normative framework. Expressed positively, such deviations from the norm could be understood as counter hegemonic practices, which are not accidental and incidental but are instead practices which are self-sustaining in that they firm up as social regularities.

Migdal's approach thus brings to bear a cultural orientation that takes account of so-called 'deviant' behaviours that ultimately serve as contestations over the drawing and redrawing of social boundaries between the state and society, as a function of the public (duty) and private (accumulation) divide. However, at the level of what happens within the state and its various agencies (through government, bureaucracy and administration), an additional dimension can be observed, one that operates intra-institutionally, that is, within the state and its organs. For instance, similar boundaries emerge as a function of the hierarchical structure of the state and its agencies, where the process of drawing and redrawing boundaries operates as a function of the distribution of power within the state and is also subject to the logic of the building of coalitions, alliances, accommodations and resistances. Thus, Migdal's emphasis on the notion of social boundaries yields a theoretical opportunity for a re-specification of the state/society relationship. With this in mind, we move on to probe the dialectic of image and practices as these pertain to the developmental state in South Africa.

The Developmental State in South Africa

It is not the intention of this article to delve into the meaning of a developmental state, short of stating that it is oriented around a developmental ideology at the level of the economy and seeks to foster growth and technological modernisation (Mkandawire, 2001; Woo-Cummings, 1999; Castells, 2000; for aspects of the nascent debate in South Africa, see Edigheji, 2006, 2007; Desai and Bond, 2006; Southall, 2006 and especially Motala, 2006, and Motala and Pampallis, 2007, whose suggestion that understanding the developmental path in South Africa requires an engagement with broader state theory helped prompt the writing of this article). Our particular purpose is to examine how the tensions between the developmental state's image and its practices unfold in its efforts to contribute to the national normative project via the restructuring of higher education institutions.

The image of the developmental state

In terms of the image of the state as a 'dominant and single centre of society'

(Migdal, 2001:16-17), of relevance here are those ideas, beliefs, values and norms which contribute to the perception of the developmental state as a unified centre. With respect to the developmental state in South Africa, the element of the image and how it functions as a social Gestalt depends heavily on how it has been conceived and articulated by that political party which governs the state and enjoys overwhelming popular support, namely, the African National Congress (ANC), and how it seeks to project unity in the face of apparent differences between itself and its alliance partners. In foregrounding the ANC in the discussion on the image and practices of the state we are mindful that the impression is created that we are conflating the ruling party with the state. We would like to make our position categorically clear that we do not equate the ruling party with the state complex but risk this conflation to make the point that the state is in fact fractured along a number of lines one of which is at the level of the political party vis-à-vis other contesting parties. With this caveat in place we take up the matter of the tripartite alliance as an example of the fault lines that cut across the state as a manifestation of the mutual constitutiveness of the state-in-society. And secondly we raise this example to serve as an exemplar for the relationship between higher education institutions and the state in as much as it reflects the differential positions they have in relation to each other and the different purchase they make on each other.

The ANC's developmental normative framework (ANC, 1998) highlights four principles: an improvement in the quality of life; equity; justice; and economic growth. Taken together, these principles reflect the development task as being both material and ideational, the former being addressed particularly in economic growth and the latter in equity and justice. Thus, the overarching vision is a composite view of development expressed in terms of creating the general conditions necessary for improvements in the quality of life. As such it presents a condition of possibility for the perception of the state as a unified whole. However, in relation to the ANC's practices with its alliance partners, the image of the state is both reinforced and neutralised. One partner, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), is fairly specific in terms of what it seeks from the developmental state, namely, a state that can drive development in ways not restricted to, and even in opposition to, the free market approach currently seen to be in favour (COSATU, 2005). In this respect the perceived unity of the state in as much as it involves the ruling bloc seems to be contradicted by one of its alliance partners. Similarly, the approach to development of the other alliance partner, the South African Communist Party (SACP), includes ideas such as 'responding to market failure, identifying the state's function as the provider of essential services, creating the conditions to achieve development-oriented growth and promoting redistribution' (SACP, 1998). In this regard,

the state's perceived image viewed through the ruling party's power structure is both reinforced and neutralised insofar as it relates to the politics of its alliance partners.

With regard to the specific approaches by the alliance partners to the four principles of the normative framework, on the one hand the image of the state is reinforced in those instances involving agreement across the elements of equity, justice and improvement of the quality of life. On the other hand, with respect to economic growth as the Archimedean lever of social development, the divergent position of labour as represented, consistently in terms of its sectoral interest, by COSATU, neutralises the image of the state as an absolute authority standing above society. In the case of the SACP, the image of the state is reinforced to the extent to which it concurs with the general will of the state in terms of the provision of services and a regulatory framework informed by a developmental orientation. However, the SACP, too, is not persuaded by a market driven approach, although it recognises in the developmental state the social responsibility to assuage the structural effects of the logic of capital. It follows that the ANC's relationship to its alliance partners is contradictory and thus we might infer that the image of the state as far as it is mediated through the ruling party is continually being constituted and reconstituted in said engagements with social forces contending for hegemony around social policy. This example clearly shows that the state is engaged in drawing and redrawing boundaries within the ambit of its own structure as a ruling power bloc but more importantly since the state is in society this does not stop at this intra level of engagement, it radiates throughout the institutional milieu and finds its way, as we will show later, into higher education institutions as well, as case in point.

The practices of the developmental state

With regard to the element of the image of the state, and despite contestations over the content of this image, the state nevertheless projects itself as a unified field and is received as such by civil society. Notwithstanding this, the practices of the state are in themselves heterodox, and as such the coherence and unity of the state is not entirely palpable at this level. It is important to note that these practices are not merely instrumental or technical mechanisms but are tied to the image of the state in ways that reinforce, neutralise or undermine its standing in society. In this regard, the disjuncture between policy formulation and policy implementation, in particular delivery is a salient example of how the state is undermined in terms of its standing for those communities adversely affected. In this process, the alliances and coalitions between the state and social actors subsequently impact on their respective social boundaries and as such distinguish and set up the practices in terms of a mutually transformative dynamic (Migdal,

2001).Here, we make reference to the tripartite alliance as outlined earlier in which, what is evidenced are the kinds of contestatations and tensions alluded to in establishing their respective social and political boundaries between them.

In his analysis of the developmental state, Edigheji also arrives at the mutually transformative nature of alliance formation as described by Migdal, but from a different vantage point by using the concept of social embeddedness (Edigheji, 2007; see also Evans, 1995). He argues that alliance formation "requires high levels of coherence on the part of state agencies – it has to behave as a coherent collective actor capable of identifying and implementing developmental goals and should not be overwhelmed by particularistic interest groups" (Edigheji, 2007:8).

While Edigheji's analysis shows how the image comes to bear on the practices of the state insofar as it seeks to constitute itself as a 'coherent collective actor' that transcends sectoral interests, it does not consider practices to be multivariate (as Migdal does), and thus does not address the fragmentary and divisive effects of the state's practical engagements in society.

The State-in-Higher Education: Policy Tensions in Relation to the Image of the State

We turn now to an analysis of the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and higher education as a function of the relationship between the image and practices of the developmental state, and probe how this unfolds in the efforts to transform higher education institutions. The past decade has been marked by much policy activity on the part of the state as well as the implementation thereof in higher education institutions (CHE, 2004). In the engagement of the developmental state with that of higher education institutions and vice versa, and in the state's efforts to redress the legacy of fragmentation, what kinds of normative tensions arise?

Normative tensions in relation to image

The developmental image of the state and its normative framework are manifested in the higher education arena in the form of an insistence on a single, unified and nationally coordinated system, operating under the auspices of the principles of equity, redress, democratisation, development, quality, effectiveness, efficiency, academic freedom, institutional autonomy and public accountability (Department of Education, 1997:11-13; CHE, 2004).

On the one hand, from the state's angle, institutions have to account for how these elements of the normative framework will be developed in their respective

constituencies. Here, the image of the state is projected as the national centre from which the developmental project radiates. Nevertheless, while Minister Pandor, depicts a close relationship between the state and the university, and brings the universities into the purview of the state's national project (Pandor, 2005:3), the executive arm of the state has tended to argue for a more clearly demarcated boundary between itself and that of the epistemic project of the universities (Mbeki, cited in Pandor, 2005). There are thus normative tensions with regard to the role and function of universities within different apparatuses of the state. On the other hand, the view from the university is that, given the central role that higher education plays in terms of human resource development, universities need to be invested with trust and confidence, with due cognisance being accorded to the state's requirement for universities to "self-regulate and be publicly accountable" (Pityana, cited in Pandor, 2005). When one considers the university as an institution in terms of its own stated image, that is, in its relation to society as a whole, there is a convergence between Pityana's and Pandor's understanding of that relationship. But there remains a potential tension between the way that the state engages with a university and how this engagement re-shapes its image in the public eye. There is a multidirectional (state-university-society) process at work when one considers the state *in situ*. That is, the image of the state appears to be restricted to its actual practices, which reins in the otherwise potentially unlimited projection of its image; but at the same time, it appears that the university's own image as an autonomous institution is circumscribed by actual practice, in the form of what is described as 'conditional autonomy' and 'cooperative governance'.

The policy process and policy implementation: the limits of the state in situ

One of the challenges of the post-1994 developmental period is the translation of policy objectives into practice. The conventional view of the policy development and implementation process is that it is unilinear and sequential (CHE, 2004), (as if the state simply imposes its policy on society), but this view is belied by "the enormous complexity of large-scale transformative policy change" in South African higher education, with the policy development process itself being "complex and multilayered" and with several policies being formulated and implemented at the same time as several structural changes (CHE, 2004:36).

Among scholars and policy makers alike there is a perception that, during the late 1990s, a hiatus emerged between policy formulation and policy implementation (CHE, 2004). What is more important for the analysis being developed here, however, are the reasons for or implications of this hiatus. As the National Plan for Higher Education suggests,

> the implementation vacuum has given rise to a number of significant developments, including unintended and unanticipated consequences which, if left unchecked, threaten the development of a single coordinated but diverse higher education system (Department of Education, 2001:8).

The division between the image and the practices of the state are apparent in the reference, in the same breath, to a 'single coordinated' system which is nevertheless 'diverse'. Aside from the implementation vacuum itself, the existence of unintended and unanticipated consequences give a sense of the limited nature of the state *in situ*, and implies that one is not dealing with a unified centre that directs change. In turn this calls into question both the model of the state as elevated and standing outside society, and the corresponding political strategy of seeking a cataclysmic reckoning with the state. Instead, it lends support to Migdal's model of the state in society (and society in the state) and suggests a politics of critical engagement with the state on a terrain replete with relatively greater potential for transformation.

Furthermore, and together with the acknowledged complexity of policy development and implementation processes, it evokes an image of state practices as multi-linear and simultaneous yet also diverse and discrete, and of a state that is dispersed (in terms of multiple alliances and accommodations) and labyrinthine (as being mutually interlocking in itself and in relation to society). To some extent, this means that conflict becomes institutionalised, in as much as one works with and through the state and its agencies or at its points of interface with other social forces, given that social projects (such as the epistemic project in the case of the university) are not exhausted by the political projects of the developmental state but forever begin anew (for example, in negotiations around the redrawing of social boundaries). Nevertheless, there can be no question that the state-in-society model domesticates conflict, for conflict is always implicit, and often emerges explicitly, in the kinds of alliances, accommodations, oppositions and resistances that occur (for example, in the case of higher education, around policy implementation).

The policy process and symbolism

Another common perception among scholars (though not among policy makers) is that the initial stages of higher education policy formulation in South Africa were largely symbolic, being primarily concerned with declaring a break with the past (Jansen, 2001; Cloete et al, 2002). This view fails to distinguish sufficiently between symbolic policy formulation and substantial political transformation, or between whether a real break is seen to take place and engaged with in institutional life and whether this break occurs only at an abstract or

perhaps normative level. In reality there is no such thing as a clean break with the past: political projects (in this case, the developmental project in higher education) inevitably come up against a status quo that, to a greater or lesser extent, resists efforts to transform it, but where Migdal's approach proves useful is that it pays attention to the degree to which a new normative framework establishes a particular kind of relationship to the past, and not only a clean break as such. Instead of wishing away the past, the state in society approach focuses on the modalities of actual practices. Thus, to return to the question of symbolism, it would be better to say that the policy formulation phase marked the pomp of the state as developmental, democratic and constitutional. To the extent to which this was symbolic, it was a symbolism which was more about affirming the present than denying the past. As Migdal shows, drawing on Geertz's (1973) study of the early Balinese 'theatre state' (cited in Migdal, 2001:238), the symbolism of the state as an expression of its pomp is not a means to extend the state's power; rather, the state's power serves the end of the state's pomp. In other words, what, in the South African case, is rendered 'pompous', is the state's new democratic content, and what needs further investigation is how the symbolism attached to the plethora of policy formulation in the first phase of the democratic dispensation can be viewed as an ideological reckoning with the past which is predicated on the power connoted in the image of the state.

The State-in-Higher Education: Policy Tensions in Relation to the Practices of the State

Autonomy and accountability: delimiting the boundaries of the institutional domain

Despite, but perhaps indirectly because of, the gap between policy formulation and policy implementation, one of the central tensions arising from state efforts to effect its policies is the universities' perception of the state as being strongly interventionist. On the one hand, universities in terms of their general role in society express agreement with the state's normative framework and thus are seen to accommodate the national developmental logic. However, this logic exacerbates tensions between the university's (unified) image of itself as a national public institution and its (unified) image as an autonomous institution (see Jansen, 2004, Du Toit, 2007, and Waghid et al, 2005). On the other hand, with regard to the (unified) image of the state and how it views the social position of the university and its academic project, there is a tension between how the university fulfills its role within this developmental normative framework and the state's function in overseeing and intervening insofar as it seeks to fulfill

its political mandate. In each of these instances, the practices of the state and the practices of the university with respect to questions of accountability and autonomy provide fertile soil for the kinds of contestations that mutually inform each other's development under contemporary conditions. Whether the university sees the state's intervention on a particular issue as hostile or adversarial, or whether it sees this issue as a matter for historical redress, hinges (in part, but not entirely) on the relatively privileged position that such a university might have enjoyed in the past. On the flipside of autonomy is the thorny question of the public accountability of the universities. While state practices in this regard may be suggestive of sanctions, in that they involve the state's coercive capacity to induce obedience to and conformity with its policies, rules and procedures, they may also be no more than a reflection of the modern state imperative to standardise and universalise practices within the prescriptions and proscriptions of a national normative framework.

In reality, what takes on additional meaning is that the uneven institutional topography (that is, the legacy of apartheid) is itself the social imperative behind practices intended to renegotiate and redraw social boundaries. These practices are accompanied by contradictory and neutralising processes as well as opposition and resistance. It is by honing in on state-society relations in their mutual engagements of coalitions, alliances and accommodations, that one is better able to understand how the state, its agencies and society mutually constitute each other. This process of mutual constitutiveness of state and society takes one to the heart of the developmental project in South Africa, namely, those practices that inform the renewal of the social infrastructure.

State coordination: cooperation, cooptation and resistance

A key feature of a developmental state is the need to coordinate the different parts of the overall system in order to ensure coherent policy formulation and implementation (Edigheji, 2007). In higher education, this process is facilitated by a coordinating body – the Council on Higher Education (CHE) – that brings together the various practices in relation to the overall national developmental project, and interfaces between the universities and the state. From a state-centric perspective, the working relationships thus developed through the mutual engagement of the CHE, the state and the universities, might be considered to be equivalent to state cooptation (Waghid et al, 2005), but this is only a foregone conclusion if one adopts a zero-sum conception of power. From a state-in-society perspective, these relationships involve boundary crossings and the emergence and firming up not only of alliances and accommodations but also of resistances amongst special interest groups; for this perspective takes its cue from a more pastoral conception of power. Were a form of cooptation to

indeed emerge out of the state-university interface, this is more likely to be a result of a successful manufacture of consent by state practices.

The state-in-society approach also pays close attention to the social relations and institutional forms that emerge in the multidirectional engagements of state, public institutions and society. Overlaps between the coordinating structures of the state (in terms of state officials) and the coordinating structures of the university (in terms of executive-level management) give an indication of how social boundaries are being drawn and redrawn, and these in turn are mutually transformative of both the state and university. The CHE, for example, in its efforts to coordinate the state-university relationship and ensure continuity and stability within the system, has spearheaded several annual consultative fora and engaged with specific interest groups. The National Working Group established to oversee the higher education restructuring process included groups representative of both business and higher education, and this created the conditions for an 'efficiency and effectiveness' discourse to increase its influence on higher education practices. Despite the fact that the state canvasses for a broad consensus on matters influencing public policy, efforts to maintain continuity and avoid major disruptions may also have the effect of being conservative and reformist in orientation and thereby fall short of substantive transformation.

Accountability, academic freedom and curriculum reform: cooperation and resistance

The realisation of the national developmental project requires the leveling out of the historically uneven field of higher education, and this pertains especially to the standardisation of curriculum practices. The impetus for such large scale curriculum reform, emanating initially from labour, was spearheaded by the state in the form of the National Qualifications Framework (NQF).

In the course of this process the social boundaries between the state and the university began, to some extent, to blur, not least because matters of equity and social justice are as dear to the state's unified normative framework as they are to the universities' pedagogic project. Mutually constituting each other, the universities to varying degrees have to recalibrate their institutional practices to conform to the preferred modalities of the state, while in its turn the state's curriculum-standardising intervention acts directly upon, and in so doing implicates itself in, the practices of teaching and learning at universities.

However, the real import of the NQF as a bureaucratic intervention vis-à-vis its potential for initiating pedagogic reflexivity remains in question.

> Following the requirements of the NQF, academics proceeded to identify different kinds of modules (fundamental, core, elective) … with little

> consideration of the curriculum implications of such physical division of disciplinary knowledge. …. What preoccupied institutional planners and academic planners and academic departments, was the largely bureaucratic and organisational task of preparing their qualifications for purposes of interim registration with the South African Qualifications' Authority (Jansen et al, 2007:166).

Thus, even though the normative framework underpinning the NQF was largely agreed to by universities, the actual process of its implementation was influenced by a range of factors, including the universities' self-image of academic freedom and autonomous regulation. Here again we come up against the limited nature of the state, and the mutual constitutiveness of state apparatuses and social institutions. This example also highlights another clash between the image and the practices of both the state and the universities vis-à-vis the NQF, specifically between the university's image of itself as an autonomous institution and the state's image of itself as effecting public accountability. As the state seeks to redraw social boundaries in relation to curriculum reform in the universities, the universities resist by establishing zones of alternate meanings that involve a re-specification of academic 'freedom' in ways that are caught up in their own institutional practices.

It follows from this that, rather than seeking analytically to understand the nature and impact of the state by juxtaposing its practices against its normative framework, it would be more fruitful to show how practices unfold in the mutually transformative engagement of the university and the state, and how the image of the state with respect to its developmental normative framework, which underpins its project of curriculum reform, is either aligned or at odds with the university's need to accommodate the state's preferred modality for representation (as per the NQF), and with the university's practices that end up effecting the evacuation of the epistemic project.

The State-in-Higher Education and the National Developmental Project

Coalitions, alliances, accommodations and interest groupings

A key facet of the state's efforts to advance the image of a unified normative framework for higher education has been the establishment of a structure which can 'speak with one voice for the sector' (CHE, 2004). The historically fragmented nature of higher education in South Africa is apparent in the various organisations that until recently managed the sector, such as the South

African Vice-Chancellors Association, the Council of Technikon Principals and the Association of Vice-Chancellors of Historically Disadvantaged Tertiary Institutions in South Africa. In the unfolding of the post-1994 policy environment an alliance has been formed between the executive levels of the universities and the state, an alliance firmed up by the institutional accommodation of the state by the universities in what is now called Higher Education South Africa.

To this extent, the state is seen to be inside institutions and institutions are seen to be inside the state.

The social boundaries between the state and society are thus effectively being redrawn; insofar as universities are increasingly adopting corporatist and managerialist forms of governance; and insofar as the state is increasingly incorporating the epistemic markers of the knowledge society, and the information revolution by engaging academics as consultants and policy advisers, and deploying them under the auspices of the Higher Education Quality Council, to review the content of academic programmes.

The limited state and the limited university: public accountability, economic growth and global forces

In terms of the national development framework, universities in South Africa are obliged to promote human resource development, an undertaking which requires extensive capital investment even as the current global tendency is towards reduced public expenditure on higher education and cost reductions, even while trying to expand enrolment in higher education (Menon et al , 2006).

Using the GDP index in SA, the state's higher education budget has declined by almost 23% in six years (Menon et al, 2006:3), and the concomitant increase in university tuition fees is certainly not in favour of the poor. This trend is likely to compromise the image of the state as serving the public good, and reduce the degree of trust and legitimacy invested in the state.

It follows that any investigation of the post-1994 developmental state has to factor in these and other constraining effects of the neo-liberal global context. Social policies predicated on market fundamentalism will inevitably come into conflict with the developmental framework and especially with efforts to redress class, race and gender inequalities. In this regard, through its accommodations with global forces such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the state-in-the-global-context reveals itself as a 'regulatory' and a 'facilitative' state (Carmody, 2002), even while continuing to foster an image of itself as a developmental state. Thus the image of the state also varies in relation to its specific engagements with society in general (national, continental and global), and this suggests that the state in relation to its practices is at

once limited, constrained, divided and fragmented.

Conclusion

Migdal's state-in-society model with its dialectic of images and practices offers a fruitful theoretical corrective to state-centric and socio-centric views of the state-society relationship, in that its attention to praxis restores equivalence to both state and society, thereby freeing them from reification. However, the extent to which the state-in-society model hones in on the actual practices involved in the mutual engagements of the state and society, it pays less attention to the bigger theoretical picture, and thus would benefit substantially from the stock of theoretical knowledge available in the state-centric and socio-centric views. This notwithstanding, it can be concluded that, on the basis of the exploratory state-in-society analytical approach developed here, the state can be understood as a structure in the process of *becoming*, and not merely in the way it *ought to be*. In other words, the state is informed and altered by the relationships established when other social forces engage with the state and vice versa. These relational effects, and the mutual constitution of state and society along a developmental trajectory, reveals the South African state to be a limited state with limited capacity (but nonetheless with real effects), rather than an omnipresent and omnipotent social force with unbounded capacity. In the process of describing some of the mutually transformative and constitutive alliances, accommodations and resistances that have arisen in the context of the engagement of the state with the higher education sector, the dynamism of the state in drawing and redrawing social boundaries has become apparent and, in particular, it has been shown that these boundaries are mediated not only by the state and its apparatuses but also by the higher education institutions with which they are engaged. Moreover, these boundaries delimit a number of tensions between the (ostensibly unified albeit multiple and contradictory) image of the state and its (fragmented and apparently unsuccessful yet not ineffective) practices, caught up as they are in the ebb and flow of local, national, supranational and global social contingencies.

Postscript

With the advent of the new political dispensation under the leadership of President Zuma (2009) and the reconfiguration of the Ministry of Education into higher and basic, with the former under the leadership of Minister Nzimande, certain subtle changes can be noted. Whereas President Mbeki was explicit

about the demarcation of the state and higher education and thus foregrounded the role of the executive, President Zuma, on the other hand, appears to defer to the Ministry of Higher Education and in so doing plays down the executive arm. The opposite is true when we consider Ministers Pandor in relation to Nzimande. What Ms Pandor seemed to have alluded to with respect to the relationship of higher education to the national project, Dr Nzimande makes explicit. The former dealt more with the image of the state, in other words, the focus seemed to fall more on policy with a 'hands off' approach to universities.

By contrast Minister Nzimande appears to be closer to an engaged state in as much as he seeks to be developing a new regimen of practices that in effect takes the state through him into higher education with what appears to be hedging towards a 'hands on' approach thus recasting the boundaries between the two. Having signaled certain potentialities in the current dispensation it must, however, be qualified by pointing out that it is clearly still too soon to tell which way the political current will flow: whether towards greater integration of the state in society, that is a de-distanciation between state and society.

Or whether a putative duality of state and society will be maintained where the distance between the two is such that it reinforces the myth of the 'ivory tower' carrying with it social reification and social sterility. Thus the challenge to higher education institutions following on Migdals state-in-society' approach espouses a level of social engagement without epistemic compromise, which sees instead universities-in-society: that is, a praxis standing neither above nor outside society, and moreover, is not an image of itself bordering on a simulacrum.

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Anthropologie des enjeux de la violence chez lagunaires de Côte d'Ivoire

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Résumé
*Le projet d'une Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle suscite particulièrement dans les communautés lagunaires une dynamique de transformation des ordres sociaux (institutions, idéologie des classes d'âge, matrilinéarité) face aux nouveaux enjeux qui mobilisent les populations (démocratie, développement, bien-être des populations, respect des institutions, création de nouvelles richesses, etc.). L'analyse socio-anthropologique de la micro-violence dans ces communautés à travers ces ordres sociaux et leur transformation, la justification des indices d'expression de la violence et les enjeux de celle-ci dans la transformation sociale, révèle que la violence en «s'inscrivant » dans ce processus comme un désordre apparent (**Gbudzu-gbudzu**), mieux comme un moyen de passage de l'ordre ancien à l'ordre nouveau, est au surplus le thermostat dans la bonne marche de la transformation sociale pour un mieux être.*

***Mots-clés**: Micro-violence, matrilinéarité, classes d'âge, développement, conflit, désordre, transformation*,

Introduction

Dans la littérature des sciences sociales relatives à la Côte d'Ivoire, depuis la crise sociopolitique qui a débuté en 1999, l'on constate un intérêt croissant pour la macro violence (Akindès 1990; Akindès 2003; Akindès 2004; Konaté 2004; Bouquet 2005; Langer 2005; Collett 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006). Mais, pour comprendre les dynamiques de la macro-violence, l'on ne peut minorer l'importance des micro-violences, c'est-à-dire des expressions de violence socialement et/ou géographiquement circonscrites. Dans le contexte ivoirien l'analyse des micro-violence s'est surtout polarisée sur les enjeux du conflit foncier dans la partie Ouest (Chauveau 2000; Chauveau, Pape et al. 2001; Chauveau 2003; Ibo 2006; Sissoko and Goh 2006; Vanga and Affou 2006) avec une forte implication des jeunes (Chauveau 2003; Ibo 2006) et dans une moindre mesure

sur le Sud (Colin 1990) et le Nord (Bassett et al. 1993; 1995; Dugué, Akindès et al. 2004; Strozeski 2006) de la Côte d'Ivoire. Or l'analyse socio-anthropologique de la micro-violence dans une Côte d'Ivoire en mutation pourrait aussi s'enrichir de la dynamique de la transformation des ordres sociaux dans des communautés tout aussi traversées par des contradictions sociales. L'objectif du présent article est de comprendre les enjeux de la micro-violence chez les lagunaires de Côte d'Ivoire, des sociétés dont l'organisation et le sens de la hiérarchie sociales semblent être confrontés aux pressions du changement social dont les formes spécifiques d'expression que nous présenterons apparaissent comme étant des indices.

La thèse soutenue dans cet article est la suivante : la violence ouvre le chantier des changements sociaux dans les communautés lagunaires au travers des organisations et des projets de développement local, de la démocratie, du bien-être des populations, du respect des institutions à une Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle, mais des changements risqués.

Ainsi, dans une première partie, nous allons montrer les ordres sociaux dans les communautés lagunaires et leur transformation. Dans une deuxième partie, nous tenterons de justifier les indices d'expressions de la violence dans ces communautés. Enfin, dans une troisième, nous tenterons d'analyser et de comprendre les enjeux de la violence dans la transformation sociale.

I- Des ordres sociaux et leur transformation

Les lagunaires dont il est question ici sont ceux des communautés ethniques autochtones principalement Ahizi, Alladian, Ebrié ou Kyaman et Odjoukrou. Ils se sont installés le long du bassin occidental de la lagune ébrié au sud de la Côte d'Ivoire.

Leurs mouvements migratoires sur la bande littorale maritime et lagunaire ont donné lieu à une longue histoire commune de brassage de populations et d'activités de pêche, de commerce et d'agriculture. Il faut souligner que deux souches étaient aux origines du brassage des populations : la souche Akan (venue de l'Est) et la souche krou (venue de l'ouest).

La souche Akan est composée de : Alladian, Ahizi (d'Allaba, Tabot, Atoutou, Nigui-Assoko, Abraniemmiembo, Téfrédji), Odjoukrou (d'Aklodz), Ebrié ou Kyaman (P. Loyer, 1702 ; P. Roussier, 1936 ; Atger, 1962 ; M. Augé, 1968 ; H. Diabaté, 1988 ; R. Allou Kouamé, 2002 ; H. Memel Fotê, 1980 ; J. N. Loukou, 1984 ; J.P. Colleyn, 1986 ; B.G. Diringbin, 1989. ***La souche Krou*** est aussi composée de : Ahizi (d'Abra, Nidz et Tchagba), Abidji-Obrou, Odjoukrou (Oborou, Dibmein) et des Kyaman-Abia (H. Diabaté, 1989 ; R. Allou Kouamé,

2002 ; H. Memel Fotê, 1980). A ces populations il faut ajouter celles venues plus tard de l'intérieur de l'actuelle Côte d'Ivoire et de l'étranger pour faire fortune dans les mêmes activités que les autochtones. Ces populations ont adopté des institutions et des systèmes de parenté presque semblables, par exemple les cas du système des classes d'âge, de la chefferie villageoise et de la matrilinéarité (système de parenté).

I-1- Des ordres sociaux

I-1-*1- Au niveau des institutions*

I-1-1-1- Les classes d'âges

I-1-1-1-1- *Approche conceptuelle*

Panoff M. et Perrin M. (1973) définissent la classe d'âge en ces termes *"Ensembles d'individus ayant approximativement le même âge, de l'un ou l'autre sexe, et qui sont organisés de manière cohérente en groupe socialement reconnu soumis aux mêmes rites de passage, ayant le même statut au sein de la société globale et exerçant les mêmes activités"*. Il faut retenir ici deux caractéristiques majeures : le ***statut de groupe social officiel*** et ***l'égalité***, fondée sur l'identité de formation, de statut et de fonctions, qui règle les rapports entre membres. Mais en fait, ce sont les rites de passage qui, en définitive, consacrent officiellement les groupes de jeunes recrues et en font des classes d'âge reconnus (Memel-Fotê H., 1980).

Ces rites constituent l'initiation qui est selon Claude Rivière *"à la fois épreuve physique, stage de formation à la vie adulte, mode d'accès aux vérités secrètes, permis d'entrer dans la vie sexuelle, intégration à la communauté des vivants et des morts"* (1969). Certes, si l'initiation collective exprime un principe d'égalité comme le fait remarquer J.Hurault à propos du système bamiléké : *"Aucun principe de hiérarchie ne présidait à la formation, et il s'engageait pas non plus, à mesure que les jeunes gens grandissent, la raison d'être de cette institution étant de créer entre eux des liens de solidarité durable, fondée sur une rigoureuse égalité. Non seulement les fils de chefs étaient admis sur le même pied d'égalité que les fils de serviteurs, mais on évitait de créer à l'intérieur de chaque société des fonctions (président, etc.) qui auraient été une source de discorde"* (1969), dans bien des cas ***cette égalité se trouve tempérée par la hiérarchie à l'intérieur de la classe.***

En effet, il y a d'abord une hiérarchie d'âge : les aînés et les cadets ; ensuite une hiérarchie de fonctions qui accompagne ce premier type de hiérarchie. Il y a également une hiérarchie entre classes d'âge qui s'exprime au niveau des comportements et du langage en termes de respect qui régit les relations entre aîné et cadet, père et fils.

Enfin, dans l'organisation des sociétés, les classes d'âge accomplissent des fonctions importantes au bénéfice des membres qu'au bénéfice de la société globale.

Par exemple, au bénéfice des membres, les classes d'âge assurent un rôle de groupes de secours mutuel ; ils y trouvent aide, assistance, bref, solidarité matérielle et morale tout au long de leur existence. Au bénéfice de la société globale, les classes d'âge remplissent une première fonction importante qui est d'ordre économique.

Elles se constituent en main d'œuvre dans la production des biens de subsistance individuels et familiaux, soit "des biens de fêtes" collectives (J. Capron, 1969), soit des biens religieux (confection de vêtements liturgiques). Le rôle politique majeur est celui de la défense de la patrie pour lequel une formation militaire des classes d'âge est exigée.

I-1-1-1-2- Terminologie, nombre et réalité des classes d'âge chez les lagunaires

I-1-1-1-2-1- *Terminologie et nombre*

Les Ahizi-Abra et les Odjoukrou dénomment la classe d'âge **Oworn** et ont sept classes : *obodjlou, sete, ndzroma, abrma, mbedje, mborma, nigbesi.* Les Alladian dénomment également la classe d'âge **Esouba** et ont cinq classes *: agrou,atioukou, abobo, aïri, asro*. Les Kyaman nomment la classe d'âge **Asepasa** et en ont quatre*: dugbo, niando, breswe, tchagba*.

Enfin, pour les Ahizi-Atoutou la classe d'âge est **Adro** comme chez les Ahizi-Nidz elle est **Tchagba.** Mais les deux groupes ont chacun douze classes : *mbro-aka, somo-aka, tchouake, dzipake, bogake, trotchouake, ladzake, martake, leteake, amake, sokpake, atchrake*.

I-1-1-1-2-2- *Recrutement et formation*

Dans toutes les communautés lagunaires (Ahizi, Alladian, Ebrié et Odjoukrou) l'accès aux classes d'âge et l'égalité de statut de membre se justifient par les conditions sociales et culturelles. L'appartenance à un patrilignage est une condition *sine qua non*. Entre les classes d'âge, une durée fixe variable d'une société à l'autre constitue l'unité de mesure séparant deux classes d'âge. Par exemple, de huit ans chez les Ahizi-Abra et Odjoukrou ; de trois à cinq ans chez les Alladian ; de quinze ans chez les Ebrié. La promotion des jeunes recrues s'effectue réellement dans l'initiation : ***low*** en modjoukrou ; ***esuba-krua*** en alladian ; ***gnakpa*** en ahizi-atoutou. Bref, le but de cette initiation est de pourvoir

la société en hommes cultivés, en citoyens responsables et en patriotes guerriers. Cette promotion s'opère donc par une formation technique : "l'apprentissage de la guerre" (Memel-Fotê H, 1980:405). Il faut souligner qu'à cet apprentissage se trouvent étroitement associées la formation morale, l'assimilation des vertus nécessaires de solidarité, de discipline et de fidélité auxquelles on confère un caractère sacré.

Marc Augé, à propos de la formation physique, rapporte que chez les Alladian les exercices de combats, destinés à hisser le chef de file (*efreno*) au sein des classes chargées de la défense armée, se pratiquent au village, au main nue, opposant soit la moitié ouest et la moitié est d'un même *esouba,* soit deux camps d'*esouba* apparentés où s'allient *esouba-fils*, *esouba-pères*, *esouba-grands-pères* (1969).

Chez les Odjoukrou, à propos de l'histoire et la pratique de la guerre pendant la formation, Memel-Fôtê H. rapporte également que *"la formation historique porte spécialement sur l'origine du peuple et les guerres entre tribus. Son but est quadruple : cultiver le patriotisme des jeunes, susciter des héros sur des modèles anciens, assurer la cohésion du groupe et justifier les luttes futures. Chose significative : l'enseignement s'achève par un exercice pratique intitulé "guerre d'initiation". Les initiés ce jour-là, portent leur panoplie, ayant en guise de fusils, des bras de bananiers.*

Les récits les soulèvent d'une colère apparente ; ils veulent gagner le champ de bataille, les adultes le calment, en vain. Ils enfoncent la cohue et prennent le chemin de la savane, ceux de Usr vers Lokp ou vice versa, ceux de Gbadjn vers Kosr ou vice versa. A Lokp leurs cadets les accompagnent, déguisés en femmes.

Bientôt une pétarade fuse dans l'air ; un guerrier, le plus faible de la promotion, joue au blessé ; les "femmes" se lamentent, l'armée regagne le village. A l'entrée des cours, les guerriers subissent un bain rituel et la peinture du caolin blanc" (1980 : 324).

I-1-1-1-2-3- Rôle des classes d'âge et signification de l'initiation

Si des conditions sociales et culturelles justifient l'accès aux classes d'âge et l'égalité de statut de membre, le rôle initial à elles destinées est d'ordre militaire : organiser les hommes de vingt à cinquante ans pour la défense de la sécurité et de l'indépendance de la patrie sous la direction des chefs de guerre.
Ensuite vient un rôle économique : travaux pour le village, pour les tuteurs des classes d'âge et entraide entre camarades de promotion ; puis un rôle politique : police du village, pour les aînés sociaux, selon les cas, conseil de gouvernement, fourniture d'armes et de munitions en cas de guerre. Enfin, un rôle culturel distraire la population villageoise par leurs musiciens et chorégraphes.

Bref, à travers les rôles des classes d'âge se dessine en filigrane une signification

éloquente de l'initiation (qui ouvre aux classes): ***l'initiation par ses différents rites opère le passage d'une vie à la mort et de la mort à une nouvelle et pleine vie***[1].

Mais en interprétant davantage leur initiation en termes de génération les lagunaires insistent et retiennent le second moment dialectique de la théorie classique à savoir : ***de la mort à une nouvelle et pleine vie.*** En effet, les patriclans et les classes monitrices ou "tutrices" accouchent des initiés, au sens culturel ; les initiés recréent eux-mêmes leur nouvel être, dans et par les épreuves physiques, intellectuelles et morales qu'ils maitrisent.

Bref, les communautés lagunaires dans leur ensemble se régénèrent périodiquement par l'initiation. C'est pourquoi, l'initiation en classes d'âge est *"une fête où les groupes rivalisent de richesses, manifestant leurs capacités économiques et le réseau de leurs relations sociales. Fête des jeunes, fête des clans, fête de la société des vivants et des morts, fête de la nature et de la vie, une réception des rameaux l'ouvre et un partage des rameaux la clôt",* dit Memel-Fotê H (1980 : 326).

Bref, une fois initiés les jeunes gens deviennent *ipso facto* des citoyens des sociétés qui les portent et assument les fonctions plus haut citées.

Mais le pouvoir suprême (le gouvernement du village), *Eb-eb,* chez les Odjoukrou par exemple, est assumé de manière cyclique par les classes d'âge, tous les cinq, huit ou douze ans selon les sociétés ou communautés ethniques.

La prise donc de pouvoir par les seniors leur confèrent ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler "chefferie collective des classes d'âge". Cette chefferie laissera plus tard place à la "chefferie villageoise" initiée par le colonisateur. A ces types de chefferies les lagunaires vouent respect et autorité, honneur et gloire.

I-1-1-2- ***La chefferie villageoise***[2]

Après avoir soumis tous les résistants à l'action colonisatrice, l'Etat colonial français décida vers 1910 de l'application de l'Administration indirecte à l'ensemble de la Côte d'Ivoire conquise et particulièrement à la région des lagunes dont les formations politiques étaient jusque-là lignagères à classes d'âge.

C'est ainsi qu'il créa des chefferies villageoises en rapport avec les chefferies cantonales (créés également par le colonisateur) et le gouverneur du cercle. Dans un premier temps l'application de cette institution nouvelle ne fut pas heureuse : confusion de rôles et de prérogatives entre la chefferie "collective des classes d'âge" et celles de la nouvelle chefferie villageoise.

1 C'est une théorie classique bien résumée par Claude Lévi-Strauss dans *La pensée sauvage* (1962 :350) et illustrée par Robert Jaulin dans *La mort sara* (1967).

2 Voir à cet effet Memel-Fotê H (1980), Augé M (1969), Mel Meledje R (1994).

Avec le temps, les villageois ont fini par accepter de force ou de gré la nouvelle chefferie. Mais dans la réalité villageoise, le nouveau chef gouverne devant les anciens et ils se doivent mutuellement respect et à leur suite toutes les classes d'âge.

Pour l'Administration coloniale, le chef du village était une "courroie de transmission" entre le gouverneur de la région et le village.

Au village, le chef s'entourait de notables, de héraut(s) et d'anciens de classes d'âge selon la vision institutionnelle de la communauté.

Ainsi, dans les chefferies villageoises lagunaires le sens de l'organisation et de la hiérarchie était toujours sauvegardé et articulé sur les principes du système politique et social des classes d'âge pour lesquels l'idéologie et les structures de fraternité et d'unité fonctionnent. Rappelons brièvement quelques structures idéologiques : le lignage, la classe d'âge, la palabre politique et culte public des morts[3].

Le ***lignage*** (patrilignage ou matrilignage) : au sein du lignage, l'ancêtre éponyme sert de référence à tous et les relations entre membres constituent le lignage en une communauté d'hommes et de femmes dans laquelle dominent des courants solidaires et fraternels.

La ***classe d'âge*** : les camarades ou "frères" d'une même renaissance initiatique sont régis par des liens de solidarité et de fraternité qui les soudent les uns aux autres pour la vie.

La ***palabre politique*** : assemblée politique des citoyens mâles réunis pour juger, délibérer et décider afin de maintenir l'unité de la communauté. Le ***culte public des morts*** : *makpegn-ob* (odjoukrou), *agbamankô* (ahizi- Atoutou- Allaba) est une institution cultuelle politico-religieuse (publique) qui restaure annuellement la communauté villageoise.

Donc en réunissant le même jour les vivants et les morts de la communauté villageoise en patrilignages, autour des patriarches pour un repas cultuel et communiel, les parentalies ou le culte public des morts, manifestent à la fois la cohésion des résidents, l'unité et la fraternité de toute la communauté.

A propos de la sauvegarde et du maintien de l'unité et de la fraternité, les anciens qui sont chargés de l'interprétation et de l'application de l'idéologie se révèlent puissants dans l'exécution des décisions.

C'est pourquoi Marc Augé (1974) parle d'***idéologique unique*** parce que celle-ci n'accepte pas des discours, pratiques et interprétations qui lui soient contradictoires.

L'idéologique (langue et idéologie) demeure donc la référence dernière. Emmanuel Terray quant à lui parle d' **"*espace social à courbure*"** (1978),

3 Voir Mel Meledje R (1994) et Memel-Fotê H (1980).

parce que seuls les anciens occupent toute la scène et les autres ne parviennent jamais à se constituer en force autonome, malgré les remous de la démocratie de l'arbre à palabres (Mel Meledje R, 1994 ; Sylla Laciné, 2001).

Bref, il s'agit donc d'une domination sans partage parce que le système en place est assez puissant pour prévenir la formation de concurrents éventuels. Mais l'écran protecteur dont bénéficiait l'idéologique dans "l'espace social à courbure" du temps des anciens n'est plus, il sera remis en cause et même rejeté au temps des jeunes générations et de la modernité. Nous le verrons plus loin avec les transformations.

I-1-2- ***Au niveau du système de parenté : cas de la matrilinéarité***

I-1-2-1- *Approche conceptuelle et histoire*

Si le matrilignage peut être défini comme un groupe de filiation unilinéaire dont les membres se considèrent comme descendants en ligne utérine d'un ou d'une ancêtre commun(e) et connu (e) et nommé (e), le matrilinéaire se présente comme un système de filiation et d'organisation sociale dans lequel seule l'ascendance maternelle est prise en ligne de compte pour la transmission des privilèges (héritage), d'appartenance à un clan ou à une classe. Alors la matrilinéarité est le "vivre" ou la pratique de ce système de parenté et d'organisation articulé sur la ligne maternelle.

Pour les Akan en général et les Akan lagunaires en particulier, la matrilinéarité est un héritage historique qui s'origine dans la descendance et le mouvement migratoire de la reine Abla Pokou (XVII – XVIII° siècle)[4], nièce et héritière du grand roi Osséi Toutou qui jeta au XVIII° siècle les bases de la puissante Confédération aschanti.

Après la mort d'Opokou Waré, jeune frère d'Osséi Toutou, Abla Pokou pour éviter le massacre de ses partisans et sa famille les rassembla et organisa leur fuite vers l'ouest.

Les Akan de Côte d'Ivoire, descendants des Aschanti et héritiers matrilinéaires d'Abla Pokou continuent de vivre les enseignements de la lignée.

Ainsi, chez les Akan lagunaires, la pratique de la matrilinéarité se révèle décisive dans la transmission des privilèges et ses règles incommensurables dans la généalogie matrilinéaire.

Par exemple, la vraie famille de l'enfant est celle de la lignée maternelle. Il peut travailler pour son père, le nourrir, l'enterrer, mais ne l'hérite pas. Il héritera de l'oncle maternel. La femme également peut gouverner et hériter sans

4 Voir particulièrement Jean-Noel Loukou et Françoise Ligier, 1977, *La Reine Pokou, Fondatrice du royaume baoulé,* Paris, Editions ABC.

conteste des oncles ou frères de la lignée maternelle quand elle est en rang utile pour le faire**.** Bref, comme une vérité de Lapalisse, la logique interne de ces ordres sociaux avait convaincu et régi hier les sociétés qui les pratiquaient jusqu'au jour où le système lui-même sera remis en cause par des opposants internes ou externes convaincus à leur tour qu'il faudrait voir et vivre autrement.

1-2- Des transformations

Les ordres sociaux que nous venons de décrire et d'analyser plus haut sont en fait le résultat d'une longue évolution historique. Mais dans la modernité actuelle qui est aussi le temps des jeunes, ils vont subirent des transformations structurelles importantes et seront même menacés de disparition.

1-2-1- *Au niveau des institutions*

Par son organisation, son fonctionnement et sa périodicité, le système des classes d'âge renforçait avec le temps son idéologie sociale et politique de fraternité et d'unité par l'égalité et le dynamisme des membres des classes d'âge. De nouveaux termes comme *màl-idj* (en odjoukrou) ou *Abri* (en alladian) expriment cette similitude des rapports entre pairs et ce dynamisme interne des classes et se traduisent par : compagnon, camarade, promotionnaire.

Ensuite, l'élargissement de la société politique par l'initiation de nombreux jeunes membres, la collégialisation du pouvoir et la limitation temporelle de son exercice a donné naissance à de nouvelles institutions introduites dans le système politique. Mais le dépérissement de ces nouvelles institutions est déjà entamé par la démocratie, la modernisation, la décentralisation, le développement local en marche dans les nouveaux Etats africains comme dans la Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle. Par exemple, les nouveaux regroupements par affiliation aux partis politiques nationaux et à leurs idéaux, la création de nouvelles Préfectures, Sous-préfectures et Communes comme instruments de développement local, les conflits de générations, soit au niveau des objets de développement, soit au niveau des terres que l'histoire commune a réservée à leur intention, soit au niveau de la hiérarchie sociale face à la pression du changement global…affaiblissent l'unité, l'égalité, le dynamisme et la fraternité des classes d'âge et développent des oppositions souvent farouches entre elles.

La chefferie villageoise sera à son tour frappée de dépérissement avec la création de nouveaux pôles administratifs dans le pays rural : préfectures, sous-préfectures, communes dans les villages. Cela entraine la réduction de l'espace d'autorité et de pouvoir des chefs de village. La crédibilité et la compétence de ces

derniers sont souvent mises à nu par les jeunes générations contestataires. La crise militaro-politique de la Côte d'Ivoire qui a débuté en 2002 a également donné l'occasion de porter aux nues l'incompétence des chefs et rois traditionnels qui prétendaient résoudre la crise ivoirienne au niveau national avec les mécanismes de gestion des conflits dont ils avaient la "maitrise" dans les arènes villageoises[5].

Bref, la décentralisation de l'Administration par la communalisation des villages inaugure véritablement la mort de la chefferie villageoise.

1-2-2- *Au niveau de la matrilinéarité*

Cet ordre social et ses règles qui ont fait autorité hier dans les sociétés lagunaires, agonisent de nos jours sous deux rapports malgré des résistances: le soulèvement des générations jeunes contre les règles de la matrilinéarité (village d'Ousrou en ses débuts) et la loi des successions de la Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle qui stipule en substance : *"les enfants héritent de leurs géniteurs père et mère"*.

Aujourd'hui, dans la réalité villageoise, on peut encore parler d'alternative législative parce que les populations peuvent choisir le mode de législation qui leur convient selon leurs intérêts. Mais les jeunes générations recourent la plus part du temps à la législation étatique pour se rendre justice et réclamer leur dû. Malheureusement ce processus est toujours émaillé de violence entre les opposants.

Bref, les ordres sociaux d'hier se transforment coûte que coûte aujourd'hui face aux pressions d'un environnement lui-même changeant. Aussi ces changements interviennent dans la violence et l'opposition des parties. Alors quelle justification les lagunaires donnent-ils aux indices d'expression de cette violence ?

2- Justification des indices d'expression de violence : constats et opportunités

2-1-Constats de distanciation à la violence dans les communautés lagunaires

La longue histoire de cohabitation des lagunaires révèle une relative homogénéité manifestée dans les données géographico-écologiques, de l'anthropologie sociale, de l'histoire (Mel Meledje R.)[6].

5 Mel Meledje R., *Les rois et chefs traditionnels face à la crise ivoirienne : les mécanismes traditionnels de gestion des conflits sont-ils appropriés ?* **A paraitre**.

6 Mel Meledje R., idem.

Celle-ci a donné lieu à des similitudes langagières dont témoignent les productions des expressions de la distance à la **violence.**

2-I-1- *Chez les Ahizi*

Les Ahizi nomment de plusieurs manières la violence. Ainsi : 1°) ***Nôtchu ata :*** *il a l'esprit guerrier ou il aime la guerre ;* 2°) ***Nôtchu kucru kucru :*** *il aime la brutalité ou il est brutal ; 3°)* ***Napa egbi :*** *il fait tout avec force ou il est dominateur ; 4°)*

Gnana ké gbudzu-gbudzu *: il est brutal ou il est violent ;* ***Gnana ogbo wo mrin-mrin :*** *il parle mal ou est violent verbalement.*

De la sorte, la brutalité ou la force aveugle exprime la distanciation à la violence. Pêcheurs, les Ahizi sont arrivés aujourd'hui à l'utilisation de cette force comme nécessaire pour faire respecter les règles des activités de pêche sur la lagune et de cohabitation aux contrevenants récidivistes dans les localités.

2-I-2- *Chez les Odjoukrou*

Les Odjoukrou disent : 1°) ***Ongn gbudz-gbudz :*** *tu es brutal, violent ; 2°)* ***Ongn ar :*** *tu possèdes l'esprit guerrier ou tu es dominateur; 3°)* ***Bicok ob-fein letch-em*** ou ***cokro-cokro-em :*** *tu fais tout avec force ou avec brutalité : tu es belliqueux; 4°)* ***Ongn odad :*** *tu aimes la palabre ou la violence verbale.*

Certes, plus agriculteurs que pêcheurs, les Odjoukrou étaient jaloux des leurs propriétés comme de leurs héritages. Les matrilignages ne partagent pas, par exemple, leur terre avec les patrilignages. Mais aujourd'hui, les terres des matrilignages odjoukrou sont aussi revendiquées par les descendants des patrilignages comme conforme aux nouvelles dispositions du code civil ivoirien *("L'enfant hérite de ses géniteurs, père et mère").* La charge de violence libérée dans l'altercation est l'un des principaux indices de distanciation sociale de transformation : les anciennes dispositions coutumières deviennent caduques même dans les arènes villageoises régies jusque-là par les règles de la matrilinéarité. Au surplus, une *nouvelle race d'Odjoukrou* voit le jour.

2-I-3- *Chez les Kyaman ou Ebrié*

Les Kyaman désignent par ***Adi*** ou ***Adusan:*** *la violence* ; ***Ata :*** *la guerre* **;** ***Agbohi :*** *la palabre*. Par exemple : *cet homme est violent*, ***Sèlokon duasanho ;*** *cette femme est violente*, ***Biélokon duansanho ;*** *pourquoi aimes-tu faire la guerre ?,* ***Ebikin è sran-***

manbué nin ? ; *Pourquoi, aimes-tu te battre ? ,* ***Ebikin è adihi nin ? ;*** *Pourquoi es-tu si violent ?,* ***Ebikin ètè adusanhi ?*** En effet, l'utilisation de la violence comme moyen de survie justifie le changement opéré par les Ebrié de notre champ d'étude: devenus de moins en moins pêcheurs, les Ebrié se sont tournés résolument vers la culture du manioc (fabrication de l'atiéké), du palmier à huile et de l'hévéaculture.

Mais la rareté des terres cultivables suscite une course effrénée vers celles disponibles avec quelquefois une violence indescriptible dans l'occupation. Pour ceux qui vaquent encore aux activités de pêche, les plans d'eau lagunaires sont désormais disputés souvent avec violence par des étrangers-pêcheurs et des autochtones. Indice de distanciation sociale de transformation, la violence inaugure les temps de lutte et de réinvention des Ebrié.

2-I-4- *Chez les Alladian*

Les Alladian nomment la violence ***Fru-fru*** ou ***Gbudzu-gbudzu.*** Par exemple : *Yesso kanhan gbudzu-gbudzu,* ce qui veut dire que Yesso fait de la violence ou est violent ; *Yesso kanhan frufru*, Yesso est devenu brutal, ne respecte plus rien. Certes, si la formation des citoyens Alladian en classes d'âge avait le mérite du respect de l'autorité, de tout homme et du sentiment de responsabilité de toute chose publique et privée, l'esprit de domination, d'influence et de brutalité (*fru-fru ou gbudzu-gbudzu)* qui se développe davantage aujourd'hui par la jeunesse alladian peut aussi trouver meilleure explication dans les manifestations de 1990 réclamant l'avènement effectif du multipartisme et de la démocratie au niveau national. La jeunesse ivoirienne dans son ensemble s'en est impliquée et a même payé le lourd tribut (plusieurs morts). Aujourd'hui encore elle continue la lutte même dans les localités les plus éloignées sous l'égide de "l'Association des patriotes". Dans les villages alladian cette jeunesse est désormais au devant de toutes les manifestations et récriminations sociales et politiques, mais aussi des prises de position qui entrainent la violence. Certes, indice de distanciation sociale pour un ordre nouveau, la violence manifestée par la jeunesse alladian ouvre la voie à l'Alladian nouveau.

Bref**,** de cette production sociale de l'expression de la violence chez les lagunaires et des commentaires qui ont suivi, nous pouvons faire les remarques suivantes :
- des similitudes langagières constatées attestent de la longue cohabitation des populations et au surplus de leur relative homogénéité. D'ailleurs, il est également constaté que le terme ***Gbudzu-gbudzu*** commun à toutes les communautés lagunaires est le résultat d'une évolution après ***cokro-cokro, kru-kru, fru-fru, fian-fian.*** Il exprime d'une certaine façon l'intensité plus grande

de la violence ; - l'accroissement de la violence et son intensité plus grande ces dernières années dans ces localités sont fonction de l'émergence de nouveaux défis comme les connaissances nouvelles, l'ouverture aux autres horizons, à la démocratie, au développement local, à l'emploi et au refus de l'ancien système dominé par la matrilinéarité ; - le développement de l'hévéaculture dans la région des lagunes entraine des conflits violents dans l'occupation des terres et les nouveaux regroupements qu'induit la décentralisation de l'Administration territoriale. Certes, ces facteurs dont nous revisiterons quelques uns dans les "Opportunités" influencent à la fois le langage dans la production sociale d'expression théorique de distanciation de la violence et dans une large mesure, les comportements. Alors qu'en est-il donc des Opportunités de la violence sur le terrain ?

2-2-Les Opportunités de distanciation à la violence dans les communautés lagunaires

La vie dans les communautés villageoises et les relations entre des communautés lagunaires révèlent: pour les communautés qui vivent déjà éloignées les unes des autres dans le même village, les fréquentations comme les services réciproques régressent ; pour les communautés ethniques, les problèmes de frontières comme ceux du foncier ressurgissent ; pour celles qui habitent la bande littorale, la réfection des infrastructures communes et les appuis économiques des populations deviennent objets de palabres et de **violence.**

2-2-I- Chez les Ahizi

Au niveau local : non respect des lois de cohabitation

Le village d'Allaba abrite depuis plusieurs années une population étrangère de pêcheurs (Béninois et Togolais) devenue plus nombreuse que la population autochtone. Les lois internes qui les régissaient hier sont devenues caduques aux yeux de la génération montante autochtone et étrangère née dans le village. Ainsi, le non-respect des lois de la communauté sont réprouvées sévèrement par "les soldats" de la chefferie ou des anciens. A cet effet, la violence verbale ou physique exercée ces dernières années (2005-2008) pour mettre au pas les contrevenants est inhabituelle. Désormais l'impunité n'est plus acceptée au village. Et on entend les autochtones dire aux étrangers *"Si vous ne voulez pas accepter nos nouvelles lois, il vaut mieux entrer chez vous !".* Cette atmosphère met en mal l'harmonie du village et les services réciproques.

Le village d'Atoutou–**A** avait accepté, il y a plusieurs années, à la demande des étrangers de leur accorder à titre gracieux la presqu'île du village pour habitation et activités de pêche. Cette demande a été acceptée. Depuis lors, les relations entre les deux communautés étaient plutôt harmonieuses. Mais voilà qu'aujourd'hui, le village d'Atoutou-**A** érigé en commune depuis 2007, se voit contraint de réviser le contrat d'occupation de la presqu'île établi à titre gracieux. Désormais les étrangers de la presqu'île doivent payer à la municipalité des redevances ou l'impôt d'habitation.

Et c'est le refus d'exécution de bon nombre d'entre eux qui provoqua la colère de la population autochtone : des menaces d'expulsion et de violence verbale et physique ont été enregistrées de part et d'autre. Depuis lors, les relations entre les communautés sont empruntes de méfiance.

Des étrangers ont même quitté le village et ceux qui y sont restés vivent dans la peur de se voir chasser un jour pour un impôt impayé ou pour une agression (verbale ou physique) portée à un autochtone.

Au niveau des relations entre villages autochtones : conflits fonciers

Les villages de Nidz-Assoko et Nianmiembo se disputent un espace terrien pour lequel ils se réclament tous deux propriétaires bien avant l'indépendance du pays. Mais très occupés par les activités de pêche, les Ahizi de Nidz-Assoko ont mis en veilleuse cette revendication. Aujourd'hui, avec l'essor de l'hévéaculture dans la région, la course à la terre pour des villages voisins distants l'un de l'autre d'environ 600 mètres, devient source de conflits violents. A chaque occasion, les deux villages libèrent une charge de violence instrumentale qui fait des morts. Ainsi, malgré la réconciliation des deux villages, la méfiance s'en est installée jusqu'aujourd'hui.

Les villages d'Allaba (Ahizi) et de Ngatti (Odjoukrou) séparés l'un de l'autre d'environ 300 à 500 mètres par endroit, se disputent depuis plusieurs années le chef de terre de l'espace des deux villages, du moins, le premier arrivé en ces lieux. A chaque altercation les deux villages libèrent une charge de violence qui fait des morts de part et d'autre. La voie principale de sortie terrestre du village d'Allaba est celle passant par Ngatti, alors que ce dernier monte des barrages pendant les périodes de crise, empêchant les habitants d'Allaba d'avoir facilement accès à la ville de Dabou. Et c'est bien une des raisons du ralliement d'Allaba à la nouvelle commune de Tabot. Mais les conflits entre les deux n'ont jamais eu de cesse.

Au niveau du développement : revendication d'instruments économiques

Le bac à péage de Jacqueville dit aussi bac de N'djêm est devenu un instrument

économique convoité par la nouvelle commune de Sassako (village alladian) et celle homologue de Tabot (village ahizi). La revendication de cet instrument par l'une et l'autre commune a suscité de vives controverses et de violences qui ont amené l'armée ivoirienne à séjourner pendant un mois dans la région (en 2008).

Le ré-profilage de la route d'Allaba-Dabou en passant par Ngatti (en 2009) qui exigeait de rabaisser la colline de Ngatti côté Allaba a été l'objet de vives tensions entre les deux villages (Allaba et Ngatti). Une fois encore, la bagarre violente qui s'en est suivie est terminée par la mort d'hommes. La police nationale, la brigade de gendarmerie et le conseil général de la région de Dabou ont volé au secours des villages. Mais malgré les solutions communes arrêtées, les deux villages se regardent toujours en chiens de faïence.

2-2-2- Chez les Odjoukrou

Au niveau local : problèmes politique, économique et socio-culturel

Pendant de la crise ivoirienne, des jeunes étrangers Maliens, Burkinabé, Guinéens et autochtones odjoukrou, armes à la main, attaquent et volent les habitants du village d'Ousrou **B,** de nuit comme de jour, sur les chemins des champs comme dans les maisons. Excédés, les habitants du village s'organisent avec toutes sortes d'armes et attendent les "prédateurs". Au signal donné par le héraut du village, un échange de coup de feu fait des morts principalement dans le camp des "prédateurs" parmi lesquels se trouvent des fils du village identifiés. Depuis cette attaque des villageois, Ousrou **B** s'est débarrassé des voleurs armés, mais reste vigilent.

Le village de Toupa (village odjoukrou) abrite un nombre important d'étrangers (Burkinabé, Maliens, Guinéens, Sierra-Leonniens), ouvriers agricoles dans les plantations de palmiers à huile, d'hévéa et salariés à l'usine de transformation du latex de l'hévéa du village et à l'huilerie de palme de Cosrou (village odjoukrou) et commerçants. Pendant les événements de la crise (en 2002), des étrangers Burkinabé auraient pris partie pour Alassane Dramane Ouattara, président du parti du Rassemblement des Républicains (R. D. R). De nuit, ils montent des barrages et agressent les passants (automobilistes, passagers…). Mais voilà qu'un soir, les villageois, la police nationale et la gendarmerie y ont donné l'assaut pour sécuriser les lieux. La charge de violence libérée a fait plusieurs morts parmi les étrangers insurgés. Depuis cette nuit, on n'a plus entendu parler d'agresseurs Burkinabé dans la région, mais la méfiance entre étrangers Burkinabé et autochtones Odjoukrou s'en est installée.

Au niveau des relations entre villages autochtones : problèmes économique, de frontière

Le village de Lopou (village odjoukrou) fait frontière avec ceux de Yassap-**A** et **B** (villages odjoukrou). Les problèmes frontiers mettent en conflit d'une année à l'autre les trois villages. Ces dernières années (en 2005), un match de football entre jeunes des dits villages a dégénéré en bataille rangée. La création du village de Yassap **B** et l'extension des plantations d'hévéa du nouveau village ont fait l'objet d'empiètement constaté par le village de Lopou, mais sans violence à l'époque. Ainsi, à la suite de la bataille rangée entre jeunes footballeurs et la poursuite des jeunes de Lopou par les habitants des deux villages Yassap jusqu'au-delà des limites de leurs frontières ont alerté les habitants de Lopou qui ont chargé à leur tour les deux villages Yassap. La guerre déclenchée a été fatale des deux côtés : des morts. Depuis cet événement malheureux, ces villages voisins sont sur le "qui vive" aux frontières respectives et les relations entre Lopou et les villages Yassap ne sont plus au beau fixe.

Les villages odjoukrou voisins d'Okpoyou-Em et d'Oursou **A** et **B** cohabitent très difficilement. Aux origines, Ousrou **B** et Opkoyou-Em font partie de l'unique village d'Ousrou (**A**). Et plus tard pour des raisons démographiques et d'entente, Oursou **B** et Okpoyou-Em sont créés et installés "pas trop loin et pas très près" d'Oursou **A.** Mais, bien que partis, les habitants d'Okpoyou-Em veulent encore conserver une partie des terres d'Ousrou **A.** Pire, ils louent cette terre à un industriel Chinois qui y crée une vaste plantation d'hévéa. La guerre déclarée est impitoyable, surtout qu'Okpoyou-Em refuse de reverser une partie des redevances à lui octroyées au village d'Ousrou **A**. La charge de violence libérée par les deux villages d'Ousrou contre Okpoyou-Em est fatale : des morts par centaines du côté d'Okpoyou-Em. Depuis ces événements (2007), les coopérations comme les relations entre les Ousrou-**A** et **B** et Okpoyou-Em sont rompues. Mais des expéditions punitives perpétrées sur les routes et dans plantations ont été enregistrées de part et d'autre ces dernières années.

Au niveau du développement: problème économique et de remise en cause de l'autorité

Le village de Débrimou (village odjoukrou) crée une vaste plantation collective d'hévéa pour financer les projets de développement local. Et la gestion de cette plantation est confiée par le village aux classes d'âge gouvernantes. Cette année-là, c'est la classe d'âge *Mborman* au pouvoir suprême qui gère le patrimoine. Et voici qu'un projet de réhabilitation de l'école primaire et de canalisation des eaux de pluie exige un décaissement d'argent. L'assemblée villageoise commande alors aux gestionnaires *Mborman* un bilan à mi-parcours avant le décaissement.

Le bilan est catastrophique : un déficit de 250 millions de francs cfa est constaté. Pour plus de clarté et de crédibilité, à nouveau, le village fait appel à un cabinet d'expertise comptable. Le résultat de l'expertise est formel : un déficit de 250 millions de francs cfa. Alors la colère des villageois monte au paroxysme. Les anciens calment les esprits surchauffés ; puis donnent un mois aux gestionnaires pour rembourser la dette. Mais voilà que le délai expire et que le village n'est pas entré dans ses fonds. Alors il décide de punir sévèrement par tous les moyens l'équipe de la direction pour servir de leçon aux classes d'âge futures gestionnaires.

Des actes sont joints à la parole : les premiers décès dans l'équipe provoquent l'émoi et la frayeur dans la population villageoise. Mais entretemps, le décaissement d'argent est fait et les travaux ont été réalisés.

Dans les villages odjoukrou généralement, la réalisation d'un projet de développement communautaire met en compétition financière toutes les classes d'âge. Et c'est à l'occasion de la réhabilitation de l'ancien château d'eau que le village d'Agbaille devient le théâtre d'une vague de violence entre classes d'âge. Les générations montantes souhaitent *"la construction d'un nouveau château d'eau plus grand et moderne, puisque la population s'accroît et que le village s'étend de plus en plus"*. Les anciens trouvent qu'il y a urgence : *"Le village a besoin d'eau dans l'immédiat, puisque le château d'eau actuel ne fonctionne plus. Le nouveau projet dont vous parlez est onéreux et ne peut être réalisé dans l'immédiat compte-tenu de nos moyens"*.

Après la comparaison des devis des deux projets, les générations montantes estiment que *"la réhabilitation sera une erreur. Il vaut mieux faire un bon travail une fois pour toutes et se répartir la somme entre classes comme nous avons l'habitude pour la construction d'un nouveau château d'eau"*.

Cette proposition des générations montantes ne plait pas aux anciens qui jugent que les jeunes les défient et remettent en cause leur autorité : "*Vous remettez toujours en cause nos décisions, méfiez-vous! Et cette fois, cela ne se passera pas comme vous l'entendez!"* déclare le doyen d'âge au nom des anciens. Et de discussion en discussion, on en arrive aux bagarres, puis aux rixes avec une charge de violence inhabituelle des générations jeunes. On compte de nombreux blessés parmi les anciens qui ne cessent de maudire les jeunes générations et réclament leur exclusion du village. Depuis cet événement, la tension reste vive entre les anciens et les générations montantes.

Au niveau de la démocratie : problème d'exclusion et recentrement des groupes

Les élections législatives, municipales et présidentielles se déroulent partout en Afrique et particulièrement dans les villes et villages dans une ambiance

emprunte de violence parce que la culture de démocratie à l'occidental n'est pas encore ancrée dans les mœurs. Tel a été le cas aux élections municipales et législatives démocratiques à Dabou de 1980 et 1985[7].

Aux élections municipales de 1980, au deuxième tour du scrutin, restent en liste Nomelagne Michel, Odjoukrou, originaire de Dibrm, donc de la Commune de Dabou, mais résidant habituellement à Abidjan ; Kol Memel Jean, originaire d'Usr, village de la Sous-préfecture de Dabou, résidant habituellement à Dabou et fondateur du collège Nouvelle Atlantide de la dite ville. Mais Kol Memel est traité d'*utu* (étranger) par la majorité des Odjoukrou des villages de la Commune, électeurs de Nomelagne.

Aux résultats, Kol Memel est élu. Cette élection lui a coûté une jambe brisée et une hanche fracturée, à cause des hostilités dont il fut l'objet. Les dessous du terme 'étranger' attribué à Kol Memel font remonter la compréhension plus loin : en dehors du découpage administratif de Commune et de Sous-préfecture, l'animosité entre la Confédération de Dibrm et celle de Bobor dont fait partie le village d'origine de Kol Memel va également resurgir.

Aux élections municipales de 1985, au deuxième tour de scrutin, restent en liste : Nomelagne Michel, originaire de Dibrm de la Commune de Dabou, résidant à Abidjan et soutenu par la grande majorité des habitants de Dibrm et alliés ; Lohoues Vincent, originaire de Dibrm de la Commune de Dabou, résidant à Abidjan et soutenu par une partie des habitants de Dibrm, mais en majorité par les habitants du village de Kpas de la dite Commune et alliés.

Il faut souligner qu'en soutenant fortement la candidature de Lohoues Vincent (marié également à une fille de ce village) les habitants du village de Kpas mûrissaient le projet de la candidature de Mangou-EÏ Jean Marie, originaire de Kpas aux législatives.

Aux résultats Lohoues Vincent est élu et de nouveau Nomelagne Michel est battu. Aux législatives, au deuxième tour de scrutin, Lohoues Vincent et Mangou-EÏ Jean-Marie se portent candidats contre Nomelagne Michel.

Il faut souligner que les électeurs de Nomelagne Michel traitent Lohoues Vincent de traitre parce qu'il fait alliance avec un fils d'étranger ou un fils d'esclave (père de Mangou-EÏ J. Marie serait un esclave, dit-on). Aux résultats Nomelagne Michel est élu.

2-2-3- Chez les Kyaman ou Ebrie

Au niveau des relations entre villages autochtones : problème de frontières

7 Cf. Mel Meledje R., 1994 : 225-228.

Anthropologie des enjeux de la violence chez lagunaires de Côte d'Ivoire

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Résumé
*Le projet d'une Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle suscite particulièrement dans les communautés lagunaires une dynamique de transformation des ordres sociaux (institutions, idéologie des classes d'âge, matrilinéarité) face aux nouveaux enjeux qui mobilisent les populations (démocratie, développement, bien-être des populations, respect des institutions, création de nouvelles richesses, etc.). L'analyse socio-anthropologique de la micro-violence dans ces communautés à travers ces ordres sociaux et leur transformation, la justification des indices d'expression de la violence et les enjeux de celle-ci dans la transformation sociale, révèle que la violence en «s'inscrivant » dans ce processus comme un désordre apparent (**Gbudzu-gbudzu**), mieux comme un moyen de passage de l'ordre ancien à l'ordre nouveau, est au surplus le thermostat dans la bonne marche de la transformation sociale pour un mieux être.*

***Mots-clés**: Micro-violence, matrilinéarité, classes d'âge, développement, conflit, désordre, transformation*,

Introduction

Dans la littérature des sciences sociales relatives à la Côte d'Ivoire, depuis la crise sociopolitique qui a débuté en 1999, l'on constate un intérêt croissant pour la macro violence (Akindès 1990; Akindès 2003; Akindès 2004; Konaté 2004; Bouquet 2005; Langer 2005; Collett 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006). Mais, pour comprendre les dynamiques de la macro-violence, l'on ne peut minorer l'importance des micro-violences, c'est-à-dire des expressions de violence socialement et/ou géographiquement circonscrites. Dans le contexte ivoirien l'analyse des micro-violence s'est surtout polarisée sur les enjeux du conflit foncier dans la partie Ouest (Chauveau 2000; Chauveau, Pape et al. 2001; Chauveau 2003; Ibo 2006; Sissoko and Goh 2006; Vanga and Affou 2006) avec une forte implication des jeunes (Chauveau 2003; Ibo 2006) et dans une moindre mesure

Le village de Songon-Mbratté (village Ebrié) a maille à partir avec celui de Tabot (village Ahizi), quelques années après l'indépendance de la Côte d'Ivoire.

La délimitation des frontières lagunaires a été remise en cause par des jeunes pêcheurs Ebrié de Songon-Mbratté. Ceux de Tabot trouvent que les repères sont bien à leur place et qu'il ne faudrait pas les déplacer. La discussion entre jeunes pêcheurs Ebrié et Ahizi tourne bien vite en palabre, puis en rixe. Dans la foulée, les pêcheurs Ahizi emmènent avec eux un pêcheur Ebrié. Les habitants de Songon-Mbratté l'ayant appris, descendent sur la lagune, la traversent et détruisent le campement de Ndjêm qui était sous le contrôle des Ahizi de Tabot. Devant cette provocation, les villages Ahizi de Koko et d'Allaba s'invitent au côté de Tabot dans la bataille engagée avec Songon-Mbratté. La charge de violence libérée par les Ahizi sur la lagune oblige les Ebrié à se replier chez eux. Plus tard la conciliation entamée par les anciens Ebrié et Ahizi a permis une visibilité plus grande des frontières lagunaires. Mais les relations entre les Ebrié de Songon-Mbratté et les Ahizi de Tabot sont jusqu'aujourd'hui empruntes de méfiance.

Au niveau du développement : problème économique et de leadership

Bien avant la crise ivoirienne (2002), la construction d'un marché vaste et moderne divise les Ebrié de Songon-Dagbé et de Songon-Agban. Auparavant, le seul marché de Songon-Agban accueillait, le jour du marché (le dimanche), les vendeuses de poisson du littoral lagunaire et maritime, les ouvriers agricoles des plantations industrielles de banane particulièrement des forêts de Songon et les ménages des villages de Songon-Kassemgbré, Songon-Dagbé, Songon-Té, Songon-Agban, Songon-Mbratté, Abiaté et même de Dabou. L'espace marchand s'avère aujourd'hui restreint pour tant de monde. Avec la création de la commune de Songon, il a été jugé bon de délocaliser le marché en un lieu plus vaste et plus sécurisé. Et voilà que le nouveau marché construit à Songon-Dagbé n'est pas du goût de bon nombre des populations, *a fortiori,* celle de Songon-Agban. L'instigateur principal du refus, Songon-Agban est mal vu par son voisin Songon-Dagbé.

La crise entre ces deux villages trouve son point culminent lors de la négociation entamée par la nouvelle municipalité. De la salle de réunion avec des procès d'intention et de la violence verbale et physique aux villages, la crise s'amplifie.

Le village de Songon-Agban fait construire à ses dépens des hangars modernes sur son marché pour abriter les commerçants. La fidélité des commerçants au marché de Songon-Agban accroît l'abandon du marché de Songon-Dagbé et ravive la haine entre ces deux villages.

Dans le même élan de crises qui secouent les villages Ebrié lagunaires de

notre champ d'étude, la nouvelle mairie des Songon construite à Adiapoto- 1 est même abandonnée par les nombreux désaccords manifestés avec violence entre eux au profit des anciens bureaux de la SAPH (société africaine de plantations d'hévéa) à Anguédédou.

2-2-4 - Chez les Alladian

Au niveau des relations entre communautés : non respect des lois de cohabitation

Les relations entre la communauté villageoise autochtone de Sassako et celle étrangère du campement béninois situé sur le territoire villageois de Sassako ne sont pas au beau fixe. Les nombreuses palabres entre communautés ont d'ailleurs été à l'origine de leur séparation. Maintenant qu'elles vivent "*pas trop près ni pas trop loin*" l'une de l'autre, pensions-nous qu'elles s'entendraient mieux ; mais bien au contraire, ce sont des palabres et des conflits à la moindre occasion entre les générations : celle des adultes pendant les activités de pêche et celle des écoliers sur le chemin de l'école. Devenue une commune aujourd'hui (2008), le village-commune de Sassako souhaite l'installation d'une brigade de gendarmerie ou d'une police nationale pour faire respecter les lois de cohabitation et assainir les environs. En attendant, la méfiance est de mise entre ces deux communautés.

Au niveau du développement: revendication non contrôlée et problème de délocalisation

L'installation de la société de râpage de noix de coco, SICOR à Jacqueville bien avant la crise ivoirienne faisait de cette ville à la fois un pôle d'emploi régional et un instrument économique important pour les populations du littoral. Mais comme par enchantement, la crise qui frappait la Côte d'Ivoire toute entière l'a aussi affectée: un violent mouvement ouvrier de revendication de salaire et de conditions de travail (incendie des locaux) s'est soldé par le licenciement d'une partie du personnel, bagarre en chaine entre les ouvriers, fermeture de l'usine de Jacqueville et enfin délocalisation à Grand-Lahou. Le littoral Alladian connait aujourd'hui un crucial problème d'emploi, puisque même la nouvelle usine d'extraction de pétrole installée récemment au large de Jacqueville ne peut servir de sauvetage : elle n'emploie que des ouvriers hautement qualifiés et le plus souvent venus d'ailleurs ; les ouvriers autochtones qualifiés ou non sont très peu nombreux.

Bref, au regard des cas rapportés, les opportunités de distanciation à la violence (*Gewalt)* dans les communautés lagunaires sont nombreuses. Et elles

expriment tantôt le non-respect des lois de cohabitation, les conflits fonciers et frontaliers, tantôt la remise en cause de l'autorité des anciens et les problèmes de leadership, tantôt des revendications non contrôlées de salaires et d'instruments économiques, tantôt une démocratie mal comprise.

De la sorte, en s'inscrivant dans des situations historiques des lagunaires, la violence s'ancre dans la mémoire collective et rend sa résolution difficile (*morts d'hommes).* Par conséquent, ce qu'elle veut enseigner n'est plus entendu par la partie adverse. Alors elle devient destructrice de la communauté, surtout qu'elle ne connait pas le moment alchimique qui la transforme en force qui rétablit l'ordre[8]. Ainsi, ces problèmes évoquées à travers les constats et les opportunités de distanciation à la violence, les lagunaires cherchent à se réinventer (S. Berstein et M. Winock, 2003) dans une Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle d'économie de marché et de droit ; mais une réinvention tout de même risquée (F. Akindès, 2007).

En effet, pendant longtemps, nombre de ces communautés de pêcheurs comme les Ahizi ne se contentaient que d'activités de pêche. L'agriculture n'était pratiquée que secondairement comme culture de subsistance pour la famille.

Mais voilà que l'hévéaculture en se développant dans la région provoque aussi des changements ou renversements de situation importants: de la primauté accordée hier à la pêche, les lagunaires pénètrent aujourd'hui le continent et font de l'agriculture leur principale activité pourvoyeuse de richesse.

Mais la brutalité avec laquelle ils s'accaparent les terres soient-disant restantes ou s'en réclament la propriété accroît l'hostilité entre eux. De même les structures de développement ou d'appui économique que la Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle inaugure dans la région deviennent objets de lutte et de violence.

Mais la lutte (*Kamp)* et la violence *(Gewalt)* ne sont jamais pensées sans ce rapport au droit qui les transfigure (Azoumana Ouattara, 2007). Dans le cas d'espèce, le droit (dans les sociétés traditionnelles) serait ce qui légitime la propriété ou l'acquisition du premier occupant. Alors, les problèmes frontaliers seraient résolus sans violence par les contractants ou les témoins d'alors.

Or ce qui est donné de constater aujourd'hui semble être dans bien des cas une remise à flot des acquis d'hier ; ce qui engendre une course effrénée et une brutalité dans l'occupation parce qu'également les liens historiques ont été déliés au profit d'intérêts égoïstes ou individuels.

3-Les enjeux de la violence dans la transformation sociale

Dans les cas rapportés, les causes de la violence ne sont pas perceptibles au moment des faits.

8 Cf. Colliot-Thélène C, « Violence et contrainte », in *Lignes*, n°25, mai, 1995.

Leur latence et leur enracinement socioculturel créent des îlots de tension dont l'éclosion constitue ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler ***violence***.
Mais quelque soit l'impact de cette violence sur les individus ou sur les groupes, ceux-ci sont à la fois "auteurs et victimes"[9].

Ainsi, la relation de causalité se fait de plus en plus sentir même dans les termes ou les expressions qui expriment la violence – ***Nôtchu cru-cru, Gnanaké gbudzu-gbudzu ; Ongn gbudzu-gbudzu ; Adi, Adusan*** et fait plus penser à une **réaction**. Cette réaction si brutale soit-elle est le plus souvent l'œuvre des jeunes générations qui se propulsent au-devant de la scène ; ce qui fait d'eux les principaux acteurs des nouveaux enjeux.

De la sorte, si la violence chez les lagunaires a été perçue comme *domination, trafic d'influence et d'autorité et soumission,* mais son but pour les nouveaux enjeux est plutôt d'amener le récalcitrant ou le résistant à changer de comportement, de mode de vie et à entrer dans l'ordre nouveau que de rechercher uniquement son anéantissement même si dans l'exercice de la violence la mesure n'est pas toujours dictée.

Donc, en produisant de la violence qui manifeste un désordre apparent dans ces communautés, les jeunes générations ouvrent la voie au changement et aux nouveaux enjeux par un nouvel ordre.

Ces enjeux sont pour les lagunaires : démocratie, bien –être des populations, respect des lois et des organisations, de la chose publique et privée, paix et développement. De la sorte, le désordre et l'ordre comme indicateurs du processus d'ouverture (III-1) aux nouveaux enjeux (III-3) par des mutations profondes (III-2) méritent aussi d'être analysés.

3-1- Désordre et Ordre

> "*Vous remettez toujours en cause nos décisions ! Et cette fois cela ne se passera pas comme vous l'entendez !*", déclare le doyen d'âge au nom des anciens du village d'Agbaille[10] aux jeunes générations.

La tradition est communément admise comme génératrice de continuité ; elle exprime la relation au passé et sa contrainte ; elle impose une conformité résultant d'un code du sens et donc des valeurs qui régissent les conduites individuelles et collectives transmises de génération en génération.

Elle est un héritage qui définit et entretient un ordre en effaçant l'action transformatrice du temps.

9 Voir également Françoise Ngendahayo (1997).

10 Voir plus haut ; Agbaille est un village odjoukrou de nouvelle Commune de Toupa.

Elle ordonne dans tous les sens et pèse sur le cerveau des hommes comme une 'obsession' (G. Balandier, 1988 : 36). Les choses doivent donc se passer comme l'entendent les anciens !

Mais, ces décisions qui ordonnent et marquent le sens inaltérable des choses sont génératrices de désordre dans l'histoire nouvelle des jeunes générations.

Ainsi, ces dernières utilisent la force et la violence pour s'imposer et s'exprimer ou dire aux anciens que les temps et les expériences ont évolués, qu'un nouvel ordre des choses est établi.

Ce qui revient à dire que pour les jeunes générations la tradition en voulant donner forme et sens au présent devient source de désordre.

Alors, croyons-nous que les anciens n'ont-ils pas une conscience claire de la présence du désordre et du péril d'immobilisme qui empêcherait toute marche en avant ? Ils en ont bien conscience, mais les dispositions du nouvel esprit et les moyens conséquents leurs manquent. C'est pourquoi nous redit Balandier : "*a tradition n'est ni ce qu'elle semble être, ni ce qu'elle dit être ; les anthropologues le savent désormais*" (1988).

- "*Si vous ne voulez pas accepter nos nouvelles lois, il vaut mieux entrer chez vous !*", intiment les jeunes générations du village d'Allaba[11]aux membres de la communauté étrangère récalcitrants ou résistants au nouvel ordre.

Né du désordre, l'ordre nouveau doit se *"traditionnaliser"* pour se maintenir et s'équilibrer. Ainsi, si la force des jeunes générations provient du travail antérieur des anciens comme texte ou comme patrimoine sur lequel elles veulent bâtir l'avenir, la brutalité avec laquelle elles enseignent ce nouvel ordre doit faire plutôt place à la modération afin de comprendre elles -mêmes le difficile passage qu'elles commandent aux étrangers.

En effet, habitués à respecter l'ordre ancien, ces étrangers entrent brusquement dans le chaos ou le point zéro (*ut- topos)* de renaissance où se conjuguent ordre, désordre et violence pour donner naissance à un nouvel ordre pour de nouveaux enjeux. Bref, comme l'avers et le revers d'une médaille, l'ordre et le désordre sont indissociables dans la dynamique même de la société.

"Dans une société de tradition qui se définit elle-même en termes d'équilibre, de conformité, de stabilité relative, qui se voit comme un monde à l'endroit, le désordre devient une dynamique négative engendrant un monde à l'envers. Il n'est pas pour autant ignoré que l'inversion de l'ordre n'est pas son renversement (…)", dit G.Balandier (1988).

11 - Voir plus haut ; Allaba, village ahizi situé dans la Commune de Dabou.

3-2- Mutations ou nouveaux enjeux dans la transformation sociale

- *La construction d'un nouveau château d'eau plus grand et moderne est nécessaire parce que la population s'accroît et que le village s'étend.*
- *L'hévéaculture et la culture du palmier en plein essor ont fini par séduire les lagunaires devenus plutôt des agriculteurs que des pêcheurs. Mais l'occupation des terres se fait avec violence.*
- *Les habitants du village de Songon-Agban refusent le projet de délocalisation de leur marché pour Songon-Dagbé où l'espace et la sécurité sont acceptables et suffisants pour accueillir les villages voisins. Ce refus crée de l'animosité entre voisins (Songon-Dagbé et Songon-Agban).*
- *La gestion du bac-navette à péage de Jacqueville est revendiquée par les communes de Sassako et de Tabot, parce qu'opérant sur leur espace commun. Les revendications à titre exclusif se font avec violence.*
- *- La paix entre les communautés villageoises.*
- *Respect et bon usage des institutions ou structures de développement : nouveau découpage administratif (conseil général, préfecture, sous-préfecture, commune) et regroupements conséquents.*
- *La démocratie se veut aussi un instrument pour résorber de beaucoup les conflits tribaux et régionaux et favoriser la mobilité des populations dans une Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle. Mais voilà qu'elle crée chez certains une mentalité de rejet, d'exclusion et de recentrement.*

Ces enjeux nouveaux (déjà relevées plus haut) s'inscrivent dans les processus de transformation ou de mutation des ordres sociaux de la région lagunaire comme "bouleversement des systèmes" (Roger Bastide, 1969). En effet, les termes de mutation et de transformation (au sens sociologique) s'inscrivent dans un champ sémantique plus élargi incluant en quelques manières : changement, évolution, révolution, développement, modernisation, etc.

Ils servent le plus souvent à exprimer les différences qui apparaissent par rapport à la stricte répétition des formes sociales ; les uns soulignant la pertinence d'une identité fondamentale malgré les modifications apparentes, les autres la rupture (G.Balandier, 1971 et 1986) et non la destruction.

C'est pourquoi le mouvement des ouvriers de la SICOR de Jacqueville a été réprimé sévèrement : licenciement et délocalisation. C'est aussi pourquoi, en parlant de mouvement social plutôt que conscience de classes A.Touraine (1992) préfère un acteur collectif dont une orientation majeure est la défense du sujet, la lutte pour les droits et la dignité des travailleurs.

Ce mouvement était réservé aux ouvriers qualifiés, défenseurs du travail et de

l'autonomie des ouvriers, comme celui de la SICOR (mouvement des syndiqués et qualifiés). De la sorte, pour A. Touraine, *"un mouvement social est à la fois un conflit social et un projet culturel. Cela est vrai de celui des dirigeants comme de celui des dirigés. Il vise toujours à la réalisation des valeurs culturelles en même temps qu'à la victoire sur un adversaire social. Une lutte revendicative n'est pas en elle-même un mouvement social ; elle peut être défense corporative, utilisation de la conjoncture sur le marché du travail, pression politique même.*

Pour qu'elle devienne mouvement social, il faut qu'elle parle au nom de la société industrielle et s'en fasse le défenseur contre ses propres adversaires. Pas de mouvement social dans la société industrielle tant que les ouvriers s'opposent à l'industrialisation, ***cassent les machines*** *ou résistent à des techniques nouvelles, même quand c'est pour des raisons importantes et légitimes, dès lors que ces techniques menacent leur emploi ; pas de mouvement social non plus si* ***l'action syndicale n'est pas positivement dirigée*** *vers le renforcement de l'autonomie ouvrière et ne bat pas, en particulier, la brutale affirmation des patrons tayloristes : on ne paie pas pour penser"* (1992 : 279).

Bref**,** les enjeux nouveaux (démocratie, bien-être, respect des lois et des institutions, paix et développement) nécessitent des changements. Et la violence consécutive comme moyen contraignant certes, à l'avènement du nouvel ordre, est le thermostat de la bonne marche dans la transformation ou la mutation sociale.

Pour ainsi dire, les nouveaux enjeux mobilisent, orientent et éclairent le processus de transformation sociale pour un mieux être dont la place de la violence est déterminante.

Conclusion

Au terme de notre analyse, il apparait que la violence dans les communautés lagunaires a pris du regain et une intensité inhabituelle parce que les amarres sont jetées, les liens déliés (la matrilinéarité est récusée et le système des classes d'âge agonie) et les enjeux attrayants. Les indices d'expression de cette violence ont d'abord révélé des similitudes langagières éloquentes du fait d'une longue cohabitation des communautés ; ensuite, elle a insisté sur l'intensité de la violence due à l'émergence de nouveaux enjeux (démocratie, développement local, communalisation, respect des institutions et des personnes, bien-être social) et des sources nouvelles de création de richesses (hévéaculture, bac à péage, emploi salarié). Les implémentations rapportées de la distanciation à la violence ont aussi révélé une brutalisation des communautés dans l'occupation des terres dites inoccupées ou celles que l'histoire commune a réservées à leur intention et de la remise en cause des acquis d'hier dont les règles de la matrilinéarité et l'idéologie

des systèmes des classes d'âge. Mais l'analyse socio-anthropologique de la micro-violence dans les communautés lagunaires a plutôt révélé la violence non seulement comme un moyen de passage de l'ordre ancien au nouvel ordre, mais davantage comme le thermostat de la bonne marche de la transformation sociale pour un mieux être. Au surplus les enjeux attrayants ouvrent le chantier social, économique et politique d'une réinvention risquée des populations lagunaires à une Côte d'Ivoire nouvelle. Ainsi revient-il aux lagunaires de se maintenir dans cette réinvention en se réappropriant réellement les instruments.

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Multiple Discourses On Sexuality Implications For Translating Sexual Wellness Concept Into Action Strategies In A Kenyan Context

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Abstract
This Paper attemps to map, drawing mainly from HIV and AIDS prevention interventions, the multiple discourses on sexuality. The aim is to provide a picture of the challenges and opportunities in transforming the concept of sexual wellness currently being articulated. This is a move from the commonly held view of sexuality as a threat to health, to one promoting sexual wellness or positive view of sexuality. A postcolonial conceptual perspective is used to help grasp the multiple-realities emerging from the historical influences on Africa and for reflexivity on the ambivalences and representations of Africa and African culture including sexuality.

***Key words**:* sexuality, complexity, moral sensitivity, postcolonial, HIV and AID

Introduction

This paper is principally concerned with sexuall wellness. It asks: how can sexuall wellness be made a policy? What would be required to make positive the negative

view of sexuality in an African context? How will actors in multiple positions and which intersect in diverse and complex ways be mobilised in this direction? These questions derive frm two case studies recent case studies: a 2004 study in central Kenya on HIV prevention and earlier studies on male circumstision by Ahlberg et al. (1997). In the 2004 study, parents expressed concern that the young people had turned Kesha, an evening Christian fellowship into a space for sexual orgy.

The evidence was used condoms, littered all over after worship. As a space for Christian worship, most parents, including non-faithfuls, allowed their children with ease, to participate until evidence revealed the fellowship could be fulfilling both spiritual and sexual needs.

The parents thus urged the local chief to ban Kesha. In the 1997 studies,teachers as well as pupils were surprised to learn that there had been a practice in their community, known as Ngwiko in which young men and women were, after initiation allowed to sleep together, to explore and enjoy each other without penetrative sex. Younger parents too were surprised that the community had such elaborate sexual education and sexual discipline, a kind of reflective moment on the dilemmas they faced today.

The paper addresses the complex questions raised above with the aid of a post-colonial conceptual framework that allows for us to underscore the historical processes of change, but more significantly to highlight the emerging conditions of double-reality, multiple power players and ambivalences in all complex realities when thinking of changing the mind-set on sexuality.

We proceed first, briefly, with HIV/AIDS interventions followed by a discussion of the post-colonial perspective which we then apply to the subject of our concern.

AIDS and Quest for Change in Sexual Behaviour

The discovery of the causal link between the AIDS-virus and sexual behaviour in the early 1980s, coupled with lack of effective biomedical or technological fixes, led to a surge of interest and concern on sexual behaviour change as the main option to prevent the spread of the AIDS-virus.

The assumption was that individuals could, with information, or as moral agents be persuaded to change sexual behaviours exposing them and their sexual partners to the risk of infection (Leichter 1991, Sears 1991).

Two lines of preventive action were advocated: premarital sexual abstinence and fidelity within marriage; both are foundational principles and expectations from a Christian moral discourse (Messer 2004). Marriage is, in this context,

the only legitimate arena for sexual expression.

Any sexual expression outside of this boundary is condemned as sin. Condom use is the second option mostly advocated in public health discourse seemingly implying that sexual intercourse with more than one partner is legitimate as long as protection is used during coitus or that people can have sexual pleasure in the ways they choose. In reality however, there is little reference to sexual pleasure and sexuality as a health risk is what has been drummed.

These two preventive strategies, informed by Christian morality and biomedical/public health concerns, pose dilemmas: How do individuals and groups interpret and act on the technical and Christian moral scripts on sexuality in diverse contexts? And do their actions in turn influence the discourses or scripts and in what ways? We use discourse from a Focaultdian perspective to refer to the script or speech and more significantly to the situated social practice in its relationship to agent power and authority (Rabinow 1994, Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990).

The two discourses and more so their influence on sexuality cannot be meaningfully discussed without focusing on western societal influences on Africa (Feffer 2007, Klein 2007). More significantly, it is necessary to understand some of the paradoxes emerging as a result of the historical influences especially in relation to the representations of Africa. A major impact of the European colonial expansion and ensuing development discourse and practice is the near suffocation of the African cultural and moral systems in spite of which, the same African systems are represented as though they still are in their original form. It is a writing of Africa as "epitomising the intractable, the mute, the abject or the other worldly" (Mbebe and Nutall, 2004:348). This picture of Africa "as an object apart from the world, or as an example of something else" underplays the "embeddedness in multiple elsewheres of which the continent actually speaks" (Ibid:348). Such interrogation makes postcolonial lenses plausible for grasping the emerging patterns as well as identifying avenues for change.

A Postcolonial Perspective

The meaning of the term postcolonial is hotly contested. The issue of contestation centres on whether the word "post" means after colonisation. Anne McClintock (1992) strongly cautions against an enthusiastic embrace of the term postcolonial for the reason that it gives the impression of decolonisation based on a historical linear progress, or conceptualised along time rather than power, thus avoiding the global situation as a multiplicity of powers and histories. She notes that the

current use of "post this" or "post that" marks a global crisis in the ideology of the future especially the ideology of progress. Postcoloniality is therefore a condition or process that has generated a kind of double-reality and double consciousness of power with new and old formations at work all at once. For Mbembe (1992), postcoloniality is a state of multiple temporarities where Africa is evolving in multiple and overlapping directions simultaneously. Thus, the postcolonial should interrogate the present by questioning the fixed sense of the self and historical certainties to allow for exploring avenues through which subjectivities are constructed, maintained and contested (Chambers, 1999).

This is the line we adopt as it would help to reposition the dominant and the marginalised on the stage of a cultural discourse, challenging the representations of the colonised and colonising cultures in binary forms with essential, unchanging features (Narayan, 2000). More significantly, it allows reflection on the specific ways the African systems including those regulating sexuality were and continue to be nearly suffocated, silenced, stereotyped and stigmatised (Ahlberg 1994, 2008, Ani 1994).

HIV and AIDS has generated such conflicting voices regarding cultures and sexualities in the African contexts. In a historical analysis of the response to AIDS in western countries, Baldwin (2005:10) notes how the view of Africans sodomising or alternatively eating apes became an image in Western thinking. Many Africans and African governments responded initially to AIDS by defending themselves against Western images therby losing time in responding to the virus. The stress on marriage boundary is advocated in Christian as well as in many indigenous African moral regimes as is clear from the second case *Ngwiko* above. However, the different regimes have unique rules, norms and logic which may appear immoral viewed from the perspectives of the other. The seemingly open sexualities in some societies in Africa were for example, condemned as promiscous by the early Christian missionaries (Ahlberg 1994, Ani 1994) as was the case with the *Ngwiko* practice.

It can be argued that the missionary condemnation at the time reflected their active role in the colonisation process where they were part of the colonial dominating powers, used as the software to win through converting the African souls or as the handmaidens of information gatherers and adjuncts of corporate penetration described by Feffer (2007) in the case of Latin America or to divide the local people along religious lines as was the case in India under the British colonial rule (Hallinan 2007). The missionaries wore an extra coat, providing education to produce a local elite (Shivji 2007), using a language of bringing good news and civilising the savages. The education was, as Mitchell and Salsbury (1996) argue in the case of Tanzania, however designed to prepare young people for the service of the colonial state by only teaching the values of the colonial

society. It was therefore intended to produce half-baked individuals, but it is here that the near sufforcation of local values was entrenched. It is hardly surprising that the missionaries failed to see that sexual transgression outside marriage was similarly condemned in some societies in Africa (Ahlberg 1994, Mugambi 1989). The bone of contention however seemed to be how sexual pleasure[1] was expressed.

The civilising mission did not end at independence. There is, according to Feffer (2007), a resurgence of religious fervor after the end of the cold war with an unprecedented number of Western humanitarian organisations including evangelicals (Hearn 2004). Chamberlain (2006) shows that evangelising is not limited to some remote village in Africa, although most international funding through faith based organazations (FBOs) may still go to rural areas (Birdsall 2005). Many humanitarian organisations including evangelical missionaries justify their continued presence in African countries as a mission to help in what is now popularly known as poverty reduction (Shivji 2007, Marshall and Taylor 2007, Hearn 2002) and more lately for promoting peace and governance. However, besides the hidden agendas, some of which bring about (Harmon-Snow,2007, Klein 2007), the explanations for the continuesd presence are framed in ways that reveal ambivalences when dealing with Africa. We discuss this in the section that follows.

Ambivalences in Responding to African Conditions

Three texts are presented as examples to illuminate the different ways ambivalence is commonly expressed by Western scholars and development agencies when responding to culture and sexuality in African contexts. The three texts present an Africa which is still virgin, never been tampered with or one that is obstinate and oblivious to the rythms of change forced on to Africa. Two areas of cultural practice in Kenya illuminate similar ambivalences about change among the Africans themselves.

The first text is by Marshall and Taylor (2006) on African church leaders and their selective reading of the bible. Marshall and Taylor observed that many African church leaders accept prevailing values from their societies, rather than examining the compatibility of those values with biblical teaching (2006:368). According to them, the African church leaders read only those parts similar to their local values, which mostly discriminate women, causing a great deal of suffering to women. Their idea of mission is therefore to rescue African women from the fangs of patriarchal control.[2]

The second text by Green (2003) advances a theory of chastity which he

argues is part of the African cultural heritage. He criticizes, using Uganda as an example, the strategy of risk reduction and condom promotion in HIV and AIDS. He, however, fails to mention the shifts taking place in what he calls the African cultural heritage; the current tensions facing parents and their children arising from these shifts or the role of western Christian missionaries His attacks and arrogance when dismissing other American anthropologists who oppose his position on condom promotion (Kroeger 2003, Feldman 2003), and his argument that they do so for fear of loosing the financial support they previously enjoyed, suggest that he is less concerned about AIDS in Africa but with advocating a religious ideological stand.[3] The suffering from AIDS merely offers a type of natural context for evangelising and re-missionising of Africa.

The third text, edited by Signe Arnfred (2006 focuses on how Africa's insider perspectives on sexuality have been ignored, silenced, stereotyped or erased in mainstream thinking since the colonial era. Women were represented as passive victims of patriarchal control needing rescue. According to the text, emphasis on procreative aspects of sexuality made invisible the expressions of sexual pleasure and desires. Colonial and ensuing devolopment discourses and practice thus produced and reproduce the view of an African sexuality - savage, uncontrollable, exotic, irrational and primitive.

Despite this powerful mapping, Arnfred still blames Mbeki and the African Renaissance Movement for the revival of virginity testing that has shown its face in the context of AIDS. In her critic of Mbeki and the African Renaissance, she fails to see the new religious landscape emerging worldwide, especially the expansion of the more fundamentalist Western Evangelical and Pentecostal Christian Missions. Moreover, she ignores a number of related practices including the selective funding systems which use a carrot and stick approaches to force receivers of aid to bow to donor conditionalities (Hoodbhoy et al 2005), the violence entailed in crisis or disaster capitalism and related economic shock therepy policies forced on to poor countries by the international financial institutions in the name of economic recovery (Klein 2007).

While the three texts above and more so the ambivalence of the authors can be understood as part of the "othering" process rooted in the history of European colonisation of Africa and in their postcolonial relations, interpretations of culture and sexuality by the Africans themselves are similarly of concern. In their defence against outside attacks, a common response among Africans is: "this is or is not African culture." For instance, gender violence, genital cutting, multiple sexual partners, polygamy etc may thus be explained in response to the outsider inquirer. There are issues strongly categorised as "un-African" as is clearly evident from debates currently ranging against homosexuality in many African countries especially after South Africa approved a bill recognising same

sex marriage (Kuppan and Quintal 2006). Here too, the defence of African culture, depends less on reflexivity, critical analysis or self questioning of the cultural heritage being defended. What is portrayed is an Africa that has not been touched by the rest of the world or alternatively as obstinately holding on to its heritage. Two examples from a Kenuyan context may illustrate the defence of African culture by Africans.

The first is what came to be known as the "Kenyan theory of love." The theory evolved when in 1978, the Kenyan parliament introduced the marriage bill which among other things had a clause against wife-beating. The bill would have gone a long way to promote gender equality and improve the welfare of women and children in the case of death of a husband or after divorce. Nevertheless, the bill was shelved largely because of the wife-beating clause. The men, in the male dominated parliarment, argued that they would have no means of demonstrating their love to their wives. According to one member of parliament, the bill would make it impossible for men to teach their wives "manners", while another added that African women loved their men when they are slapped, but also argued with consensus from most men, that the proposed legislation was "very un-African" (Time Magazine 1979, JAL 1979). There was little reflection by the Kenyan male parliamentarians on the socially instituted checks previously protecting women and children against abuse.

The second example is the practice of male circumcision. Our intention is not to focus on male circumcision just because it is now increasingly promoted in the public health discourse as a cultural practice, appropriate in the prevention of HIV and AIDS (Green 2003). Neither could we agree more with the health benefit reasoning advanced particularly given the presence of confounding factors such as poor sanitation and lack of adequate water to maintain cleanliness in areas where it is promoted.

Nonetheless, in those areas where it is a tradition, it could be undergoing change which counter the preventive status, for which it is being promoted. The policy silence on this is deafening. Studies in central Kenya (Ahlberg 1997, Kamau et al 2006, Kamau 2007) show how male circumcision has changed from an institution, used to impart cultural values, knowledge and the moral standing or *Ubuntu* to the young men, to one where genital cutting is devoid of the educative functions. This emptiness has not reduced the importance of the cutting, although a major question asked by school boys concerns the social meaning of circumcision (Ahlberg 1997).

Yet, from another perspective it is not as devoid of cultural meanings as we claim and this is where the challenge seems to be. A good deal of its traditional form and meanings, for example, transforming boys into adult men is still embraced. The term *Kugimara* or making adult is used even for boys under

fifteen years. The parents still provide a separate room or house- *Thingira or Kiumbu*- where female relatives are not allowed in. The counselor- *Mutiiri*- who used to be a man of immense knowledge on cultural values and was known and chosen by the parents, is today mainly left to the boys to chose. The boys mostly chose equally young men recently circumcised. The fact that circumcision is still universal has left a heavy institutional burden on the young men who in turn have interpreted it to fit their current contexts and realities. Two rituals practiced or adopted by the boys to suit their realities are particularly important from a masculinity formation and prevention of HIV.

The first is what the boys call "buying the road licence" where the newly circumcised is expected to offer money or buy cigarettes for those circumscised before them. This is a type of secondary initiation that allows the newly circumcised to freely move around and talk or socialise with girls. The second ritual is what is known as *Kuhurwo mbiro* (cleaning the sootfrom the penis). This is adapted from a practice in the past where young men and women initiated together had a teasing relationship. The men teased the women on what would happen if they did not accept to have sex or if their soot was not dusted before marriage.

There were then many socially instituted checks to prevent premarital penetrative sex including participating in *Ngwiko* where young men and women could explore their bodies and experience sexual pleasure without penetration. Participation in *Ngwiko* was in this way also a form of moral testing by being presented with actual experiences (Ahlberg 1994, 1997, Mugambi 1989).[4] The practice has changed to mean that the boys can have the soot cleaned through penetrative sex, soon after circumcision. Since the ritual has to do with cleansing or more specifically cleaning the soot, condom use is therefore discouraged (Kamau 2007).[5] They use a great deal of proverbs and songs for educating, but also for pressurising the newly circumcised to conform to the rituals and violence is not uncommon against those who may refuse to follow the rituals (Kamau et al 2006).

It seems that recruitment into what has come to be known as the *Mungiki* phenomenon may have roots in these developments, although the *Mungiki* as a movement of young men need to be understood broadly in its political, economic and religious contexts (Wamue 2001).[6]

The conclusions to draw from these examples of ambivalence, whether from within Africa or from without, whether on the attack or on the defence of African cultural and moral systems, is that reflexive evaluation is critical in order to avoid attributing or explaining conditions, issues and practices as manifestations of "African culture" or as "un-African".

To get a fuller picture of the complex contexts within which the concept

of wellness will be translated into action, it is necessary, to reflect on some skirmishes or the specific ways the scripts, be they technical or religious are dramatised or acted on by a range of actors, individuals as well as institutions, and dilemmas or paradoxes which have emerged.

Selected Scripts, Dramas and Dilemmas

In this section, we highlight examples of how discourses or scripts have been acted on by individuals and institutions. We highlight, also, how these actions and their contexts could be reshaping the discourses. Warlike methods and messages, discrediting sexuality outside the defined boundaries, combined with a focus on negative consequences of sexuality meant to scare young people in particular, is what we refer to as prohibitive silence. It is prohibitive in the sense that there is a great deal of loud noise about the "ought and ought not" to, mainly no sex outside marriage and no condom use.

It is silence in the way it cannot as much as pronounce the pleasurable, the erotic, the desires or the positive aspects of sexuality. The young people are discouraged from having relationships which could result in premarital sex, even though the love discourse may allow sexual indulgence as long as people are in love irrespective of marital status. It is the tension between the public pronouncements and performance and the private realm of individual actors manifested in the prohibitive silence that is the challenge when figuring how to transform wellness from a concept to action strategies.

A drama unfolded in Kenya when the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), a technical discourse institution, made plans in 1985, to supply contraceptives to girls from the age of ten years to prevent early teenage pregnancies. This plan was strongly opposed. Parents in the central part of Kenya for example, resisted by advising their primary school daughters against drinking the school milk which had been introduced by the government, on suspicion that the milk could be laced with contraceptives (Weekly Review, February 21, 1986). This forced the Family Planning Association of Kenya (FPAK), an affiliate of the IPPF, to publicly disassociate itself from the IPPF's plan (Weekly Review, June 20, 1986).

Although there seem to be some softening taking place (Kamau 2007), the Catholic Church, among the Christian denominations has had an extremely hardline stand on sexuality. In February 1993, the Catholic Church protested against the proposal by the Kenyan Ministry of Education to make Family Life Education an examinable subject, forcing the government to abandon the idea.

Some Christian moral agents have become extremely aggressive and are

currently using a number of tactics to enforce the Christian moral script.

One such tactic is violence as evident in the anti-abortion protests including the killing of doctors who perform the surgery and vandalising of abortion clinics (Horgan 1991).Another tactic is to enforce the "abstinence only sex education" by creating fear of what would happen to teenagers who fail to adhere to the Christian sexual moral script. Condom use is highly discredited for being ineffective in preventing sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy (Green 2003) while premarital sex is said to lead to unhappy marriage in the future. Sexually active teens are portrayed as more likely to be depressed and suicidal and are talked into adopting secondary virginity (Bader 2005, Epstein 2005).

A third tactic is the use of "selective funding,"where donor agencies including humanitarian organisations with Christian influence increasingly channel funding through FBOs, while forcing the non-FBOs to declare not to engage in activities on issues such as abortion (Horgan 1991) and prostitution (CHANGE 2005).

Organisations funded for HIV and AIDS activities in such contexts thus censure themselves and are reluctant to include broad reproductive health for fear of loosing funding (Sindig 2005, Okello 2005, Pisan 2008). The consequences of these responses and dramas are felt in various ways. Apart from shortage of condoms in the African contexts as described by UNFPA (Godia 2004), abortion is becoming the major cause of maternal deaths for women aged15-19 years, the stigma produced and reproduced in these processes is perhaps the hardest obstacle in moving to sexual wellness perspective.

This discussion does not claim that the Christian moral scripts are uncontested. The history of Christian sexual moral discourse itself is characterised with shifts in level and intensity of torelance over sexual taboos and morals (Davies 1982, Preston 1996). These shifts indicate that although the Christian sexual morality has a utilitarian natural basis, sexual transgression remains the most abominable of sins in the contemporary period (Bujo 1990, Genovesi 1996, Wilson, 1989). Chaves (1994) argues that the broad shifts have meant no single sector of society can claim any necessary functional primacy and religion is just another institutution or organisational sphere where the elites struggle among themselves. Ellingson and colleagues (2001) describe, using examples from USA, how "local sexual norms and practices shape congregational responses to sexuality issues- in some cases limiting the voice of a congregation while in others driving the congregation towards a more public and politicised position." Johnson (2004) describes how Europeans migrating to USA used Christianity to justfy slavery of the black people and similarly how those enslaved used Christianity to define themselves as people of God.

In the context of AIDS, Messer (2004) notes that different denominations

have taken different positions even when facing similar challenges. Some Christian denominations are for example, discussing how to revert the moral teaching by declaring life as more important than sex. In December 2003, the World Council of Churches in an ecumenical meeting with representatives from 24 churches and church-related organisations from 12 countries, declared stigmatisation and discrimination against people with HIV and AIDS as sin. The questions that observers ask are: Is this a sign of some mind-set change? Is AIDS assuming the role of catalyst enabling religious moral agents to start reflecting on sexual wellness rather than just moral judgement?

While some changes are taking place, there are interesting patterns in condom use to reflect on when thinking of promoting a sexual wellness perspective. Men for example, tend to use condoms only with sexual partners outside marriage. Evidence suggests there is fear that asking for a condom within a firm relationship could be interpreted as a sign that a partner is unfaithful, has a disease or has no trust in the partner. The risk of infection is in this case conceptualised less in the sexual act, as it is in the sexual partner and the relationship (Squire 1993). Moreover, male clients of women in prostitution reportedly opt to pay a higher price to have sex without a condom, although this is one of sexual encounters regarded epidemiologically as most risky. For the men, the issue of risk does not arise as they pursue what they regard as more pleasurable sex regardless of the needs of women or the risks the men expose themselves to. Although women in prostitution may be empowered to demand or negotiate for protection, their economic status and vulnerability in gender power terms limit them in exercising acquired skills. Patterns of condom use are reportedly different among homosexual men. Evidence in the context of AIDS suggest that homosexual men more than other social groups, adopted condoms at least at the early stages, when the epidemic was largely viewed as a problem of homosexuality (Squire 1993).

With treatment increasingly becoming available and AIDS becoming another chronic disease (Rosegarten et al 2004, Robins 2005), homosexual men may have similarly become less strict and information about ones status no longer a moral obligation (Ainslie 2002). The widespread use of condom among homosexual men however introduces a new dimension to the moral discourses. Why would homosexual men adopt the condom more than other groups? Does it not interrupt sexual pleasure as heterosexual men claim?

According to Squire (1993), condom adoption among homosexual men was an act of resistance on their part against the very opposition they experience from the religious moral agents and the rest of the society. It is also partly to do with the meaning of the sexual expression. Homosexuality is more associated with sexual pleasure rather than procreation. This means

the risk is seen in the sexual act itself (Squire 1993) and it is there that prevention should take place. This contrasts with heterosexuality where the risk is seen in the persons or social categories epidemiologically or according to technical discourses are defined as "risk groups."

Discussion: Translating Sexual Wellness to Action

This paper has tried to map the various ways discourses on sexuality, whether technical or religious, influence sexual expression and practice. The two cases from which the questions addressed derive have two messages. The first illuminates the dilemmas experienced and expressed by the young people living within contexts of prohibitive silences.

The second reflects on or gives a glimpse of the value that could be accrued from basing the debate on people's cultural history. This is not an issue of going back to the past, but rather using the past and the local contexts as a methodology to help reflect on the present; to question the self, to gain insights of the changes which have and continue to take place, and more importantly to explore how to build on the insider perspective.

The paper was not meant to present guidelines on how to move wellness from concept to action. On the contrary, the aim was to map the complexities entailed in any serious attempt to change mind-sets regarding sexuality. Some of the complexities relates to moral dispositions and more importantly, how the discourses, whether the technical/public health or the religious stipulate a type of ideal universal sexuality.

In their different ways the discourses appeal to the moral sensitivity of the individual actor, ignoring that the individual is a part of a wider frame of reference. The discrepancies, the dilemmas and the protests observed in this paper reflect tensions between the public discourse as situated practice and the embeddedness of the individual actor in the multiple discourses. The issue of condom use is a case in point where the public health discourse appeals to individuals without taking account of the contexualised social meanings of different sexual relationships, gender power differences, economic status and sexual orientation.

A related complex phenomenon is the representation of Africa where in spite of being integrated into the world systems in specific ways, there is still a strong tendency to present it as frozen in time. This implies that the hoards of humanitarian organisations, international as well as local ones, could be pulling the wrong notes, thus unleashing the negative development we see all over (Shivji 2007, Shiva 2004, Klein 2007). More than ever before, understanding

how Africa is represented and building on specific contexts, could make an appropriate point in the sort of change needed to liberate the minds in oder to build a positive view of sexuality.

The question however still remains regarding where and how this history can be imparted to offer the positive view needed to empower people. The postcolonial lenses point to a history that nearly suffocated local cultures and sexualities and although they are represented as though they are in their original forms, the half belonging is challenging as is clear from the ambivalences among the Africans themselves.

The ritual of circumcision continue to be regarded as still central in the making of men, without understanding what changes have taken place, to make it not only different but also violent.

In conclusion, the complexity mapped in this paper calls for a move from the current linear thinking as noted in the HIV and AIDS interventions, be they research or development, to the idea of learning by doing, which implies cyclical movements – a type of "two steps and a turn" in order to allow for learning, unlearning and relearning or a reflexivity that facilitates questioning of the "taken for granted" thus allowing new understanding and appropriate action.

Endnotes

[1] The missionaries for example banned the practice of Ngwiko mentioned in this paper, because they could not farthom how young people could avoid sexual pentration.

[2] Becker (2003) advances a similar view about African church leaders in northern Namimbia, but also notes how the local elite distort cultural practices by adopting only certain aspects of rituals in weddings ceremonies.

[3] Edward Green moreover, avoids to articulate that the change of emphasis in Uganda is a recent phenomenon and that it was only after receiving the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that the president of Uganda made a complete turn around from the openness he had earlier been praised for by many western donors as unique in the region, to preaching virginity and moral conduct as African values (Epstein 2005, Kalinaki 2005).

[4] Unlike the Christian moral regime, the Kikuyu then recognised that the young people had a sexuality. This practice where penetration was not allowed is confused by some western scholars as a sign that sexuality in Africa was for procreation only.

[5]The boys moreover argue that the condom is in any case also discouraged by the church which has also become active in the circumcision itself and counseling the boys before and after circumcision.

[6] Instead of taking the hardline action the government has taken to root out the Mungiki, policy should be directed at reflecting on the institution of male circumcision and its changing forms particularly how the boys shoulder the burden of a ritual in

contexts of poverty. Such reflection is opportune especially given the current political manifestations where the cutting of the penis or not cutting, health benefits aside, has become politicised in ways that make managing ethnic diversity, masculinities, gender and sexual violence exceedingly complex in Kenya.

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Statutory Law, Patriarchy and Inheritance: Home ownership among Widows in Uganda

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Abstract
This paper discusses the ways in which urban widows in Uganda are deprived of home ownership upon the death of their husbands. It is based on a qualitative research conducted in the middle-income areas of Kampala between 2004 and 2007. The results show that the institutional legal framework and the patriarchal customary practices and beliefs deprive widows of home ownership notwithstanding the gender sensitive Constitution. The study also shows that the special ways in which widows are able to inherit the matrimonial home upon the death of their husbands demonstrate the difficulty widows face to become home owners.

Keywords: *Home ownership; inheritance; Ugandan constitution; patriarchy; customary law*

Introduction

Studies in western countries reveal that inheritance is one of the ways in which women accumulate wealth (Deere, 2006). In this regard a woman becomes the owner of the matrimonial home upon the death of her husband, regardless of whether the home was previously jointly owned or solely owned by the husband marriage. Widows are only denied inheritance rights if they cannot afford to pay the mortgage rates. Home ownership through inheritance in western countries is thus determined by income and affordability. These two factors become crucial in home ownership making it a necessity or a prerequisite to have dual income in order to own a house. This is hardly the case in many countries in sub-Sahara Africa, statutory law does not guarantee a widow's inheritance rights except user rights of the matrimonial home (Asiimwe, 2006; Deere and Doss, 2006; Kameri-Mbote, 2001; Okumu-Wengi, 2001; Munalula, 1995; Matere-Lieb, 1995). In many cases, statutory legal systems promote male dominance whereby land and housing are passed on to the male line - from father to son (Kanabahita, 2006;

Narayan et al., 2000; Asiimwe, 2005).

This patriarchal customary system deprives widows of the matrimonial home (Narayan et. al.2000). It is sons and not widows who inherit the matrimonial home and at times brother in-laws of widows have the right to claim household property which includes the matrimonial home unless the male children are old enough to inherit. If the deceased did not have a boy child, his younger brother becomes the heir (White et. al. 2002). They are only guaranteed user rights of the home and upon the death of their husbands become homeless (Okumu-Wengi, 2001; Owen, 1996; Larsson and Schlyter, 1995; Guyer, 1987). Those without children are more vulnerable to be disposed of their matrimonial home (Casimiro, 1996; Narayan, 2000). As a result one of the routes through which women could own property is closed (Miraftab, 2001). Home ownership through inheritance is thus highly gendered and culturally determined in a complex dynamic. This, however, differ in different countries and among ethnic groupings (White, et. al. 2002; Harley and Verbeeek, 2005). Although a woman may have the legal right to inherit property through inheritance, this may not be realised if the claim is not socially and culturally recognised as legitimate (Farha, 1998).

Intestate succession law gives the matrimonial home to the first-born son of the deceased in a case where the husband does not make a Will bequeathing the matrimonial home to his wife. Although a husband is free to bequeath the matrimonial home to his wife, few husbands leave behind valid Wills. This state of affairs is examined in this paper which draws upon a qualitative data collected from life stories of widows. The paper discusses the two key determining factors, statutory inheritance law and the patriarchal customary system and some widows' experiences of both.

Statutory inheritance Laws in Uganda: the 1995 Constitution and inheritance

There are two national statutory laws that govern inheritance matters in Uganda namely the 1995 Constitution and the Succession Act (Amendment) Decree No.22/1972. These are examined in this section to establish how they translate themselves in guaranteeing the widow the right of ownership of the matrimonial home. According to the current Constitution, widows have a right to inherit their husband's property. However, it is upon Parliament to come up with a specific law that governs inheritance matters. For example Article 31(2), states that "Parliament shall make appropriate laws for the protection of the rights of widows and widowers to inherit the property of their deceased spouses".

Since the matrimonial home is not specifically mentioned, it is presumed to be part of the estate.

The Constitution gives general guidelines but does not deal with specific laws that govern inheritance matters; the onus is on Parliament to pass the relevant Bills, which specifically look at the detailed aspects of inheritance. While the Constitution seems to guarantee a widow the right to inherit the matrimonial property, this right can only be extended to her through an Act of Parliament. As at the time of writing, Parliament has not passed a new Act that specifically handles inheritance and other family laws. This means that Courts of law continue to apply the old laws inherited from the British Government, despite the various changes that have occurred since independence. The current succession law in place is the Succession Act Amendment Decree No.22 of 1972.

The Succession Act (Amendment) Decree No.22/1972.

The Succession Act, like many laws in Uganda, dates back to 1904. The 1972 Succession Act amended after the Succession Ordinance of 1906, which was based on English common law. The succession Act (Amendment) Decree was a clear attempt to put in place a uniform law of Succession that would apply to both intestate and testate succession (Wagubi, 2003; Okumu-Wengi, 1994). The amendment of the Decree was aimed at addressing gender issues and customary laws (Nanyenya, 1973). As a result, all succession matters shifted from the hands of clan leaders to the Courts of Law. Subsequently, new sets of rules of inheritance, that could neither be classified as custom or as fully statutory, was created. The Succession Act (Amendment) Decree No.22/1972 is divided into two parts; one part deals with properties of persons who die testate and the second deals with properties of persons who die without leaving wills (intestate). It is important to look at each of these sets of laws in relation to the matrimonial home.

Intestate Inheritance

Intestate inheritance refers to situations where a person dies without leaving behind a Will to dispose of his or her property. Although everyone above 18 years of age is allowed to make a Will, the majority of Ugandans die intestate (Okumu-Wengi, 1994). For example, only five out of every 100 cases reported to the Administrator General's office die testate. The reasons include, among others, the superstition that people attach to writing a will whereby many people

believe that writing a will hastens one's death (Kanabahita, 2006). Other reasons include lack of awareness about how to write a valid Will and lack of attention to it's importance. Since the majority of people, especially men with property, die without any will the law provides for the appointment of a personal representative of the deceased to administer and distribute the estate of the deceased persons according to defined and fixed percentages. According to the distribution schedule a widow acquires 15 percent of the entire estate, the children can receive 75 percent, the legal heir one per cent and the dependants nine percent. The personal representative of the deceased, referred to as the administrator, acquires Letters of Administration before she or he can effect distribution of the property according to the schedule laid down (Nayenya, 1973). However, the matrimonial home, legally referred to as the principal residential holding, is not among the list of items distributed (Kanabahita, 2006; Rukimirana, and Bateson, 2000).

The matrimonial home is kept upon trust for the legal heir who is the eldest son of the deceased. In case there are no sons, any nearest male relative of the deceased inherits the home. The legal heir is defined as the nearest living male relative in partrilineal descent to a person who dies intestate. Lineal descent is that person who in a direct line of ancestry in an ascending line for example, a son and his father, grandfather, great-grandfather or in a direct descending line for example, between a man, his son, grandson, and great-grandson (Rukimirana and Bateson, 2000). Since the intestate Succession law prefers the male child in the appointment of a legal heir, it can be argued that the law promotes patriarchal inheritance customs, which in many cases discriminate against women.

While one would expect the inheritance statutory law to protect the widow, instead it supports the cultural image ideology that encourages male dominance. The intestate succession law guarantees the widow only the user rights to the matrimonial home and the eldest son of the deceased inherits the matrimonial home (Wagubi, 2003;Okumi-Wengi, 1994).

The intestate law does not recognise the widow's financial contribution to the matrimonial home. The Law looks at a widow as a dependant and not as a contributor to the home. Since very few male Ugandans leave behind valid wills, the administration of most estates, which include the matrimonial home, no doubt is handled under intestate succession laws (Kanabahita, 2006). Since under intestate succession the matrimonial home is not among the items distributed, we can conclude that the majority of Ugandan widows are unlikely to inherit the matrimonial home unless there are special circumstances. What makes the law contentious is that it does not cater for matrimonial homes that are jointly owned by married women with their husbands. The intestate succession law is also silent on who inherits what when a married woman dies. The Succession Law

therefore assumes that the matrimonial home belongs solely to the husband and therefore upon a wife's death, the husband automatically inherits the home.

Whereas the Constitution is gender sensitive, the intestate Succession law still displays elements of customary law ideology in its provisions. The Succession law provisions still emphasise male dominance that disregards a woman's contribution to the home. Unlike marriage laws where a married woman can present her case before the judge with proof of her contribution, in succession law there is no one to make a defence after a husband's death. Since husbands do not to make wills to specifically cater for their wives' contribution, widows have no choice but to depend on the unfair distribution coded in the intestate law. The intestate law does not take note of the different residential areas, urban and rural. The law ignores the contribution married women make to home projects in urban areas.

Therefore, granting the matrimonial home in the city to the eldest son of the deceased instead of the widow deprives the widow of her lifetime's contribution to the home project when her name is not on the title deed. Unfortunately, Parliament has not made substantial reform in the family laws over the years, although there has been a demand for change from NGOs and other women civil society groups representing women's rights.

Recent challenges on the intestate Succession Law

Recently, the Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda, one of the NGOs in Uganda, petitioned the Constitutional Court to declare a number of clauses in the Succession Act unconstitutional. On April 5, 2007 the Constitutional Court declared Section 27 of the Succession Act, which guarantees a widow only 15 percent of the value of the estate and Rule 8 (a) of the Second Schedule that provides for a widow's right of occupancy only until she remarries, unconstitutional. The resultant lacuna created in the Succession provides an opportunity for lawyers to successfully argue their cases for widows. Although the Constitutional Court declared these provisions in the Succession Law unconstitutional, what remains to be seen is whether Parliament will change the law itself. Legislation needs to be put in place to address the widow's share in the entire estate of her deceased husband as was the inheritance of the matrimonial home. The Constitutional Court declared only the clause which states that a married woman loses occupation if she marries, unconstitutional: But the clause that states that the matrimonial home is not part of the estate to be distributed, remains contentious. Since the widow is unable to transfer the title deed of the matrimonial home into her name, it becomes difficult for her to use her

deceased husband's title deed as collateral for a loan. She thus cannot utilise the matrimonial home to generate income for the family. For example, in a case where a husband leaves a big matrimonial home in a prime area, the widow may find it difficult to sell it, buy a smaller one, and invest the remainder of the profit in business ventures. Hence a widow's freedom to utilise the matrimonial home for other purposes than living in it is curtailed.

It is not surprising; therefore, that individuals and civil society groups have tried to urge Parliament to approve the Domestic Relations Bill in order to address such inequalities in ownership rights (Kawamara, 2003; Kharono, 2003; LaShawn, 2005).

Testate Succession

Testate inheritance refers to a situation where a deceased person dies having written a statement that legally is called a Will (Nanyenya, 1973). In the Will, a person expresses his/her wishes regarding the disposal of his/her property and other rights or obligations (Okumu-Wengi, 1994). The testater is expected to name an executor or executors of the Will and the beneficiaries of the estate (Nanyenya, 1973).

The main strength of the rules of testate succession in the Succession Act is that they allow a person to dispose of his/her property as he wishes without following defined rules (Rukimirana, and Bateson, 2000). A husband is free to bequeath the matrimonial home to his legal wife. Therefore, the testate statutory law makes fair provision for a widow (Okumu-Wengi, 1994).

Patriarchal customary laws

Under customary law, women do not inherit property on widowhood. When a man dies, the clan appoints an heir, usually the first son in the family. He inherits the property of the deceased and is supposed to take care of the family. A widow only holds goods in trust for her sons until they are adults. The widow's right to access to the home and property within the home depends on whether she decides to remarry or not.

Customary law puts a woman in an economically insecure position. She inherits no property despite the fact that she has contributed to it through her unpaid labour in the home. The widow is left at the mercy of her husband's line and his heir. As a result, women continue to be marginalised as far as property ownership is concerned. Hence, statutory inheritance laws tend to echo the social-cultural norms that promote male supremacy. The life stories that follow

the above discussion present the different situations in which married women were denied inheritance rights upon the death of their husbands.

Patriarchal practices and beliefs in depriving a widow of home ownership through inheritance: the story of 'Evelyn Kalungi'

Evelyn is a widow who was unable to inherit the matrimonial home. Her husband died before he acquired the title deed. Evelyn lives in two bed-roomed servants' quarters with her two daughters and a stepson, aged 12, 10 and 9. The house is has a corrugated roof, with electricity (see fig.1). Evelyn moved out of the former matrimonial home (Fig.3) and rented it out to generate income to pay school fees for her children.

Figure1: Evelyn's current accommodation in the servant's quarters

Figure 2: The interior of Evelyn's two-roomed house

Evelyn, aged 30 years was born into a poor family in Mukono District. She had only six years of primary education due to lack of school fees. As a result she could not acquire any formal employment. Due to social problems in the rural village, Evelyn migrated to Kampala in search of any informal job. She rented a room in Kiwatule where she lived alone. She ran different kinds of businesses for a living and earned a reasonable income. It was at Kiwatule that she met Peter who was working with 'KK Car Clearing Company'.

Figure 3: Evelyn's main house

In 2000 Evelyn was married to Peter under customary law and they had two daughters. While married, Peter also had a son with another woman. By the time Evelyn was married to Peter, he had acquired a plot of land from his father but had not transferred it into his name. The couple first constructed a small housing unit (Evelyn currently lives in this unit) where they lived before they built the main house. Evelyn spent part of her income from her business on building materials for the main house while Peter met other construction expenses. The couple later moved from the servant's quarters to the main house.

In 2005, Peter abruptly fell ill and within two months he died. He left no Will. Immediately upon his death Evelyn's in-laws demanded the car keys on the pretext that they needed to use the car for the funeral preparations. After

the funeral Evelyn learned that her in-laws had sold off Peter's car. Evelyn learnt from the neighbours that her in-laws had transferred the Title Deed of the matrimonial home to which she had contributed. The action of the in-laws was aimed at deterring Evelyn from claiming inheritance rights to the home. By registering the home in their grandchildren's names, the property remained in the male line. If the matrimonial home was to be registered in Evelyn's name, it would mean transferring the family property to Evelyn's patriline. Although Peter died intestate and before he processed the title deed, Evelyn could not register the property in her name. The plot on which Peter built the matrimonial home was registered in Evelyn's father in-law's name. His family thus had control over the title. Evelyn could not register home in her name because she lacked the consent of her father in-law to do so.

In addition, before Peter died, his father had not given him an allocation letter for the plot of land on which he built the matrimonial home, as required by the Kiganda custom. According to Evelyn, in Kiganda custom when a parent gives a plot of land to his child, he or she is supposed to do so in writing. This agreement enables the child to register the land in his or her name. In Peter's case, there was no such agreement and when he died the land reverted to Evelyn's father in-law. He then registered the land in his grandchildren's names. Had there been a written agreement between Peter and his father, Evelyn could have used it to register the title deed in her name. The matrimonial home legally now belongs to the children and hence Evelyn can only exercise user rights. When Evelyn's husband died in December 2005, she could no longer sustain the family because of her small income. She moved out of the matrimonial home and rented it out to generate school fees for her children. She consoles herself that her children will benefit from her contribution. Although she continues to put up new structures on her deceased husband's land, she plans to acquire her own land where she can construct her own home. In summary, Evelyn was unable to exercise inheritance rights over the matrimonial home she contributed to.

Deprivation of the home through Will making

Although husbands have the right to bequeath the matrimonial home to their wives, a widow's inheritance right to the home depends on how her husband writes a Will. The discussions that follow demonstrate the ways a widow is deprived of the home even when her husband dies testate.

Jennifer, a widow, was unable to inherit the matrimonial home because her husband did not make her the sole beneficiary and sole executor. Jennifer is 54 years of age. She lives in Kiwatule in her own three bedroomed house

with six of her children. The house has a corrugated roof with water and electricity (Fig.4).

Jennifer was born in Luwero, 50 miles from Kampala, and grew up in a poor family in Katikamu. Her life was one of pregnancies with different men, three of whom were married. As a result she had four children, each with a different father, and two from the man who finally married her.

Jennifer studied at Katikamu senior secondary where she completed seven years of education. In 1966, she dropped out of school due to pregnancy. After her first child was born Jennifer lived with her sister in Gombe and with the help of her brother in-law she completed her eighth year of study. She later joined Ishaka Hospital, where she did a first aid nursing course and qualified as a nurse aid. In 1970s she went to Kendu in Kenya and completed a three-year nursing course and qualified as a nurse. She then returned to Uganda and worked in Gombe Hospital. At Gombe she became pregnant again with her second child, whose father was a married man. Jennifer later left Gombe for Kampala and worked at a private clinic for one year.

Figure 4: Jennifer's house, registered solely in her name

In 1974 Jennifer undertook a course in midwifery at Mengo Hospital and completed in 1975. Meanwhile, she became pregnant with her third child from

yet a different father. She then acquired a job with the Muslim Supreme Council as a nurse. Her employer gave her a free house on South Street in Kampala city centre. She then left the father of her third child and moved to the house provided by the employer. She stayed there for five years. In the 1980s, Jennifer met Jamaine, who was a civil servant and a divorcee with three children. In 1981 Jennifer was legally married to Jamaine. She then stopped working at the Muslim Supreme Council and shifted to Kiwatule. In their nine years of marriage, the couple lived in Jaimane's home whose title deed was registered solely in his name (Fig.5) The couple had two children, a boy and a girl now aged19 and 24 years. Having lost her job at the Muslim Supreme Council because of marriage, Jennifer used her qualification as a midwife to start a clinic in her matrimonial home to generate income. Had Jennifer not had any qualification, she would most likely have depended on Jamaine for income. She also jointly opened a pharmacy and a clinic in Ntinda with Jamaine. Although Jamaine invested more money in the pharmacy and the clinic than Jennifer, Jennifer's medical experience was an asset to the business.

Figure 5: Jennifer's original matrimonial home, registered solely in her husband's name

In 1990 Jamaine died testate. In his Will Jamaine made Jennifer asufruct of the home. She was allowed to live with her two children until she died or remarried. Her husband also made Jennifer as well as two male relatives executors. While Jaimaine had the right to bequeath the matrimonial home to Jennifer as a sole beneficiary and to make her sole executor of his estate, due to patriarchal ideology, he preferred to include two other executors. Jamaine's action is a clear indication that he wanted his property to remain in the male line. Had Jaimaine made Jennifer the sole executor and beneficiary, she would be able to transfer the home into her name. This could have the patriarchal family property revereted to her clan. Hence Jamaine included the two male executors as custodians of the family property. After the funeral rites, Jennifer and the other executors registered the Title Deed jointly in their names. The existence of the two male executors on the Title Deed limited Jennifer's inheritance rights. As a businesswoman, Jennifer could not use the Title Deed as collateral to borrow money. To do so, she needed consent from the two male executors. In 1995, Jennifer 'a woman of loans' as she describes herself, bought her own plot of land and registered it in her own name. Thereafter, Jennifer was able to acquire a loan from a financial institution. With the loan from the bank and the income from the pharmacy and the clinic Jennifer built her own home within two years. She converted the matrimonial home into a health centre and moved to her own house. Jennifer is proud to have a home of her own, as she puts it:

"I left that house and built this house I am in now. This house I am in is my own house; it's a woman's house." (Fig.5)

In conclusion, although Jennifer's husband died testate, the Will did not guarantee Jennifer outright inheritance rights. Jennifer was unable to inherit the matrimonial home because her husband didn't make her the sole executor and sole beneficiary.

Jennifer's life story demonstrates that the way a husband writes the Will determines the widow's inheritance rights to the home. Hence husbands can deny their wives inheritance rights if they do not make their wives sole beneficiaries and sole executors. Though Jennifer's husband had the liberty to bequeath the matrimonial home to his wife as a sole beneficiary and sole executor he preferred the home to remain in the male line by including two of his male relatives as executors in the Will to protect the family property.

The above discussion shows that patriarchal cultural beliefs and practices can affect home ownership through inheritance. Evelyn's husband died before he acquired the Title Deed of their home. She was unable to register the home in her name. Widows in Uganda do not automatically inherit the matrimonial home, they inherit the matrimonial home only under special circumstances. The discussions that follow present evidence on the special ways in which

widows inherited the matrimonial home.

Inheritance through Manipulation of the existing law: the Story of Namatovu:

Namatovu is a widow who inherited the matrimonial home even though her husband died intestate. Namatovu, aged 56 years, was born into a big family of 15 siblings in Bugerere Mukono District.

She lives in Kiwatule in a four bedroomed home with her three children aged 24, 28 and 30 years. The house has a corrugated roof, two sitting rooms, two bathrooms, two toilets, and has electricity and water (Fig 6).

Figure 6: Namatovu's home in Kiwatule that she inherited after her husband's death

Namatovu studied at Nagalama primary school from 1952 to 1960, before she joined Namagunga secondary school in 1961. She completed her eleventh year of education in 1964. She then joined Nsambya Nursing School for a three-year course in nursing, qualifying as a nurse in 1969. Namatovu joined World Health Organisation based in Mbale from 1969 to 1972. In 1972 she enrolled in Mulago School of Nursing and completed an advanced course in nursing in 1974.

In 1976 Namatovu was married to Saul, a police officer working with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). They had three children, one boy and two girls aged 30, 28 and 24 years respectively. However, her husband had three other children, two girls and one boy, from other relationships. From 1974 Namatovu worked at Mulago Hospital as a registered nurse until 1986 when she became unemployed due to the political changes. She remained at home as a housewife until she left for the United States in 1988. While in the United States, she attended a course in pediatrics. In 1991, Namatovu returned to Uganda and joined Saul who was by then living in a government-owned house. Saul later bought a quarter of an acre (25 decimal) plot of land from one of the landowners in Kiwatule. He made structural building plans in his name and constructed a home on the untitled land (kibanja)*. In 1995 Saul died intestate, before he acquired the Title Deed for the plot of land on which he built the matrimonial home.

After the burial, Namatovu moved from the government house to the unfinished and untitled house in Kiwatule. Her in-laws granted her permission to solely administer Saul's estate. Namatovu obtained letters of administration to enable her to claim Saul's death gratuity and pension. Although Namatovu benefited from Saul's pension and death gratuity, the amount was inadequate to pay for her children's school fees and complete the matrimonial home. Namatovu also used part of Saul's death gratuity to start a clinic at home. Namatovu was able to start a clinic because she had a nursing qualification.

With income from the clinic Namatovu was able to construct more rooms for renting and expand her medical service business. She also rented a house in Ntinda where she started another clinic. With regular income from her clinic and rentals from the rooms, and using household property as security Namatovu borrowed more money from the informal credit associations within Kiwatule to build more rooms for renting.

Because of the enormous financial demands of completing the matrimonial home, Namatovu needed to access bigger loans from financial institutions. To do so, she needed a title deed in her own name. Namatovu then contacted the local council officials to introduce her to the landowner of Saul's plot of land. Because the local council officials already knew her as one of their residents they introduced her to the landowner and convinced him to sign the transfer forms in her favour. Namatovu paid about 3 000 dollars for ownership. Namatovu registered the plot of land with the matrimonial home solely in her name and acquired the Title Deed in 2005.

Namatovu was able beat the inheritance system and its patriarchal laws because Saul died before he acquired the Title Deed and secondly her in-laws did not bother to follow up matters concerning their son's home. Namatovu's in-laws

were liberal and good-natured judging from their actions to grant her a family letter to solely administer Saul's estate. This is reflected in Namatovu's words after further probing as to how she succeeded in registering the plot of land in her name when her husband died intestate "My in-laws did not conflict with me at all and even when I received the death gratuity money they never insisted on sharing it. My in-laws did not bother me with the money or attempt to evict me because they are naturally good people. I observed their good behaviour before whereby all the women who have been married in this family after losing their husbands are left with their property. The only complaint I have with my in-laws is failure to assist me to pay the children's school fees."

Although legally letters of administration do not permit an administrator to register the plot of land in the widow's name especially, where her husband dies intestate, Namatovu managed to work around the inheritance system with the assistance of local council officials. She convinced the landowner through the local leaders to sign the transfer forms in her favour, knowing that her in-laws would never question her actions because of their good nature.

Had Namatovu known that her in-laws were problematic and possessive of their son's estate, Namatovu would most likely not have dared to register the plot of land solely in her name. Namatovu was able to have the plot of land registered solely in her name for four reasons. Firstly, she was single and free from the control of Saul. Had Saul been alive, he would most likely have registered the plot of land solely in his name, judging from the building's structural plans, which he registered solely in his name. Had Saul had an intention to register the plot of land in both his name and Namatovu's name; he would not have registered the building plans in his name alone.

Secondly, Saul died intestate and Namatovu found it extremely difficult to register the deed into her name. Thirdly, the Title Deed of the land on which Saul built the matrimonial home was not in any of Saul's relatives' names. Had the Title Deed been in the names of Namatovu's in-laws, Namatovu would most likely have found it difficult to have it registered in her favour. Because the title deed was not in the names of any of Namatovu's in-laws she was able to convince the landowner, through the local leaders, to sign the transfer forms in her favour. Fourthly, Namatovu's in-laws did not bother to follow up matters concerning the property because they were generous.

Although Namatovu's in-laws authorised her to acquire Letters of Administration, this good gesture did not necessarily mean registering Saul's home in her name. Under Succession Law, an administrator of a deceased estate is not supposed to transfer the deceased estate into his or her own names but he or she is supposed to protect and administer the deceased property on behalf of the beneficiaries who in many cases include the children, the widow, and the

deceased relatives. Fifthly, Namatovu was able to pay an equivalent of 3 000 dollars to the landowner. In summary, Namatovu was able to register the home in her name and got the support of local council officials.

Conclusion

The findings in this paper demonstrate the dominant patriarchal cultural practices as far as inheritance is concerned. While widows in western countries are guaranteed inheritance rights of the matrimonial home upon the death of their husbands through legislation, the legal framework in Uganda does not guarantee a widow inheritance rights upon the death of her husband. Inheritance matters are determined culturally. In this study I argue that the state presents a difficulty to a widow's inheritance rights. State laws carry with them customs that regard women as subordinates.

Ugandan inheritance practices are patrilineal and therefore, a widow is not allowed to inherit the matrimonial home both through customary or statutory law. The first-born boy child of the deceased inherits the matrimonial home. Even in situations where a husband dies before he acquires the Title Deed of the home, a widow can register the matrimonial home in her name only through manipulation of the legal system. In this case the widow must have enough money to pay for the transfer costs and must receive support from her in-laws.

On a cultural and interpersonal level, there is a complex nature of patriarchal customary beliefs that are deep rooted. Firstly, since married men insist on registering the matrimonial homes solely in their names during marriage, it indicates that they do not wish their wives to inherit the matrimonial home upon their death. In addition, the husbands' relatives are not willing to transfer the matrimonial home to the widow even in a situation where her husband died before he acquired the Title Deed.

Instead, they prefer to register the home in his children's names to ensure that the home remains in the male line. Secondly, many men die intestate which, simply implies that they prefer the matrimonial home to remain in the male line. Hence a widow is disadvantaged at every level and therefore has nowhere to run to demand her inheritance rights. The few husbands who make Wills rarely bequeath the matrimonial home to their wives as sole executors and beneficiaries.

When a husband does not name his wife as sole executor and sole beneficiary, he leaves the widow at the mercy of the other executors. Widows not only have to negotiate around patriarchal statutory law at institutional level, but also have to negotiate with customary laws at the interpersonal level.

Endnotes

* Ekibanja is a plot of land managed by a de facto owner, while it belongs to a de jure landowner. Often, though not always, it applies to tenants on mail or freehold land. See Nabwire, S., *The Impact of Health User Fees on Women's role in Household Health Care Decision-Making in Mukono District, Uganda: A Gender Analysis,* Ph.D Thesis, Queen Margaret University College, UK, 2003, p.213; In the period prior to colonialism, the different ethnic groups had land tenure systems governed by their traditions and customary practices. In Buganda for example, prior to 1900, there were four categories of rights of control over land:clan rights – Obutaka; the rights of the King and his chiefs – Obutongole; individual hereditary rights of occupation – Obwesengeze; peasant rights of occupation – Ebibanja. See Nkurunziza, E., *Informal Land Delivery Processes and Access to Land for the Poor in Kampala*, DFID Contract No. SSR Project R8076, Working Paper

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More Hands in Complex ART Delivery? Experiences from the Expert Clients Initiative in Rural Uganda

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Abstract
This paper aims to analytically describe the experiences and outcomes of involving people living with HIV/AIDS in clinical care of HIV/AIDS within the healthcare clinic in a poorly resourced setting. With HIV/AIDS treatment finally available in poorly resourced settings, there was huge number of people in need of clinical care. As a result, professional health workers became overwhelmed by the demand for treatment and care. Consequently, this called for a new way to handle the rising numbers and needs of clients at the health clinic level so as to minimise the burden of care on the health professionals. An 18 months ethnographic study was conducted between 2005 to 2007 with professional medical workers (including Doctors, nurses and counsellors, clinicians), ART clients and with family care givers of ART clients, at a Health center IV-HIV clinic in a rural district in Uganda. The result shows that the scaling up of ART and subsequent introduction of Expert Clients as a new care arrangement within the health clinic has opened up the clinical space as some pseudo space where at least in principle, the patient has a voice in care with various outcomes.

Keywords*: HIV/AIDS, ethnography, poorly resourced setting, Expert Clients, ART*

Introduction

> *Many HIV treatment approaches remain highly dependent on scarce and expensive medical professionals and highly sophisticated laboratory equipment, which are in short supply in low-resource settings. Implementation of alternative, lower-cost human resource models for delivery of HIV prevention, treatment, care and support—including the deployment of auxiliary and community workers and engaging people living with HIV in service delivery – is urgently required (UNAIDS 2006).*

Unlike any other disease so far, the 'exceptional' nature of HIV/AIDS has prompted debate about the nature of its treatment, but also the challenges of

treatment (Farmer, et. al. 2001). Antiretroviral therapy has been dubbed a complex therapy and therefore special for a number of reasons (Oyugi et. al. 2004, Amolo-Okero et.al. 2006). Its complexity lies not only in the pharmaco-kinetics of the drug, it is a combination therapy which once 'initiated' into, remains on it for life (Barnett T, & Whitehead A, 2002). 'Initiation' into the therapy also requires thorough preparation of the patient including a prior HIV test and continued follow-up care. According to the Ugandan guidelines for implementation of ART (MoH 2003, 2005), one is required to bring along a treatment-supporter to whom they have disclosed their HIV status and who will help with treatment adherence. The professional health worker in consultation with the patient must draw up a treatment plan for each patient. Patients must be initiated to therapy by a medical doctor after thorough assessment (WHO 2005).

ART has changed AIDS from a deadly disease to a chronic one where the chronic care model is more favoured to the acute model (WHO 2001). The model requires the professional health worker to dialogue together with the patient about one's medical treatment and care. It also requires on-going counseling and treatment of opportunistic infections and at least a monthly face-to-face interaction between the client and the professional health workers. However, total adherence is also required (and sometimes a pre-requisite to initiation) and defaulting the drug is medically unacceptable. In ART, adherence is of utmost importance (Weidle P J, et. al. 2006). Poor adherence, indeed, may lead to medication failure, viral mutations and development of drug resistance (Bangsberg et.al. 2006) and future treatment options become limited because of cross-resistance. The risk of transmission of resistant viruses makes adherence a public health concern (Wainberg & Friedland 1998, Boden et.al. 1999). Research and daily practice have shown that strict adherence is difficult to achieve for many of the HIV-infected patients treated with antiretroviral therapy (Nieuwkerk et.al 2001, Hugen et.al. 2002). Adherence to HAART requires patients to behave in a way that cannot easily be incorporated into daily life (Vervoort et. al. 2007).

The Most extensive research in chronic care has been done in high income countries in disease specific programmes, such as diabetes (Tang et. al.. 2005, Stone et.al. 2005, Rosal et.al.2005), asthma (Bodenheimer et.al. 2002) and arthritis (Barlow et.al. 2000). However, these have focused on health status and health service utilisation (Kennedy et al. 2004 & 2005, Kober & Van Damme 2006). Fewer evaluations have focussed on generic self-management programmes for various chronic conditions (Lorig et al. 1999, 2001, Dongbo et al. 2003, Kober & Van Damme 2006). Most evaluations of self-management programmes focus on improvements in the core self-management elements from the patient's perspective, such as for example increased knowledge, skills

and sense of self-efficacy (Kober & Van Damme 2006). The current paper goes beyond patient perspectives to give in-depth analytical insights into provider perspectives of chronic care initiatives in a resource poor setting. Using data from a longitudinal ethnographic study I go beyond patient self-management to analytically explore the nature of emergent relationships between providers and patients engaged in chronic care.

Here I argue that to understand Expert Clients as a useful concept in chronic care in poorly resourced settings, it is important to go beyond a conceptualisation that emphasises their support functions (Kober & Van Damme 2006) to explore the emerging relationships which allows for a conceptualisation of their possible professional involvement as expert patients.

Background

The scaling up of a complex therapy for the treatment of HIV/AIDS in poorly resourced settings globally and in Uganda specifically was difficult because of overburdened health systems (Amolo-Okero et al. 2006). In the literature on creation of resources, it has been argued that although most health systems contain successful examples of service delivery for TB, chronic diseases and in recent times ARVs, expanding service provision beyond these islands of success faces significant obstacles (Crane et al. 2006).

The inadequate supply of skilled and motivated health care workers is now regarded as the key systems constraint to scaling up HIV treatment (Kober et al. 2004, Chen 2005). For example, in 2006 the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPfAR) Report on workforce Capacity and HIV/AIDS treatment and care recommended task shifting from health professionals to lay health workers or volunteers.

The problem of human resource is multi-faceted – it includes supply, migration, distribution, skills mix, renumeration and productivity dimensions (Chen et al. 2005, Adetoyeje. 2007, WHO 2008). High levels of infection amongst health personnel may be one contributor to attrition of personnel in some countries (Tawfik & Kinoti 2004, Kober et al, 2005). For instance by the late 1990s, deaths constituted more than 40% of all nurses lost to the public sector in Malawi and Zambia (Kober et al. 2004), while in South Africa in 2002, 16.3% of health workers were infected with HIV (Shisana et al. 2002).

Furthermore, with HIV/AIDS treatment finally available in poorly resourced settings, there were overwhelming numbers of people in need of clinical care. Consequently, professional health workers became overwhelmed by the demand for treatment and care (UAC, 2006). This called for a new way to handle the

rising needs of clients so as to minimise the burden of care on the health professionals.

Scaling Up HIV/ AIDS Treatment in Uganda

In 2003, the Uganda government committed itself to provide more equitable access to AIDS treatment by scaling up HAART under a public sector care arrangement (MoH 2003, Wendo C. 2005). In June 2004, the government began dispatching ARVs to district hospitals and later to health centre IV clinics to be administered under routine healthcare conditions (MoH 2005) with emphasis on broadening coverage (MoH 2003, MoH 2005, Uganda Cares report 2004, UAC 2004, UNADS, 2007). By October 2007, there were 212 ART centres across the country and the number of people accessing ART reached 106 000 that is far less than half of the estimated 234 500 who need treatment now (MoH 2006, UNADS, 2007). The health sector in Uganda faces staff shortages. With a total of 30 000 health workers who were employed in 2004, 5000 qualified staff were required by then and certainly the demand is greater today. A shortage of health workers could negatively influence access to and quality of care (Chen & Hangvaravongchai 2005, Marchal et al. 2005). Moreover, in the wake of scaling up AIDS treatment and care, organisational responses in Uganda were implemented haphazardly and were limited to providing protective materials and the AIDS related services offered to patients while the health workforce was left without due attention (Dieleman et.al. 2007). Therefore, when the Uganda government scaled-up ART from regional hospital settings to lower levels (health centre IV and III) of care in support of the 3 by 5 initiative, the need to create resources necessitated initiative. But wwhereas there is a policy requirement for People Living With AIDS (PLWA) to be involved in every area that concerns their health (MoH 2005) in fulfilment of the "greater involvement of people living with HIV/AIDS (GIPA)" principle, currently, there is no policy document institutionalising and operationalising their involvement, regulating participation or even their recruitment into the clinical set-up.

With ART becoming more available, the high volume of patients and increasing demand for treatment at lower levels of care (health centre IV) necessitated significant re-organisation of health service delivery. So, to minimise the burden of care related to ART, medical care workers at a local clinic in rural Luweero district charted the delivery of HAART treatment by introducing lay providers called 'Expert Clients' within the traditional hierarchy of public clinic practice in the clinical space (health centre annual report 2005). Through this new care arrangement, people living with HIV/AIDS and using

HAART were given a chance to participate in delivery of chronic HIV/AIDS clinical care. The main aim of this initiative was to reduce the workload burden of medical health care providers in the clinical care of patients specially those on HAART. The question addressed here is: what has been the outcome of this new type of clinical care arrangement on those involved in the clinic space and on overall chronic HIV/AIDS care and treatment in a resource poor setting? The aim is to give in-depth insights and learn from the outcomes of emerging care dynamics within the health system at clinic level following the scaling up of chronic HIV/AIDS treatment. Results show that the scaling up of ART and subsequent introduction of Expert Clients as a new care arrangement within the health clinic has opened up the clinical space as some pseudo space where at least in principle, the patient has a voice in care with varying outcomes. The Expert Clients initiative also points to an emerging process of popularisation and domestication of ART within a constrained resource-limited healthcare setting.

Study Design

I conducted 18 months of ethnographic study between December 2005 to December 2007. A qualitative descriptive design (Sandelowski 2000) was deemed appropriate for this study as the aim was to provide a comprehensive summary of events in everyday lives and terms of those events as well as what actors, especially in the clinical space, thought and how they experienced the new expert-client clinical care arrangement. In October 2007, after almost two years of expert-clients' service, a one-day evaluation workshop was held by Uganda Cares group for 15 of the 20 Expert Clients who had been trained in December 2005. I attended the workshop. Five of the original 20 Expert Clients had died. Methodologically, I conducted Clinical participant observations, informal conversations, open-ended in-depth interviews and topical focused group discussions.

For such a sensitive topic, participant observation became key because it allowed for an understanding of the symbolic representations e.g. through metaphorical expressions as well as other life concerns like relations of caring e.g. bodily gestures and facial expressions, general expression of feelings and emotions. Such are not quantifiable aspects but are qualitative experiences of everyday life which people have learned to attend to. Statistical sampling or applying a structured questionnaire for that matter may not give in-depth insights. In-depth interviews and FGD data was collected using a topic guide to augment and validate the findings. This paper presents data from informal conversations

and clinical observations of 10 professional medical workers, open-ended key informant interviews with 6 professional medical workers (including 1 doctor and 3 clinical officers and 2 senior nursing officers), 2 FGDs with nurses, informal conversations and open-ended in-depth interviews with 4 Expert Clients, 2 FGDs with ART clients exclusive of Expert Clients, 2 FGDs with family care givers of ART clients. Participation was voluntary and confidentiality assured. The findings here have been augmented by the proceedings from the evaluation workshop mentioned above.

Study Site

The study was conducted at a public, static HIV clinic, of a Health Centre IV in Luweero district. This site was purposively selected following the criteria that it provided a static ART programme, was rural and with limited infrastructures, one of the very first sub-district level public health centre IV after the district level regional hospitals, where the government ARV roll out program started in 2004 and had the highest number (4) of the Expert Clients trained by Uganda Cares; therefore there is a wealth of experience to draw from. The HIV clinic is housed in a separate building in the backyard of the health centre. It is government funded and cared for 510 ART clients as of July 2007. The clinic provides voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), antiretroviral (ARV) distribution, treatment of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), opportunistic infections (OI) treatment and health education services. The ART programme runs every Monday, while Wednesday and Friday are voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) days. During these days as well as the rest of the week, all the staff at the clinic attend to care of other patients across different departments at the health centre e.g. maternity and labour section where prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) is run as a separate program from the HIV clinic, theatre, general ward rounds, OPD, child nutrition ward.

Ethical Considerations

Approval of the study was gained from the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology and from the ethics committee at the clinic. The participants were given detailed information about the study during the exploratory fieldwork visit of three months to which they gave verbal consent. To ensure the confidentiality of the study participants, I use pseudo names in the script. All the study participants verbally consented to the take part in the study and their views being written in the study report.

Data Analysis

I used the guide analysis proposed by Attride-Stirling (2001) for qualitative descriptive studies. I designed a coding framework and dissected texts line by line. Basic themes that were explicit enough to encapsulate an idea as well as expansive enough to include varying text segments from the transcripts were identified. From the basic themes are generated clusters of organising themes that summarise the principle assumptions of a group of basic themes so they are more abstract and revealing of what is going in the text (Attride-Stirling 2001 p.389). The organising themes were explored for commonalities and relationship with each other. I further clustered the organising themes into a macro-theme 'more hands' which encompassed the principle metaphors in the data as a whole. I returned the transcribed material to the participants who confirmed that they were an accurate reflection of the discussions held. Data analysis run concurrently with data collection and coding was on-going until such a moment when data saturated.

As I was interested in the specific experiences of specific actors in the clinical space, a small sample size was deemed appropriate to produce the kind of in-depth knowledge necessary to understand the structures and all the processes within which individuals or situations are located. Because the study was conducted with a specific group of chronic ART care providers within a specific rural context, I took the approach of 'maximising information and not facilitating generalisations'. In other words, the aim was to produce findings that could potentially be transferable rather than be generalised to every setting. The validity of data was assured by triangulation using different methods of data collection and asking the same questions during focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, exploring the same topics among all study participants at different times and places and comparing and contrasting information from interviews with information from informal conversations and observations.

The Expert Clients Initiative: Structure of the Program

Uganda Cares is a donor funded non- profit organisation that pioneered the introduction of the Expert Clients program within the government funded public health care settings in Uganda in 2005. The main aim of the initiative was to help lessen the workload of professional health workers (resulting from scaling up of ART) within the clinical care setting. Expert Clients were HIV positive patients and using HAART themselves.

Those trained as Expert Clients were selected by fellow clients based on a

set criteria by WHO's principles of Greater Involvement of People with HIV/AIDS –GIPA. One had to be approachable, helpful, kind, willing to share, able to communicate with fellow clients & the medical care providers, in an improved state of health attributable to HAART and open about his/her HIV status. Selected clients were trained in a one-week skills building workshop. Professional health workers from Uganda CARES AIDS programme found in Masaka Hospital conducted this workshop. This training, which I attended as a participant took place in December 2005.

Participants were drawn from 2 static ART health care centres and 5 satellite ART outreach centres in four rural districts i.e. Masaka, Kalangala, Sembabule, Luweero in Uganda. 20 participants were trained in basic counselling skills; communication skills with patients, what & why counselling is needed, how HAART works, referral care support, positive living, disclosure and basic nutrition.

Accordingly, during training Expert Clients roles were stipulated as: initial clinical preparations of ART patients, help in monitoring, and supporting patients in comprehensive care and positive living. After training, Expert Clients were given T-shirts & caps for recognition as well as a letter of introduction of their new status of being Expert Clients. What follows is a description of the Expert Clients work in Kasana Health centre IV, a static ART care centre in Luweero district, which had the highest representation (4 participants) at the training.

After training, the Expert Clients became stationed at the HIV clinics (more or less as receptionists). They report and are answerable to the senior clinical officer in charge of the HIV clinic and the senior nursing sister who are in turn answerable to the Doctor who is the director of health services at the health centre.

On the side of patients, Expert Clients are answerable to their fellow clients who elected them under the leadership of the post-test club chairman.

At the clinic expert patients' specific roles included: registering patients, selecting out very ill patients for immediate attention, filling visitation cards/registers, weighing patients and taking their height, encouraging patients to come for care and treatment of opportunistic infections, educating clients about the benefits of treatment by sharing their personal experiences and sharing basic nutrition facts. Expert Clients also solicited reports of those clients who are very ill and are unable to make it to the clinic – a rather informal way of following up on their friends.

They familiarised new patients with the clinic care procedures and also helped attend to those who need admission. Expert Clients also reported on the condition of those who are admitted in the wards especially soliciting for

psychosocial, emotional and moral support. The results and their implications in terms of lessons learned from this initiative both to Expert Clients and to providers and the health facility as an institution, are provided below.

Results

The results show greater in-depth insights but do not reflect striking changes in perceptions over time. From the clinical observations though, there was generally less inhibition and a greater degree of fluidity in social interactions between providers and Expert Clients. This could be interpreted as greater acceptance of the Expert Clients' presence or greater appreciation of their work in the clinical space. But the limited inhibition in interaction on the part of the Expert Clients could also be interpreted as a time factor. The longer they stayed at the clinic, the more their presence was normalised and thus they, more or less, naturally fitted in with time. Although relations sometimes tended to be rather conflictual and/or contradictory, Expert Clients played a significant role in mobilising PLWHA as critical support providers to their peers and health care personnel.

New Roles Acquired at Clinic Level

Expert Clients as intermediaries

Group counselling sessions acted as opportunities where Expert Clients took on an intermediary role of reporting to fellow patients and soliciting feedback on the overall situation of care at the clinic, general patient situation (in terms of attendance, dropout, deaths, constraints, etc), update patients on upcoming health related events in and around the district, and any upcoming plans by the management and reporting back to the clinician in-charge. Proposals are sometimes written and presented to the clinic in-charge who endorses them to management for action e.g. the porridge project, the window project that involved breaking and reconstructing the records room.

> *"we proposed what is now called the porridge project for the clients while at the clinic, we also proposed the breaking and opening up of a window in the records room to ease pressure and noise from the corridor of people collecting their files but also so that clients don't have to stand for long hours while waiting in a queue for their files. These are small changes but they have made a difference and improved overall care for us patients and the working environment for the health care providers" (in-depth interview with Expert Clients, July 2006).*

Expert Clients as advocates

At another level, the Expert Clients act as advocates for fellow clients to improve overall care at the clinic. For instance, after listening to the woes of fellow clients about marital and family problems, they wrote and suggested to management that the Alliance of female lawyers (FIDA) be lobbied to come and assist clients with legal advice. There is a sincere desire to holistically improve the situation of the clients as well as the general care environment at the clinic.

> *"More recently through our bosses we invited FIDA to help educate us about our rights as HIV positive patients and they now come here once every month to give legal assistance to those who need it at no cost and also teach us how to write a will"(indepth interview with Expert Clients, October 2007).*

New Roles at a Community Level

The findings show that Expert Clients roles have grown to extend beyond the clinic. They act as extension health workers linking the community and the health facility in a sense that they help deliver the drugs to those who live near their home areas and are too sick to come for the clinic days. They also act as 'ambassadors of hope' for the ART therapy through sharing their experiences not just with fellow clients at the clinic but also in the communities where they live, for instance they are usually called to address community health gatherings on HIV/AIDS, care and treatment.

Results from the interviews and the evaluation workshop clearly show that with time, Expert Clients acquired new roles beyond the clinic care context. They act as a bridge between the clinical set up and the community. They go out of their way and make home visits and sometimes offer material support as well as referral of patients to other care organisations and consequently, many people have been encouraged to test for HIV. Expert Clients were able to give peer support, counseling and encouraging adherence to other clients. Through training and practice, they gained more confidence and better skills of knowledge sharing, hence they act as role models giving hope to clients and caregivers. This is exemplified in the following quotes from an FGD with ART clients family caregivers;

> *"Our Expert Clients visits every home with an AIDS patient in this village at least once a month to encourage us not to loose hope in caring for our sick person"*

"she is really an expert…she is a good example to us, she visits us often and encourages us and even helps us with house chores for the patient."

"He has also encouraged many people here to get tested especially through sharing stories of his past experience with the disease"

"Her kind of comfort and encouragement is crucial not just for the patient to regain hope but also for us who are not yet sick to be nice while caring for others because tomorrow it might be me" (July 25, 2006).

Knowledge and Skills

From clinical observations, Expert Clients frequently search for opportunities to better their knowledge through asking questions and a keen watch of how medical health care providers carry out different tasks of their daily work, and even how they carry themselves around. Expert Clients also attempted to portray themselves with a similar demeanour and ways of expression with confidence, as the medical health care workers do. By doing so, they, somehow, continue to command and keep the newly acquired respect from fellow clients and the community. The findings show that Expert Clients attempt to display total command of what they say and do in the way they speak and attend to the patients which wins them further respect from fellow clients.

"we have to learn the rules of the game otherwise our patients sometimes suffer a lot. We even go and seek knowledge outside this clinic e.g. we go and visit other clinics to see how they do things and we come here and sometimes propose to our bosses. We also ask our friends who get medicines from elsewhere about questions on patient care at other HIV clinics – we simply want to help ourselves – we want to see things get better and better for us patients and for our providers who we recognize have a lot of work on their shoulders." (in-depth interview with Expert Client, July 2006)"

The above quote also recognises that the level of care at the facility is still wanting in some ways and can be bettered. Expert Clients indeed took extra steps to find out how to improve themselves, other patients and the general care situation within and beyond the clinical setup.

"After our initial training by Uganda Cares, I attended a three months certificate course in counselling for ART and now I know a lot about the drugs and care. I am

often invited to give talks on HAART care. I also have started writing a booklet on what an AIDS patient using HAART should know because many of our people are just ignorant and they have stigma…there is a lot I can share with them"(In-depth interview with Expert Client, October 2007)

Trust and Disclosure

Ironically, Expert Clients became more trusted than the medical health care providers also because they identify, share and are open to fellow clients about their experience of the disease and the HAART therapy. As a result Expert Clients knew a lot of client information that is key to treatment but which was not necessarily yet known to health professionals. The attitudes of the health providers towards the patients strongly came out as key in facilitating disclosure and building relations of trust between clients and providers. Female FGD participants had this to say;

"This is the second time I am pregnant when on HAART but I prefer to tell our leaders (referring to the Expert Clients) who are more understanding and will guide me where to go without blaming me why I got pregnant. I cannot tell the doctor or nurses that I am pregnant simply because they may at times abuse the hell out of you" (here almost all FGD participants were nodding their heads in agreement).

Another participant interjects*;*

"for me when it happened the first time and they accused me of neglecting my own life when they are trying their best to help me …they forget that I love my life more than they do care anyway. Am now five months pregnant but I have not told the other nurses yet so they do not know except nurse Harriet who treats us like a mother. However I told all our Expert Clients because they are very supportive of us all, they understand these things, they are jocular and will handle you with compassion…they really are good even if at times may complain about us…they are only human and suffering as we are and they are not even paid.

Another participant goes on to say*;*

Ehh…!!! some nurses here often don't know or even understand the great difficulty we women go through to survive and to convince men to have protected sex. This is even more so a challenge for us young women (FGD with female ART clients– Kasana Luweero Health Centre IV, March 8, 2007)

The trust here may also be seen in terms of the degree of clinical information Expert Clients have about the patients which is seldom known to health professionals. Such information relates especially to signs and symptoms, state of mind, issues relating to counselling and state of wellness. The reason for this concealment of information may also relate to medical health care workers over emphasis on the drugs and adherence other than the totality of the body, soul and mind. The statement above also underscores the need for ongoing counselling that is lacking and undermining the confidence of HAART clients in medical health workers. Patients felt Expert Clients were more available to them, are open about their HIV status and openly use themselves as models for the patients to learn from which the medical care workers did not openly do. In the men's FGD, when asked to give their opinion about their nurses, one man said;

> *"they really don't give us time, they are selective of who goes to see the counsellor but most times you find that majority of us have problems beyond just taking pills yet which affect our adherence to the rules of the drugs – These Expert Clients are always here to listen to us and they actually understand us better than most nurses here so we share with them a lot about us than we even tell to the nurses and counsellors…(another patient goes on to add)… they are our heroes" (others nodded in agreement). (FGD with male Clients- Kasana Luweero Health Centre IV, March 8, 2007).*

Patients also disclosed that they sometimes might withhold information from professional health workers for fear of being denied the medicines especially in cases of non-adherence. The concealment of information from professional health workers also at times relates to being given treatment options in terms of prescriptions that are not available at the health facility at the time including even essential drugs as panadol, septrin etcetera. Other views expressed in the FGDs were that often a times, some prescriptions are not affordable to the clients and instead of telling the medical health workers about the untreated symptom, they may tell the Expert Client who sometimes may devise a cheaper trial remedy, which he himself may have tried for similar signs and symptoms.

Tensions in Caring Relations

Some of the challenges and tensions that presented themselves in the implementation of this initiative relate to the control of knowledge of the professional health worker vis a vis the Expert Clients and the general clientele. Questions arose relating to who gives what information to whom and when,

and who has control over which knowledge and why. Generally speaking, some patients had more knowledge on some issues (e.g. nutrition facts, side effects control and management) than some nurses so it creates a clash of expectations. Expert Clients expect respect for what they know but in some cases they know only less or as much as other clients. This knowledge gap often related to one's level of exposure to HIV/AIDS related information and ability to read.

Participant observations from the group counselling sessions revealed that patients generally had high expectations of Expert Clients and at times expect to hear new solutions to old problems. For instance, patients sometimes have more technical questions for Expert Clients than they can answer given their level of knowledge and exposure to related information. This makes Expert Clients to go on an aggressive search for answers to client's questions from all possible sources including trying to penetrate the backstage of professional health workers to get more information. However, this is sometimes to the dislike and discomfort of the professional health workers.

> *"Sometimes client questions are too technical for us and we need to consult so we go the nurses or clinician or the doctor… though sometimes we may not know how far to go or how to do it and this usually annoys the nurses…they complain that we disturb them with questions at the wrong times, etc but the most important thing is that we seek always to learn so as to help our fellow patients… (FGD with Expert Clients, 20 October, 2007)*

The Expert Clients expressed that they always enjoyed being utilised and answering client's questions but also searching for answers to technical questions posed to them by fellow clients thus:

> *"It feels empowering for us when patients seek answers from us. It brings us some feeling of respect and prestige to know that we are actually being utilised as experts"*
> *"…it also feels good to search for answers and always learn something new that is helpful for us all about our condition" (FGD with Expert Clients, 20 October, 2007)*

a) Acceptance and legitimacy

The Expert Clients agreed that they are constantly confronted with issues of acceptance and legitimacy as new entrants within the traditional hierarchy of clinical health service delivery in the clinical space.

"Since the beginning the nurses here often joke that we are the 'adopted children of chronic medicine' and they (the health professionals) are the born and trained children of medicine" (FGD with Expert Clients, 20 September, 2007)

This metaphor can have two different meanings. An adopted child may be privileged above others that at least they have a home to stay plus some other defined privileges. But depending on the mood and manner in which one says and/or is perceived may also carry negative connotation. It may also be a reminder to Expert Clients that they have no entitlements e.g. in terms of ownership to whatever is found in the home (clinical space), therefore one ought to watch themselves in terms of what they do and say when and how.

b) Overshooting boundaries within the clinical space

Currently there is a policy requirement for PLWA to be involved in every area that concerns their health (MoH 2005) in fulfilment of the GIPA principle. However, this is not barked by guidelines on institutionalising or operationalising their recruitment into the clinical space. There were general feelings and agreement among all medical care providers and even among clients themselves (see outgoing section) that Expert Clients as PLWA often overshoot their 'boundaries'.

"…despite its advantage of restoring faith in the medical profession, HIV/AIDS treatment using HAART has done our profession some harm as well. Because of the complexity of HAART treatment and care, we have new entrants in the clinical affairs called the Expert Clients who I must say have been very helpful. But you know as time goes on and especially when there are no proper streamlined guidelines things begin to be problematic. (In-depth interview with HIV clinic Clinical Officer, July 2006)

"Our Expert Clients sometimes want and pretend to know more than we – the experts on HIV/AIDS treatment…quite often this leads to some discomfort and a clash in expectations" (FGD with nurses, October 7, 2007)

"They [Expert Clients] are too inquisitive and often overstep their boundaries. We have to be careful sometimes what we say or do because they are unaware of professional medical practice and ethics … there have been cases like the drug-stock outs case and where a patient died due to lack of second line regime, the placebo patient case etc.

In all cases emotions flared beyond reason and we were accused of deliberately wanting to kill our patients by our friends the Expert Clients. In turn they misrepresented us by misinformation to the patients and the tensions were obvious and our respect became at stake" (in-depth interview with senior nurse, October 20, 2007).

This clash of expectations creates uncertainty and an inertia that may get in the way of progress and improvement in terms of trying to establish service delivery partnerships with lay providers and the community so as to improve access and delivery of care.

c) Complementary or conflicting roles

Expert Clients are seen as mediating the relationship between the clients, doctor and clinicians and by so doing, they continuously seem to subsume the roles of nurses who occupy the lower cadre in clinical medical care. Whereas they should be looked at as complementing clinical care on the one hand, they have on the other hand been looked at like a new category of entrants in the clinical space that may threaten the existence and the roles of nurses in chronic care.

In the HAART era, since medical knowledge is more than ever an open market, the nurses felt that the involvement of the Expert Clients in the clinical space may compromise their roles in the long run. Some medical health workers described sometimes being caught up in a situation where they uneasily carry out their work simply because the clients knew too much.

"The Expert Clients are always too eager to see, to know and to learn from us at the same time which is not bad. However they sometimes have inappropriate technical information… given that the HAART information market is open to the general public, it is difficult to control what and how to tell and not to tell patients. In reality some information like the case of mercy killing of an agonising patient or placebo treatment of a dying patient who has failed on the available HAART regime, unavailability of a next line drug regime, convincing someone that HAART cannot work on them when it has worked on other familiar people, etc. are things that need to better be left to the medical care professionals. (in-depth interview with doctor, October, 2006)

This issue is made complex given the lack of confidence resulting from an absence of updated knowledge of HAART treatment (MoH 2005: 39), but also a resentment about the very presence of these lay providers who are seen

as watchmen to medical practice in the clinical space. Furthermore, the fact that Expert Clients learn and reveal information that health professionals would rather not reveal to patients. The outcome of these revelations is often accusations and resentment among the patients and their family caregivers about the medical care workers who at times would be perceived as accelerating suffering instead of relieving it.

> *" there are sometimes accusations of killing our own patients by denying them HAART treatment or having given them a wrong dosage. This is frustrating especially well knowing that I am supposed to be giving life and this is the correct impression patients must always have of us their providers…however, sometimes you find these Expert Clients discussing with patients some technical information, which they have may be overheard but which patients must not learn of especially that they may not understand it in medical terms. This sometimes alarms the patients and the effects of which both Expert Clients and patients cannot handle…and as a medical care provider this puts me in a difficult position" (In-depth interview with a clinician, September 20, 2006).*

d) Misuse of power and undermining of authority outside the clinic space

From the informal conversations, there were strong sentiments among medical care health workers that Expert Clients were sometimes undermining their authority and that this might cause real conflict situations in the long run. When I returned to the field in December 2007, these feelings had become open resulting in an Expert Client being sent away from the clinic. It is alleged that Fred (*pseudonom used here*) had for long been posing as a medical care worker in the community and soliciting money from unsuspecting patients while inviting them to come to the clinic for cheaper CD4 tests on days when this was not happening (people were bled for CD4 count only on Mondays by JCRC), or for cheaper drugs like septrin (as this often run out at the clinic and patients were required to buy from outside the clinic – which was expensive) and on the day of appointment he would disappear. This left the medical workers with the discomfort of explaining to the angry patients how one of their own could engage in such an activity. Fred was subsequently expelled.

e) Accountability and allegiance

Expert Clients were often reminded to pay their allegiance to the health facility

authorities where they were employed by following the instructions as given by the professional health worker staff and that they were accountable to the HIV/AIDS clinician in-charge. However, tensions arose earlier with regard to the loyalty of the Expert Clients who attached great importance to the plight of fellow clients.

> *"Often, you have to act in the interest of the patients because they trusted you as their helper and watchman and to argue their case especially when caught in a difficult situation. For instance these "basawo" [health professional care providers] sometimes come late and then some complain that they are too tired to either see a patient or have the patient put on direct admission and they will send such a patient to the Outpatient Department with his file to start lining up again after having lined up the whole day at the HIV clinic waiting to see either a doctor or a clinical officer or a nurse in-charge."*

From the in-depth interviews, Expert Clients reported that they were actually more accountable to fellow patients than to the medical care health workers. This is mainly because Expert Clients and these patients view each other as *"balwadde banaffe* [fellow sufferers]" and thus having common interests. But even more, Expert Clients' sometimes felt that the health system in away manipulates their plight since they work a lot and are not paid anything for their good will.

Discussion: Implications of Findings and Way Forward

Conceptualising Expert Clients in terms of their support function shows that through training and practice, Expert Clients gained confidence, hope and substantially lessened the workload of health professionals. Expert Clients acquired new roles from being advocates and intermediaries of care at the clinic to extending beyond the clinical care context such that they act as a bridge between the clinical set up and the community. Expert Clients are not only able to give peer support, counselling and encouraging adherence to other clients, they gained more confidence and better knowledge sharing skills, hence they act as role models giving hope to clients and family caregivers. They go out of their way and make home visits and sometimes offer material support as well as referral of patients to other care organisations and consequently, many people have been encouraged to test for HIV. These findings compare with health status and health service utilisation outcome measurement of self-management programmes in high income countries where, evaluations of self-management programmes have shown improvements in the core self-management elements

like increased knowledge, skills and sense of self-efficacy from the patient's perspective (Barlow et.al.. 2000, Bodenheimer et.al. 2002, Tang et. al. 2005, Stone et.al. 2005, Rosal et.al.2005, Kober & Van Damme 2006).

The findings show that the scaling up of ART and subsequent introduction of Expert Clients as a new care arrangement within the traditional health clinic in resource limited settings has opened up the clinical space as some pseudo space where at least in principle, the patient has a voice in care. There is a great degree of patient expression within the clinical space as can be read in the approved and implemented proposals (the porridge proposal, the window project the FIDA project) resulting from patient voice for a different form of care than what is being offered, a kind of agitation that is rather unique in chronic health care to the HIV/AIDS treatment discourse. That patients propose and systems adopt, is a shift in the care discourse of the health system in Uganda i.e. from the conventional top-down organisational implementation approach to a bottom-up approach. This shift also points to the gradual attempt to shift from the acute care model to the chronic care model in resource poor settings and key here is patient expression in care. In high-income countries, where the 20th century saw a shift from acute to chronic care models, a central component of all models for chronic disease care is the altered relationship between patients and health service providers (see Kennedy et al. 2004, 2005, Jardine 2005, TAC 2006, WHO 2006). For the effective management of a chronic disease it is deemed essential that the patient assumes an active role in its management (Shaw et al. 2004, Jones 2004), which is a departure from the traditional 'medical paradigm' where the patient is seen as a passive recipient of care and treatment from the medical doctor. But I must caution here that for either settings it is important to carefully consider the logic and mechanism generating factors. Involvement of patients in high income countries stems from the logic of the need for every patient to self-manage their chronic condition whereas, the logic and emphasis on involvement of patients in low income countries stems from the need to curb the problem of scarce human resources and relieving the workload burden of professional health workers, in other words, the need for patients to be engaged in care delivery for the sake of fellow patients. It is a privilege with power bringing about inequalities among patients. However, the Expert Client initiative may create resistance from patients especially if they feel that Expert Clients lack in proper knowledge to give answers to the kinds of questions that patients may pose to them especially given the high medicalisation of the HIV/AIDS treatment.

Because HIV/AIDS disease and its treatment has been highly medicalised within the public health approach to care, I argue that the Expert Clients initiative as a new care arrangement is a channel to an emerging process of de-

medicalisation, popularisation and domestication of ART within a constrained and resource-limited healthcare setting. For instance, Expert Clients became clinical care providers without any rather formal training in western medicine and engaged and intervened in care using a highly complex treatment at different points including, giving advice to fellow patients to adhere to this complex drug regime which would be seen as the prerogative of the medical personnel who have received formal training in the kinetics and complexity of drugs. Additionally, Expert Clients became advocates for treatment outside the clinic through the new roles they acquired beyond the clinic and, they also became negotiators and intermediaries for better care within the clinic, for example, when they escort and help negotiate for attention or admissions for fellow clients at the outpatient department, their suggestions of new projects and ways of doing things within the clinic. The findings reveal clearly that there is striking divergence between the content of the training programme and the Expert Clients roles. Such results have implications for training of the Expert Clients. Ideally, a comprehensive training programme should be designed to prepare Expert Clients to be competent in the roles they are expected to fulfill. The study participants identified need for the will and leadership between managers, clients and clinicians to make things change through creation of an open forum where all stakeholders can work together, learn from and feel appreciated eg 'create and belong to a convention of carers' so as to minimise apprehension. Their suggestions seem to come from an awareness of the enormity of work involved in chronic care and the fact that they each are insufficient to provide all the care needed. Hence there is a great awareness that they all need each other in the caring process to be able to effect and sustain chronic care. However, from the lessons drawn above, this new awareness would require employing mechanisms to build trust and confidence in the entire health care system if the delivery of care for people with chronic conditions is to succeed.

Several recommendations have been proposed by the clientele and professional health workers about how to minimise the existing tensions. They proposed the need for a clear elaboration and understanding of roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders in the clinical space vis a vis the emerging chronic care needs. However, since these have not been institutionalised, a key policy issue arises here: how the caring role of Expert Clients can be institutionalised and operationalised within the healthcare system of Uganda, a question requiring further exploration. For instance, with reference to the Expert Clients providing material support to fellow clients, it may be advantageous to have definitive roles as a way of having clear expectations. However creating very strict responsibility and role boundaries may also be disadvantageous in a way that there is less flexibility.

Conclusion

This study has shown that to conceptualise the involvement of PLHA as Expert Clients in the clinical space as work (support function), improves outcomes for HIV positive individuals as well as the community, while crucially reducing the workload of chronic HIV/AIDS care for medical personnel. While the objective of expert patient programmes for chronic diseases in high-income countries is not in the first place a reduction in health service utilisation, there is some evidence that expert patient programmes do reduce health service utilisation while improving health outcomes (Kober & Van Damme 2006).

Exploring this aspect in the context of the current study has shown that Expert Client programmes do hold great potential for the context of chronic ART care in resource-constrained settings.

Additionally, by exploring into the emerging relationships I have highlighted the tensions arising in care, which has allowed for an understanding of PLWA professional involvement as Expert Clients. The implication of the findings here is that whereas caregiving can be an immensely enriching experience, one that immeasurably deepens human connections, it can also create crushing burdens, devolving into mutual punishment. There is no way to eliminate the core of responsibility and obligation embedded within the caregiving relationship. If the provider or the Expert Clients as a caregiver is not morally, emotionally, and educationally well prepared, then caregiving can become a frustrating experience and, for those involved, an intrusion and a threat rather than a helping connection.

Even medical caregivers can become so stressed by impossible demands that they are unable to give the care they would otherwise be able to offer, and their frustration can turn to undifferentiated anger, affecting their performance and inevitably leading to the denial of comfort to patients and to the health workers themselves.

Nonetheless, the meaningful involvement of PLWHA as an integral part of the health care team can be useful to support the implementation of the National AIDS Program strategic plan in fostering sustainable chronic care in a resource poor setting. But this would mean establishing a condusive environment where each party involved in the clinical space is educationally and emotionally prepared, and the contributions of each party appreciated. Whereas patients need to air their voices and these voices need to be hard, they should be accompanied with somekind of framework that operationalises and supports the functions and interactions of all parties.

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La revue scientifique : un élément d'analyse des sciences humaines et sociales

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Résumé
L'article se propose d'aborder la question de la structuration du champ des sciences humaines et sociales, en prenant pour "entrée" les revues scientifiques de ces disciplines, en particulier dans le cas de la production scientifique marocaine. Il s'agit, à travers l'analyse de la structure et du fonctionnement d'un ensemble de revues de sciences humaines et sociales, de montrer que cette production constitue un indice de la structuration de ce champ scientifique. L'article montre notamment qu'à une focalisation disciplinaire correspond un certain recentrage des revues sur elles-mêmes — donc un certain regroupement des chercheurs autour d'objets scientifiques, de normes de publication, ou encore de modèles de traitement de ces objets. Par ailleurs, des supports de publication comme les revues se resserrent autour de certains objets scientifiques, et doivent probablement l'importance croissante de leur noyau de contributeurs à cette spécialisation et à la visibilité peu à peu acquise par la revue ; en somme, à un certain monopole de la production scientifique.

Mots clefs: *Maroc – Sciences humaines et sociales – Revues scientifiques – Champ – Structure*

Introduction

Au Maroc, comme dans la majorité des pays occidentaux, la revue scientifique est le principal espace de publication retenu par les chercheurs pour faire connaître leurs résultats de recherches, le principal organe aussi de diffusion de ces résultats auprès de la communauté des chercheurs. Selon une recherche que nous avons

réalisée au Maroc sur la production scientifique globale (de 1995 à 2001), plus de 50 % des travaux scientifiques publiés prennent en effet place dans ce support (graphique 1, page suivante).

La revue scientifique offre donc un large panorama, même s'il n'est pas exhaustif, des domaines de recherches explorés et des sujets abordés par les chercheurs des différentes disciplines. L'ensemble des revues présente par ailleurs une image de la production scientifique en termes quantitatifs : il renseigne sur l'état de cette production du point de vue de la diversité et de la fréquence des sujets traités, et sur la communauté de chercheurs mobilisés pour aborder ces sujets. La fréquence de parution d'une revue instruit ainsi non seulement de l'intérêt accordé, au fil des années, à un domaine ou un thème donné de recherche, mais aussi des ressources mobilisées (en nombre de chercheurs) pour cette exploration. À titre d'exemple, après avoir été objets d'investigations constantes durant de nombreuses années, les recherches relatives à l'éducation paraissaient, il y a quelques années, de plus en plus rares ; et, lorsqu'elles se poursuivaient, elles ne suffisaient plus à alimenter la revue spécialisée sur ces questions, *Attadriss*, qui ne paraissait plus que très rarement (par exemple, sept ans séparaient le numéro de 1999 du précédent).

Une étude sur les principales revues en sciences humaines et sociales peut donc apporter des informations, non seulement sur les recherches conduites et sur leur publication, mais aussi sur l'état de la production, en termes de volume et de structuration. Par hypothèse, une telle étude nous semblait pouvoir offrir des réponses à la double question de savoir ce qui se publie et comment les recherches sont publiées, notamment à quelle fréquence et par quels chercheurs (identifiés selon leur discipline, leur institution d'appartenance, marocaine ou étrangère). De cette hypothèse a découlé une autre question : une analyse des revues scientifiques peut-elle renseigner sur les caractéristiques du champ des sciences humaines et sociales au Maroc, en particulier sur la structuration de ce milieu scientifique ?

In fine, c'est cette question qui a motivé les recherches dont nous exposons ici des résultats[1].

L'approche et la méthode ont été doubles : d'une part dépouiller des revues scientifiques et en analyser le contenu, d'autre part aborder les revues comme "contenants" — et non plus seulement comme véhicules de contenus scientifiques — ayant une structure particulière, dont l'analyse devrait permettre de comprendre le fonctionnement et, au-delà, des logiques structurantes du champ scientifique.

1 Nous avons développé une partie de la recherche, en particulier sur la nature disciplinaire de la production scientifique, dans un autre article (Gérard & Kleiche-Dray, 2006). Nous nous consacrerons ici exclusivement aux revues scientifiques.

Il s'agissait donc de "traiter" ce matériau scientifique non plus comme un réceptacle ou comme une collection de produits scientifiques individuels, mais de l'interroger pour tenter de déceler si les revues scientifiques ne sont pas le produit de "groupes" de chercheurs — donc de relations entre eux —, davantage que la simple agrégation d'articles publiés *in nomine* par des chercheurs, sinon isolés, du moins sans "relations de production scientifique" entre eux.

Graphique 1
Volume et part de chaque type de production scientifique dans la base recensée (1995-2001)



Pour tenter d'apporter des réponses à ces questions et avancer dans la validation de ces hypothèses, nous avons principalement retenu sept revues marocaines (après une première exploration de quatorze), en fonction de trois critères principaux : leur parution de 1995 à 2001 (certaines, comme la *Revue Maroc-Europe, Attadriss ou la Revue de géographie du Maroc* ont finalement été écartées compte tenu du faible nombre de publications durant cette période), leur représentativité disciplinaire, appréciée sur la base de l'ensemble des productions pour chaque discipline et sur la base d'entretiens avec des chercheurs, enfin l'"ancrage institutionnel" des revues (encart 1). Pour chaque numéro des revues sélectionnées, le dépouillement a consisté à dresser un fichier dans lequel devaient figurer, outre les coordonnées du numéro : le titre de l'article — auquel ont été affectés des mots-clefs thématiques —, l'auteur correspondant et sa discipline. Le dépouillement concerne les revues et leurs numéros suivants.

Encart 1

Les revues de Sciences humaines et sociales étudiées (1995-2001)

REMALD

Période : 1995 à 2001
Nombre de numéros : 27 (n°10 à n°38-39)
Nombre d'articles : 349
Nombre de contributeurs : 97

PROLOGUES

Période : 1995 à 2001
Nombre de numéros : 16 (n°4 à n° 21 + un n° H.S)
Nombre d'articles : 239
Nombre de contributeurs : 122

ANNALES MAROCAINES D'ECONOMIE

Période : 1995 à 1998
Nombre de numéros : 11 (n°11 à n°22-23)
Nombre d'articles : 126
Nombre de contributeurs : 93

HESPERIS TAMUDA

Période : 1996 à 1997
Nombre de numéros : 4 (n°34 à n°37)
Nombre d'articles : 51
Nombre de contributeurs : 49

REVUE JURIDIQUE POLITIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE DU MAROC

Période : 1995 à 2000
Nombre de numéros : 4 (28 à 31-32)
Nombre d'articles : 48
Nombre de contributeurs : 42

CAHIERS DE LA FONDATION ABDERRAHIM BOUABID

Période : janvier 97-mars 99
Nombre de numéros : 20 (1 à 27)
Nombre d'articles : 98
Nombre de contributeurs : 68

ETUDES MAGHREBINES

Période : 1996 à 2001
Nombre de numéros : 9 (n°1-2 à n°13)
Nombres d'articles : 41
Nombre de contributeurs : 33

Les spécificités disciplinaires des revues apparaissent comme suit, après relevé de tous les articles parus durant la période :

Tableau 1. Spécificités disciplinaires dominantes des revues dépouillées

Revue	Dominantes disciplinaires
Remald	Droit, économie, sciences politiques
Prologues	Sociologie, sciences politiques, littérature
Annales marocaines d'économie	Économie, socio-économie
Hesperis Tamuda	Histoire
Revue juridique politique et économique du Maroc	Droit, économie, sociologie
Cahiers de la fondation A. Bouabid	Sciences politiques, économie, sociologie
Études maghrébines	Histoire, philosophie, anthropologie

Parmi ces revues peuvent être distinguées celles qui sont à forte dominante disciplinaire (comme *Remald* pour les questions de droit) ou plus "ouvertes" de ce point de vue (comme *Prologues, Études maghrébines* ou la *Revue juridique, politique et économique marocaine (RJPEM)*, qui accueillent des articles de différentes disciplines : sociologie, sciences politiques, anthropologie, histoire, etc.). Les graphiques suivants en donnent une illustration pour deux revues incluses dans un champ disciplinaire similaire, *Remald* et *RJPEM*.

Graphiques 2 et 3
Répartition des articles selon la discipline des auteurs dans les revues *Remald* et *RJPEM*





Les revues se différencient aussi selon que la publication est assurée par leur université d'appartenance (comme les revues des Facultés de lettres, sciences humaines et sociales de Fès, Oujda ou Marrakech — pour ne citer que celles-là) ou par une institution non universitaire, moins directement liée à l'enseignement supérieur (par exemple *Prologues* ou *Les Cahiers de la Fondation A. Bouabid*).

La plupart des revues ici retenues (*Remald*, *Prologues*, les *Annales marocaines d'économie*, *Hesperis tamuda*, la *Revue juridique politique et économique du Maroc*, les *Cahiers de la fondation A. Bouabid* et les *Études maghrébines*) ont par ailleurs une parution irrégulière. Certaines sont plutôt annuelles (la plupart), d'autres plutôt mensuelles (les *Cahiers de la fondation A. Bouabid*), d'autres encore comptent quelques numéros par an (*Remald*).

La Revue Scientifique : Une Structure de Publication en "noyau" et "cercles" de Contributeurs

L'une des questions principales posées pour appréhender la structuration de la production scientifique a été de savoir comment "fonctionne" chaque revue : repose-t-elle sur une quelconque "communauté de chercheurs" ? Si, oui, celle-ci est-elle homogène ou hétérogène d'un numéro à l'autre et dans le temps ? Plus encore : peut-on, en termes de structuration des revues, identifier une règle ou un schéma de fonctionnement qui s'applique à toutes, quel que soit leur champ disciplinaire respectif ? La réponse n'est, *a priori*, pas donnée. Rien ne permet, en effet, de préjuger que toutes les revues publient selon les mêmes règles, qu'elles comportent les mêmes structures, ou encore qu'elles soient alimentées en articles de manière identique.

Des indicateurs simples vont dans ce sens : toutes les revues n'ont pas de comité de lecture ; toutes n'ont pas non plus de "focalisation disciplinaire".

Deux indicateurs, en revanche, ne sont pas visibles sans analyse : le fait que des revues reposent, ou non, sur un nombre donné de contributeurs — une hypothèse conjointe voulant que ces derniers soient mutuellement identifiés — et, parallèlement, le mode de publication des chercheurs — soit de manière privilégiée dans un nombre restreint de revues, soit, à l'inverse, dans le plus large éventail possible. Ces deux indicateurs se rejoignent bien sûr pour mettre au jour la configuration de la production scientifique — ses modes, ses règles, sa capacité à structurer le champ de recherches, ou encore le pouvoir de représentation que peuvent en tirer des chercheurs ou groupes de chercheurs.

Pour apprécier le fonctionnement des revues, nous avons, dans un premier temps, regardé si les articles sont toujours produits par des auteurs différents ou si, à l'inverse, ils sont principalement écrits par quelques contributeurs.

Nous avons donc relevé la production moyenne par auteur, sur l'ensemble des numéros dépouillés pour chaque revue. Notons en premier lieu qu'un simple comptage fait état d'un mode hétérogène de production d'une revue à l'autre. Par exemple, et pour prendre les cas extrêmes, les auteurs de la revue *Hespéris Tamuda*, répertoriés à travers 51 articles publiés en 1996-97, en avaient écrit, en moyenne, un chacun ; ceux de la revue *Remald*, examinée de 1995 à 2001 à travers ses 27 numéros, en avaient écrit, toujours en moyenne, près de trois (tableau 2).

Tableau 2. Production moyenne d'articles par auteur dans les revues dépouillées

Revue	Nombre d'articles	Nombre de contributeurs	Nombre moyen articles/ contributeurs
Remald	254	97	2,6
Prologues	239	122	1,9
Annales marocaines d'économie	126	93	1,3
Hesperis Tamuda	51	49	1
Revue JPEM	46	42	1,1
Cahiers de la fondation A. Bouabid	98	68	1,4
Études maghrébines	41	33	1,2
Total	**855**	**504**	**1,7**

Ce simple constat permettait d'émettre l'hypothèse que chaque revue comptait des auteurs qui apportaient régulièrement leur contribution, d'autres plus épisodiquement, d'autres encore, de façon occasionnelle. Autrement dit, chaque revue comporterait ce que l'on désignera ici par un "noyau" de chercheurs

rédigeant régulièrement des articles pour la revue — si ce n'est dans chaque numéro —, et des "cercles" de contributeurs plus occasionnels — des cercles que l'on pourrait sans doute aussi différencier selon la participation respective des auteurs à l'ensemble des publications de la revue. Pour le vérifier, on a procédé au comptage systématique des articles écrits par chaque auteur, sur l'ensemble des numéros de chaque revue. Un nombre modal d'articles par auteur a ainsi pu être identifié pour chaque revue. Enfin, des " classes " — ou nombre d'articles par auteur — ont été établies, permettant de figurer le volume de production pour les auteurs, la dispersion de ces derniers selon leur production et, également, la répartition des articles en fonction de ce volume respectif de production.

Pour les revues que nous avons dépouillées, ces caractéristiques se présentent de la façon suivante :

Tableau 3. Nombre modal d'articles par auteur dans les revues dépouillées

Revue	Nombre minimum d'articles/ auteur	Nombre maximum d'articles/ auteur	Nombre modal d'articles/ auteur	" Classes " d'articles (1)
Remald	1	43	4	[1-3], [4-6], [7-9], [10-12], [13 et +[
Prologues	1	20	2	[1-2], [3-4], [5-8], [9 et +[
Annales marocaines d'économie	1	6	1	[1], [2-3], [4 et +[
Hesperis Tamuda	1	2	1	[1], [2]
RJPEM	1	3	1	[1], [2], [3]
Cahiers de la fondation A. Bouabid	1	11		[1-2], [3-4], [9 et +[
Études maghrébines	1	3	1	[1], [2-3]

Deux distinctions importantes apparaissent entre les revues : d'une part, le nombre maximum — et le nombre modal — d'articles par auteur varie. Au maximum, les contributeurs de revues écrivent de 3 à 43 articles ; le nombre modal

est, lui, de 1 à 4. D'autre part, les "classes" d'articles, telles qu'on les a définies, sont elles aussi inégales. La revue *RJPEM*, par exemple, ne comprend que trois "classes" correspondant chacune à une production d'un article seulement, tandis qu'une revue comme *Remald* compte cinq "classes" — qui sont, de surcroît, plus importantes, puisque, lors de notre dépouillement, la grande majorité des auteurs avaient publié au moins deux articles. Qui plus est, les contributeurs de la première avaient produit trois articles au maximum, alors que les auteurs les plus prolifiques de la seconde en avaient écrit plus de treize.

Les graphiques ci-dessous illustrent ces écarts : dans le cas de la revue *RJPEM*, 93,8 % des articles étaient écrits par de très nombreux auteurs distincts (97,6 % de l'ensemble des contributeurs de la revue) ; la production des auteurs les plus prolifiques (2,4%) ne représentait, elle, qu'une part minime de tous les articles publiés par la revue (6,2%). En revanche, 46,5 % seulement des articles de la revue *Remald* étaient écrits par des auteurs occasionnels (n'ayant publié qu'un, ou deux, ou trois articles), alors que plus du quart des articles étaient dus à quelques contributeurs (2,1 % de l'ensemble).

Graphiques 4 et 5



Caractérisation de la production scientifique des revues *REMALD* et *RJPEM*



Apparaissent ainsi des " noyaux " d'auteurs, distingués par la fréquence et le volume importants de leurs contributions à la revue. Suivant nos deux exemples, le noyau de la revue *Remald* (2,1 % des contributeurs) est, de façon relative, beaucoup plus "important" que celui de la revue *RJPEM* (2,4 %), puisque, dans le premier cas, les membres de ce noyau participent à 25,5 % de la production totale de la revue — contre 6,2 % seulement pour le noyau de la seconde revue.

Différents " cercles " d'auteurs, correspondant aux "classes" précédemment définies de publications par auteur, peuvent également être mis au jour. Certains cercles sont plus proches du noyau des contributeurs réguliers, et plus denses dans la mesure où la production des auteurs, même irrégulière, représente un volume non négligeable d'articles.

D'autres cercles, à l'inverse, sont davantage "périphériques" : les chercheurs qui en font partie ne publient dans la revue que de manière occasionnelle (souvent une seule fois).

La structure de la revue *Remald* peut ainsi être caractérisée par cinq "classes" de productions par auteur, et par autant de "cercles" de contributeurs : de un à trois articles écrits, de quatre à six, de sept à neuf, de dix à douze, enfin de treize articles et plus (le minimum d'articles écrits par auteur étant de un, le maximum étant de quarante-trois). La structure de la revue *RJPEM*, comme nous l'avons vue, est tout autre.

Le noyau et les cercles de contributeurs varient donc d'une revue à l'autre, selon deux paramètres : le nombre respectif de contributeurs d'une part, le volume d'articles écrits par eux, en proportion de l'ensemble des articles publiés par la revue, d'autre part (voir graphiques pages suivantes[2]). Certaines revues ont un " noyau " très restreint d'auteurs qui se détachent par leur contribution plus importante et régulière à la revue ; tel est par exemple le cas de la revue *RJPEM*. À l'inverse, le noyau de certaines autres revues, de même que les cercles de différents contributeurs, sont l'un et les autres très importants : non seulement les auteurs réguliers et "fidèles" à la revue y publient une proportion importante de toutes les publications, mais la revue compte nombre de contributeurs qui lui proposent des textes en volumes très variables.

C'est le cas, par exemple, des revues *Prologues*, *Annales marocaines d'économie* ou encore *Remald*.

2 *Pour représenter ce noyau, on a choisi de faire correspondre aux contributeurs les plus " productifs " le plus petit cercle. Pour calculer les diamètres des différents cercles, on a donc pris l'inverse du nombre d'articles (plus celui ci est grand, plus le diamètre est petit), multiplié par 10 pour une question d'échelle et de visibilité. Chaque " volume " de contributeurs est repéré par l'intervalle entre deux cercles de même couleur. Le diamètre du second cercle correspond au diamètre du premier, auquel augmenté du nombre de contributeurs divisé par 20. On veut remercier ici P. Giraudbit pour sa collaboration à cette figuration.*

Dans la première (voir graphique), 46,9 % seulement des articles que nous avons dépouillés de 1995 à 2001 avaient été écrits par des auteurs qui n'intervenaient qu'exceptionnellement, à raison de un article ou deux ; 53,1 % des articles avaient donc été écrits par des auteurs qui proposaient trois contributions ou plus (jusqu'à 20 pour l'auteur le plus prolifique). Parallèlement, la revue comptait au moins trois cercles d'auteurs en fonction du volume de leurs contributions. Un premier cercle regroupait des contributeurs qui figuraient de cinq à huit fois dans la revue, un second des auteurs qui apportaient trois à quatre contributions, un dernier enfin de chercheurs qui n'y publiaient qu'une fois ou deux. Comme *Prologues*, la revue *Remald* a un noyau de contributeurs plus important que pour les autres revues, et des cercles périphériques d'auteurs qui rédigent une importante proportion d'articles. Ainsi, pour la période que nous avons retenue, 53,5 % des articles étaient écrits par 13,4 % des auteurs, et 2,1 % des auteurs comptabilisaient 25,5 % de l'ensemble des articles écrits sur la période. 8,2 % des auteurs rédigeaient entre quatre et six articles, et 3,1 % de dix à douze.

De La Spécialisation au Monopole de La Publication Scientifique

Certaines revues accueillent donc très majoritairement des auteurs différents et qui n'interviennent que ponctuellement, voire exceptionnellement. Parallèlement, elles ne reposent que sur très peu d'auteurs " permanents ", dont la contribution est de surcroît modeste par rapport à l'ensemble des articles publiés.

Réciproquement, certaines revues semblent moins "ouvertes", dans le sens où leur fonctionnement repose pour partie sur un noyau d'auteurs plus important, dont la contribution est parfois majoritaire par rapport à l'ensemble des articles.

Dans ce cas, même si les contributeurs extérieurs au noyau et au(x) premier(s) cercles(s) alimentent fortement la revue, leur place est bien moins importante que pour le premier ensemble de revues, et parfois même secondaire.

Une telle étude du fonctionnement des revues, à travers l'identification de leurs "noyau" et "cercles" de contributeurs d'une part, à travers la répartition des contributions par auteurs d'autre part, apporte ainsi plusieurs enseignements.

En premier lieu, si ce fonctionnement possède des ressorts communs à toutes les revues — en particulier l'existence d'un noyau et de différents cercles —, ce fonctionnement est assez hétérogène. Schématiquement en effet, certaines revues vivent essentiellement de l'apport ponctuel de contributeurs toujours nouveaux (en particulier les revues *RJPEM* et *Hesperis Tamuda*) ; d'autres, à l'inverse (*Prologues*, *Annales marocaines de l'économie* ou la revue *Remald* surtout) bénéficient du concours régulier de cercles restreints de contributeurs et offrent leurs colonnes à des auteurs extérieurs, de manière ponctuelle et exceptionnelle,

dans une bien moindre mesure.

Faute d'investigations qualitatives (auprès des comités de rédaction de revue notamment), on se gardera ici d'aller trop loin dans l'interprétation d'une telle donnée. Ignorant si cette structuration ressortit à une demande (forte ou faible) de contributeurs extérieurs à chaque revue, ou à une politique d'édition particulière de l'une à l'autre, on ne saurait en effet apporter de conclusions fermes sur ces apparentes "fermeture" ou "ouverture " — au demeurant relatives — des différentes revues. On avancera l'hypothèse (pour s'en assurer il faudrait lire l'ensemble des articles ici répertoriés) que cette "fermeture" et cette "ouverture" constituent des indices de structuration du champ de production et de diffusion des recherches. Certaines revues, en effet, semblent privilégier les résultats de recherche propres au champ scientifique marocain, tandis que d'autres paraissent s'ouvrir davantage aux recherches externes à ce champ.

On notera aussi que chaque discipline a visiblement des modes différents, pluriels, de production et de diffusion des résultats de recherche. Pour l'économie, par exemple, les revues *RJPEM* et les *Annales marocaines d'économie* sont caractéristiques puisqu'elles présentent très nettement les deux schémas de fonctionnement précédemment distingués. On notera aussi, plus justement peut-être, qu'il n'y a pas — et ce, pour aucune discipline — de mode unique de production et de diffusion des recherches. Chaque "champ disciplinaire" est en lui-même hétérogène : il recourt à des modes différenciés de production, de publication et de diffusion des recherches, que celles-ci lui soient propres (internes) ou extérieures.

Une investigation plus poussée permet cependant d'être plus précis : manifestement, pour les revues marocaines étudiées, c'est la longévité de la revue — son histoire, donc — qui module son fonctionnement. La participation de chercheurs extérieurs au noyau est en effet toujours plus nette pour les jeunes revues que pour celles qui ont dépassé un nombre important de numéros. Conjointement, le noyau des revues anciennes est plus important (en volume de publications), et la contribution des auteurs occasionnels proportionnellement moindre. Un support comme la revue scientifique semble ainsi permettre la réunion de chercheurs et semble fonctionner petit à petit comme un pôle de production scientifique, de reconnaissance (scientifique, s'entend) de chercheurs — par l'audience que représentent la publication et sa diffusion — et, tout autant, comme un espace de visibilité institutionnelle des recherches. Cette visibilité et cette reconnaissance des chercheurs et des recherches configurent le champ de la recherche lui-même. En effet, non seulement elles signalent la "réussite" de chercheurs ou de groupes de chercheurs dans le procès de reconnaissance auquel ils sont soumis de la part de leurs pairs (Bourdieu, 1975, 1991 ; Latour & Woolgar, 1979, (Latour, 1995), mais elles fonctionnent comme un aimant pour

Graphique 6 - Répartition des contributeurs selon le nombre d'articles - Revue Juridique, Politique et Economique du Maroc



Graphique 7 - Répartition des contributeurs selon le nombre d'articles Revue Prologues



tout chercheur extérieur (« il faut absolument que tu publies là ») et contribuent, en retour, à l'émergence de ce que l'on a pu désigner par "école" (*i.e.* de pensée[3]).

Comme le signale B. Godin, « *les chercheurs, dont le capital scientifique est tributaire de l'audience potentielle, tendent évidemment à maximiser l'impact de leurs travaux en essayant de publier dans les revues les plus largement diffusées* » (Godin, 2002 : 466), en l'occurrence celles où publient les chercheurs qui ont obtenu une consécration de leurs pairs.

La comparaison des revues marocaines dépouillées (de la structure de leur production en noyau et cercles périphériques) suggère donc qu'à mesure de son évolution, la majorité d'entre elles se resserrent autour d'un noyau de contributeurs principaux et enregistrent une participation de contributeurs extérieurs plus faible qu'elle ne l'était à la naissance et dans les premiers temps de la revue.

Chaque revue semble peu à peu se "recentrer" sur elle-même — soit qu'elle ne parvient pas à fidéliser ses contributeurs, soit que sa diffusion ne lui permette pas un apport régulier de contributeurs occasionnels. À l'étude, on voit ainsi que le fonctionnement de la revue scientifique de SHS au Maroc ne va généralement pas dans le sens d'une "externalité" mais, au contraire, dans celui d'un recentrage sur elle-même.

Cette donnée n'est pas générale, loin s'en faut. L'analyse d'une autre revue scientifique, française cette fois — analyse que l'on ne détaillera pas ici —, a pu au contraire nous montrer que la longévité de la revue allait de pair avec la contribution, toujours plus importante quantitativement, de chercheurs extérieurs au cercle des fondateurs.

Si cette revue spécialisée pouvait également constituer un pôle quant aux publications sur son objet principal (l'éducation), elle ne le devait qu'à cette agrégation constante de chercheurs extérieurs, proportionnellement de plus en plus importants par rapport au noyau initial de la revue.

Cette étude sur le fonctionnement de la production scientifique des SHS au Maroc invite ainsi à émettre l'hypothèse que le mode de recherche — voire le fonctionnement des équipes de chercheurs, et des chercheurs eux-mêmes — répond à une logique particulière, allant dans le sens d'une concentration importante.

À mesure de son évolution, ce champ de la recherche semble ainsi atomisé en un ensemble de "groupes" de chercheurs communs par leur discipline et, à la fois, "concentré" en quelques "groupes" qui produisent prioritairement autour d'eux-mêmes.

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3 *En France, une revue vient spontanément à l'esprit à cet égard : les Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, très longtemps dirigée par Pierre Bourdieu.*

Cette caractéristique, qui demanderait des recherches qualitatives complémentaires, indique l'une des directions possibles pour une éventuelle recherche sur les SHS : une étude du fonctionnement du champ global de ces sciences peut prendre pour base l'identification des noyaux de chercheurs (et non plus de contributeurs — avec lesquels il faudrait néanmoins les comparer), par discipline et appartenance institutionnelle, et se prolonger par l'étude des modes de collaboration/coopération de ces chercheurs, entre eux et avec d'autres, plus occasionnels.

Enfin, s'il s'agit d'identifier le mode de travail et de coopération possible, avec les chercheurs en SHS, il apparaît nécessaire d'identifier les principes et règles à la base de cette logique de fonctionnement : quelles peuvent être, notamment, les contraintes à la source de cette structuration en noyaux et de ce recentrage des chercheurs sur eux-mêmes ?

Conclusion

Nous avons pu montrer dans un autre texte que certains objets scientifiques sont davantage abordés et "traités" par certaines sciences sociales, de sorte que le travail et la production scientifiques respectent une certaine « *focalisation disciplinaire* » (Gérard & Kleiche, 2006).

L'une des conclusions apportées par ce volet d'étude sur les revues converge avec cette dernière donnée.

En effet, la structure des revues et leur mode de publication se modifient avec le temps : au départ largement alimentées par un grand nombre de contributeurs, dont les apports sont ponctuels, les revues se recentrent autour d'un nombre restreint de contributeurs, dont l'apport prend peu à peu de l'importance par rapport à celui des "cercles" périphériques d'auteurs extérieurs et occasionnels.

À une focalisation disciplinaire correspond ainsi un certain recentrage des revues sur elles-mêmes — donc un certain regroupement des chercheurs autour d'objets scientifiques, de normes de publication, ou encore de modèles de traitement de ces objets.

L'assertion corollaire semble vraie également : alors que certains thèmes font l'objet, à travers la focalisation des chercheurs, d'un approfondissement qui prend pour traits ceux d'une spécialisation — voire d'une spécificité — disciplinaire, des supports de publication comme les revues se resserrent aussi autour de certains objets scientifiques, et doivent probablement l'importance croissante de leur noyau de contributeurs à cette spécialisation et à la visibilité peu à peu acquise par la revue ; en somme, à un certain monopole de la production scientifique.

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Situating South Africa's Past, Present and Future

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Shakela Bukingu, John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman {eds.} [2007]. *State of the Nation – South Africa*. Publishers - Human Science Research Council {HSRC} Press, ISBN 978-0706921888. Price R200.00, Paperback. 586 pages.

Adrian Hadland, Eric Louw, Simphire Sesanti and Herman Waiserman [2008] *Power, Politics and Identity in Southern African Media*. Human Science Research Council {HSRC}.ISBN 978-0-7969-2202-1. Price R180.00. Paperback. 403 pages,

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Vishnu Papayachee {ed.} [2006]. *The Development Decade – Economic and Social Change in South Africa, 1994-2004*. Publishers - Human Science Research Council {HSRC} Press ISBN. 0-7969-2123-7 Price

Nombonniso Gasa {ed.} [2007] *Women in South African History*. Publishers – Human science Research Council {HSRC} Press. ISBN 978-0-7969-2179-1 Price R210.00 paperback 458 pages

Richard Calland & Paul Graham {ed.} [2005]. *Democracy in the Time of Mbeki. Publishers – Institute for Democracy in South Africa {IDASA}, Cape Town*. ISBN 1-919 798-88-9: 13-978-1-919798-88-2. Price. Not given Paperback. 252 pages

Mcebisi Ndletyana {ed.} [2008] *African Intellectuals in the 19th and Early 20th*

Century South Africa. Publishers: Human science Research Council {HSRC} Press. ISBN 978-0-7969-2207-6 Price R100.00, Paperback 76pages

Andre Kraak & Karen Press [2008] *Human Resources Development Review 2008: Education, Employment and Skills in South Africa. Publishers Human Science Research Council* {HSRC} Press ISBN 978-07969-2203-8. Price R380.00 Paperback 640pages

Since the collapse of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has made tremendous progress in the process of constructing a capable developmental state to ensure sustainable development for the common good of its people. Both the mass media and knowledge production units (universities and research centres) have been active in the process. The books under review here document and comment on such effort. These books are in fact indicative of the state of intellectual maturity and discourse in the country; the determination to develop and properly utilise human capital resources, the state of freedom and quality of publishing which few African countries can march. The analyses and interpretations as offered by the various scholars depart from different analytical theoretical framework. Some of the interpretations are critical of government policies and state institutions but have the goals of aiding government to be transparent and correcting certain wrongs in society.

The State of Nation Report [2007]. This compact book comprising 22 chapters, surveys the political, economic, social, security and environmental health of the country. Grouped under four main themes, Politics, Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, the book penetrates the annals of an emerging society, depicting the strength, weakness, opportunities and threats faced by the continent's most prosperous state.

In the introductory chapter Roger Southall argues that 'state capacity' is a critical aspect of South Africa becoming a developmental state. State capacity is characterised within the realm of four dimensions: ideational, political, implementational and technical. How has South Africa been able to meet the formidable challenges that fall under these headings? Of course, opinions vary, even though it is probably true to state that there is a growing consensus around implementation and technical dimensions than around ideational and political capacities. The presidency of Mbeki comes under sharp focus. Southall goes further to contrast the regime of Mandela and that of Mbeki by stating that Mandela's presidency was characterised by the drive for national unity and racial reconciliation; while that of Mbeki sought to give substance to the ANC's perception of its historical role to structure a modern democracy out of the legacy of apartheid. [See Daniel et al. 2005].

Following the 1996 Constitution of South Africa which effectively went operational on 4th February 1997, the objectives of local government were established under three domain; {i}democratic and accountable government; {ii}the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; and{iii} facilitating the involvement of communities and associated organisations in local governance; activities which enhance the era of participatory developmental local government and thereby deepening democracy in the country [Reddy et al 2005]. The process continued even after the rift within the ANC and Mbeki's forced resignation in 2008 and as the country faced the 2009 elections.

The *State of the Nation Report* gives the reader a picture of the changing political dynamics in South Africa. It remains an interesting annual publication depicting unfolding socio-political and cultural evolutions in the rainbow nation. It remains an important reference book which raises and answers important questions on the socio-economic, environmental and cultural setting of South Africa. The treatment of the various subjects is nuanced and the writing is simple, accessible, packed with useful statistical data and information for further exploitation by scholars. The contributors have done a marvelous job in piecing together systematically issues confronting South Africa.

Power, Politics and Identity in Southern African Media [2008] is a collection of essays presented at an international conference in Stellenbosch, South Africa, in July 2006 as part of a project to excavate the space between media and identity. The media, of course, have many forms, just as identity has many variations. The media do generate, corroborate and accelerate identity formation, just as they diminish, overshadow and negate it. The variety of essays included in this volume reflects the various forms this process took during the first decade of democracy in South Africa.

The contributors concentrate on the 'double moment' of change and continuity paying attention to racism and identity. The book is organised into three sections. The first section focuses on "Identity in Theory" and has five contributions beginning with "Media, Youth and Violence in South Africa" by Abebe Zegeye who sees identity as 'people's source of meaning and experience' {Castells 1999:6-7}. In the discussion of essentialism, Kees van der Waal emphasises the challenges to studies of identity, culture and language. He points out that all forms of essentialism need to be questioned and seen as political attempts to frame constructions in a specific way, based on a set of interest and relationships. He goes on to address Neo-Afrikaner nationalism, as an ethnicisation process and a tool of the transfer of power by Afrikaans-speaking whites to a mainly African elite that prioritises the use of English to access the world of work and knowledge. He points out the importance of the political economy of language: "in order to get rid of the myth of purity and essentialism that are crippling

successful dialogue, it is necessary to embrace variety and process in their place."

The paper by Ruth Teer-Tomaselli looks at the relationship between the public broadcaster, the public, the nation and the state and problematises the way that the concept 'has been applied to media with an almost canonical reverence'. She goes to streamline the fact that the confluence of South Africa's democratising process and accelerated globalisation places the South African public broadcaster in a precarious position. Section two "Media Restructuring and Identity Formation After Apartheid" has five contributions and explores in a more detailed way, South Africa's media which have undergone massive changes in the wake of the country's political transformation from apartheid to democratic rule.

A significant trend in the post-1994 print media is the arrival of tabloid newspapers. In 1994, the biggest selling daily newspaper with an average of 191 322 copies per day was *The Star* of Johannesburg. By 2006, the *Daily Sun* was selling over 450 000 copies daily with a daily readership of 3.44 million. The authors note the arrival of the tabloids, and the controversy among media analysts. First, commentators bemoaned the apparent poor journalism of the tabloids which they considered was construed within dodgy ethics and pandering to the lowest common denominator. Nicolas Jones et al. present critical thoughts in their analysis noting that "while tabloid journalism may have many faults, it can also be seen as alternative arena for public discourse."

Tanja Bosch in "Online Coloured Identities" examines how the meaning of 'coloured' is explored on the Internet. She states that "coloured identity is linked more to global notions of blackness than to a South African black identity: coloured identity is still more than a dated apartheid label: it has been invented and reinvented". Anthea Garman's analysis of Antije Krog's *"Country of My Skull"* uses the experience of reporting on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission {TRC} to illustrate this notion and contemplates its implications for identity formation. Apparently, the TRC has become South Africa's export commodity in reconciliation, peace-building, post-conflict resolution and reconstruction in enhancing the democratisation process across the world. South Africa was deformed and destroyed by apartheid, and Garman's paper is a contribution to understanding the political and developmental context and role of the media in identity formation after apartheid.

The last section focuses on different identity formations. The paper by Simphiwe Sesanti "The Media and Zuma/Zulu Culture: An Afrocentric and Contemporary South African Media "adopts a form of perennialism to understand identity. By and large this section offers a series of case studies depicting the tensions and struggles associated with the birth of a new and mutation of old identities in contemporary South Africa. Wiida Fourie's paper "Afrikaner Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Self in terms of the Other" reveals how Afrikaners

are adjusting to the post-apartheids environment. He draws out core features of Afrikaner identity which remain resistant to change.

Anita Howarth's paper on identity is different from other contributions insofar as it focuses on government's attempts to manufacture a state identity. The author argues that South Africa's collective identity constructed and popularised since 1994 is now under threat due to struggles over how South Africa should respond to the Zimbabwe crisis; a crisis which is undermining some elements of the 'self-vision' South Africans have constructed of themselves. If Howarth is correct, South Africans may end up reconceptualising their collective vision, which would reconstruct key elements of their collective identity.

Democracy in the Time of Mbeki edited by Calland and Graham [2005] presents Thabo Mbeki as the pre-eminent political figure in the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Nelson Mandela is the hero and global icon securing and giving international prominence to the struggle for, an ultimate acquisition of, democratic majority rule. Section 1 – "Index: Scoring South Africa's Democracy" scores the country on issues as 'participation and democracy' [11 questions with a score 6.2]; 'elections and democracy' [33 questions with a score of 7.2]; 'accountability and democracy' [20 questions with a score 5.7]; 'political freedom and democracy' [18 questions with a score of 6.9]; and 'human dignity and democracy' [18 questions with a score of 4.7]. There is a total of 100 questions with a total score of 6.3. The index assesses the state of democracy and the extent to which all are contributing to the general well-being of society or eroding it. The democracy index is by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa).

Section 2 "Context: Contemporary thoughts on Democracy" provides some conceptual context, with a series of contemporary thoughts about democracy – 'A Symbiotic Relationship – Business And Democracy'; 'Black Economic Empowerment – Capital and Democracy'; 'The Politics of Centralisation – Citizens and Democracy'; 'Mixed Signals – Women and Democracy'; 'South Africa in the World – Foreign Policy and Democracy'; 'Social activism – Globalisation and Democracy'. Section 3 – Analysis: Applying Idasa's Index'. Here the index is applied by five scholars for their critical analysis. The section begins with 'Real Citizenship – Participation and Democracy'; 'An Active Electorate – Elections and Democracy'; 'Servants of the People – Accountability and Democracy'; 'Political Freedom – Equality and Democracy'; 'Inequality lives on – Human Dignity and Democracy'.

The study is an attempt to measure South Africa's progress in achieving and maintaining stability and order, change and promote the wellbeing of the least advantaged, within a rights-based constitutional. The book tries to take the pulse of South Africa's transition to democratic governance and its consolidation. Apparently, there is no short cut to democratisation. Nevertheless, the country

has made significant strides towards the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Since the collapse of the apartheid governance system the political landscape has changed for the better. The creation of new institutions to promote and protect democracy gives the country an edge over other African nations which the various authors attempt to address from their different disciplines. It is an interesting publication depicting the reality that the new South African democracy is alive and kicking.

African Intellectuals in the 19th and Early 20th Century edited by Mcebisi Ndletyana [2008] is an introduction to the lives and works of five exceptional Africa intellectuals based in the former Cape Colony in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This unique study recounts and preserves a part of African intellectual heritage which is not widely known. In reviewing this book, one draws inspiration from the 1998 Nobel Prize Laureate for Economics, Amartya Sen's [2005] publication. The slim volume of 76 pages does not do justice to African 'Intellectuals'. Nonetheless, the book establishes the premises of understanding literary traditions, culture and religions within the African context. By and large, the book creates the anvil to understand and distinguish the role an individual plays in the transformation of a society. Thus the publication is 'timely and its value is timeless' and gives a voice to Africans in a manner that makes us 'understand how they interpreted and reacted to colonial conquest and the missionary proselytizing project'[pxi].

The book profiles the lives and works of five individuals: Ntsikana, Tiyo Soga, John Tengo Jabavu, Mpilo Walter Benson Rubusana and Samuel Edward Krume Mqhayi. These early intellectuals, based in the Cape, owed their rise to the cumulative impact of missionary activities, as well as to British colonialism. The Missionaries first arrived among Xhosas in September 1799.

Ntsikana conceptualised and constructed his religious belief in a pattern that attracted and accommodated the various cultural dimensions of his people. Because of this fusion, Ntsikana could advance Christian beliefs within the African community. Tiyo Soga was the first internationally educated South Africa and priest, a pioneer of African literature, and a seminal intellectual. Tiyo Soga embodied the paradox of the civilising mission, personified the modernising influence of the missionary enterprise, but was also an indictment of the supposed moral virtue of the colonial establishment. He had a brief but illustrious life span of only 42 years, but turned his educational training towards awakening the very same national pride and consciousness that his missionary teachers had denounced.

Soga's ideas were the precursor of nationalist thought, and sowed the seeds of black consciousness and black theology in South Africa. Black consciousness was to given a new kiss of life by Steve Biko in the 1970s leading to a new break path

for the demise of the apartheid governance system which finally came in 1994. John Tengo Jabavu was a pioneer of African journalism and champion of higher education for Africans and a controversial figure who woefully depended on white-liberal agency. Ultimately, he was a very conflicting figure. Tengo excelled at an early age in literature and mathematics and repeatedly won many academic competitions.

Mpilo Walter Benson Rubusana, educationist, journalist and politician who started his early childhood herding livestock, and went to school at the age of 16. He was part of a team that established more than 10 schools in and around East London; helped in providing and expanding formal education to Xhosa children. Rubusana advocated for compulsory education and went further than others in advocating mother-tongue education. His contribution to literature and history earned him an Honorary PhD from the McKinley Memorial University in Louisville, Kentucky in the United States, in 1906. His great works in the country were destroyed by the apartheid regime – the schools and churches were demolished during the apartheid programme of forced removal in the 1960s and 1970s when thousands of African inhabitants of East London were uprooted to Mdantsane, a township in the Ciskei homeland 30 miles away. He passed away on 19 April 1936.

A renowned poet and author, Samuel Edward Krune Mqhayi embodied the transition of African narratives from the oral tradition to the written word. He fused his natural talent for oratory and story-telling with his literary training to produce the first ever literary collection by an *imbongi* – a poet and keeper of history. Mqhayi did not advocate that blacks put political and economic power towards the destruction of a white presence among them. Rather, he pleaded for racial cooperation, counseling that whites could become agents for good. He used poetry and the biblical analogy of a spear that, even though it is a lethal weapon can also be turned into a life-sustaining plough. His many texts reveal an intense interest in a variety of social issues.

This is a book of inspiration that should appeal strongly to the youths and for the senior citizens to dig deep into the libraries and rediscover the continent's lost intellectuals.

Poverty and Policy in Post Apartheid South Africa edited by Bhorat and Kanbue [2006] is a massive publication, 471 pages with 11 papers. The political freedom ushered after 1994 was seen as the basis for redressing long standing economic deprivations suffered by the majority of the population. The reduction of poverty in all its facets was high on the political agenda. This volume attempts an evaluation of this goal. Generally, the papers, individually and collectively, present an overview of the changing dynamics of the political, economic and social landscape of the new South Africa, drawing implications for policy articulation

in the second decade of the country's post-apartheid governance system. 'How well has South Africa done?' still remains a subject of debate. No doubt there has been progress in the economy, the critical issues remain poverty and inequality has been fought.

The various essays reflect this point. The conclusion of the authors is that: (a) there is an increase in both absolute and relative income poverty; (b) there has been an increase in income inequality, which is notably being catalysed by a rise in the share of within-group inequality; (c) despite some employment growth, the rapid expansion of the labour force has resulted in increased unemployment rates irrespective of the definitions used; (d) a large and swift fiscal resource shift has engendered widened access to assets and basic services for poor households; and (e) these changes in poverty and well-being in the post-1994 period have occurred within, and have influenced and been influenced by, an environment of tepid economic growth rates.

This is a publication of immense value to researchers, government ministries, policy-makers, international agencies, non-governmental organisations and students at all levels.

Women in South African History [edited by Nomboniso Gasa 2007] is a rich collection of texts and narratives, by 15 authors revisiting the task of writing South Africa's history from an overtly feminist perspective, giving readers an opportunity to understand and reflect on debates about women's power and location in new and fresh ways. The 458 page book takes readers on a long journey through the major themes of the country's history – colonial period through the struggle of the apartheid era to the present 'rainbow nation' making genuine efforts to consolidate its independence. The problems are not solved and remain challenging.

The introduction, "New Freedoms and New Challenges, a Continuing Dialogue" by Nomboniso Gasa, sets the premise of the book which examines the texture, confluences, narratives and nuances that are so powerful a part of the history of South Africa. The central thread running through the different phases of South Africa's history is the quest for emancipation. The desire for crossing rivers and moving boulders constitutes the constant struggles and movements of women; movements that at times were seen as unimportant and not warranting official documentation.

Admittedly, gender, feminism, womanism and African feminism all constitute a complex discourse with variant positions taken by the pros and cons of the subject. While not penetrating much into the debate, it can be pointed out that there are many academics, activists, politicians and policy-makers who associate feminism with Euro-American, Anglo-Saxon and Occidental traditions. There are of course those who argue that the very concept of feminism is out of place in

the African context. Yet the underlying reality is that women of African descent have been looking at ways in which their cultural and historical realities can be taken as point of departure in feminist scholarship and world view. Many writers have sought to address this vital topic [Oyewumi 1997;Walker 1983; Amaidume 1997; Hooks 1981] have made invaluable contributions in taking some of these issues forward and highlighting the limitations of the mainstream Euro-American feminist discourse.

This book is a significant contribution not only to South African historiography and feminist literature but of an invaluable input to the enter struggle for gender equality and recognition of the role and contributions by women in the nation struggle.

The Development Decade? Economic and Social Change in South Africa, 1994-2004 with Vishnu Padayachee as editor covers an impressive breadth of issues. The 471 page publication has as contributors scholars like Dani Nabudere; Jonathan Michie Adam Habib, Rashad Cassim, Eleanor Preston-Whyte, Kuben Naidoo, Dale McKinley, Julian May, Haroon Bhorate to name but a few.

Locating the South African challenges within the broader international perspective, the issues covered include all the major development challenges confronting South Africa – employment, HIV/AIDS and health policy, industrial policy, urban governance, poverty, inequality, the informal economy, social challenges, ethnic divide, and human resources development. The key development debates of the post-apartheid period are outlined and the success or failures of the past decades of reform, reconstruction and experimentation is considered from holistic and scientific perspectives.

Development Decade is a publication in 8 sections with 23 well-researched papers. The paper by Vishnu Padayachee, "Development Discourses in Post-Apartheid South Africa" notes that "the period in post-apartheid South Africa reminds one of what Philippe Hugon, writing about Francophone thinking in development economics, calls the 'period of modernisation." South Africa's development discourse is preoccupied with issues such as: the level and rate of unemployment, whether poverty and inequality are getting worse, how big is the informal economy? What is the HIV/AIDS status of the country? Looking at contemporary debates in a global context, Section 1 is examines African and South African development discourse within the context of a critique of the major theories of development that have emerged in the past 50 or more years, depicting the rise, fall and resurrection of 'development theory' in the post-war period, as well as the continuities and discontinuities in the way these theories have impacted on countries Africa. The contributors to this section include Gillian Hart and Dani Wadada Nabudere.

Section 2 "Macroeconomic Balance and Microeconomic Reform" examines

the initial wave of economic reforms in the country after the transition in 1994 and provides a rich account of the country's economic reform process. It looks at the employment effects of macroeconomic reforms in terms of both the performance and the possible options for the future. Distributive issues in post-apartheid South Africa constitute the topic discussed in Section 3 with contributions by Julian May and Francie Lund. The focus is on how the new government addressed the legacies of the racially determined poverty and inequality issues. What has government performance been in the past decade? What policies and programmes have made a difference? Section 4 focuses on global competitiveness, industrial upgrading and innovation with papers by Jo Lorentzen, Mike Morris, Glen Robbins and Justin Barnes. The papers look at South Africa's industry rapidly shifted from an import-substituting industrialization growth path towards one of engaging with the competitiveness demands of the global economy. This required a new industrial policy environment and new government support measures were necessary to assist manufacturing enterprises in meeting these challenges. The authors equally grapple with the question of how demand for knowledge especially by firms incorporated and articulated within discrete national and regional contexts. Equally, the authors examine the role of government in facilitating cluster development with a focus on the auto sector in developing countries.

Section 5 discusses issues concerning municipal governance and development with contributions from Christian Rogerson, Benoit Lootvoet and Bill Freund. Basically, the 1996 Constitution fundamentally changed local government into an independent sphere of government, seen as the "hands and feet" of reconstruction and development in South Africa. Using this as the premise of departure, it is pointed out that within Africa, the greatest progress in decentralisation is recorded in post-apartheid South Africa [Ndegwa 2002; Nel & Rogerson 2005] and, significantly, the country is now emerging as a pioneer in terms of local economic development (LED) on the African continent.

Section 6 deals with labour, work and the informal economy with contributions from Haroon Bhorat, Richard Devey, Caroline Skinner and Imraan Valodia. The paper by Haroon Bhorat looks at labour supply and demand constraints on job creation, noting that there has been a significant reconceptualisation of the notion 'informal economy'. First the post-apartheid labour market has experienced 'jobless growth' and the economy in the aggregate, has been creating jobs rather than shedding them. Second, in terms of both labour supply and labour demand, there exist significant microeconomic constraints, operating at the level of the household and firm, which remain a constraint on employment creation. Third, the role of information and knowledge networks was severely undermined for the 70 percent of the unemployed, as the employed and union

members were predominantly located in the middle-to-upper end of the expenditure distribution. And lastly, the 'pro-poor' orientation of the social grants has a labour market variant.

The issue of population, health and development is taken up in Section 7 with four papers concentrating on how to incorporate health practices and health technology into everyday life of all segments of society. Health remains an important catalyst between population and sustainable development. A healthy society is a productive and progressive society. Issues such as coping with illnesses and deaths in post-apartheid South Africa, condoms in marital and cohabiting partnerships and development issues around HIV/AIDS are discussed.

The topic of Section 8 is on social movements. Two poles of opinion are identified with regard to civil society. The one view is that civil society should be a unified volunteer sector that aims to assist the democratic state to implement its agenda; the other that civil society should constitute itself as a set of countervailing forces that can and should challenge state and corporate power. The papers by Habib, Imraan Valodia and Richard Ballard review these new social movements and assess their significance for the consolidation of South African democracy. Other sections look at why the new social movements are likely to remain outside of the mainstream of the country's institutional politics and why the poor may no longer view active participation within our 'representative democracy' as being in their interests.

The *Development Decade* depicts progress made by post-apartheid South Africa, looks at prevailing challenges as well as maps out strategies that can move and consolidate South Africa's developmental process. It remains a well researched and documented book which readers interested in the theories of development and the practical realities of transformation will find very useful.

Human Resources Development - Education, Employment and Skills in South Africa 2008 edited by Andree Kraak & Karen Press with 25 chapters, provides an extensive overview of the contextual factors driving human resources development in South Africa. The contributors point to the multi-faceted skills development strategy operating at three levels; (i) high skills policies aimed at expanding export-oriented manufacturing production and services provision particularly in new globally competitive 'niche' areas; (ii) the economy's ongoing need for intermediate skills, evident in the shortage of skilled artisans and technologists; and (iii) the provision of basic, entry-level skill for large scale job creation schemes, triggered by public sector initiatives, to ameliorate high levels of unemployment and despondency, especially amongst the youth and women.

The book points out certain flaws in human resources development noting that even though structural changes have occurred in South Africa since the collapse of apartheid towards greater capital and skills-intensity, these changes

have not dramatically reduced the demand for sufficient numbers of technically competent operatives, artisans and technicians in the manufacturing sectors of the economy. Secondly, the economy is characterised by greater poverty, unemployment and low levels of labour absorption. The expansion of entry-level jobs in labour-absorbing sectors is of crucial importance to South Africa's future prosperity. The book takes up issues covered in the 2003 volume with many updated sections. Most importantly, the various chapters in the *HRD Review* 2008 are strongly influenced by the three-level conception of skills development in the 2003 edition. The book is well illustrated with tables, diagrams and other useful statistical materials. It remains an essential user friendly resource for policy makers, managers, researchers and educators at all levels.

Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?

The strength and weakness of South Africa as a nation state can be seen through these books. The progress made so far are encouraging pointing towards better days ahead. But hard work, commitments and responsibility by all as well as shared prosperity are required in constructing a capable developmental state. Though South Africa is on the right track, much more is required to give this rainbow nation a kiss of life. Largely united, but tragically still deeply unequal, plagued by poverty, unemployment and still struggling to entrench the basic tenets of democracy, South Africa enters its second decade of democratic governance, strong and confident, and with resolve to do better as it approaches its third decade of independence.

As Calland and Graham [2005] note; "this is no time for complacency; having laid such a foundation, it must be used as a springboard for the full emancipation of South Africans." These publications show the necessity of building the critical mass for development. The books are well researched and written in readable language and appeal to a wide cross-section of the reading public, students, policy-makers, government officials, academics, international organisations, non-governmental organisations. South Africa is reconstructing its past in order to build a sustainable future. This requires all hands on deck.

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Zimbabwean History: Becoming Complex

Review of Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds.
Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008
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On the back cover of *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008* this reviewer's blurb says it is "a profoundly new history that tears apart all of the old certainties". That might be misleading: if the 'certainties' referred to are Zimbabwe's ruling party's versions of its truths, then any reader with an iota of objectivity would not find it hard to deconstruct them. It's not too difficult to refute the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) claim that Zimbabwe's modern war(s) of liberation (i.e. 'Chimurenga 2' in the sixties and seventies and 'Chimurenga 3' of the past decade) were all about restoring the land to its rightful occupiers, nor would it be difficult to disprove tales of a 'Zvimba Dynasty' that has the royal heritage of the Zimbabwe's current president going back centuries[1].

It is a tougher task to revise the more subtle historical beliefs beneath the turmoil of Zimbabwe today; there long before the current crisis. It is a more profound project to tear down and rebuild the intellectual foundations on which ZANU-PF has erected its ephemeral interpretations of the past to service its (hopefully equally fleeting, but already 30 years long) current hold on power. *Becoming Zimbabwe* has begun that process substantially.

It chips away at the old historical narratives and historiographical epistemologies reifying the pre-colonial and colonial contexts, the tensions of tribe, the contradictions of class, and the legacy of the liberation war, that constitute a complex matrix upon which the more propagandistic blandishments of contemporary Zimbabwe's tragedy rest.

1 *The Zvimba Dynasty,' The People's Voice, 24 February-2 March 2002. 1*

The accepted verities of history in Zimbabwe structure even anti-ZANU-PF discourses, not to mention 'a-political' versions of history. *Becoming Zimbabwe* is a long-awaited start at their dismantling.

Becoming Zimbabwe has also started a second, more overtly political project, inclusive of but also beyond a teleological reading that could have some readers believing there is a (neo- Nationalist) mission behind the title. (This is indicated in the introduction entitled "The Hard Road to Becoming National", which is so hard the end is not really in sight. Thus the editors' conclusion, befitting historians, tapers off with a call for better history – better than offered by truth commissions, at least! – which might somehow lead to an improved nation[alism]). *Becoming Zimbabwe* is not a book simply occasioned by the rise of an opposition party worth ZANU-PF worrying about, but there is a deep sense of democratic hope underpinning this historical omnibus, an aspiration that is epitomised by the Movement for Democratic Change (even in its two versions) and the civil society activism alongside it, spurring movement towards civic nationalism at the end of the tunnel.

Thus *Becoming Zimbabwe* surveys Zimbabwe's very *longue durée* (long, indeed: Gerald Mazarire's stunning 'Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe starts at around 850) with an openness of inquiry that prefigures a truly democratic dispensation while at the same time being very much aware that, as Bill Freund has put it, "in order to be meaningful, discussions of democratic prospects in [Zimbabwe or anywhere] … require a real grasp of the historically generated and limited situation … it is this dimension, this sense of the determined and the possible, to which historians in particular can make a crucial contribution[2]."

One cannot say that this book is burdened by the weight of history, because it is bursting with an effort to chart a history pregnant with a meaning saying 'the current tragedy did not *have* to happen: it was not predestined'.

Yet simultaneously none of the excellent historians in *Becoming Zimbabwe* would dare say Zimbabwe's present conjuncture is a *tabula rosa* on which a new history can be made, nor that the current imbroglio is not to some extent structured. Like all good social scientists – and this book is informed by a sociological sensibility combined with a political economy bias – the contributors are contesting the binaries of structure and agency that pervade any halfway interesting study of a society's past and present.

In these ways, then, *Becoming Zimbabwe* is both an intense survey of just

2 *Bill Freund, 'The Weight of History: Prospects for Democratisation in South Africa', Jonathan Hyslop, ed., African Democracy in the Era of Globalisation Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press, 1999, p. 434.*

about all the history and social science scholarship on Zimbabwe written to date, as well as an attempt – sometimes explicit, at others between the lines – to break out of those bounds. On the 'survey' front the range starts off by confronting slanted pre-colonial histories written seemingly to justify contemporary configurations of ethnic power or their mirror images. The seminal qualities of Mazarire's *tour de force* "Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe, c.850 – 1880s" must again be emphasised; not only for setting new angles on empirical research for that era but for establishing new lenses for the "sagas of political intrigue and competition" (p. 16) that now as well as then blend military strata with political and ideological castes in struggles for clientelism (Mazarire uses the notion objectively based on his study of what could be called the *nyai* class's move into spaces of power during times of transition: it is not a pre-disposition imposed by neo-Weberian political scientists) and re-aligned articulations of power leading to altered statist organisations. Perhaps the arrival of the Ndebele should be known for altering the complex *nyai* system more than their previously assigned role of the first oppressor 'nation': Mazarire – as well as Sabelo Ndlovu- Gatsheni in the next chapter on colonial encounters – starts the inquiries into the Ndebele place in Zimbabwe's history, the opening up of which is a pivotal part of the process of inventing a new Zimbabwe historiography.

Of course, part of that *apertura* leading to a new Zimbabwean history consists in the debates among Ranger, Cobbing and Beach about whether or not the 'first Chimurenga' was really a united struggle. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's "Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters, 1880s – 1930s" summarises those arguments adeptly (and Ranger's unity thesis does not come off too well).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni also starts off on a path promising more complexities, unevenness, complicity, contestations of too easy binaries, mimicry, syncretism, hybridities, negotiations, alienations – and even white's efforts to 'ndiginise themselves' (pp. 48, 68, 40) – than one chapter can hope to condense, if such a task is possible at all. Co-editor Alois Mlambo's contribution on the 1940s to the 1960s serves as ballast to such radical uncertainty as it surveys the more definite terrain of class differentiation amidst the development of a coherent ideology – stymied only by the intransigence of the Smithian rearguard, which sealed an equally interesting split between liberal and reactionary whites (still left too unexplored in this and all Zimbabwean histories) that led to war. Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and Teresa Barnes team up to write the next two chapters dealing with society, economy and war during the period of white reaction and black liberation. They start by accepting Jeffrey Herbst's strikingly American notion that the Rhodesian Front practised 'socialism for the whites' (what ever happened to the idea of 'state capitalism'?), but go on to

tackle the theme of 'nation' among both blacks and whites with considered complexity amidst the African nationalist struggle, as progress towards majority real was finally Manifested in 1980. The authors' comprehensive sources, ranging from a vast array of University of Zimbabwe history and political studies theses, assiduously cultivated official archives, oral history, and mastery of all the secondary literature one could imagine, reveals the high standards of the Zimbabwean intellectual industry.

Deftly weaving the political economy of sanctions and their busting with the demands of white workers for the 'good life', and the contradictory efforts to win the 'hearts and minds' of Africans while simultaneously practicing scorched earth policies, the march through the political economy of UDI leaves no doubt that antiquated beliefs about 'democracy', defined mostly by race but partially by merit, wealth and property, could not last long even if protected by an impressive – but expensive – war machine. In that context, perhaps it is not surprising that the history of the liberation war charted by the three authors is more interesting for the tensions of class, ideology, gender, generation and ethnicity illustrated from within the nationalists, than their progress towards a united nationalism or a victory which was more or less foretold. Continuing *Becoming Zimbabwe's* tradition of mastering the sources, James Muzondidya's "From Buoyancy to Crisis" charts the rise and fall of ZANU-PF's efforts t o consolidate the tenuous hold on power it gained in 1980 by blending a belated mode of welfarism (why Zimbabwe did not have to adopt structural adjustment policies until the 1990s while the rest of Africa was pushed into them much earlier is a question not asked here or elsewhere; but is probably intimately tied in with Cold War and southern African regional politics) with increasingly excessive coercive capacity. Structural adjustment policies in the nineties, combined with less than enthusiastic efforts to work out the land issue and to create a black bourgeoisie and middle class with a base in production rather than rent-seeking led ZANU-PF down the road to the crisis of the past decade with which we think we are all too familiar. Brian Raftopoulos's deftly crafted final chapter, however, blends all the elements of those years into a complex whole that goes beyond the expected. From debates about 'fast-track' land reform and the 'national democratic revolution', to the disappointments of South African-led 'mediation, to the economic meltdown epitomised by unimaginable rates of hyperinflation leading to the complete disappearance of Zimbabwe's dollar, Raftopoulos ability to blend scholarly activism with academic rigour unmatched in the ivory towers serves historians and political economists well.

Such a nuanced approach cannot allow the dialectic between authoritarian nationalism and deep new forms of democracy to be resolved. *Becoming*

Zimbabwe's conclusion is about as tentative – if not as stalemated – as the 'government of national unity' with which the decade ended. Raftopoulos has remarked lately that some of the reasons for Zimbabwe's impasse – perhaps as much intellectual as political and economic – are rooted in a sharp dichotomy between a historical and almost non-political notions of human rights and 'good governance' so pervasive in opposition and donor circles now, and a harsh, economistic idea of 'political economy' (combined, one might say, with a crude nationalism built on narrow notions of sovereignty and the importance of 'the land') deeply entrenched in the older generation of Zimbabwe's intelligentsia and political class[3]. *Becoming Zimbabwe* goes a good way to delivering on its promise to move us away from these debilitating binaries. If it becomes a set-university text and also informs secondary school curriculum restructuring, Zimbabwe could well be on the road to getting out of its impasse, which, as the chapters in this extremely thought-provoking book show, is deeper and more complex than ever imagined.

3 *See Brian Raftopoulos, "The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Challenges for the Left', Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 2, June 2006, pp. 203-17, for an early expression of this concern.*