6 - Corruption, croissance et capital humain : quels rapports ?
Corresponding Author(s) : Pierre Roche Seka
Afrique et développement,
Vol. 38 No 1-2 (2013): Afrique et développement
Résumé
L’objectif de ce papier est d’expliquer l’une des raisons du fort taux d’abandon devenu monnaie courante dans nos universités Africaines. En d’autres termes, comment dans un environnement corrompu, les étudiants perdent tout engouement de poursuivre les études.
Il a été démontré théoriquement, que l’attrait du gain facile en est la cause la plus pertinente. En effet, des étudiants talentueux qui au départ voudraient faire de longues études les jugent précipitamment trop longues, quand ils comparent le niveau de vie de ceux qui en ont déjà fait et ceux qui n’en ont pas fait mais riches de par la corruption.
La méthodologie pour analyser ce phénomène est de deux ordres : à la fois théorique et empirique. Premièrement, au plan théorique, nous sommes inspirés par l’hypothèse de Grusham qui dit que la mauvaise monnaie chasse la bonne ainsi que par la théorie de la panique bancaire qui est que lorsque des mauvaises banques font faillite, les clients des bonnes banques, une fois informés se précipitent pour exiger leurs avoirs dans l’affolement et sans chercher à comprendre, à tel point que c’est tout le système bancaire qui explose très rapidement. Nous pensons que ce phénomène pourrait être utilisé pour expliquer les abandons massifs des bons étudiants. Nous avons donc utilisé un modèle simplifié de la théorie de la panique bancaire pour montrer que dès que les étudiants talentueux sont informés de ce que les mauvais qui n’ont pas terminé les études s’enrichissent de façon frauduleuse, ils abandonnent les études précipitamment pour les rejoindre dans leurs activités mafieuses.
En second lieu, un modèle économétrique est utilisé pour montrer qu’il existe un lien négatif et significatif entre le taux d’inscription aux études universitaires et l’indice de corruption.
Les résultats confirment qu’il existe effectivement une relation négative et significative (dans un intervalle de confiance de 5%) entre le taux d’inscription aux études supérieures et le taux de corruption. Un tel mouvement dit de transfuge met en péril grave le système éducatif des pays Africains.
Enfin, le papier attire l’attention des pouvoirs publics sur le fait que si rien n’est fait pour rétribuer la connaissance à sa juste valeur, l’école en général, et l’enseignement supérieur en particulier, risque l’ex inction, mettant ainsi en péril tout effort de croissance et de développement.
Mots-clés
Télécharger la référence bibliographique
Endnote/Zotero/Mendeley (RIS)BibTeX
- Acemoglu, D.and J. Angrist, 2000, “How large are the social returns to education? Evidence from compulsory schooling laws”, in Bermanke, B. S. and Rogoff, K.(Eds), NBER Macroeconomic Annual, MIT Press.
- Al-Marhubi, F., 2004, “The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-country Analysis”, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol.22 (3), pp.394-406.
- Ali, A. M. and Hodan, S. I., 2003, “Determinant of Economic Corruption: A cross country comparison”, Cato Journal, Washington Vol. 22(3), pp. 449-469.
- Azariadis, A. J., and A. Drazen, 1990, “Treshold Externalities in Economic Development” , Quaterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104 (2), pp.: 501-526.
- Bardhan, Pranab, K., 1996, “The nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development”, Working Paper, no. c96-066, Dept. of Economics, University. of California at Berkeley, March.
- Bardhan, Pranab,K., 1997, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.35 (3), pp.1320-1346.
- Barro, R.J. (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross - section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106 (2), pp.407-443.
- Barro, R.J., 1997, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical Study, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Barro, R.J., and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1995, Economic Growth, McGraw Hill, New York, NY
- Beck, P. J. and Maher, M. W., 1986, “A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in thin Becker, G., 1993, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special References, Chicago University Press. Markets,” Economic Letters, Vol.20 (1), pp 1-5.
- Besley, T. and Mc Laren, J., 1993,“Axes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives”, Economic Journal, Vol.103(416), pp. 119-141.
- Campos, J.E., Lien, D. and Pradhan, S., 1999, “The impact of corruption on investment: Predictability matters” World Development, Vol. 27 (6), pp.1059-1067.
- Farida, M. and Ahmadi-Esfahani, F., 2008, “Corruption and Economic Growth in Lebanon”, Paper presented at the Australian Agricultural and Resources Economics Society Conference series, no 6043, Canberra, Australia, Feb. 5-8.
- Huntington, S.P., 1968, Political Ordering Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kraster,LandGaner,G.,2004,“TheMissingIncentiveCorruption:Anti-corruption and Re-election” in Kornai, J and Rose-Akerman, R. (Eds), Building a Trust Worthy State in Post-socialist Transition, New York, Palgrave.
- Krueger, Anne, O., 1974, “The political Economy of the rent-seeking Society”, American Economic Review, Vol. 64 (3).
- Leff, Nathaniel H., 1964, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption”, The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8 (3), pp. 8-14.
- Lui, Francis T., 1985, “An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery”, Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 93 (4), pp. 760-781.
- Lucas, R.E., 1988, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22 (1), pp. 3-42.
- Mauro, P, 1995, “Corruption and Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 (3), pp 681-712.
- Mauro, P., 1996 “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-country Analysis”, in Kimberly A.E.(Ed), Corruption and the Global Economy, the Institute for international economics, Washington.
- Mankiw, G., Romer, D. and Weil, D., 1992, “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 1107 (2), pp. 407-437.
- Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1993, “Why is Rent-seeking so Costly to Growth?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 83 (2), pp.409-414.
- Nobuo, A., Yusaku, H. and Masayo, S., 2005, “ Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-level Cross-section Data for the United States”, CIRJE Disscussion Papers, June 9.
- Ouattara, W., 2007, “Dépenses publiques, corruption et croissance dans les pays de l’Union Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA): une analyse de la causalité au sens de Granger », Revue Africaine de l’Intégration, Vol. 1 (1), pp.139-160.
- Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R., 2004, “Corruption’s effect on Growth and its transmission channels”,.KYKLOS, Vol.57 (3), pp.429-456.
- Podobnik, B., Shao, J, Njavro, D., Ivanov, P. Ch. And Stanley, H. E., “ Influence of corruption on Economic Growth Rate and Foreign Investment”, The European Physical Journal B., Vol. 63 , pp. 547-550.
- Psacharopoulos G., 1994, “Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update”. World Development, Vol.22 (9), pp. 1325-1345.
- Roberg, R., 2004, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Romer, P.M., 1990, “Endogenous Technical Change”, Journal of political Economy, Vol. 98 (5), pp. 71-102.
- Rose-Ackerman, S., 1996, “When is Corruption Harmful?”, Background paper for the 1997 World Development Report, the World Bank, Washington. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., 1993, “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.108 (3) pp 599-617.
- Stockey, N.L., 1991, “Human Capital, Product Quality and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106 (2), pp. 587-616.
- Svenson, J., 2005, “Eigth Questions about Corruption”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.19 (3), pp. 19-42.
- Tanzi V., 1998, “Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures”. IMF Staff Papers, Vol..45 (3).
- Tanzi V. and Davoodi, H. R., 1997, “Corruption, Public Investment and Growth” IMF Working Papers, no. 97/139.
- Van Rijckeghen, .C. and Weber, B., 2201, “Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption and by How Much?”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.65, pp. 307-331.
- Ventelon, B., 2001, “Equilibres et stabilité de la corruption dans un modèle de croissance: l’effet de la rémunération des politiciens”, L’actualité économique, Vol.77 (3), pp.339-356.
- Wade, Robert, 1985, “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is no Better at Development”, World Development, Vol.13 (4), pp. 467-497.
- World Bank (2000), Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washington, D.C.Refus de promotion.
Les références
Acemoglu, D.and J. Angrist, 2000, “How large are the social returns to education? Evidence from compulsory schooling laws”, in Bermanke, B. S. and Rogoff, K.(Eds), NBER Macroeconomic Annual, MIT Press.
Al-Marhubi, F., 2004, “The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-country Analysis”, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol.22 (3), pp.394-406.
Ali, A. M. and Hodan, S. I., 2003, “Determinant of Economic Corruption: A cross country comparison”, Cato Journal, Washington Vol. 22(3), pp. 449-469.
Azariadis, A. J., and A. Drazen, 1990, “Treshold Externalities in Economic Development” , Quaterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104 (2), pp.: 501-526.
Bardhan, Pranab, K., 1996, “The nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development”, Working Paper, no. c96-066, Dept. of Economics, University. of California at Berkeley, March.
Bardhan, Pranab,K., 1997, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.35 (3), pp.1320-1346.
Barro, R.J. (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross - section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106 (2), pp.407-443.
Barro, R.J., 1997, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical Study, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Barro, R.J., and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1995, Economic Growth, McGraw Hill, New York, NY
Beck, P. J. and Maher, M. W., 1986, “A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in thin Becker, G., 1993, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special References, Chicago University Press. Markets,” Economic Letters, Vol.20 (1), pp 1-5.
Besley, T. and Mc Laren, J., 1993,“Axes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives”, Economic Journal, Vol.103(416), pp. 119-141.
Campos, J.E., Lien, D. and Pradhan, S., 1999, “The impact of corruption on investment: Predictability matters” World Development, Vol. 27 (6), pp.1059-1067.
Farida, M. and Ahmadi-Esfahani, F., 2008, “Corruption and Economic Growth in Lebanon”, Paper presented at the Australian Agricultural and Resources Economics Society Conference series, no 6043, Canberra, Australia, Feb. 5-8.
Huntington, S.P., 1968, Political Ordering Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kraster,LandGaner,G.,2004,“TheMissingIncentiveCorruption:Anti-corruption and Re-election” in Kornai, J and Rose-Akerman, R. (Eds), Building a Trust Worthy State in Post-socialist Transition, New York, Palgrave.
Krueger, Anne, O., 1974, “The political Economy of the rent-seeking Society”, American Economic Review, Vol. 64 (3).
Leff, Nathaniel H., 1964, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption”, The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8 (3), pp. 8-14.
Lui, Francis T., 1985, “An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery”, Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 93 (4), pp. 760-781.
Lucas, R.E., 1988, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22 (1), pp. 3-42.
Mauro, P, 1995, “Corruption and Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 (3), pp 681-712.
Mauro, P., 1996 “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-country Analysis”, in Kimberly A.E.(Ed), Corruption and the Global Economy, the Institute for international economics, Washington.
Mankiw, G., Romer, D. and Weil, D., 1992, “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 1107 (2), pp. 407-437.
Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1993, “Why is Rent-seeking so Costly to Growth?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 83 (2), pp.409-414.
Nobuo, A., Yusaku, H. and Masayo, S., 2005, “ Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-level Cross-section Data for the United States”, CIRJE Disscussion Papers, June 9.
Ouattara, W., 2007, “Dépenses publiques, corruption et croissance dans les pays de l’Union Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA): une analyse de la causalité au sens de Granger », Revue Africaine de l’Intégration, Vol. 1 (1), pp.139-160.
Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R., 2004, “Corruption’s effect on Growth and its transmission channels”,.KYKLOS, Vol.57 (3), pp.429-456.
Podobnik, B., Shao, J, Njavro, D., Ivanov, P. Ch. And Stanley, H. E., “ Influence of corruption on Economic Growth Rate and Foreign Investment”, The European Physical Journal B., Vol. 63 , pp. 547-550.
Psacharopoulos G., 1994, “Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update”. World Development, Vol.22 (9), pp. 1325-1345.
Roberg, R., 2004, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Romer, P.M., 1990, “Endogenous Technical Change”, Journal of political Economy, Vol. 98 (5), pp. 71-102.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1996, “When is Corruption Harmful?”, Background paper for the 1997 World Development Report, the World Bank, Washington. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., 1993, “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.108 (3) pp 599-617.
Stockey, N.L., 1991, “Human Capital, Product Quality and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106 (2), pp. 587-616.
Svenson, J., 2005, “Eigth Questions about Corruption”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.19 (3), pp. 19-42.
Tanzi V., 1998, “Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures”. IMF Staff Papers, Vol..45 (3).
Tanzi V. and Davoodi, H. R., 1997, “Corruption, Public Investment and Growth” IMF Working Papers, no. 97/139.
Van Rijckeghen, .C. and Weber, B., 2201, “Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption and by How Much?”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.65, pp. 307-331.
Ventelon, B., 2001, “Equilibres et stabilité de la corruption dans un modèle de croissance: l’effet de la rémunération des politiciens”, L’actualité économique, Vol.77 (3), pp.339-356.
Wade, Robert, 1985, “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is no Better at Development”, World Development, Vol.13 (4), pp. 467-497.
World Bank (2000), Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washington, D.C.Refus de promotion.